Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy ( 2002 )

Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to
Seattle Hebrew Academy
The Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency Assistance Act of 1974 and its implementing regulations
permit the Federal Emergency Management Agency to provide federal disaster assistance for the
reconstruction of Seattle Hebrew Academy, a private religious school that was damaged in an
earthquake in 2001.
The Establishment Clause of the First Amendment does not pose a barrier to the Academy’s receipt of
such aid.
September 25, 2002
MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE GENERAL COUNSEL
FEDERAL EMERGENCY MANAGEMENT AGENCY
You asked us to analyze whether the Federal Emergency Management Agency
(“FEMA”) may, consistent with the Stafford Disaster Relief and Emergency
Assistance Act of 1974 (“the Act”), 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5121-5206 (1995 & West
Supp. 2002), the Act’s implementing regulations, and the Establishment Clause of
the First Amendment, provide disaster assistance to the Seattle Hebrew Academy
(“the Academy”). The Academy, like many other Seattle institutions, sustained
severe damage as a result of the Nisqually Earthquake on February 28, 2001. For
the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the Act and its implementing
regulations permit FEMA to provide a disaster assistance grant to the Academy,
and that the Establishment Clause does not pose a barrier to the Academy’s receipt
of such aid.
I.
The Academy, a private nonprofit educational facility for Jewish students,
applied to FEMA for disaster assistance pursuant to section 406 of the Act, 42
U.S.C.A. § 5172(a)(1)(B). The Act authorizes the President to “make contribu-
tions . . . to a person that owns or operates a private nonprofit facility damaged or
destroyed by a major disaster for the repair, restoration, reconstruction, or
replacement of the facility and for associated expenses incurred by the person.” Id.(emphasis added). In 1979, the President transferred to FEMA this and other
disaster relief functions that previously had been delegated or assigned to other
Federal agencies. See Exec. Order No. 12148, § 1-102, 3 C.F.R. 412, 413 (1980).
On March 28, 2001, a FEMA Public Assistance Officer denied the Academy’s
application for assistance. The Academy appealed to the FEMA Region X
Regional Director. The Region X Acting Regional Director denied the appeal on
October 19, 2001, on the ground that the Academy’s building was not a “private
nonprofit facility” for purposes of section 406(a)(1)(B) because it was not open to
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Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
“the general public.” See Letter for Donna J. Voss, Deputy State Coordinating
Officer, Public Assistance, Emergency Management Division, State of Washing-
ton Military Department, from Tamara D. Doherty, Acting Regional Director,
Region X, FEMA, at 1 (Oct. 19, 2001) (“Doherty Letter”). In so ruling, the Acting
Regional Director determined that a religiously affiliated educational facility is not
open to “the general public” if it only admits students of a particular faith. Id.
The Academy has appealed the Acting Regional Director’s decision. See Letter
for Donna Voss, Washington State Public Assistance Officer, Washington State
Disaster Field Office, from Ulrike I. Boehm, Attorney for SHA, Latham &
Watkins, Re: Seattle Hebrew Academy (Dec. 21, 2001) (“Boehm Letter”). It is our
understanding that the Academy’s appeal is presently being considered by the
FEMA Associate Director for Response and Recovery. See 44 C.F.R.
§ 206.206(b)(2) (2001). You asked for our views on whether FEMA is required by
statute or regulation to apply a “general public” requirement to all eligible private
nonprofit facilities or otherwise to disqualify a religiously sponsored educational
facility on the ground that it only admits students of a particular faith. If the Act
and its implementing regulations do not require that FEMA deny funding to the
Academy, you also asked for our views on whether such funding would violate the
Establishment Clause of the First Amendment.
II.
A.
On its face, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5172(a)(1)(B) requires the President to find only that
a potential disaster relief recipient “owns or operates a private nonprofit facility”
damaged or destroyed in a major disaster. The Acting Regional Director’s denial
of the Academy’s application added another requirement—that the facility be open
to “the general public.” In so ruling, she relied upon the FEMA regulation defining
“private nonprofit facility,” which provides in relevant part:
Private nonprofit facility means any private nonprofit educational,
utility, emergency, medical, or custodial care facility, including a
facility for the aged or disabled, and other facility providing essential
governmental type services to the general public, and such facilities
on Indian reservations.
44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) (2001) (second emphasis added). The Acting Regional
Director construed this regulation to mean that, in order to qualify for relief under
section 406(a)(1)(B) of the Act, any and all private nonprofit facilities—including
educational facilities—must provide essential governmental type services to “the
general public,” and that a religiously affiliated educational facility does not
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satisfy this requirement if it limits admission to students of a particular religious
faith. See Doherty Letter. 1
We believe that the Acting Regional Director’s reading of 44 C.F.R.
§ 206.221(e) is not the better interpretation of that regulation. Under the most
natural reading of section 206.221(e), the phrase “providing essential governmen-
tal type services to the general public” modifies only the “other facilit[ies]”
referenced in the clause in which that phrase appears; the requirement to be open
to the general public does not apply to the types of facilities—namely, “education-
al, utility, emergency, medical, or custodial care facilit[ies], including a facility for
the aged or disabled”—enumerated prior to the regulation’s “general public”
clause. These five types of facilities, and “facilities on Indian reservations,” are
both set off in independent clauses. 2 Thus, the text of the regulation does not
support imposition of a “general public” requirement upon any of these facilities. 3
FEMA has defined four of the types of facilities identified in the statute in a
manner that does not impose a “general public” requirement. Most important for
present purposes, FEMA’s definition of “[e]ducational facilities” does not impose
such a requirement. Id. § 206.221(e)(1). See also id. § 206.221(e)(2), (5), (6)
(defining “[u]tility,” “[m]edical facility,” and “[c]ustodial care facility” in a
manner that does not impose a “general public” requirement upon such facilities). 4
1
The record is somewhat unclear as to whether the Academy strictly limits admission to Jewish
students. At the time of the earthquake, the Academy’s by-laws prohibited admission of non-Jewish
students, although the Academy maintains that it no longer abides by this by-law. See Doherty Letter
at 1. It is undisputed that the Academy grants admission only to otherwise eligible non-Jewish students
who agree to “seriously study[] and practic[e] Jewish law and culture in their home[s], under the
supervision and instruction of a rabbi.” Boehm Letter at 9. Our reasoning, however, does not depend
upon the precise nature of the Academy’s admission requirements.
2
As explained below, although section 206.221(e) was crafted to implement a 1988 statutory
definition that references the provision of services “to the general public” (42 U.S.C.A. § 5122(9)), that
provision cannot fairly be read to require that educational facilities provide services “to the general
public.” We begin with the regulatory language, however, because it differs slightly from the statutory
language: in promulgating its definition of “private nonprofit facility,” FEMA (1) replaced the statutory
phrase “other private nonprofit facilities which provide” with the phrase “and other facility providing,”
and (2) added the term “such” before “facilities on Indian reservations.” Collectively, these changes
make it slightly more plausible to conclude that all of the referenced facilities are subject to the
“general public” requirement. As explained in the text, however, we think it is most reasonable to read
the three clauses of section 206.221(e)—the first, which lists five types of covered facilities; the
second, which pertains to facilities providing “essential governmental type services”; and the third,
which pertains to “facilities on Indian reservations”—as separate and independent clauses, of which
only the second contains a “general public” requirement.
3
Notably, the Acting Regional Director replaced the middle and final clauses of 44 C.F.R.
§ 206.221(e) with ellipses, so as to make the provision appear to state: “Private nonprofit facility means
any nonprofit educational . . . facility providing essential governmental type services to the general
public . . . .” Doherty Letter at 1. As explained in the text, this quotation is relevant for what it omits.
4
For some reason section 206.221(e) contains no definition of “rehabilitational” facilities, although
that term appears, along with the other types of facilities enumerated in the first clause of the rule, in 42
U.S.C.A. § 5122(9).
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Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
By contrast, FEMA’s definition of “[o]ther essential governmental service
facility” does contain a “general public” requirement. Id. § 206.221(e)(7). 5 Thus, if
the portion of section 206.221(e) relied upon by the Acting Regional Director is
simply interpreted in a manner consistent with FEMA’s own regulatory definition
of “educational facilities,” there is no basis for imposing a “general public”
requirement upon the Academy. As explained above, however, we do not believe
that the text of section 206.221(e) supports imposition of a “general public”
requirement upon any of the facilities enumerated in the first clause of that
regulation.
It is evident that FEMA promulgated section 206.221(e) in order to implement
a 1988 statutory definition that references the provision of services “to the general
public.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 5122(9). 6 It thus appears that the Acting Regional Director
may have adopted her construction of section 206.221(e) on the assumption that it
is the best, or only, interpretation of the statutory definition of “private nonprofit
facility.” As we explain below, 42 U.S.C.A. § 5122(9) cannot fairly be interpreted
in that manner. Furthermore, once it is understood that 42 U.S.C.A. § 5122(9) does
not support, let alone compel, a regulation of such breadth, the regulatory interpre-
tation adopted by the Acting Regional Director becomes far less tenable.
B.
Second, and more importantly, even if 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) could reasonably
be construed to require the denial of FEMA assistance to the Academy, such a
result would be inconsistent with the terms of the statutory provision that sec-
tion 206.221(e) implements (42 U.S.C.A. § 5122(9)), and is not authorized by the
5
Although FEMA’s regulatory definitions do impose a “general public” requirement on
“[i]rrigation facilit[ies]” and “[e]mergency facilit[ies],” 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e)(3)-(4), we are aware of
(and FEMA has provided) no reason, based in the statute or policy, why these facilities ought to be
treated differently from the other types of facilities enumerated in the first clause of section 206.221(e).
