Ex parte Linda Faye Manning. , 170 So. 3d 638 ( 2014 )

REL: 12/05/2014
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SUPREME COURT OF ALABAMA
OCTOBER TERM, 2014-2015
_________________________
1131152
_________________________
Ex parte Linda Faye Manning
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS
(In re: Shannon Richardson
v.
Linda Faye Manning)
(Macon Circuit Court, CV-14-900034)
WISE, Justice.
Linda Faye Manning, the defendant below, filed a petition
for a writ of mandamus requesting that this Court direct the
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Macon Circuit Court to vacate its order denying her motion to
transfer this action to the Montgomery Circuit Court and to
enter an order granting the motion. We grant the petition and
issue the writ.
Facts and Procedural History
On February 28, 2014, Shannon Richardson filed a
complaint in the Macon Circuit Court against Manning, stating
claims of negligence and wantonness as a result of a motor-
vehicle accident that occurred in Montgomery County on October
3, 2012. Richardson sustained injuries and was taken by
ambulance to Baptist South Hospital in Montgomery after the
accident. Law-enforcement personnel who responded to the
accident worked in Montgomery County. At all material times,
Richardson was a resident of Montgomery County, and Manning
was a resident of Macon County.
On March 25, 2014, Manning filed a motion to transfer the
action to Montgomery County based on the doctrine of forum non
conveniens, as codified in § 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975. On
April 1, 2014, Richardson filed a response in opposition to
the motion to transfer. On June 4, 2014, the trial court
denied the motion to transfer. This petition followed.
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Standard of Review
"A petition for a writ of mandamus is the
appropriate 'method for obtaining review of a denial
of a motion for a change of venue' pursuant to §
6–3–21.1. Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So.
2d 788, 789 (Ala. 1998). ...
"'....'
"'A party moving for a transfer under § 6–3–21.1
has the initial burden of showing, among other
things, one of two factors: (1) that the transfer
is justified based on the convenience of either the
parties or the witnesses, or (2) that the transfer
is justified "in the interest of justice."' Ex
parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So. 3d 536, 539
(Ala. 2008). Although we review a ruling on a
motion to transfer to determine whether the trial
court exceeded its discretion in granting or denying
the motion, id., where 'the convenience of the
parties and witnesses or the interest of justice
would be best served by a transfer, § 6–3–21.1, Ala.
Code 1975, compels the trial court to transfer the
action to the alternative forum.' Ex parte First
Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 912
(Ala. 2008) (emphasis added)."
Ex parte Wachovia Bank, N.A., 77 So. 3d 570, 573 (Ala. 2011).
Discussion
Manning argues that the trial court exceeded its
discretion in denying her motion to transfer the action from
Macon County to Montgomery County. Specifically, she contends
that Montgomery County has a strong connection to the case
because all the material events that gave rise to Richardson's
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claims occurred there. In contrast, Manning asserts that
Macon County has, at best, only a tenuous connection to the
case -- namely, the fact that she resides there. After noting
that the court deciding the transfer issue must consider "the
burden of piling court services and resources upon the people
of a county that is not affected by the case and ... the
interest of the people of a county to have a case that arises
in their county tried close to public view in their county,"
Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982 So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala.
2007), Manning asserts that the interest-of-justice prong of
Alabama's forum non conveniens statute mandates a transfer to
Montgomery County.
Section 6-3-21.1, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent
part:
"With respect to civil actions filed in an
appropriate venue, any court of general jurisdiction
shall, for the convenience of parties and witnesses,
or in the interest of justice, transfer any civil
action or any claim in any civil action to any court
of general jurisdiction in which the action might
have been properly filed and the case shall proceed
as though originally filed therein."
(Emphasis added.)
"Historically, the plaintiff has had the initial
choice of venue under the system established by the
legislature for determining venue. Before the
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enactment of § 6–3–21.1 by the Alabama Legislature
in 1987, a plaintiff's choice of venue could not be
disturbed on the basis of convenience to the parties
or the witnesses or in the interest of justice.
With the adoption of § 6–3–21.1, trial courts now
have 'the power and the duty to transfer a cause
when "the interest of justice" requires a transfer.'
Ex parte First Family Fin. Servs., Inc., 718 So. 2d
658, 660 (Ala. 1998) (emphasis added). In First
Family, this Court noted that an argument that trial
judges have almost unlimited discretion in
determining whether a case should be transferred
under § 6–3–21.1 'must be considered in light of the
fact that the Legislature used the word "shall"
instead of the word "may" in § 6–3–21.1.' 718 So.
2d at 660. This Court has further held that
'Alabama's forum non conveniens statute is
compulsory.' Ex parte Sawyer, 892 So. 2d 898, 905
n.9 (Ala. 2004)."
Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d 745, 748-49
(Ala. 2010).
"The 'interest of justice' prong of § 6–3–21.1
requires 'the transfer of the action from a county
with little, if any, connection to the action, to
the county with a strong connection to the action.'
Ex parte National Sec. Ins. Co., 727 So. 2d [788,]
790 [(Ala. 1998)]. Therefore, 'in analyzing the
interest-of-justice prong of § 6–3–21.1, this Court
focuses on whether the "nexus" or "connection"
between the plaintiff's action and the original
forum is strong enough to warrant burdening the
plaintiff's forum with the action.' Ex parte First
Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994 So. 2d 906, 911
(Ala. 2008). Additionally, this Court has held that
'litigation should be handled in the forum where the
injury occurred.' Ex parte Fuller, 955 So. 2d 414,
416 (Ala. 2006). Further, in examining whether it
is in the interest of justice to transfer a case, we
consider 'the burden of piling court services and
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resources upon the people of a county that is not
affected by the case and ... the interest of the
people of a county to have a case that arises in
their county tried close to public view in their
county.' Ex parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth., 982
So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala. 2007)."
Ex parte Indiana Mills & Mfg., Inc., 10 So. 3d 536, 540 (Ala.
2008).
The parties do not dispute that the complaint was filed
in an appropriate venue, namely, Macon County. Likewise, they
do not dispute that the action could properly have been filed
in Montgomery County.1 However, they do dispute whether the
interest-of-justice prong of § 6-3-21.1 requires a transfer of
this case from Macon County to Montgomery County.
1
With regard to venue of actions against individuals, §
6-3-2, Ala. Code 1975, provides, in pertinent part:
"(a) In proceedings of a legal nature against
individuals:
"....
"(3) All other personal actions [i.e.,
those not identified in subparagraphs (1)
and (2)] if the defendant or one of the
defendants has within the state a permanent
residence, may be commenced in the county
of such residence or in the county in which
the act or omission complained of may have
been done or may have occurred."
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As Manning points out in her reply brief, this Court
recently addressed a factually similar case and similar
arguments in Ex parte Morton, [Ms. 1130302, August 29, 2014]
___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. 2014). In Ex parte Morton, Watkins, a
resident of Jefferson County, filed a complaint in the Greene
Circuit Court against Morton, a resident of Greene County,
asserting claims that arose out of an automobile accident that
had occurred in Jefferson County. After the accident, Watkins
was treated at a hospital in Jefferson County and later
received medical treatment at four health-care facilities
located in Jefferson County. Morton filed a motion to
transfer the case to Jefferson County based on the doctrine of
forum non conveniens; the trial court denied that motion, and
Morton petitioned this Court for a writ of mandamus.
This Court granted Morton's petition and issued the writ,
reasoning, in relevant part:
"In reviewing this case under the
interest-of-justice prong of § 6–3–21.1(a), we must
'determine whether "the interest of justice"
overrides the deference due the plaintiff's choice
of forum' in the present case. [Ex parte] J & W
Enters., [LLC, [Ms. 1121423, March 28, 2014]] ___
So. 3d [___,] ___ [(Ala. 2014)]. We hold that it
does.
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"In Ex parte Wachovia [Bank, N.A., 77 So. 2d 570
(Ala. 2011)], this Court thoroughly discussed the
application of the interest-of-justice prong of §
6–3–21.1(a) in several cases involving facts similar
to those presented in this case:
"'In its petition for the writ of
mandamus, Wachovia relies solely on the
interest-of-justice prong as a ground for
transfer.
"'"'[I]n analyzing the
interest-of-justice prong of §
6–3–21.1, this Court focuses on
whether the "nexus" or
"connection" between the
plaintiff's action and the
original forum is strong enough
to warrant burdening the
plaintiff's forum with the
action.' Ex parte First
Tennessee Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 994
So. 2d [906,] 911 [(Ala.
2008)].... Further, in examining
whether it is in the interest of
justice to transfer a case, we
consider 'the burden of piling
court services and resources upon
the people of a county that is
not affected by the case and ...
the interest of the people of a
county to have a case that arises
in their county tried close to
public view in their county.' Ex
parte Smiths Water & Sewer Auth.,
982 So. 2d 484, 490 (Ala. 2007)."
"'Ex parte Indiana Mills [& Mfg., Inc.], 10
So. 3d [536] at 540 [(Ala. 2008)]. Thus,
the dispositive question is whether the
nexus between this action and Macon County
is "strong enough to warrant burdening"
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Macon County with this action. For the
following reasons, we hold that it is not.
