June Williams v. The Thompson Corp. , 383 F.3d 789 ( 2004 )


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  •                    United States Court of Appeals
    FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 03-2395
    ___________
    June Williams,                          *
    *
    Appellant,          *
    * Appeal from the United States
    v.                                * District Court for the
    * District of Minnesota.
    *
    The Thomson Corporation; Thomson *           [PUBLISHED]
    Publishing Corporation; West            *
    Publishing Company, doing business      *
    as West Legal Publishing, doing         *
    business as West Group; Brian Hall;     *
    Andrew Prozes; Timothy J. Blank;        *
    Jeannine Bieter; Lea Harpster, also     *
    known as Lea Walstrom; Kevin            *
    Appold; Kay Engler; Kirk Emmen,         *
    *
    Appellees.          *
    ___________
    Submitted: May 14, 2004
    Filed: August 25, 2004
    ___________
    Before MURPHY, HEANEY, and MAGILL, Circuit Judges.
    ___________
    PER CURIAM.
    June R. Williams was terminated on February 4, 1998, after four years of
    working as a reference attorney for the Westlaw division of West Group. Following
    her termination, Williams lodged a complaint against Westlaw with the Office of
    Federal Contract Compliance Programs, alleging that she was discriminated against
    on the basis of her race, sex, religion, and disability. Williams’s complaint was
    referred to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), which mailed
    a right-to-sue letter to her on-file address on June 17, 1999. Williams filed suit
    against West Publishing Corporation, The Thomson Corporation, several of
    Thomson’s subsidiaries, and various West employees on October 21, 1999, in the
    United States District Court for the District of Ohio, advancing claims under Title
    VII, 
    42 U.S.C. § 1981
    , the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Equal Pay
    Act, the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Minnesota Whistleblower’s Act, and the
    Family Medical Leave Act. The district court in Ohio granted the defendants’ motion
    to transfer the case to the District of Minnesota. After the case was transferred, the
    defendants moved for summary judgment, urging the district court1 to dismiss several
    of the claims as time-barred and to dismiss the remaining claims on the merits. The
    court granted the motion and Williams now appeals. After carefully reviewing the
    record before us, see McKay v. United States Dep’t of Transp., 
    340 F.3d 695
    , 697
    (8th Cir. 2003) (applying de novo review to an appeal from a grant of summary
    judgment), we affirm.
    We agree with the district court that Williams’s Title VII and ADA claims are
    time-barred, see 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1); 
    42 U.S.C. § 12117
    (a) (applying the 90-
    day statute of limitations to ADA claims); Maegdlin v. Int’l Ass’n of Machinists &
    Aerospace Workers, Dist. 949, 
    309 F.3d 1051
    , 1054 (8th Cir. 2002) (affirming the
    dismissal of Title VII claims as untimely because they were filed more than 90 days
    after the issuance of the right-to-sue letter). Williams’s explanation that she did not
    read the right-to-sue letter until two weeks after it arrived at her forwarding address,
    does not save her claims from being time-barred. Hill v. John Chezik Imps., 
    869 F.2d 1
    The Honorable Michael J. Davis, United States District Court Judge for the
    District of Minnesota.
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    1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 1989) (“Generally, the ninety-day filing period begins to run on
    the day the right to sue letter is received at the most recent address that a plaintiff has
    provided the EEOC.”); St. Louis v. Alverno Coll., 
    744 F.2d 1314
    , 1317 (8th Cir.
    1984). Additionally, Williams’s argument that the district court was bound by the
    law of the case doctrine because the Ohio court ordered her case transferred, as
    opposed to dismissing her claims as untimely, is incorrect. See Murr Plumbing, Inc.
    v. Scherer Bros. Fin. Servs., Co., 
    48 F.3d 1066
    , 1070 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he doctrine
    of law of the case is applicable only to final judgments, not to interlocutory orders.”);
    United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Family Life Assurance Co., 
    787 F.2d 438
     (8th Cir.
    1986) (per curiam) (holding that an order transferring the case to another district court
    is an interlocutory order).
    Furthermore, the district court was correct to conclude that the facts of this case
    do not warrant an equitable tolling of the statute of limitations. See Heideman v.
    PFL, Inc., 
    904 F.2d 1262
    , 1266 (8th Cir. 1990) (“Equitable tolling is appropriate only
    when the circumstances that cause a plaintiff to miss a filing deadline are out of his
    hands.”). Williams failed to update her address with the EEOC when she moved to
    Ohio in the beginning of June, despite her pending appeal with the EEOC and her
    awareness that the EEOC intended to issue her a right-to-sue letter. See Hill, 869
    F.2d at 1124 (finding that equitable tolling was not appropriate when the plaintiff did
    not inform the EEOC of her new address); 
    29 C.F.R. § 1601.7
    (b) (stating that a party
    who has a complaint pending with the EEOC has “the responsibility to provide the
    Commission with notice of any change in address and with notice of any prolonged
    absence from that current address”). Additionally, even if Williams’s claims were not
    time-barred, she has not adduced any evidence to show that West’s legitimate reasons
    for denying her promotions, and eventually terminating her, were pretextual. See
    Brooks v. Ameren UE, 
    345 F.3d 986
    , 988 (8th Cir. 2003) (affirming summary
    judgment when the employer offered a nondiscriminatory reason for denying plaintiff
    the promotion and plaintiff could not offer proof of pretext); Edmund v.
    MidAmerican Energy Co., 
    299 F.3d 679
    , 685 (8th Cir. 2002) (finding that plaintiff
    -3-
    must do more than “raise doubts about the wisdom and fairness of the opinions of him
    held by his superiors and his fellow employees” to survive a summary judgment
    motion).
    We also find that the district court did not abuse its discretion in striking
    Williams’s affidavit in support of her opposition to the defendant’s motion for
    summary judgment. See Northwest Bank & Trust Co. v. First Ill. Nat’l Bank, 
    354 F.3d 721
    , 725 (8th Cir. 2003) (“We review the district court’s application of its local
    rules for an abuse of discretion.”). Based on her pattern of late filings, the court was
    well within its discretion to strike the document; especially considering her affidavit
    merely repeated the allegations contained in her complaint. See African Am. Voting
    Rights Legal Def. Fund, Inc. v. Villa, 
    54 F.3d 1345
    , 1350-51 (8th Cir. 1995) (finding
    no abuse of discretion when the district court refused to admit materials submitted in
    violation of local rules).
    As to Williams’s remaining claims, we find that the district court correctly
    applied the summary judgment standard by resolving all doubt in Williams’s favor.
    For the reasons aptly stated by the district court, we find that Williams failed to raise
    any triable issues, thereby entitling the defendants to summary judgment.
    Accordingly, we affirm. See 8th Cir. R. 47B.
    ______________________________
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