We are aware that in 2000, Congress amended the statutory definition to add the word “irrigation” to
the definition of private nonprofit facilities, and the legislative history indicates that “[i]rrigation
facilities should be eligible for Federal assistance to the extent that they provide water for essential
services of a governmental nature to the general public.” 146 Cong. Rec. 20,583 (2000) (statement of
Rep. Fowler) (emphasis added). Representative Fowler, however, appears to have assumed (mistaken-
ly) that the statute requires that all eligible private nonprofit facilities provide services to the general
public, and that likewise appears to be the only explanation for the express references to the “general
public” in FEMA’s definitions of “emergency” and “irrigation” facilities. As explained in the text
below, the statute itself—even as amended in 2000—provides no warrant for treating irrigation or
emergency facilities any differently than educational facilities.
6
Prior to 1989-90, when FEMA promulgated the regulatory definition of “private nonprofit facili-
ty” now found in section 206.221(e), see 54 Fed. Reg. 11,610 (1989) (interim rule with request for
comments); 55 Fed. Reg. 2297 (1990) (final rule), FEMA’s regulatory definition of that term did not
make any reference to “the general public.” Congress’s 1988 statutory amendment, however, did
include such a reference. See infra p. 119. Thus, it is fair to presume that FEMA promulgated the new
definition in order to implement the definition contained in the 1988 Act.
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Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
statutory provision that the Acting Regional Director invoked (42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5151(a)). Upon careful reading, neither of these provisions requires that eligible
private nonprofit facilities provide services to “the general public,” or that
religious schools that limit admission to students of a particular faith be deemed
ineligible for disaster relief.
In 1988, in Public Law No. 100-707, 102 Stat. 4689, Congress amended the
Disaster Mitigation Act of 1974 to add for the first time a statutory definition of
“private nonprofit facility.” See 102 Stat. at 4690. Section 103(f) of the 1988 Act,
as amended and codified, presently provides:
“Private nonprofit facility” means private nonprofit educational, util-
ity, irrigation, emergency, medical, rehabilitational, and temporary or
permanent custodial care facilities (including those for the aged and
disabled), other private nonprofit facilities which provide essential
services of a governmental nature to the general public, and facilities
on Indian reservations as defined by the President.
42 U.S.C.A. § 5122(9). In a manner similar to 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) (see supra
note 2), the provision defines three categories of private nonprofit facilities: seven
types of enumerated facilities; other facilities that provide “essential services of a
governmental nature to the general public”; and facilities on Indian reservations.
The language and structure of this provision indicate that the phrase “which
provide essential services of a governmental nature to the general public” modifies
only the second category of eligible facilities—“other private nonprofit facili-
ties”—which is identified in the same, middle clause as the “general public”
requirement. The phrase does not modify either the first category of enumerated
eligible facilities (“private nonprofit educational, utility, irrigation, emergency,
medical, rehabilitational, and temporary or permanent custodial care facilities
(including those for the aged and disabled)”) or the third category of eligible
facilities (“facilities on Indian reservations as defined by the President”), both of
which are set off in separate, independent clauses. Indeed, the range of institutions
found in the first phrase of section 5122(9) itself suggests that the “general public”
requirement does not extend to those facilities: in particular, one would not
ordinarily think of an “irrigation facility” as being open to the general public, and
the text provides no basis for treating irrigation facilities any differently than the
other enumerated facilities in this regard. See supra note 5.
The statutory history of this definition confirms this interpretation. Private
educational institutions first became eligible for disaster assistance in 1972, when
Congress gave the President authority to make grants to private nonprofit schools
that suffered damage from Hurricane Agnes. Act of Aug. 16, 1972, Pub. L. No.
92-385, § 4, 86 Stat. 554, 556-57. That statute defined which “educational
institution[s]” were eligible and further imposed certain conditions on the grants
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Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
made to such institutions. Id. § 4(b)-(d), 86 Stat. at 556-57. Nowhere, however, did
Congress impose any requirement that eligible educational facilities provide
services “to the general public.”
Congress amended the governing statute in the Disaster Relief Act of 1974
(now known as the Stafford Act), Pub. L. No. 93-288, 88 Stat. 143, which gave the
President still broader authority to make grants for the repair or replacement of
certain private facilities damaged in major disasters. See id. § 402(b), 88 Stat. at
153 (authorizing the President to make grants “to help repair, restore, reconstruct,
or replace private nonprofit educational, utility, emergency, medical, and custodial
care facilities, including those for the aged or disabled, and facilities on Indian
reservations as defined by the President, which were damaged or destroyed by a
major disaster”). Here again, however, the statute did not include any reference to
facilities providing services to “the general public.” Nor, as far as we are aware,
did the legislative history suggest a “general public” limitation. See, e.g., H.R.
Rep. No. 93-1037, at 37 (1974) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3091, 3102. Not surprisingly, therefore, the regulations implementing the 1974
Act—which contained extensive, detailed limitations on eligibility for funding—
thereafter defined “[p]rivate non-profit organization,” “[e]ducational [i]nstitution,”
“[p]rivate non-profit facility,” and “[e]ducation[al] facilities,” all without reference
to any “general public” requirement. See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 2205.54(a)(1)-(3), (e),
(f) (1976) (HUD regulations); 44 C.F.R. § 205.54(a)(1)-(3), (e), (f) (1979) (FEMA
regulations adopting former HUD regulations); 44 C.F.R. §§ 205.2(15), 205.71(a),
(d), (e), 205.72(b) (1980-1988) (revised FEMA regulations). It is therefore clear
that, prior to the 1988 statutory amendment, neither the statute nor its implement-
ing regulations required educational facilities to provide services to the general
public. 7
It was not until the 1988 amendment discussed above that the governing Act
contained any reference to the “general public” whatsoever, and nothing in the
language of that amendment or its legislative history suggests that Congress
intended to impose a new “general public” requirement for eligibility of those
facilities of nonprofit organizations that already were eligible for relief prior to
the amendment. As the statute’s text confirms, Congress did intend that facilities
within the newly codified “catch-all” category of “other private nonprofit facilities
which provide essential services of a governmental nature” would be required to
provide services “to the general public.” But the only change that Congress made
7
From the time of their initial promulgation, the pre-1988 regulations defined “[e]mergency
facilit[ies]” to mean “those buildings, structures, or systems used to provide emergency services, such
as fire protection, ambulance, or rescue, to the general public.” See, e.g., 24 C.F.R. § 2205.54(a)(3)(iii)
(1976); 44 C.F.R. § 205.71(d)(3) (1980) (emphasis added). When it first promulgated this regulation,
HUD did not explain why it included the “general public” qualifier for emergency facilities. See 39
Fed. Reg. 28,212, 28,221 (1974). Notably, however, that same qualifier was not included in any of the
other definitions prior to the 1988 amendment, including the definition of “education facilities.”
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Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
concerning the eligibility of private nonprofit organizations (other than codifying
the definition itself) was to establish this new category of eligible facilities—a
change that, in the words of the House Committee Report, “broadened” the
“definition” of eligible private nonprofit facilities to “include facilities which
provide to the general public services of a governmental nature,” such as “muse-
ums, zoos, community centers, libraries, homeless shelters, senior citizen centers,
rehabilitation facilities, and shelter workshops.” H.R. Rep. No. 100-517, at 4
(1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6085, 6088; see also 134 Cong. Rec. 4186
(1988) (Congressional Budget Office Cost Estimate, March 16, 1988, included in
statement of Rep. Nowak). In sum, there is no evidence that Congress intended to
place new restrictions on those facilities that already were eligible for assistance
prior to 1988.
For whatever reason, the Acting Regional Director did not invoke sec-
tion 5122(9) as authority for her decision, notwithstanding the fact that it contains
the phrase “general public.” Instead, the only statute she cited was 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 5151(a), which provides:
The President shall issue, and may alter and amend, such regulations
as may be necessary for the guidance of personnel carrying out Fed-
eral assistance functions at the site of a major disaster or emergency.
Such regulations shall include provisions for insuring that the distri-
bution of supplies, the processing of applications, and other relief
and assistance activities shall be accomplished in an equitable and
impartial manner, without discrimination on the grounds of race,
color, religion, nationality, sex, age, or economic status.
Doherty Letter at 1. For at least two reasons, however, this statutory provision
cannot serve as authority either for a rule that all eligible nonprofit facilities must
provide services “to the general public,” or, more specifically, for a rule making
ineligible for aid all private nonprofit facilities that limit admission on the basis of
religion.
First, section 5151(a) says nothing about requiring that private recipients of aid
provide services “to the general public.” Second, and more fundamentally,
section 5151(a) is addressed not to discrimination by the recipients of FEMA aid,
but to discrimination—including religious discrimination—by those engaged in
the provision of FEMA aid. The regulations that the President is required to issue
are “for the guidance of personnel carrying out Federal assistance functions at the
site of a major disaster or emergency,” and must insure “that the distribution of
supplies, the processing of applications, and other relief and assistance activities
shall be accomplished in an equitable and impartial manner.” (Emphasis added.)