"'Lee County is the situs of all the
alleged acts or omissions giving rise to
the plaintiffs' claims. Any allegedly
unauthorized withdrawals were made from a
Wachovia branch in Lee County. Police
investigation of the matter was conducted
in Lee County. Lee County is Floyd's place
of residence, as well as the location of
Unique [Image Pro Car Care, Floyd's
business]. Thus, Lee County is the place
where all the injury alleged in the
complaint occurred. Although it is not a
talisman, the fact that the injury occurred
in the proposed transferee county is often
assigned considerable weight in an
interest-of-justice analysis. See Ex parte
Autauga Heating & Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d
745, 748 (Ala. 2010) ("'[T]his Court has
held that "litigation should be handled in
the forum where the injury occurred."'"
(quoting Ex parte Indiana Mills, 10 So. 3d
at 540)); Ex parte McKenzie Oil, Inc., 13
So. 3d 346, 349 (Ala. 2008) (same).
"'In short, nothing material to this
case transpired in Macon County. Macon
County's sole material contact with this
case is that the two individual defendants
... reside there. Recent cases decided
under the interest-of-justice prong are
dispositive.
"'In Ex parte Autauga Heating &
Cooling, LLC, for example, this Court
issued a writ of mandamus directing the
Montgomery Circuit Court -- in the interest
of justice -- to transfer the action to
Elmore County. 58 So. 3d at 747. That
case arose out of an automobile accident
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involving Lori Lee Wright, a resident of
Elmore County, and Richard Alexander
Rogers, a resident of Montgomery County.
The vehicle being operated by Rogers at the
time of the accident was owned by Autauga
Heating & Cooling, LLC ("Autauga"), which
had its principal place of business in
Autauga County. The accident occurred in
Elmore County, and Wright received
treatment at the scene of the accident from
emergency medical personnel who lived in
Elmore County. 58 So. 3d at 749. When an
action was brought against Rogers in the
county of his residence, Rogers sought the
removal of the action to Elmore County, the
situs of the alleged acts or omissions and
the place of the injury.
"'This Court concluded that a transfer
of the case was required. In so doing, we
said:
"'"Although we agree with
Wright that the case has a
connection with Montgomery County
because Rogers is a resident of
Montgomery County and [Autauga]
may have some business
connections there, ... the
overall connection between
Montgomery County and this case
is weak and ... the connection
between the case and Elmore
County is strong.
"'"... Besides the fact that
Rogers is a resident of
Montgomery County, there was no
other evidence before the trial
court indicating a connection
between the case and Montgomery
County.
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"'"....
"'"The accident underlying
this action occurred in Elmore
County, and the emergency
personnel who responded to the
accident were from Elmore County.
The plaintiff herself is a
resident of Elmore County. This
Court sees no need to burden
Montgomery County, with its weak
connection to the case, with an
action that arose in Elmore
County simply because the
individual defendant resides in
Montgomery County and the
corporate defendant does some
business there."
"'58 So. 3d at 750 (emphasis added).
"'In so holding, this Court relied on
and discussed Ex parte Indiana Mills &
Manufacturing, Inc.:
"'"This Court addressed similar
facts in Ex parte Indiana Mills &
Manufacturing, Inc., supra. In
Indiana Mills, the decedent was
driving a garbage truck in Lee
County owned by his employer when
the raised rear door of the truck
struck an overhead railroad
trestle, causing the truck to
crash. The decedent was killed
when he was ejected from the
truck. His widow filed a
complaint in Macon County against
the manufacturers of the garbage
truck and the seat belts in the
truck and three employees of the
decedent's employer. The
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employer's principal place of
business was in Tallapoosa
County. The employer conducted
business in Macon County, and one
of the individual defendants
lived in Macon County. The
defendants moved the trial court
to transfer the case to Lee
County based on the doctrine of
forum non conveniens. The trial
court denied that motion, and the
defendants petitioned this Court
for mandamus relief.
"'"This Court granted the
defendants' mandamus petition and
ordered the trial court to
transfer the case from Macon
County to Lee County based on the
'interest of justice' prong of §
6–3–21.1. In doing so, this
Court noted that the accident
occurred in Lee County, that the
law-enforcement and emergency
personnel who had responded to
the accident were based out of
Lee County, that the chief deputy
coroner who investigated the
decedent's death did his work in
Lee County, and that the records
and documents of the fire
department that responded to the
accident were located in Lee
County. Comparing this to the
fact that only one of the
individual defendants resided in
Macon County and that the
employer conducted business
there, there being no other
relevant facts involving Macon
County, this Court held that the
nexus between Lee County and the
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case was strong, that the nexus
between Macon County and the case
was weak, and that the trial
court thus had exceeded its
discretion in refusing to
transfer the case to Lee County."
"'Ex parte Autauga Heating & Cooling, 58
So. 3d at 750 (discussing Ex parte Indiana
Mills) (emphasis added).
