Authority of the Comptroller General to Appoint an Acting Comptroller General ( 1980 )


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  •    Authority of the Comptroller General to Appoint an Acting
    Comptroller General
    T h e C o m p tro lle r G e n e ra l is a u th o riz e d to d esig n ate an em p lo y ee o f th e G e n e ra l A c ­
    co u n tin g O ffice to a ct as C o m p tro lle r G e n e ra l in his absence, e v e n if the O ffice o f
    D e p u ty C o m p tro lle r G e n e ra l is v acant.
    A c tin g h eads o f ag en cies h a v e p o w e rs th at are c o m m e n su ra te w ith th o se o f a g e n c y heads
    w h o h a v e b een co n firm ed b y th e S enate.
    June 13, 1980
    M EM ORANDUM OPIN IO N FOR T H E G E N ER A L COUNSEL,
    D E PA R TM EN T O F TH E TREASURY
    This responds to your inquiry whether the Comptroller General may
    designate an employee of the General Accounting Office (GAO) to act
    as Comptroller General during his absence.1 In particular, you have
    asked whether a GAO employee may be designated to serve as Comp­
    troller General for purposes of action taken by the Chrysler Corpora­
    tion Loan Guarantee Board, of which the Comptroller General is a
    member.
    The core issue here is whether the Comptroller General may desig­
    nate an employee of the General Accounting Office to act as Comptrol­
    ler General pursuant to 31 U.S.C. § 43a, which provides:
    The Comptroller General shall designate an employee of
    the General Accounting Office to act as Comptroller
    General during the absence or incapacity o f the Comptroller
    General and the Deputy Comptroller General, or during a
    vacancy in both o f such offices. (Emphasis added.)
    It might be argued that the italicized language signals Congress’ intent
    only to authorize the designation of an Acting Comptroller General in
    two situations: when both the Comptroller General and Deputy Comp­
    troller General are absent or incapacitated, or when both offices are
    vacant. On this reading, the provision would not cover the present
    case, in which the Comptroller General is absent and the office of
    Deputy Comptroller General is vacant.
    1   You have m ade this inquiry in your capacity as G eneral Counsel to the C hrysler C orporation
    Loan G u aran tee Board, established pursuant to Pub. L. No. 96—185, § 3 , 
    93 Stat. 1324
    , 
    15 U.S.C. §§ 1861
     et seq.
    690
    However, such a narrow interpretation ignores the well-established
    principle of statutory construction that literal interpretations of statutes
    are not to be favored at the expense of the statute’s evident purpose and
    history. See, e.g., Train v. Colorado Public Interest Research Group, Inc.,
    
    426 U.S. 1
    , 9-10 (1976); United States v. Public Utilities Commission. 
    345 U.S. 295
    , 315 (1953); Church o f the Holy Trinity v. United States, 
    143 U.S. 457
    , 459 (1892). The evident aim of 31 U.S.C. § 43a is to provide a
    mechanism whereby an Acting Comptroller General may be designated
    when the Comptroller General and Deputy Comptroller General are
    unavailable to perform the Comptroller General’s duties. This purpose
    is not served by distinguishing between situations in which the Comp­
    troller General and Deputy Comptroller General are both either absent
    or incapacitated or in which both offices are vacant, on the one hand,
    and situations in which one of the officers is absent or incapacitated and
    the other office is vacant, on the other hand.
    Furthermore, the legislative history confirms that Congress did not
    intend to so limit the provision’s application. The provision—enacted as
    part of the Independent Offices Appropriation Act of 1945, June 27,
    1944, ch. 286, Title I, 
    58 Stat. 371
    —was introduced as a floor amend­
    ment at the urging of the Comptroller General. See 90 Cong. Rec.
    3069-70 (1944). The clearest statement of its purpose appears in the
    Comptroller General’s letter proposing it, which states in pertinent part:
    The need for legislation of the character here proposed
    is apparent in the recent history of the General Account­
    ing Office. During the period from July 1, 1936, to April
    10, 1939, and for a considerable period in 1940, the office
    of Comptroller General was vacant. The then Assistant
    Comptroller General [now the Deputy Comptroller Gen­
    eral 2] acted as Comptroller General, pursuant to law, but
    there was no other officer specifically authorized by law
    so to act in the event o f his absence or incapacity or in the
    event he had resigned or retired or his term had ended. . . .
    (Emphasis added.)3
    The provision thus was designed specifically to cover a situation in
    which the office of the Comptroller General was vacant and it was
    feared that the Assistant (now Deputy) Comptroller General might
    become absent or incapacitated or that he might resign or retire. It was
    plainly not intended to be confined to situations in which both officers
    were either incapacitated or absent, or in which both offices were
    vacant.4
    2 T he Assistant C om ptroller G eneral was designated D eputy C o m ptroller G eneral pursuant to
    Pub. L. No. 92-51, 
    85 Stat. 125
    , 143 (1971).
    3 90 C ong. Rec. 3070 (1944).
    4 See also 90 C ong. Rec. 5171 (1944).
    691
    We therefore conclude that 31 U.S.C. § 43a authorizes the Comptrol­
    ler General, in present circumstances, to designate an employee of the
    G A O to act as Comptroller General during his absence. It is established
    that acting heads of agencies have powers that are commensurate with
    those of agency heads who have been confirmed by the Senate. See,
    e.g., Ryan v. United States, 
    136 U.S. 68
    , 81 (1890); Marsh v. Nichols,
    Shepard & Co., 
    128 U.S. 605
    , 615 (1888); Shafer v. United States, 
    229 F.2d 124
    , 129 (4th Cir. 1956); Anderson v. P.W. Madsen Investment Co.,
    