Accordingly, we do not think that section 5151(a) is authority for the broad
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“general public” requirement that the Acting Regional Director would impose on
all eligible private nonprofit facilities. 8
In sum, we have found no statutory provision that requires either that all eligi-
ble private nonprofit facilities “provide services to the general public,” 9 or that
8
FEMA’s definition of eligible private nonprofit “[e]ducational facilities” further provides that
such facilities “[may] not include buildings, structures and related items used primarily for religious
purposes or instruction.” 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e)(1). We note that there is no longer any basis for this
requirement in the text of the Act (the Act formerly provided that educational institutions were
ineligible if used primarily for religious purpose, see Pub. L. No. 92-385, § 4(c)(4), 86 Stat. at 557)—
and, in light of current doctrine (see infra Part III), there is some question whether it is consistent with
the First Amendment to the Constitution—but in any event the Acting Regional Director specifically
found that the religious components of the Academy’s class requirements amount to less than 50% of
the curriculum, and thus that the Academy’s building is not used “primarily for religious purposes or
instruction.” See Letter for Tamara Doherty, Acting Regional Director, Region X, FEMA, from Donna
J. Voss, Deputy State Coordinating Officer, Public Assistance, State of Washington, at 1 (July 21,
2001); Staff Analysis, Prepared by Bruce Baardson, Public Assistance Section Supervisor, and Donna
Voss, Deputy State Coordinating Officer, Public Assistance, State of Washington, Re: Seattle Hebrew
Academy, First Appeal at 1, 2 (July 24, 2001) (“Staff Analysis”).
9
We also note that, even if it were proper to interpret 44 C.F.R. § 206.221(e) to require that all
eligible facilities (including educational facilities) applying for assistance under the Act be open “to the
general public,” it is not entirely clear, in light of FEMA policy, why a school should be deemed to fail
this requirement because it uses religious criteria as a basis for admission. In its Private Nonprofit
Facility Eligibility Policy, FEMA states that an organization fails its “general public” requirement if
“[m]embership” therein “excludes individuals of certain discrete groups.” Policy No. 9521.3, ¶ 7.E.1.e
(Apr. 25, 2000). On the other hand, an organization will “likely” satisfy the test if, inter alia, “[u]se
restrictions, if any, are clearly related to the nature of the facility.” Id. ¶ 7.E.2.d. The Policy goes on to
provide examples of facilities limited to senior citizens, children’s day care, and care for abused
spouses, all of which presumptively satisfy the “general public” requirement. Id. ¶ 7.B.4.
In light of these examples, it appears that FEMA does not construe the “general public” require-
ment to require that facilities be open to all persons. Senior citizens’ homes serve only elderly people,
excluding the young and middle-aged; child care facilities serve only young people, excluding adults;
facilities for abused spouses serve only abused married people, excluding those who are unmarried (and
presumably those who are abused by people other than their spouses). It cannot be denied that these
facilities “exclude[] individuals of certain discrete groups.” Yet FEMA permits these facilities to
receive aid notwithstanding the fact that they are not open to everyone, because their admission
practices are “clearly related to the nature of the facility,” which is to serve people with specific needs
or backgrounds.
Insofar as the same can be said of a school that restricts admission to students of a particular faith—
such restrictions on admission “are clearly related to the nature of the facility,” which, in part, is to
provide religious education—it is not evident why the Academy should be viewed as not providing
services “to the general public” simply because it applies religious criteria in its admission practices
and thus is not open to everyone. To the extent that the Acting Regional Director may have rested on
the policy judgment that religious discrimination is more invidious than other types of discrimination,
we note that the statute contains no such judgment and that many federal statutes permit religious
organizations to preserve their autonomy by limiting their associations to co-religionists. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 2000e-1 (2000) (Title VII provision permitting religious nonprofit organizations to hire on a
religious basis); id. § 2000d (Title VI provision prohibiting recipients of federal funding from
discriminating on the basis of “race, color, or national origin,” but not religion); 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a)
(2000) (Title IX provision prohibiting federally funded educational institutions from discriminating on
the basis of sex, but not religion).
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schools that limit admission to students of a particular faith be deemed ineligible
for disaster relief.10
III.
You also asked us to analyze whether the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment would require another result. Although there is no precedent that
directly controls this specific issue, we conclude that the Establishment Clause
does not pose a barrier to FEMA’s provision of a disaster assistance grant to the
Academy. The aid that is authorized by federal law is made available on the basis
of neutral criteria to an unusually broad class of beneficiaries defined without
reference to religion and including not only educational institutions but a host of
other public and private institutions as well. Moreover, the program’s design is not
characterized by the sort of administrative discretion that can readily be used to
favor religion, and the evidence demonstrates that FEMA has exercised its
10
Under 42 U.S.C.A. § 5151(b), which the Acting Regional Director did not cite, the President has
authority to promulgate “regulations relating to nondiscrimination” that apply to institutions that
receive FEMA disaster assistance. See id. (“As a condition of . . . receiving assistance under this
chapter, . . . organizations shall be required to comply with regulations relating to nondiscrimination
promulgated by the President . . . .”). The President, however, has not promulgated regulations
prohibiting recipients of FEMA disaster assistance from discriminating on the basis of religion. See 44
C.F.R. § 7.920 (2001) (prohibiting recipients of assistance from discriminating on the basis of age, but
not religion). Nor are we aware of any other provision of federal law that would impose such a
requirement upon the Academy. See 20 U.S.C.A. § 1681(a) (2000) (Title IX) (prohibiting educational
institutions from discriminating on the basis of sex, but not religion); 44 C.F.R. pt. 19 (2001)
(implementing Title IX for purposes of FEMA assistance); 42 U.S.C.A. § 2000d (prohibiting recipients
of federal funding from discriminating on the basis of “race, color, or national origin”); 44 C.F.R. § 7.3(2001) (prohibiting recipients of FEMA assistance under various statutes from discriminating on the
basis of “race, color, or national origin”); see also Staff Analysis at 2 (finding that the Academy
complies with Title VI).
FEMA Director’s Policy 2-01 provides that “[i]t is the policy of [FEMA] to ensure that the Civil
Rights of all persons receiving services or benefits from agency programs and activities are protected”
and that “[n]o person shall, on the grounds of . . . religion . . . be denied the benefits of, be deprived of
participation in, or be discriminated against in any program or activity conducted by or receiving
financial assistance from FEMA.” Id., Re: Civil Rights Program, ¶ 1 (July 17, 2001). See also id. ¶ 4(explaining that these requirements apply to “educational institutions” that receive FEMA assistance).
We note, however, that this policy has not been adopted by regulation, and thus cannot be said to
implement 42 U.S.C.A. § 5151(b). Nor are we aware of any other statutory authority that would
authorize FEMA to impose a “general public” or religious nondiscrimination requirement on the
Academy. Sections 5164 and 5201(a)(1) of title 42 (2000) authorize the President to “prescribe such
rules and regulations as may be necessary and proper to carry out any of the provisions of this chapter,”
but we are doubtful that those provisions would permit FEMA to impose a “general public” require-
ment where Congress, in the statutory provision that speaks directly to the question, has imposed such a
requirement on other institutions but not on educational institutions such as the Academy. See 42
U.S.C.A. § 5122(9). Similarly, there is some question whether these provisions would authorize FEMA
to adopt a “policy” imposing a religious nondiscrimination requirement upon participating institutions
where another provision of the same statute (42 U.S.C.A. § 5151(b)) mandates that such requirements
be imposed pursuant to “regulations.”
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Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
discretion in a neutral manner. Thus, we believe that provision of disaster assis-
tance to the Academy cannot be materially distinguished from aid programs that
are constitutional under longstanding Supreme Court precedent establishing that
religious institutions are fully entitled to receive generally available government
benefits and services, such as fire and police protection.
The Supreme Court’s general framework for analyzing Establishment Clause
issues is familiar. A statute violates the Establishment Clause if it lacks a “secular
legislative purpose,” has a “primary effect” of advancing religion, or results in an
“excessive entanglement” between government and religion. See Lemon v.
Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971); see also Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203(1997) (reformulating the Lemon test by incorporating its “entanglement” prong
into its “effects” prong). Here, as in the vast majority of situations implicating the
Establishment Clause, the critical question is whether allowing the Academy to
receive direct disaster assistance would have the “primary effect” of advancing
religion.11 Accordingly, our analysis will focus on decisions that illuminate that
inquiry.
Ever since its first modern Establishment Clause decision in Everson v. Board
of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 17 (1947), the Supreme Court has indicated that
religious institutions are entitled to receive “general government services” made
available on the basis of neutral criteria. Everson held that the Establishment
Clause does not bar students attending religious schools from receiving generally
available school busing services provided by the government. In reaching its
decision, the Court explained that even if the evenhanded provision of busing
services increased the likelihood that some parents would send their children to
religious schools, the same could be said of other “general state law benefits” that
were even more clearly constitutional because they were equally available to all
citizens and far removed from the religious function of the school. Id. at 16. As
examples, the Court cited “such general government services as ordinary police
and fire protection, connections for sewage disposal, public highways and
sidewalks,” concluding:
11
It is clear that allowing a range of nonprofit organizations like the Academy to receive rehabilita-
tion grants serves the secular purpose of rehabilitating the community by helping to rebuild institutions
that perform quasi-public functions and are (by virtue of their nonprofit status) most in need of
assistance. See Pub. L. No. 92-385, § 4, 86 Stat. at 556-57 (explaining that disaster relief for private,
nonprofit educational facilities was appropriate because such institutions “have a secular educational
mission,” and because the public schools would have to bear the cost of educating the students
attending such private schools if the damaged institutions were not restored); see also 57 Fed. Reg.
