United States v. Miguel Fonseca , 369 F. App'x 825 ( 2010 )


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  •                              NOT FOR PUBLICATION
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS                        FILED
    FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT                           MAR 05 2010
    MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
    U .S. C O U R T OF APPE ALS
    UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,                       No. 09-50254
    Plaintiff - Appellee,             D.C. No. 3:08-CR-03610-DMS
    v.
    MEMORANDUM *
    MIGUEL ANGEL FONSECA,
    Defendant - Appellant.
    Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Southern District of California
    Dana M. Sabraw, District Judge, Presiding
    Submitted February 16, 2010 **
    Before:        FERNANDEZ, GOULD, and M. SMITH, Circuit Judges.
    Miguel Angel Fonseca appeals from the 36-month sentence imposed
    following his guilty-plea conviction for attempted entry after deportation, in
    violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326. We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291,
    *
    This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
    except as provided by 9th Cir. R. 36-3.
    **
    The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
    without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
    EG/Research
    and we affirm.
    Fonseca contends that the district court procedurally erred by failing to
    address several of his sentencing arguments and that the sentence was
    substantively unreasonable because it failed adequately to reflect the
    considerations at 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Our review of the record indicates that the
    judge’s explanation of the sentence was procedurally adequate under the
    circumstances. See Rita v. United States, 
    551 U.S. 338
    , 359 (2007); United States
    v. Carty, 
    520 F.3d 984
    , 995 (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc). Considering the totality of
    the circumstances, the 36-month sentence—five months below the advisory
    guidelines range—was substantively reasonable. 
    Id. at 993.
    Fonseca also contends that application of the 16-level enhancement under
    U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 resulted in improper double-counting of the fact of his prior
    conviction, because the prior conviction was also considered in calculating his
    criminal history category. This argument is foreclosed by United States v. Garcia-
    Cardenas, 
    555 F.3d 1049
    (9th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
    Finally, Fonseca contends that the district court erred in applying the 16-
    level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 because Fonseca’s prior conviction for
    lewd or lascivious acts with a child under 14 years of age, in violation of Cal. Penal
    Code § 288(a), does not qualify as a crime of violence. He contends that
    EG/Research                                2                                       09-50254
    Estrada-Espinoza v. Mukasey, 
    546 F.3d 1147
    (9th Cir. 2008) (en banc), overruled
    United States v. Baron-Medina, 
    187 F.3d 1144
    (9th Cir. 1999), and United States
    v. Medina-Maella, 
    351 F.3d 944
    (9th Cir. 2003). This contention is foreclosed by
    United States v. Medina-Villa, 
    567 F.3d 507
    , 511-16 (9th Cir. 2009). Fonseca’s
    related contention that Nijhawan v. Holder, 
    129 S. Ct. 2294
    (2009), effectively
    overruled Medina-Villa also fails. See 
    Nijhawan, 129 S. Ct. at 2300
    .
    AFFIRMED.
    EG/Research                              3                                   09-50254