"'In this case, as in Autauga Heating
& Cooling and Indiana Mills, the injury
occurred in the county to which the
transfer is sought. Here, as in Autauga
Heating & Cooling and Indiana Mills, no
material act or omission occurred in the
forum county. As in Indiana Mills, the
official investigation of the incident was
in the county to which the transfer was
sought -- here, Lee County.'
"77 So. 3d at 573–75.
"As in Wachovia, Ex parte Autauga Heating &
Cooling, LLC, 58 So. 3d 745 (Ala. 2010), and Ex
parte Indiana Mills & Manufacturing, Inc., 10 So. 3d
536 (Ala. 2008), Watkins's injury occurred in the
county to which transfer is sought -- Jefferson
County; Watkins is also a resident of Jefferson
County and received treatment in four separate
medical facilities located in Jefferson County.
Additionally, as in Wachovia and Indiana Mills, the
official investigation of the incident was conducted
in the county to which the transfer is sought.
Furthermore, as in Wachovia, Autauga Heating &
Cooling, and Indiana Mills, no material act or
omission occurred in Greene County.
"Watkins argues that Wachovia, Autauga Heating
& Cooling, and Indiana Mills are distinguishable
because each of those cases involved multiple
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defendants residing in both the forum and transferee
counties. Although the number and residency of the
defendants may affect an interest-of-justice
analysis under § 6–3–21.1(a), the fact that the
above cases involved multiple defendants does not
render them inapposite to the present case involving
only one defendant. Considering the similarities
between the above cases and the present one, that
factual distinction in this case -- that Morton is
the sole defendant -- is de minimis. See, e.g.,
Wachovia, 77 So. 3d at 575 ('As in [Autauga Heating
& Cooling and Indiana Mills], the only material
connection with the forum county is a defendant's
residence. To be sure, in this case two defendants
reside in the forum county, rather than one. Given
the posture of this case, however, that distinction
is inconsequential.').
"For the reasons explained above, Jefferson
County has a significantly stronger connection to
this case than does Greene County, which is
connected to this case only by the fact that Morton
resides there -- a connection this Court has
characterized as 'weak.' See Autauga Heating &
Cooling, 58 So. 3d at 750 ('This Court sees no need
to burden Montgomery County, with its weak
connection to the case, with an action that arose in
Elmore County simply because the individual
defendant resides in Montgomery County and the
corporate defendant does some business there.');
Indiana Mills, 10 So. 3d at 542 ('We see no need for
Macon County, with its weak connection with this
case, to be burdened with an action that arose in
Lee County simply because one of several defendants
resides there. Instead, Lee County clearly has a
strong connection with this case. See Ex parte
Verbena United Methodist Church, 953 So. 2d 395, 400
(Ala. 2006) (holding that the "weak nexus" with the
county in which an action was filed did not "justify
burdening" that county with the trial of that
action; thus, the doctrine of forum non conveniens
required the case be transferred to a county that
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had "a much stronger nexus").'). Accordingly, the
interest of justice overrides Watkins's choice of
forum. Therefore, Morton has a clear legal right to
the relief she seeks."
Ex parte Morton, ___ So. 3d at ___ (footnote omitted).
Based on the reasoning in Ex parte Morton and the cases
cited therein, Manning has established that Montgomery County
has a stronger connection to the claims in this case than has
Macon County. The accident occurred in Montgomery County;
law-enforcement personnel who responded to the accident worked
in Montgomery County; Richardson was taken to a hospital in
Montgomery County after the accident; and Richardson was a
resident of Montgomery County.2 In contrast, Macon County's
only connection to the case was the fact that Manning is a
resident of Macon County. Because Macon County has only a
very weak overall connection to the claims and Montgomery
County has a much stronger connection to the claims, the
2
In her petition, Manning cites additional "facts" that
allegedly support a transfer to Montgomery County. However,
because those "facts" were "contained in 'statements of
counsel in motions, briefs, and arguments,' [they] cannot be
considered 'evidentiary material' and thus will not be
considered by this Court." Autauga Heating & Cooling, 58 So.
3d at 749-50.
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interest-of-justice prong of the forum non conveniens statute
requires that the action be transferred to Montgomery County.
Conclusion
For the above-stated reasons, we conclude that the trial
court exceeded its discretion in denying Manning's motion for
a change of venue based on the interest-of-justice prong of
the forum non conveniens statute. Accordingly, we grant
Manning's petition for the writ of mandamus and direct the
trial court, in the interest of justice, to enter an order
transferring the case from the Macon Circuit Court to the
Montgomery Circuit Court.
PETITION GRANTED; WRIT ISSUED.
Stuart, Bolin, Parker, Shaw, Main, and Bryan, JJ.,
concur.
Moore, C.J., and Murdock, J., dissent.
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