Requirement to Hold Evidentiary Hearing Before Withholding Wages of Federal Employee in Satisfaction of Debt Allegedly Owed the United States ( 1979 )


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  •                                                                                 June 28, 1979
    79-46        MEMORANDUM OPINION FOR THE ACTING
    COMMISSIONER, IMMIGRATION AND
    NATURALIZATION SERVICE
    Due Process—United States (as Creditor)—
    Withholding Wages of Federal Employee (as
    Debtor) in Satisfaction of Debt Allegedly Owed the
    Government
    This responds to your request for our guidance whether the Immigra­
    tion and Naturalization Service (INS) must accord its employees a full
    evidentiary hearing before INS withholds, pursuant to 
    5 U.S.C. § 5512
    (a),1 the wages of such employees in satisfaction of a debt allegedly
    owed the United States. In a conversation with your Office we were in­
    formed that more precisely the question is what kind of due process hear­
    ing is required. Before we prooeed with our legalanalysis and discussion it
    would be useful to delineate briefly the relevant factual situation. The INS
    believed that one of its employees was obligated to reimburse the Govern­
    ment for the loss of certain funds for which INS deemed her accountable.
    Based upon an investigation, INS decided that the employee was account­
    able for $2,175.00, funds found to be missing from a district office. Of
    that amount, $655.00 was recovered, thus leaving the amount un­
    accounted for at $1,520.00. The investigation concluded that the employee
    failed to follow adequate procedures to safeguard the funds.
    The Federal Bureau of Investigation, by way of a separate investigation,
    concluded that the evidence was inconclusive and thus recommended
    against criminal prosecution. The INS, however, decided to recover the
    missing $1,520.00 by withholding from the employee’s pay a designated
    sum each pay period. We understand that it so advised the employee
    1 T hat provision reads as follows:
    The pay o f an individual in arrears to the United States shall be withheld until he has ac­
    counted for and paid into the Treasury o f the United States all sums for which he is liable.
    See 26 O p. A tt’y. G en. 77 (1906).
    269
    who responded by filing a Federal civil action seeking to enjoin INS from
    withholding any part of the pay. The U.S. Attorney handling the case ad­
    vised INS that he believed case law requires a “ due process” hearing prior
    to administrative wage-withholding. Thereafter the Government and the
    employee stipulated that the case should be dismissed without prejudice
    and that INS, which had not yet withheld any pay, would accord the
    employee a fulll evidentiary hearing through its grievance procedures.
    While this stipulation moots your questions as to this particular case, you
    state that you seek guidance for future cases.
    The Supreme Court in recent years has considered in a variety of cir­
    cumstances what due process requirements apply where deprivation of
    property interests are involved. The case that is most relevant here is
    Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 
    395 U.S. 337
     (1969). That case dealt
    with hearing requirements involving garnishment of wages. The court con­
    sidered a Wisconsin law allowing a garnishment to be instituted by the
    creditor’s lawyer by requesting the clerk of the state court to issue a sum­
    mons. Service of the summons upon the garnishee (the employer) effec­
    tively froze the employee’s (the alleged debtor’s) wages.
    The Court stated:
    [The wages] may, it is true, be unfrozen if the trial of the main
    suit is ever had and the wage earner wins on the merits. But in the
    interim the wage earner is deprived of his enjoyment of earned
    wages without any opportunity to be heard and to tender any
    defense he may have, whether it be fraud or otherwise. [
    395 U.S. at 339
    .]
    The Court noted that there may be extraordinary circumstances justifying
    a summary procedure, e.g., in order to protect the creditor against perma­
    nent loss. However, it found no such circumstances in the case.2 In ana­
    lyzing the requirements of due process with respect to attachments and
    other like processes, the Court stressed the unique nature of wages—“ a
    specialized type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic
    system.” 
    Id. at 340
    . The Court stated:
    [A] prejudgment garnishment of the Wisconsin type may as a
    practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall. Where
    the taking of one’s property is so obvious, it needs no extended
    argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hear­
    ing * * * this prejudgment garnishment procedure violates the
    fundamental principles of due process. [Id. at 341-342.]
    Hence what the Government seeks is essentially a recoupment or a
    setoff. However, this does not distinguish it from garnishment since both
    may “ as a practical matter drive a wage-earning family to the wall.”
    1 In the usual case there probably would be no extraordinary circumstances warranting
    such a summary procedure because the persons from whom the withholdings are to be made
    are G overnm ent employees who have a substantial interest in their jobs and are unlikely to
    abscond to avoid repaym ent.
    270
    The Court’s evident concern was that wages should not be withheld
    without a due process hearing. This is because wages, in most cases, sus­
    tain the wage earner and his family from week to week and any depriva­
    tion thereof could have potentially severe consequences.3
    It may be noted that 
    5 U.S.C. § 5512
    , the provision authorizing the
    withholding here, does not expressly provide for a hearing of any kind.
    The section speaks of an “ individual in arrears to the United States,” not
    of one suspected of being in arrears. But it does not deal with the due proc­
    ess requirement governing the determination of the individual’s liability.