18,441 (1992) (preamble to FEMA proposed rule explaining that the 1972 statute permitted grants to
private schools “because of the public function which they served”). Nor is there any basis for
concluding that allowing the Academy to receive aid would “excessively entangle” the Academy with
the state, as there is even less governmental monitoring of aid recipients here than in other cases in
which the Court has not questioned the provision of aid under Lemon’s entanglement prong. Cf., e.g.,
Agostini, 521 U.S. 203; Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
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Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
cutting off church schools from these services, so separate and so
indisputably marked off from the religious function, would make it
far more difficult for the schools to operate. But such is obviously
not the purpose of the First Amendment. That Amendment requires
the state to be a neutral in its relations with groups of religious
believers and non-believers; it does not require the state to be their
adversary. State power is no more to be used so as to handicap reli-
gions, than it is to favor them.
Id. at 17-18. See also id. at 16 (“[The state] cannot exclude individual Catholics,
Lutherans, Mohammedans, Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyteri-
ans, or the members of any other faith, because of their faith, or lack of it, from
receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation. . . . [W]e must be careful, in
protecting the citizens of New Jersey against state-established churches, to be sure
that we do not inadvertently prohibit New Jersey from extending its general state
law benefits to all its citizens without regard to their religious belief”).
We believe that a FEMA disaster assistance grant is analogous to the sort of aid
that qualifies as “general government services” approved by the Court in Everson.
Although such aid is not available to all citizens or buildings—and thus is not as
broadly available as, say, utility services—neither is it limited to educational
institutions or, for that matter, to just a few classes of buildings. As noted above,
the FEMA grants in question are made available not only to public and private
schools, but to “private nonprofit . . . utility, irrigation, emergency, medical,
rehabilitational, and temporary or permanent custodial care facilities (including
those for the aged and disabled), other private nonprofit facilities which provide
essential services of a governmental nature to the general public, and facilities on
Indian reservations as defined by the President.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 5122(9). Accord-
ingly, we think that the “circumference” of this program can fairly be said to
“‘encircle[] a class so broad that it can be fairly concluded that religious institu-
tions could be thought to fall within the natural perimeter.’” Texas Monthly, Inc. v.
Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 17 (1989) (plurality opinion) (quoting Walz v. Tax Comm’n,
397 U.S. 664, 696 (1970) (Harlan, J.)). As the Court stated in Widmar v. Vincent,
454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981), “[t]he provision of benefits to so broad a spectrum of
groups is an important index of secular effect.” Accord Texas Monthly, 489 U.S. at
14-15 (plurality opinion) (footnote omitted) (“[i]nsofar as [a] subsidy is conferred
upon a wide array of nonsectarian groups as well as religious organizations in
pursuit of some legitimate secular end, the fact that religious groups benefit
incidentally does not deprive the subsidy of the secular purpose and primary effect
mandated by the Establishment Clause”); Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1, 8 (1993) (“we have consistently held that government programs that
neutrally provide benefits to a broad class of citizens defined without reference to
religion are not readily subject to an Establishment Clause challenge”); Board of
124
Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
Educ. of Kiryas Joel v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 704 (1994) (“we have frequently
relied explicitly on the general availability of any benefit provided religious
groups or individuals in turning aside Establishment Clause challenges”).
In Walz v. Tax Commission, 397 U.S. 664, 673 (1970), for example, the Court
rejected an Establishment Clause challenge to a property tax exemption made
available not only to churches, but to several other classes of nonprofit institutions,
such as “hospitals, libraries, playgrounds, scientific, professional, historical, and
patriotic groups.” See also id. at 667 n.1. In upholding the program, the Court
relied in part upon the breadth of the tax exemption: the exemption did “not
single[] out one particular church or religious group or even churches as such,” but
rather was available to “a broad class of property owned by nonprofit, quasi-public
corporations.” Id. at 673. As the Court stated in reference to Everson, if “buses can
be provided to carry and policemen to protect church school pupils, we fail to see
how a broader range of police and fire protection given equally to all churches,
along with nonprofit hospitals, art galleries, and libraries receiving the same tax
exemption, is different for purposes of the Religion Clauses.” Id. at 671. Thus, just
as a broad category of beneficiary institutions was sufficient to sustain the
inclusion of religious institutions in the tax benefit in Walz, we believe the breadth
of the eligibility categories in the FEMA program is sufficient to sustain the
provision of FEMA aid to the Academy. Put another way, we do not think that
providing FEMA grants to religious institutions that qualify for disaster relief on
the basis of wholly neutral criteria—a wide array of nonprofit organizations may
receive aid for buildings that have suffered structural damage from a natural
disaster—lacks a secular purpose or effect. See generally Lemon, 403 U.S. at
612-13; Agostini, 521 U.S. at 223-30.
We cannot say, however, that there are no arguments to the contrary. Most
important, there is an argument that providing FEMA disaster relief to repair a
school used for religious instruction would run afoul of Supreme Court precedent
restricting the use of “direct” aid that can be put to specifically religious uses. In
particular, one might argue that insofar as the grant used to rebuild the Academy’s
building would ultimately support the building’s use for secular and religious
purposes—i.e., both secular and religious teaching—such aid is unlawful under
Supreme Court decisions from the 1970s holding that public construction grants
for educational institutions may not be applied toward buildings used for religious
purposes. See Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) (federal construction
grants for college and university facilities must be restricted indefinitely to use for
secular purposes); Committee for Pub. Educ. v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973)
(invalidating the provision of state maintenance and repair grants to religious
schools on the basis that such aid could not be restricted to secular purposes); see
also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734, 744 (1973) (sustaining state financing of
construction for religious college under program that barred financing of “build-
ings or facilities used for religious purposes”).
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Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
In Tilton, for example, the Court sustained the provision of federal construction
grants to religious colleges insofar as the program at issue barred aid for “‘any
facility used or to be used for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious
worship,’” but invalidated such grants insofar as the program permitted funding
the construction of buildings that might someday be used for religious activities.
See 403 U.S. at 675, 683 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted) (concluding that a
20-year limitation on the statutory prohibition on use of the buildings for religious
activities violated the Establishment Clause, because “[i]f, at the end of 20 years,
the building is, for example, converted into a chapel or otherwise used to promote
religious interests, the original federal grant will in part have the effect of advanc-
ing religion”).12 Similarly, in Nyquist the Court invalidated state maintenance and
repair grants for nonpublic elementary and secondary schools because it was not
possible to “restrict payments to those expenditures related to the upkeep of
facilities used exclusively for secular purposes.” 413 U.S. at 774. These portions
of the holdings of these decisions, so far as they go, have not been specifically
overruled, even where government aid is distributed to both religious and nonreli-
gious schools on the basis of neutral criteria.13
12
This portion of the holding in Tilton was unanimous. See also id. at 692 (Douglas, J., dissenting
in part, joined by Black and Marshall, JJ.); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 659-61 (separate opinion of Brennan, J.,
concurring in judgment in part in Tilton); id. at 665 & n.1 (White, J., concurring in judgment in Tilton)
(“accept[ing] the Court’s invalidation of the provision in the federal legislation whereby the restriction
on the use of buildings constructed with federal funds terminates after 20 years”).
13
See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (“Although ‘[o]ur cases
have permitted some government funding of secular functions performed by sectarian organizations,’
our decisions ‘provide no precedent for the use of public funds to finance religious activities’” (citation
omitted)); see also id. (where government has given aid directly to a religious institution, “diversion of
secular government aid to religious indoctrination” is “constitutionally impermissible”); id. at 865 (the
principle that “‘any use of public funds to promote religious doctrines violates the Establishment
Clause,’ . . . of course remains good law” (citation omitted)); id. at 856-57 (discussing Tilton); id. at
857 (if plaintiffs were to prove “that the aid in question actually is, or has been, used for religious
purposes,” they would “establish a First Amendment violation”); id. at 843-44 (emphasizing that the
constitutional concern that direct aid might be impermissibly diverted to religious activities is
especially pronounced when the aid is in the form of direct monetary subsidies).
We would also note, however, that while the relevant holdings of these cases have not been over-
ruled, significant portions of their reasoning is subject to serious question in light of more recent
decisions. Separate portions of the Nyquist decision, for example, were overruled by the Court last
Term in Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639 (2002), and the “pervasively sectarian” doctrine,
which comprised the basis for many of the Court’s Establishment Clause decisions in the early 1970s
(including Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 774-75), no longer enjoys the support of a majority of the Court. See
Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 825-29 (plurality opinion); id. at 857-58 (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment)
(requiring proof of actual diversion of public support to religious uses to invalidate direct aid to schools
and explaining that “presumptions of religious indoctrination are normally inappropriate when
evaluating neutral school-aid programs under the Establishment Clause”); Columbia Union College v.