    72 F.2d 768
    , 770-71 (10th Cir. 1934); Aderhold v. Menefee, 
    67 F.2d 345
    ,
    346 (5th Cir. 1933); cf. Keyser v. Hitz, 
    133 U.S. 138
    , 145-46 (1890).
    There is no indication in the language of the Chrysler Corporation
    Loan Guarantee Act of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-185, 
    93 Stat. 1324
    , 
    15 U.S.C. § 1861
     et seq. (1980), that Congress intended to create an excep­
    tion to this fundamental precept in the context of the Chrysler Corpora­
    tion Loan Guarantee Board.5 Accordingly, we believe that the Acting
    Comptroller General is legally authorized to serve as Comptroller Gen­
    eral in the context of actions taken by that Board during the Comptrol­
    ler General’s absence.6
    L arry A. H am m ond
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    Office o f Legal Counsel
    *    Section 3 o f the A ct establishes the C h ry sler C orp o ration Loan G u arantee Board, "w hich shall
    consist o f the Secretary o f the T reasu ry w ho shall be the C hairperson o f the Board, the C hairm an of
    the Board o f G o v ern o rs o f the Federal R eserve System, and the C om ptroller G eneral o f ihe United
    States.” IS U.S.C. § 1862. T his provision contains no limiting language indicating, for instance, that the
    C o m p tro ller G eneral o r o th e r Board m em bers must personally appear at Board meetings. N o other
    section o f the A ct w ould ap p ear to impose any such requirem ent.
    N or are w e aw are o f any such indication in the legislative history. T h e provision establishing a
    three-m em ber C hrysler C orporation Loan G u aran tee Board originated in the Senate bill, S. 2094, and
    its purpose is thus described in the R eport o f the Senate C om m ittee on Banking, Housing, and Urban
    AfTairs, 96th C ong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979):
    T h e A dm inistration bill w ould have had the Secretary o f the T reasury be the sole
    adm inistrator o f the loan guarantees for C hrysler. T h e C om m ittee believes that a three-
    person board ofTers m ore balance and that the addition o f tw o mem bers w ho are
    independent o f the Executive, the Federal R eserve Board C hairm an and the C om ptrol­
    ler G eneral, will enable the Board to make tough decisions on the m erits o f the issues
    w ithout undue pressure from political considerations.
    T he aim o f providing for a three-person Board in o rd e r to establish balance and independence would
    not be undercut by the participation, pursuant to lawful designation, o f an A cting C om ptroller
    G eneral rath er than the C o m p tro ller G eneral d uring the latter's absence. See also H.R. Rep. No. 96-
    730, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 17 (1979) (confirm ing that the conference adopted the Senate provision
    regarding m em bership o f the board).
    6     W e have confirm ed that o u r conclusion is consistent w ith the practice and view s o f the G eneral
    A ccounting Office.                                    fA 'J