United States v. Specialist NATHANIEL MARTIN JR. ( 2020 )

UNITED STATES ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS
Before
ALDYKIEWICZ, SALUSSOLIA, and FLEMING
Appellate Military Judges
UNITED STATES, Appellee
v.
Specialist NATHANIEL MARTIN JR.
United States Army, Appellant
ARMY 20180495
Headquarters, 7th Infantry Division
Lanny J. Acosta, Jr. and Jennifer B. Green, Military Judges
Colonel Russell N. Parson, Staff Judge Advocate
For Appellant: Lieutenant Colonel Tiffany D. Pond, JA; Major Jack D. Einhorn, JA;
Captain Steven J. Dray, JA (on brief).
For Appellee: Colonel Steven P. Haight, JA; Lieutenant Colonel Wayne H.
Williams, JA; Major Dustin B. Myrie, JA; Major Anne Savin, JA (on brief).
29 April 2020
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SUMMARY DISPOSITION
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This opinion is issued as an unpublished opinion and, as such, does not serve as precedent.
Per Curiam:
Appellant stole over $36,000 from the Army, in the form of housing and
family separation allowances. ∗ To get this money, appellant repeatedly told the
Army that he was married, when, in reality, he was divorced.
∗A panel with enlisted representation sitting as a special court-martial convicted
appellant, contrary to his pleas, of three specifications of larceny of military
property of a value greater than $500, and six specifications of false official
statement, in violation of Articles 121 and 107, 10 U.S.C. §§ 921, 907, Uniform
Code of Military Justice [UCMJ] (2016). The convening authority approved the
adjudged sentence of reduction to the grade of E-1, confinement for 45 days, and a
bad-conduct discharge.
MARTIN—ARMY 20180495
We review appellant’s case under Article 66, UCMJ. Appellant contends the
government’s evidence was factually insufficient to support his larceny convictions,
and his six separate convictions of false official statement represent an unreasonable
multiplication of charges (UMC). We affirm but write briefly to explain that
appellant’s UMC claim misapprehends the purpose and intent of Article 107.
Appellant’s UMC claim never gets off the ground. Appellant contends that
because the “criminality behind” his Article 107 convictions was not the statements
themselves, but rather the fact that appellant made the statements “in order to steal
money from the government,” his separate Article 107 convictions represented an
unreasonable multiplication of charges.
This argument demonstrates a basic misunderstanding of Article 107. The
“criminality behind” appellant’s false official statements was the falsehood of those
statements. An Article 107 conviction does not depend on the false statement
having been made to effectuate an underlying crime; each false official statement is
a free-standing crime in-and-of itself, notwithstanding the speaker’s underlying
motivation. See, e.g., United States v. Solis, 46 M.J. 31, 33-34 (C.A.A.F. 1997); see
also United States v. Spicer, 71 M.J. 470, 474 (C.A.A.F. 2013) (our superior court
explaining the purpose of Article 107 is to “protect the authorized functions of the
military from the perversion which might result from the deceptive practices”
embodied by false statements).
The harm of false official statements is magnified in the military, where
candor and accuracy in reporting is critical. As our superior court observed,
Military missions, whether in combat, in peacetime
operations, or in training, are characterized by stress,
tension, danger, and the need for rapid decisions based
upon accurate information. The habits and traits of
character developed in peace can make the difference
between success or failure in war. Members of the armed
forces are expected to give truthful answers to official
inquiries, whether in garrison or in the field, in peace or in
war. When they fail to meet that standard, Article 107 is
available to ensure compliance.
Solis, 46 M.J. at 34.
Thus, appellant’s separate convictions for false statements made in order to
steal money from the Army do not represent an unreasonable multiplication of
charges.
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