Oliver, 254 F.3d 496, 502-04 (4th Cir. 2001) (explaining that the pervasively sectarian test is no longer
valid in light of the holdings of six Justices in Mitchell). Moreover, even if decisions such as Tilton and
Nyquist were controlling, they would limit the provision of a construction grant to the Academy only
126
Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
Assuming, arguendo, that Tilton and Nyquist remain valid precedents in these
respects, we do not believe that those decisions control the question whether
FEMA may provide a disaster assistance grant to the Academy. In Nyquist, the
Court distinguished fire and police services from construction grants and repair aid
on the ground that police and fire protection are “provided in common to all
citizens, are ‘so separate and so indisputably marked off from the religious
function,’ that they may fairly be viewed as reflections of a neutral posture toward
religious institutions.” 413 U.S. at 782 (citation omitted). But we see no principled
reason why the constitutionality of an aid program should turn on whether the aid
is provided to all citizens rather than, say, a wide array of organizations that falls
somewhat short of the entire populace. There is a range of aid programs that are
not as “general” as aid provided universally (to every person), but yet are not as
circumscribed as aid to education,14 and the grants provided by FEMA admittedly
fall somewhere within this middle ground. But such aid is more closely analogous
to the provision of “general” government services like those sanctioned by the
Court in Everson (and many times since, e.g., Nyquist, 403 U.S. at 781-82) than to
the construction grants at issue in Tilton and Nyquist, which were available only to
educational institutions.
The vast majority of the Supreme Court’s Establishment Clause decisions
rendered since Everson have concerned aid provided solely to educational
institutions as a class (in many cases, moreover, this aid was directed toward the
educational process itself), and these decisions rest in part on the theory that aid
directed solely to schools is reasonably perceived as advancing the educational
mission of those that receive it. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Helms, 530 U.S. 793, 843
insofar as the grant would be used to reconstruct those portions of buildings in which specifically
religious activities take place.
In a prior memorandum, Constitutionality of Awarding Historic Preservation Grants to Religious
Properties, 19 Op. O.L.C. 267 (1995) (“Historic Preservation Memo”), this Office concluded that
Tilton and Nyquist prohibited the Interior Department from providing historic preservation grants to
religious properties. That opinion did not consider whether the rule of Tilton and Nyquist should apply
where the grants at issue are available to a wide array of nonprofit institutions, rather than being limited
to educational institutions. Moreover, the Historic Preservation Memo relied heavily on the fact that
qualification for historic preservation grants depended on the application of “subjective criteria,” such
as historical importance, in determining “project worthiness.” Id. at 271-72. We continue to believe that
the degree of discretion exercised by governmental officials, and the manner in which such discretion is
exercised, are relevant to the constitutionality of direct aid programs (although we express no opinion
here on the Memo’s conclusion regarding historic preservation grants). But to the extent that the
Historic Preservation Memo failed to consider the possibility that the rule of Tilton and Nyquist does
not apply where direct aid is more generally available than was the aid in those cases, it does not
represent our current thinking, which is set forth in this memorandum.
14
See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 875 (Souter, J., dissenting) (stating that “government spending resists
easy classification as between universal general service or subsidy of favoritism,” and noting that “[t]he
5-to-4 division of the Everson Court turned on the inevitable question whether reimbursing all parents
for the cost of transporting their children to school was close enough to police protection to tolerate its
indirect benefit in some degree to religious schools”).
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Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
(2000) (O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment). The argument that direct aid to
education unlawfully advances the mission of religious schools applies with the
greatest force where such schools constitute a substantial percentage of those that
receive aid. See Lemon, 403 U.S. at 610 (noting that 96% of students at recipient
institutions were pupils at religious schools and that “most” of those schools were
Catholic); Nyquist, 413 U.S. at 768 (“all or practically all” of the schools eligible
for maintenance or repair grants were Catholic, and 85% of those eligible for other
forms of aid were church-affiliated); Meek v. Pittenger, 421 U.S. 349, 364 (1975)
(“more than 75% [of the qualifying schools] are church-related or religiously
affiliated educational institutions”), overruled in relevant part by Mitchell, 530
U.S. 793; Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 234 (1977) (of 720 private schools
eligible for aid, “all but 29” were religious), overruled in relevant part by Mitchell,
530 U.S. 793.15 That argument is much harder to make where the aid is provided to
a range of nonprofit institutions of which schools are but one part. The broad class
of beneficiaries that are eligible for aid under the statute here—which includes
“educational, utility, irrigation, emergency, medical, rehabilitational, and tempo-
rary or permanent custodial care facilities (including those for the aged and
disabled), other private nonprofit facilities which provide essential services of a
governmental nature to the general public, and facilities on Indian reservations,”
42 U.S.C.A. § 5122(9)—confirms that, in contrast to the education-specific aid at
issue in the foregoing cases, the disaster relief provided by FEMA serves goals
entirely unrelated to education—namely, rehabilitation of a community that has
suffered great loss from a natural disaster by helping to rebuild institutions that
perform quasi-public functions and are (by virtue of their nonprofit status) most in
need of assistance. Cf. Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 883 (Souter, J., dissenting)
(“[D]epending on the breadth of distribution, looking to evenhandedness is a way
of asking whether a benefit can reasonably be seen to aid religion in fact; we do
not regard the postal system as aiding religion, even though parochial schools get
mail”).
15
We are not suggesting that an aid program has the unlawful effect of advancing religion merely
because a large number of its beneficiaries are religious in nature. The Supreme Court has repeatedly
repudiated the view that the percentage of a program’s religious beneficiaries is relevant to its
constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. See Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 391, 401 (1983)
(sustaining a tax deduction for educational expenses made available to both religious and secular
parents, notwithstanding evidence that “about 95%” of eligible beneficiaries were parents whose
children attended religious schools); Agostini v. Felton, 521 U.S. 203, 229 (1997) (noting that the Court
was not “willing to conclude that the constitutionality of an aid program depends on the number of
sectarian school students who happen to receive the otherwise neutral aid”); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 812
n.6 (plurality opinion) (citing Agostini for the proposition that “the proportion of aid benefiting students
at religious schools pursuant to a neutral program involving private choices [is] irrelevant to the
constitutional inquiry”); Zelman, 536 U.S. at 658 (refusing to “attach constitutional significance to the
fact that 96% of scholarship recipients have enrolled in religious schools” and stating that “[t]he
constitutionality of a neutral educational aid program simply does not turn on whether and why, in a
particular area, at a particular time, most private schools are run by religious organizations”).
128
Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
We find further support for our decision in the fact that Tilton and Nyquist are
in considerable tension with a long and growing line of cases holding that the Free
Speech Clause does not permit the government to deny religious groups equal
access to the government’s own property, even where such groups seek to use the
property “‘for purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.’” Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 265 (1981). See Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Sch.
Dist., 508 U.S. 384, 394 (1993); Capital Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette,
515 U.S. 753 (1995); Good News Club v. Milford Central Sch., 533 U.S. 98(2001); see also Board of Educ. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226 (1990). Providing
religious groups with access to property is a form of direct aid—albeit not
financial aid—and allowing such groups to conduct worship services plainly
“advances” their religious mission. The Court, however, has consistently refused
to permit (let alone require) state officials to deny churches equal access to public
school property “on the ground that to permit its property to be used for religious
purposes would be an establishment of religion.” Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 394.
Indeed, the Court has gone so far as to extend the reasoning of these cases to
require equal funding of religious student expression, reasoning that “[e]ven the
provision of a meeting room . . . involve[s] governmental expenditure” for
“upkeep, maintenance, and repair of the facilities.” See Rosenberger v. Rector of
Univ. of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 842-43 (1995); see also Prince ex rel. Prince v.
Jacoby, No. 99-35490, 2002 WL 31007791, at *16-*18 (9th Cir. Sept. 9, 2002)
(extending the principles of Rosenberger to monetary and other benefits provided
to student groups that are entitled to meet on school grounds under the Equal
Access Act).
As in Rosenberger, the issue here “lies at the intersection of the principle of
government neutrality and the prohibition on state funding of religious activities.”
515 U.S. at 846 (O’Connor, J., concurring). In such a case, “[r]eliance on categori-
cal platitudes,” such as an absolute “no direct aid” principle, “is unavailing.” Id. at
847. Accordingly, we do not think it would be appropriate to conclude that the
Tilton-Nyquist decisions govern the constitutionality of allowing a religious school
to receive disaster assistance on the same terms as a wide array of institutions that
provide a public service, whether they are educational or non-educational, secular
or religious. If the diversity of recipients in Walz and the “equal access” line of
cases was sufficient to dispel any Establishment Clause problems, we see no
reason why a similar array of recipients in the FEMA program should not likewise
suffice to sustain it. See also Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 727 (2002)
(Breyer, J., dissenting) (arguing that establishment concerns are “far more”
implicated by “government involvement in religious primary education” than by
“tax deductions for charitable contributions,” which “come far closer to exempli-
fying the neutrality that distinguishes, for example, fire protection on the one hand
from direct monetary assistance on the other”). Accordingly, we conclude that the
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Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
FEMA assistance here is more analogous to the police and fire services discussed
in Everson than to the educational assistance at issue in Tilton and Nyquist.16
For similar reasons, we do not believe that a reasonable observer would per-
ceive an endorsement of religion in the government’s evenhanded provision of aid
to a religious school damaged by an earthquake. See Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 842-44(O’Connor, J., concurring in judgment).1 7 In a direct aid program limited to
educational recipients, one could argue that if a school “uses the aid to inculcate
religion in its students, it is reasonable to say that the government has communi-
cated a message of endorsement.” Id. at 843 (O’Connor, J.). The notion is that,
where the government provides education-specific aid, it is fair to say that the
government is providing the assistance because of the content of the funded
education. Such a presumption of governmental endorsement is not present,
however, where the aid is provided to a wide array of nonprofit institutions
(educational and noneducational alike), where the aid is not provided because of
the content of any activities that take place within the building, and where the
government is indifferent to the religious or secular orientation of any education
that may occur within the building. Indeed, much of the aid here is given to
nonprofit institutions that provide services that do not involve any “pedagogy” or
“speech” whatsoever.18
Our conclusion is strongly supported by the evidence regarding FEMA’s appli-
cation of the criteria for receiving funds under the Act. Apart from the Academy,
16
We acknowledge, as Justice O’Connor noted in her concurrence in Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 840, that
the Court has never approved of any direct financial assistance to religious institutions absent assurance
that the aid may not lawfully be diverted to religious activities, and the Court’s cases contain rhetoric to
the effect that “‘any use of public funds to promote religious doctrines violates the Establishment
Clause.’” Id. at 865 (quoting Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589, 623 (1988) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
At the same time, however, the Court has never passed on a program in which direct financial aid was
extended to schools as part of a broader array of public and private institutions.
