Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Requiring Renomination and Reconfirmation of Executive Branch Officers Upon the Expiration of a Presidential Term ( 1987 )


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  •       Constitutionality of Proposed Legislation Requiring
    Renomination and Reconfirmation of Executive Branch
    Officers Upon the Expiration of a Presidential Term
    A bill prohibiting the heads o f Executive and Military Departments and certain other Executive
    officers from remaining in their positions during a subsequent Presidential term unless
    renominated by the President and reconfirmed by the Senate would, if applied to officers
    appointed before the bill was enacted, unconstitutionally interfere with the President’s ap­
    pointment and removal powers. Even were the bill limited to prospective effect, it would be
    subject to serious constitutional doubt as contrary to the Constitution’s placement o f the
    Executive power in the President.
    March 6, 1987
    L etter     fo r th e    C h a ir m a n ,
    S e n a t e C o m m it t e e   on the    J u d ic ia r y
    This letter presents the views of the Department of Justice on S. 318, the
    Senate Confirmation Act of 1987. The Department of Justice strongly opposes
    the enactment of this bill.
    The bill would provide that the heads of the Executive and Military Depart­
    ments, the United States Trade Representative, the Director of the Office of
    Management and Budget, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and
    the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency who have served in
    that position during the last year of a Presidential term may not serve in the
    same position during the succeeding Presidential term unless reappointed by
    the President by and with the advice and consent of the Senate.1 The bill does
    not facially distinguish between officers appointed after its enactment and
    officers who are incumbent at the time of the bill’s enactment.
    The application of the reconfirmation requirement to persons in office on the
    effective date of the bill clearly would be unconstitutional. At present, these
    incumbent officers serve at the pleasure of the President and could therefore
    remain in office after the expiration of the term of the President who appointed
    them, if he were re-elected or if a newly elected President should wish to retain
    1 Section 2(b) o f the bill would require that all inform ation obtained in the course o f a background
    investigation conducted by the Federal B ureau o f Investigation w ith respect to specified nom inees w hich is
    transm itted to the President shall also be transm itted to the Senate. The bill does not explicitly w aive or
    preserve any statutory non-disclosure provisions that could apply to m aterials found in a background
    investigation, such as brand ju ry m aterials, fo r exam ple. W e believe that C ongress should make c le ar its
    intent to w aive or preserve any such provisions.
    25
    them.2 Under the bill, however, they could not serve during the next Presiden­
    tial term unless reappointed by the President by and with the advice and
    consent of the Senate. Thus, the bill would purport to remove incumbent
    officers from their offices and in so doing would contravene the Constitution.
    As the Supreme Court held in Myers v. United States, 
    272 U.S. 52
    , 122
    (1926), the power to remove officers of the Executive Branch is vested exclu­
    sively in the President with the exception of impeachment or the bona fide
    abolition of their office. Indeed, the exclusivity of the President’s removal
    power cannot be circumvented by an attempt of the Senate to withdraw a
    confirmation; 36 Op. Att’y Gen. 382 (1931); United States v. Smith, 
    286 U.S. 6
    (1932); by cutting off of the salaries of incumbent officials, United States v.
    Lovett, 
    382 U.S. 303
     (1946); by making new, limiting qualifications for an
    office applicable to an incumbent, 111 Cong. Rec. 17597-98 (1965) (statement
    of Assistant Attorney General Schlei); or by “ripper” legislation which pur­
    ports to abolish an office and immediately recreate it. Veto Message re; S. 518,
    93rd Cong., 1st Sess., 9 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 681 (1973).
    The proposal raises constitutional concerns, even as to officers who are
    appointed after the enactment of the bill. The United States Constitution
    explicitly states: “The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the
    United States of America.” U.S. Const, art. II, §1. In addition, §3 of the same
    article provides that the President “shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully
    executed.” A law which has the effect of subjecting executive officers to
    renomination and reconfirmation by the Senate is in tension with the placement
    of the executive power in the President. If the Congress sets a duration for the
    service of executive officers, those officers will naturally be responsive to the
    concerns of the Senate in executing the laws; otherwise, those officers would
    run the risk that the Senate would not reconfirm them at the end of their term.3
    Such a sharing of the responsibility for the execution of the laws is at odds with
    separation of powers principles.4
    2 The opinion o f the A ttorney General in 36 Op. A tt’y Gen. 12 (1929) dealt with that situation.
    3 M aking executive officers accountable in this m anner to the Legislative Branch is contrary to our
    constitu tio n al schem e. As the Supreme C o u rt has explicitly recognized, the pow er to remove is “an indispens­
    able a id ” to the “effective enforcement o f the law .” Myers v. United States, 
    272 U.S. 52
    , 132 (1926). The
    C ourt, therefore, found this power to be an incident o f the President's pow er to take care that the law s be
    faithfu lly executed. Last Term , in Bowsher v. Synar, 
    478 U.S. 714
     (1986), the Supreme C ourt recognized the
    logical corollary to this principle'
    T o perm it an o fficer controlled by C ongress to execute the laws w ould be, in essence, to perm it a
    congressional veto. Congress could sim ply remove, o r threaten to remove, an officer for execut­
    ing the law s in any fashion found to unsatisfactory to Congress. This kind o f congressional
    control over the execution of the law s . . . is constitutionally imperm issible.
    
