Araceli Gonzalez v. Bank of America Na , 643 F. App'x 665 ( 2016 )


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  •                                                                             FILED
    NOT FOR PUBLICATION                             MAR 23 2016
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                       U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
    ARACELI GONZALEZ; MARIO E.                       No. 13-16309
    GONZALEZ,
    D.C. No. 2:12-cv-02305-JAT
    Plaintiffs - Appellants,
    v.                                              MEMORANDUM*
    BANK OF AMERICA, N.A., successor by
    merger; et al.,
    Defendant - Appellee.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the District of Arizona
    James A. Teilborg, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted March 15, 2016**
    Before:        GOODWIN, LEAVY, and CHRISTEN, Circuit Judges.
    Araceli and Mario E. Gonzalez appeal pro se from the district court’s
    judgment dismissing their diversity action alleging state law foreclosure claims.
    We have jurisdiction under 
    28 U.S.C. § 1291
    . We review de novo a district court’s
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    dismissal for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
    12(b)(6). Hebbe v. Pliler, 
    627 F.3d 338
    , 341 (9th Cir. 2010). We affirm.
    The district properly dismissed plaintiffs’ action because plaintiffs failed to
    allege facts sufficient to state plausible wrongful foreclosure and quiet title claims.
    See 
    id. at 341-42
     (although pro se pleadings are liberally construed, a plaintiff must
    still present factual allegations sufficient to state a plausible claim for relief). To
    the extent that plaintiffs challenge the ability of Mortgage Electronic Registration
    Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) to assign its interest in plaintiffs’ deed of trust, these
    arguments fail. See Sitton v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 
    311 P.3d 237
     (Ariz.
    Ct. App. 2013) (holding that MERS, as nominee and beneficiary of a deed of trust,
    may assign the note and deed of trust).
    The district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs’ Rule
    60(b) motion for reconsideration because plaintiffs did not demonstrate any
    grounds warranting such relief. See Am. Ironworks & Erectors, Inc. v. N. Am.
    Construction Co., 
    248 F.3d 892
    , 899 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Because North American
    and Federal simply reargued their case . . . the district court did not abuse its
    discretion in denying the motion [for reconsideration].”).
    We reject plaintiffs’ contention that the district court was required to hold a
    hearing before deciding their motion for reconsideration. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 78(b)
    2                                       13-16309
    (“By rule or order, the court may provide for submitting and determining motions
    on briefs, without oral hearings.”).
    We do not consider issues or arguments not specifically and distinctly raised
    and argued in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 
    587 F.3d 983
    , 985 n.2 (9th
    Cir. 2009).
    AFFIRMED.
    3                                   13-16309
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-16309

Citation Numbers: 643 F. App'x 665

Filed Date: 3/23/2016

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/13/2023