17
See generally County of Allegheny v. ACLU, Greater Pittsburgh Chapter, 492 U.S. 573, 592
(1989) (the Court has, “[i]n recent years, . . . paid particularly close attention to whether the challenged
governmental practice either has the purpose or effect of ‘endorsing’ religion”); see also id. at 624-32(O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment); Santa Fe Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Doe,
530 U.S. 290, 307-08 (2000); Agostini, 521 U.S. at 235.
18
One could also argue that fire protection is distinguishable from disaster assistance in that the
latter is a more “substantial” form of aid that permits the construction of an entire facility, whereas fire
protection merely prevents such a facility from being destroyed. We do not find this argument
persuasive, however. To begin with, the Supreme Court’s decisions decreasingly focus on the
“substantiality” of aid provided to religious institutions. See, e.g., Agostini, 521 U.S. at 205 (rejecting
the rule “that all government aid that directly aids the educational function of religious schools is
invalid”); Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 820-25 (plurality opinion); id. at 849-57 (O’Connor, J., concurring in
judgment); Zelman, 536 U.S. 639. Moreover, we think it would “exalt form over substance” (Zobrest v.
Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13 (1993)) to say that the government may provide aid that
helps a religious organization avoid a disaster but not aid that would help such an organization recover
from a disaster.
130
Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
of the 268 Nisqually Earthquake applications on which FEMA has ruled,19 267
applicants—all but one—were declared eligible for funding. See Exhibit A. It thus
appears that there is little exercise of discretion regarding religion in the distribu-
tion of grant funds—indeed, in this instance, funding was virtually automatic—
and the diverse makeup of those that have received funds confirms that the
program’s administration is not “skewed towards religion.” Witters v. Washington
Dep’t of Servs., 474 U.S. 481, 488 (1986). This largely (if not entirely) eliminates
any “special risks” that direct aid “will have the effect of advancing religion (or,
even more, a purpose of doing so).” Mitchell, 530 U.S. at 819 n.8 (plurality
opinion). An examination of the array of institutions funded by FEMA confirms
that the program is neutral in practice. Of the funded institutions, 245 are public
facilities, while only 22 are private nonprofit facilities. The public facilities
include, among other things, schools and school districts (of which there are 63),
fire stations, libraries, prisons, utilities, and buildings that provide public social
services. The private facilities likewise include a broad array of institutions—
hospitals and other health facilities, low income housing centers, social services
organizations, and even a “maritime discovery center.”20 Judging from the names
of the private organizations, moreover, it appears that only a handful have
religious affiliations.21 In sum, the record reveals no basis for concern that FEMA
19
FEMA received 336 applications for funding in response to the Nisqually Earthquake, 68 of
which were withdrawn. We are informed that FEMA does not keep records of the reasons for
withdrawn applications, and that FEMA does not generally know why applications are withdrawn.
Thus, the record does not reflect the reasons for the withdrawals of these applications. Nonetheless, we
note that of these 68 withdrawn applications, 61 were withdrawn by public institutions and seven were
withdrawn by private nonprofit facilities. Thus, an almost identical percentage of public entity
applications (22.22%) and private nonprofit facility applications (23.33%) were withdrawn. In addition,
nothing in the record suggests that these withdrawals, to the extent that they were motivated by
FEMA’s actions at all, were based on any effort to skew the program in favor of religion, or that FEMA
considered the content of activities that take place within the buildings for which construction and
repair funds were sought. Moreover, FEMA personnel have informed us that the basis for any
withdrawals prompted by the agency would have been purely objective, neutral, and statutory.
20
The private nonprofit facilities that received funding from FEMA as a result of the Nisqually Earth-
quake are as follows: (1) Bayview Manor Foundation ($2,008); (2) Bread of Life Mission Association
($23,463); (3) Community Health Centers of King County ($11,910); (4) Graham Hill Mutual Water
Company ($36,594); (5) Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound ($87,522); (6) Interim Housing
Association ($6,885); (7) Kitsap Mental Health Services ($6,718); (8) Lake Alice Water Association
($33,345); (9) Madrona Beach Water Company, Inc. ($42,043); (10) Meridian Heights Water District
($7,048); (11) Odyssey, The Maritime Discovery Center ($15,768); (12) Pinewood Glen Improvement
Club ($2,911); (13) Pioneer Human Services ($163,708); (14) Plymouth Housing Group ($4,190);
(15) Providence Health System ($212,543); (16) Recovery Centers of King County ($2,866); (17) Safe
Homes ($35,942); (18) Seattle Indian Health Board ($48,463); (19) The Compass Center ($1,649,068);
(20) The Low Income Housing Institute ($543,553); (21) View Ranch Estates Water Association ($1,286);
(22) Virginia Mason Medical Center ($2,831,474).
21
See Exhibit A, No. 23 (Bread of Life Mission Association), No. 336 (YMCA of Greater Seattle).
It is our understanding that the application of the Archdiocesan Housing Authority (“AHA”) was
initially denied (Exhibit A, No. 9) on the basis that the AHA had not yet applied for a loan from the
Small Business Administration (“SBA”). The AHA subsequently did apply for such a loan, however,
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Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
administrators have discretion to favor religious applicants, or that those adminis-
trators have exercised what little discretion they do have in a manner that favors
religion.
Finally, we would emphasize that although there is some risk that a court would
invalidate the provision of disaster assistance to the Academy—decisions under
the Establishment Clause are notoriously context-dependent and difficult to
predict—the facts provide an especially strong case for arguing that direct aid to
religious educational institutions is constitutional where made available on the
basis of genuinely neutral criteria, to an array of beneficiaries including both
educational and non-educational institutions. Indeed, there are arguments that
excluding religious organizations from disaster assistance made available to
similarly situated secular institutions would violate the Free Exercise Clause and
the Free Speech Clause. E.g., Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah,
508 U.S. 520, 532 (1993) (“[a]t a minimum, the protections of the Free Exercise
Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates against some or all religious
beliefs”); Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990) (under the Free
Exercise Clause, the state may not “impose special disabilities on the basis of
religious views or religious status”); Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828 (“the govern-
ment offends the First Amendment when it imposes financial burdens on certain
speakers based on the content of their expression,” including religious expres-
sion).22 Moreover, four members of the Supreme Court have made clear that they
would sustain any program of aid that provides secular assistance, on the basis of
neutral criteria, to religious and secular schools alike, see Mitchell, 530 U.S. at
807-14 (plurality opinion), which is a narrower view of the Establishment Clause
than would be required to sustain the provision of FEMA aid to the Academy.
JAY S. BYBEE
Assistant Attorney General
Office of Legal Counsel
and its application was denied. Thus, its application is in the process of being reinstated. If the AHA’s
application is granted, it appears that not a single applicant that meets the objective criteria for funding
under the Act will have been denied eligibility for funding.
22
In July, for example, the Ninth Circuit—which might well hear any appeal involving a challenge
to the provision of disaster assistance to the Academy here—held that the State of Washington violated
the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment in denying public scholarship assistance to an
otherwise eligible college student on the ground that he intended to use the scholarship to pursue a
degree in theology. See Davey v. Locke, 299 F.3d 748 (9th Cir. 2002). There is an argument here, too,
that denying aid to the Academy solely on account of their religious faith would violate the Free
Exercise Clause.
Editor’s Note: The Ninth Circuit’s decision in Davey v. Locke was subsequently reversed by Locke
v. Davey, 540 U.S. 712 (2004). In that decision, the Supreme Court ruled that the State of Washington
could decide not to fund instruction in devotional theology without violating the Free Exercise Clause,
because of the State’s “antiestablishment interest[]” in not “using tax funds to support the ministry,” for
which there was a long tradition of state constitutional prohibition. Id. at 722, 723.