    Id.
     at 7 2 6 -2 7 (em phasis added). Though th e encroachm ent on executive pow er posed by this bill is different
    in degree from that presented in Bowsher, in which Congress had the sole authonty to remove the C om ptrol­
    le r G eneral, the principle is the same. L egislation giving Congress the effective pow er of removal over
    execu tiv e officers, even w hen applied prospectively, is questionable in view of the C onstitution’s exclusive
    vestin g o f the executive pow er in the P resident and his constitutional duty to take care that the law s be
    faithfu lly executed.
    4 T he C onstitution specifies the role o f th e C ongress in the rem oval o f executive officers: the House has the
    sole pow er o f im peachm ent, U.S. C onst, art. 1, §2, cl. 5, and the S enate has the sole power to try all
    im peachm ents. Id., art. 1, §3, cl. 6.
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    Although the Tenure of Office Act of 1867 furnishes an historical example
    of legislation purporting to limit the terms of the Heads of Departments, that
    precedent hardly resolves our constitutional concerns.5 The Tenure of Office
    Act led to a constitutional crisis of immense proportions and was repealed once
    the turmoil of the Reconstruction Period had subsided. While other issues were
    also involved, we believe that this prompt repeal is some evidence of the
    suspect nature of such limitations.
    On policy grounds, we believe that history demonstrates the inadvisability of
    this legislation in light of the existing power of Congress to call high govern­
    ment officials to account for their conduct in office. Similarly, an electorate
    dissatisfied with a President’s direction of his subordinate officers has not
    hesitated to express its view through the Presidential ballot. So too, the
    electorate’s satisfaction with such direction is expressed through the re-elec-
    tion of a President. The Constitution’s mechanism for democratic, electoral
    expression should not be thwarted or made dependent upon idiosyncratic
    reasons which may determine the fate of an individual reconfirmation.
    We are also concerned about the disruption to the operations of the govern­
    ment that would be occasioned by this proposal. The present disruption which
    occurs when a new President takes office, selects new administrators and
    secures their confirmation by the Senate is an adjunct to the President’s
    constitutional responsibility for the execution of the laws. He must be able to select
    those who shall assist him in his constitutionally assigned task. There is, however,
    no corresponding constitutional justification for the interference with the operations
    of the government when a President seeks to retain officials who are in office.
    We conclude, therefore, that S. 318 would be unconstitutional if applied to
    persons holding any of the offices covered by it on the effective date of the bill.
    Furthermore, in our judgment, the bill would be subject to serious constitu­
    tional doubt even if it had only a prospective effect. For these reasons, the
    Department of Justice strongly recommends against enactment of the legisla­
    tion and will urge its veto should it be enacted.
    The Office of Management and Budget has advised this Department that the
    submission of this report is in accord with the Administration’s program.
    John R. B olton
    Assistant Attorney General
    Office o f Legislative Affairs*
    5 Section 1 o f the T enure o f O ffice Act o f 1867, 
    14 Stat. 430
    , provided in pertinent part
    [t]hat the Secretaries o f the Treasury, o f W ar, o f the Navy, and o f the Interior, the Postm aster-
    G eneral, and the A ttorney-G eneral, shall hold their offices respectively for and during the term of
    the President by whom they may have been appointed and for one month thereafter, subject to
    rem oval by and with the advice and consent o f the Senate.
    This provision was enacted during the struggle betw een C ongress and President Andrew Johnson and was
    repealed im m ediately after President G rant assum ed the Presidency Act o f Apr. 5, 1869, § 1 ,1 
    6 Stat. 9
    . The
    position o f the Postm aster General was not covered by this repeal because the limitation o f the Postm aster
    G eneral’s term had been incorporated in the legislation codifying the laws governing the Post O ffice
    D epartment. This lim itation on the tenure o f the Postm aster General lasted until the recent establishm ent o f
    the U S Postal Service.
    •NOTE* This letter was drafted by the O ffice o f Legal Counsel for the signature o f the A ssistant Attorney
    G eneral for the O ffice o f L egislative Affairs
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Document Info

Filed Date: 3/6/1987

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/29/2017