    Accordingly, the process involved in the determination of liability must be
    considered apart from § 5512. Further, the Sniadach rule is constitution­
    ally based and cannot be undermined by statute. It is well established
    that if at all possible a statute will be construed to avoid constitutional
    difficulties. Thus, where a provision entails depriving individuals of
    property rights but fails to expressly provide for notice and a hearing,
    it must be read as embodying the procedural rights implicit in the due
    process clause. Pan American World Airways, Inc. v. Marshall, 
    439 F. Supp. 487
     (S.D.N.Y. 1977). By reading § 5512 as consistent with the due
    process clause it becomes clear that notice and a hearing are necessary
    before administrative withholding o f a Federal employee’s pay can be
    effected.
    Your precise question, as noted above, is whether a “ full evidentiary
    hearing” is required. Although Sniadach did not discuss in detail the hear­
    ing requirements needed for a wage-withholding, the Court did hold that
    an “ opportunity to be heard and to tender any defense” were required. Id.
    at 339. It is our opinion that a hearing similar to that required in Goldberg
    v. Kelly, 
    397 U.S. 254
     (1970) (termination of welfare benefits) is necessary
    here, that is, a hearing closely approximating a judicial trial. The
    Goldberg hearing procedure was summarized in Mathews v. Eldridge, 
    424 U.S. 319
    , 325 n. 5 (1976) as follows:
    (1) “ timely and adequate notice detailing the reasons for a pro­
    posed [Government action]” ; (2) “ an effective oppor­
    tunity * * * to defend by confronting any adverse witnesses
    and by presenting his own arguments and evidence orally” ;
    (3) retained counsel, if desired; (4) an “ impartial” decision­
    maker; (5) a decision resting “ solely on the legal rules and
    evidence adduced at the hearing” ; (6) a statement of reasons for
    the decision and the evidence relied on. 
    397 U.S., at 266-271
    .
    1 U nder the Wisconsin procedure, up to one-half o f a d ebtor’s wages could be frozen
    under the garnishment procedure. T hus, an argument can be made that freezing or
    withholding a significantly lesser portion o f a person’s wages would not require the same
    level o f due process protection. However, we believe that the better view is to consider any
    deprivation o f wages as substantial. Indeed, the C ourt in Sniadach did not appear to consider
    the potential severity o f the deprivation with respect to individual debtors. Rather, the focus
    was on the importance o f wages as a general m atter.
    271
    The Court in Mathews stated that the dictates of due process generally
    require consideration of three distinct factors:
    First, the private interest that will be affected by the official ac­
    tion; second, the risk o f an erroneous deprivation of such interest
    through the procedures used, and the probable value, if any, of
    additional or substitute procedural safeguards; and finally, the
    Government’s interest, including the function involved and the
    fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substi­
    tute procedural requirement would entail. [Id. at 355.]
    The private interest that may be adversely affected here by your agency’s
    action is potentially substantial. This is because wages are “ a specialized
    type of property presenting distinct problems in our economic system.”
    Sniadach, at 340.
    Moreover, as we understand it, the proposed wage-withholding in­
    volved here would constitute the final agency action. Thus, unless the
    employee sought judicial review and prevailed, the administrative depriva­
    tion will deprive the employee of the withheld wages. This is unlike
    Goldberg v. Kelly and Mathews v. Eldridge, in that the official action in
    those cases was temporary and subject to further administrative review
    which afforded the claimant an evidentiary hearing much like that ordered
    in Goldberg.* Accordingly, the deprivation would be final insofar as
    agency action was concerned so that heightened solicitude for the private
    interest is required. See, North Georgia Finishing, Inc. v. Di-Chem, Inc.,
    
    419 U.S. 601
    , 606 (1975), where the Court noted that “ the length or sever­
    ity of a deprivation of use or possession [of property] would be another
    factor to weigh in determining the appropriate form of hearing * *
    Concerning the second factor in Mathews, i.e., the value of additional
    procedural safeguards, it would seem that a wage-withholding hearing
    might frequently involve disputed factual issues and questions of credibil­
    ity. Thus, the hearing must be structured so as to provide for their resolu­
    tion. Mathews at 343-345. We do not know, of course, whether such
    issues will arise in a particular case.
    Finally, the cost to the Government of a Goldberg-type evidentiary
    hearing probably would not result in a significant burden on the Govern­
    ment. The Court in Mathews noted that the cost to the Government of
    providing statutory benefits to ineligible recipients pending decision would
    not be insubstantial. 
    424 U.S. at 347
    . This concern would be inapplicable
    in wage-withholding actions because the employee is otherwise clearly en­
    titled to his or her wages. Further, it seems unlikely that the costs of the
    hearings themselves would impose a significant burden on the Government.
    4 While the welfare recipient in Goldberg was entitled to an evidentiary hearing, the
    primary issue was whether the hearing was required before the term ination o f benefits or
    whether term ination could be m ade subject to a subsequent evidentiary hearing. 397 U .S. at
    259-260.
    272
    For these reasons, w e believe that a Goldberg v. Kelly-type hearing is re­
    quired in adm inistrative wage w ithholdings.
    Leon U lm an
    Deputy Assistant Attorney General
    Office o f Legal Counsel
    273