132
Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
Exhibit A
Applications Received by FEMA in Response to the
Nisqually Earthquake
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
1 1361 Aberdeen School District N Y $13,097
2 1361 Aberdeen, City of N Y Withdrawn
3 1361 Adna School District No. 226 N Y $16,203
4 1361 Alder Mutual Light Co N Y Withdrawn
5 1361 Allyn, Port of N Y $2,078
6 1361 Anacortes School District No. 103 N Y $39,610
7 1361 Anacortes, City of N Y $7,958
8 1361 Annapolis Water District N Y $24,254
9 1361 Archdiocesan Housing Authority Y N Applicant in
Process of Being
Reinstated
10 1361 Auburn School District No. 408 N Y Withdrawn
11 1361 Bainbridge Island, City of N Y $2,458
12 1361 Bates Technical College N Y Withdrawn
13 1361 Bayview Manor Foundation Y Y $2,008
14 1361 Beaux Arts Village, Town of N Y Withdrawn
15 1361 Bellevue Community College N Y $1,227
16 1361 Bellevue, City of N Y $230,382
17 1361 Bethel School District No. 403 N Y $341,435
18 1361 Black Diamond City Fire Department N Y Withdrawn
19 1361 Black Diamond, City of N Y $3,201
20 1361 Blaine School District No. 503 N Y $16,100
21 1361 Boistfort Valley Water Corporation Y Y Withdrawn
22 1361 Bothell, City of N Y $470
23 1361 Bread of Life Mission Association Y Y $23,463
24 1361 Bremerton School District N Y $101,876
25 1361 Bremerton, City of N Y $425,016
26 1361 Bridgeport School District N Y $15,515
27 1361 Bucoda, Town of N Y $3,141
28 1361 Burien, City of N Y $18,195
29 1361 Capitol Hill Housing Improvement Program N Y $70,348
133
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
30 1361 Carbonado Historical School District N Y $59,799
31 1361 Carnation, City of N Y $3,305
32 1361 Cascadia Community College N Y Withdrawn
33 1361 Castle Rock School District No. 401 N Y Withdrawn
34 1361 Cedar Glen Community Y Y Withdrawn
35 1361 Cedar River Water & Sewer District N Y $26,634
36 1361 Central Kitsap Fire & Rescue N Y $20,595
37 1361 Central Kitsap School District No. 401 N Y Withdrawn
38 1361 Centralia College N Y $9,006
39 1361 Centralia Public School District No. 401 N Y $29,431
40 1361 Centralia, City of N Y $42,326
41 1361 Chehalis School District No. 302 N Y $255,888
42 1361 Chehalis Tribe N Y $25,819
43 1361 Chehalis, City of N Y $34,119
44 1361 Clallam County Fire District No. 3 N Y $3,939
45 1361 Clear Lake Water District N Y $8,402
46 1361 Clover Park School District N Y $25,532
47 1361 Clover Park Technical College N Y Withdrawn
48 1361 Community Health Centers of King County Y Y $11,910
49 1361 Cosmopolis N Y $10,452
50 1361 Covington Water District N Y $3,880
51 1361 Cowlitz Cnty Fire Protection District No. 3 N Y $796
52 1361 Darrington School District N Y $25,253
53 1361 Darrington, Town of N Y Withdrawn
54 1361 Department of Corrections N Y $1,518,881
55 1361 Department of Labor & Industries N Y $238,105
56 1361 Department of Licensing N Y $0
57 1361 Department of Social & Health Services N Y $2,652,973
58 1361 Department of Veterans Affairs N Y $16,936
59 1361 Dept. of Community, Trade, & Economic Dev. N Y $14,584
60 1361 Des Moines, City of N Y $32,669
61 1361 Dieringer School District No. 343 N Y $17,988
62 1361 Eastside Fire & Rescue N Y $4,869
63 1361 Eatonville School District No. 404 N Y Withdrawn
64 1361 Eatonville, City of N Y $69,084
134
Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
65 1361 Elma, City of N Y $917
66 1361 Employment Security Department N Y $34,227
67 1361 Enumclaw School District N Y $24,770
68 1361 Everett Community College N Y Withdrawn
69 1361 Everett, City of N Y $30,603
70 1361 Evergreen State College N Y $350,537
71 1361 Everson, City of N Y $1,653
72 1361 Federal Way Fire Dept. N Y $2,508
73 1361 Federal Way Public Schools N Y $44,060
74 1361 Ferndale School District N Y $19,895
75 1361 Fife School District N Y $21,587
76 1361 Fife, City of N Y $25,078
77 1361 Fircrest, City of N Y $8,879
78 1361 Franklin Pierce School District N Y $16,758
79 1361 Gig Harbor, City of N Y Withdrawn
80 1361 Graham Hill Mutual Water Co Y Y $36,594
81 1361 Grays Harbor Community Hospital Y Y Withdrawn
82 1361 Grays Harbor Fire Protection District No. 2 N Y $7,867
83 1361 Grays Harbor, County N Y $44,406
84 1361 Green River Community College N Y $283,842
85 1361 Group Health Cooperative of Puget Sound Y Y $87,522
86 1361 Highline Community College N Y $8,385
87 1361 Highline School District No. 401 N Y $465,625
88 1361 Highline Water District N Y $40,272
89 1361 Historic Seattle Preservation Development Auth. N Y $202,594
90 1361 Hoquiam, City of N Y $15,483
91 1361 Housing Authority of Clallam County N Y $1,566
92 1361 Housing Authority of Seattle N Y $63,819
93 1361 Housing Authority of Tacoma N Y Withdrawn
94 1361 Housing Resources Group Y Y Withdrawn
95 1361 Interim Housing Association Y Y $6,885
96 1361 Issaquah, City of N Y $110,792
97 1361 Joint Legislative Systems Committee N Y $6,597
98 1361 Kalama, City of N Y $19,663
99 1361 Kelso School District No. 458 N Y Withdrawn
135
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
100 1361 Kelso, City of N Y $4,807
101 1361 Kent School District N Y $566,796
102 1361 Kent, City of N Y $115,269
103 1361 King County Fire District No. 44 N Y Withdrawn
104 1361 King County Fire District No. 16 N Y Withdrawn
105 1361 King County Hospital District No. 1 N Y Withdrawn
106 1361 King County Housing Authority N Y Withdrawn
107 1361 King County International Airport N Y Withdrawn
108 1361 King County Water District No. 90 N Y $7,123
109 1361 King, County N Y $6,255,945
110 1361 Kirkland, City of N Y Withdrawn
111 1361 Kitsap County Fire District No. 12 N Y Withdrawn
112 1361 Kitsap County Fire District No. 7 N Y $2,224
113 1361 Kitsap Mental Health Services Y Y $6,718
114 1361 Kitsap, County of N Y $44,427
115 1361 La Conner School District No. 311 N Y $30,771
116 1361 Lacey, City of N Y $115,042
117 1361 Lake Alice Water Association Y Y $33,345
118 1361 Lake Stevens School District No. 4 N Y $14,683
119 1361 Lake Stevens Sewer District N Y $95,586
120 1361 Lake Washington School District N Y Withdrawn
121 1361 Lake Washington Technical College N Y $3,641
122 1361 Lakewood Fire District N Y $3,446
123 1361 Lakewood School District No. 306 N Y $15,548
124 1361 Lakewood Water District N Y $101,031
125 1361 Lakewood, City of N Y Withdrawn
126 1361 Lewis County Fire District No. 12 N Y $788
127 1361 Lewis County Fire District No. 14 N Y $784
128 1361 Lewis County Fire District No. 2 N Y Withdrawn
129 1361 Lewis County Fire District No. 5 N Y $5,276
130 1361 Lewis County Fire Protection District No. 9 N Y $788
131 1361 Lewis, County N Y $49,271
132 1361 Longview, City of N Y Withdrawn
133 1361 Lower Columbia College N Y Withdrawn
134 1361 Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe N Y $2,783
136
Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
135 1361 Lummi Nation N Y $42,807
136 1361 Lynden Fire Department N Y $19,817
137 1361 Madrona Beach Water Company, Inc. Y Y $42,043
138 1361 Makah Tribal Council N Y $11,598
139 1361 Manchester Water District N Y $44,950
140 1361 Maple Valley, City of N Y $35,395
141 1361 Mary M Knight School No. 311 N Y $3,002
142 1361 Mason , County of N Y $127,535
143 1361 Mason County Fire District No. 6 N Y $788
144 1361 Mason County Public Utility District No. 3 N Y $230,502
145 1361 Mercer Island School District N Y $0
146 1361 Mercer Island, City of N Y $7,109
147 1361 Meridian Heights Water District Y Y $7,048
148 1361 Meridian School District N Y $3,091
149 1361 Milton, City of N Y $4,762
150 1361 Morton School District N Y Withdrawn
151 1361 Morton, City of N Y $10,865
152 1361 Mount Baker School District No. 507 N Y $3,693
153 1361 Mountlake Terrace, City of N Y $10,192
154 1361 Mukilteo School District N Y $25,608
155 1361 Mukilteo, City of N Y $6,017
156 1361 Museum Development Authority N Y $47,778
157 1361 Newcastle, City of N Y Withdrawn
158 1361 Nisqually Indian Tribe N Y $131,683
159 1361 Nooksack, City of N Y $1,460
160 1361 Normandy Park, City of N Y $835
161 1361 North Bend, City of N Y $5,384
162 1361 North Highline Fire District N Y Withdrawn
163 1361 North River School District N Y $8,739
164 1361 North Seattle Community College N Y $6,244
165 1361 North Sound Regional Support Network N Y Withdrawn
166 1361 North Thurston School District N Y $90,258
167 1361 Northshore Utility District N Y $301,483
168 1361 Northwest Railway Museum Y Y Withdrawn
169 1361 Ocean Shores, City of N Y $8,126
137
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
170 1361 Odyssey, the Maritime Discovery Center Y Y $15,768
171 1361 Office of the Attorney General N Y Withdrawn
172 1361 Office of the Governor N Y Withdrawn
173 1361 Office of the Lieutenant Governor N Y $4,705
174 1361 Office of the Secretary of State N Y $835
175 1361 Office of the State Treasurer N Y Withdrawn
176 1361 Olympia School District No. 111 N Y $65,753
177 1361 Olympia, City of N Y $675,740
178 1361 Olympic College N Y Withdrawn
179 1361 Olympic View Water & Sewer District N Y $0
180 1361 Onalaska School District No. 300 N Y $8,140
181 1361 Orting School District No. 344 N Y $2,144
182 1361 Orting, City of N Y $0
183 1361 Pacific Hospital Preservation & Dev. Auth N Y $157,980
184 1361 Pacific, County of N Y $1,819
185 1361 Pe Ell, City of N Y $8,838
186 1361 Peninsula College N Y $93,971
187 1361 Peninsula Community Health Services Y Y Withdrawn
188 1361 Peninsula School District No. 401 N Y Withdrawn
189 1361 Pierce College N Y $58,772
190 1361 Pierce County Fire District No. 17 N Y $1,479
191 1361 Pierce County Fire District No. 14 N Y $19,890
192 1361 Pierce County Fire District No. 18 N Y $23
193 1361 Pierce County Fire District No. 21 N Y $796
194 1361 Pierce County Fire District No. 5 N Y Withdrawn
195 1361 Pierce County Fire District No. 20 N Y Withdrawn
196 1361 Pierce County Fire District No. 23 N Y $19,695
197 1361 Pierce County Regional Support Network N Y $0
198 1361 Pierce County Rural Library District N Y $74,136
199 1361 Pierce Transit N Y Withdrawn
200 1361 Pierce, County of N Y $485,304
201 1361 Pike Place Preservation & Development Auth. N Y $114,888
202 1361 Pinewood Glen Improvement Club Y Y $2,911
203 1361 Pioneer Human Services Y Y $163,708
204 1361 Plymouth Housing Group Y Y $4,190
138
Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
205 1361 Port Angeles, City of N Y $47,894
206 1361 Port Gamble S’klallam Housing Authority N Y $12,856
207 1361 Port of Anacortes N Y $41,668
208 1361 Port of Chehalis N Y $8,398
209 1361 Port of Everett N Y $48,091
210 1361 Port of Olympia N Y $98,320
211 1361 Port of Port Angeles N Y $5,192
212 1361 Port of Seattle N Y $3,829,612
213 1361 Port of Tacoma N Y $164,646
214 1361 Port Orchard, City of N Y $27,478
215 1361 Providence Health System Y Y $212,543
216 1361 PUD #1 of Snohomish County N Y $38,401
217 1361 Puyallup School District N Y $194,400
218 1361 Puyallup, City of N Y $131,431
219 1361 Quinault Indian Nation N Y $1,980
220 1361 Rainier School District No. 307 N Y $350
221 1361 Rainier, Town of N Y $16,585
222 1361 Raymond, City of N Y $35,282
223 1361 Recovery Centers of King County Y Y $2,866
224 1361 Redmond, City of N Y Withdrawn
225 1361 Renton School District N Y $0
226 1361 Renton Technical College N Y $35,134
227 1361 Renton, City of N Y $217,310
228 1361 Rochester School District 401 N Y $0
229 1361 Safe Homes Y Y $35,942
230 1361 Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe of Washington N Y $2,940
231 1361 Seattle-King County Department of Health N Y Withdrawn
232 1361 Seattle Central Community College N Y $39,047
233 1361 Seattle Chinatown Development Authority N Y $34,704
234 1361 Seattle Indian Health Board Y Y $48,463
235 1361 Seattle Indian Services Commission N Y $426,988
236 1361 Seattle School District No. 1 N Y $1,110,755
237 1361 Seattle, City of N Y $3,221,569
238 1361 Sedro Woolley, City of N Y $9,629
239 1361 Sentencing Guidelines Commission N Y Withdrawn
139
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
240 1361 Shelton School District No. 309 N Y Withdrawn
241 1361 Shelton, City of N Y $8,980
242 1361 Shoalwater Bay Indian Tribe N Y $1,871
243 1361 Shoreline Fire Department N Y Withdrawn
244 1361 Shoreline School District N Y $21,536
245 1361 Silverdale Water District No. 16 N Y $16,152
246 1361 Skagit, County of N Y Withdrawn
247 1361 Skokomish Indian Tribe N Y $4,396
248 1361 Snohomish County Emergency Management N Y $4,398
249 1361 Snohomish County Fire District No. 17 N Y $23,087
250 1361 Snohomish School District N Y $22,072
251 1361 Snohomish, City of N Y $12,617
252 1361 Snohomish, County N Y $74,291
253 1361 Snoqualmie Valley School District No. 410 N Y $135,794
254 1361 Snoqualmie, City of N Y $64,405
255 1361 Sound Transit N Y $569,933
256 1361 South Bend School District No. 118 N Y $1,505
257 1361 South Bend, City of N Y $38,377
258 1361 South Kitsap School District No. 402 N Y $21,130
259 1361 South Prairie, Town of N Y $957
260 1361 South Puget Sound Community College N Y $61,128
261 1361 South Seattle Community College N Y $4,781
262 1361 Southern Puget Sound Inter-Tribal Housing Auth. N Y $1,529
263 1361 Southwest Suburban Sewer District N Y $43,149
264 1361 Squaxin Island Tribe N Y $1,268
265 1361 State Auditor’s Office N Y $1,370
266 1361 State Department of Financial Institutions N Y Withdrawn
267 1361 State Department of General Administration N Y $8,235,429
268 1361 Steilacoom Historical School District No. 01 N Y $277,798
269 1361 Steilacoom, City of N Y $21,859
270 1361 Sultan, City of N Y $1,449
271 1361 Sumner School District N Y Withdrawn
272 1361 Sumner, City of N Y $7,943
273 1361 Suquamish Indian Tribe N Y $10,734
274 1361 Swedish Health Services Y Y Withdrawn
140
Authority of FEMA to Provide Disaster Assistance to Seattle Hebrew Academy
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
275 1361 Swinomish Tribal Community N Y $4,819
276 1361 Tacoma Community College N Y $138,448
277 1361 Tacoma Department of Public Utilities N Y Withdrawn
278 1361 Tacoma Metro Parks N Y $5,875
279 1361 Tacoma School District No. 10 N Y $225,927
280 1361 Tacoma, City of N Y $87,310
281 1361 Taholah School District No. 77 N Y $7,825
282 1361 The Compass Center Y Y $1,649,068
283 1361 The Low Income Housing Institute Y Y $543,553
284 1361 Thurston County Fire District No. 3 N Y $4,839
285 1361 Thurston County Fire District No. 6 N Y Withdrawn
286 1361 Thurston, County N Y $381,389
287 1361 Timberland Regional Library N Y $6,909
288 1361 Timberlands Regional Support Network N Y Withdrawn
289 1361 Toledo, City of N Y $1,967
290 1361 Tukwila, City of N Y $53,076
291 1361 Tulalip Tribes Housing Authority N Y $7,016
292 1361 Tulalip Tribes Inc. N Y $3,283
293 1361 Tumwater School District N Y $80,924
294 1361 Tumwater, City of N Y $55,628
295 1361 University of Washington N Y $2,826,851
296 1361 University Place, City of N Y Withdrawn
297 1361 Valley Water District N Y $59,880
298 1361 Vashon Island School District N Y $6,738
299 1361 Vashon Park District N Y $17,267
300 1361 View Ranch Estates Water Association Y Y $1,286
301 1361 Virginia Mason Medical Center Y Y $2,831,474
302 1361 Wash. State Major League Baseball Stadium N Y $0
303 1361 Washington Department of Health N Y Withdrawn
304 1361 Washington Dept. of Fish & Wildlife N Y $40,657
305 1361 Washington Dept. of Information Services N Y Withdrawn
306 1361 Washington Dept. of Natural Resources N Y $134,437
307 1361 Washington Dept. of Transportation N Y $266,563
308 1361 Washington State Arts Commission N Y Withdrawn
309 1361 Washington State Board of Accountancy N Y Withdrawn
141
Opinions of the Office of Legal Counsel in Volume 26
No Disaster Applicant Name Pnp Elig Grant Amt
310 1361 Washington State Code Reviser’s Office N Y $0
311 1361 Washington State Convention & Trade N Y $199,059
312 1361 Washington State Dept. of Agriculture N Y $6,517
313 1361 Washington State Dept. of Ecology N Y $21,078
314 1361 Washington State Dept. of Retirement Systems N Y Withdrawn
315 1361 Washington State Historical Society N Y Withdrawn
316 1361 Washington State House of Representatives N Y $42,946
317 1361 Washington State Law Library N Y $77,365
318 1361 Washington State Library N Y $46,931
319 1361 Washington State Liquor Board N Y $0
320 1361 Washington State Military Department N Y $2,077,599
321 1361 Washington State Office of Financial Mgmt. N Y $4,472
322 1361 Washington State Parks & Recreation N Y $393,085
323 1361 Washington State Patrol N Y $76,993
324 1361 Washington State Redistricting Commission N Y Withdrawn
325 1361 Washington State Senate N Y $8,046
326 1361 Westport, City of N Y $2,386
327 1361 Whatcom, County of N Y $8,197
328 1361 White Pass School District N Y $11,112
329 1361 White River School District No. 416 N Y Withdrawn
330 1361 Wilkeson, City of N Y $66,081
331 1361 Winlock, City of N Y $17,139
332 1361 Woodinville Water District N Y $13,572
333 1361 Woodinville, City of N Y $23,782
334 1361 Yelm Community Schools District No. 2 N Y $2,553
335 1361 Yelm, City of N Y Withdrawn
336 1361 YMCA of Greater Seattle Y Y $0
142