Jose Iruegas-Valdez v. Sally Yates ( 2017 )


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  •                          REVISED March 24, 2017
    IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
    United States Court of Appeals
    Fifth Circuit
    FILED
    No. 15-60532                        January 23, 2017
    Lyle W. Cayce
    JOSE IRUEGAS-VALDEZ, also known as Jose Iruegas,                          Clerk
    Petitioner
    v.
    SALLY Q. YATES, ACTING U. S. ATTORNEY GENERAL,
    Respondent
    Petition for Review of an Order of the
    Board of Immigration Appeals
    Before WIENER, CLEMENT, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
    EDITH BROWN CLEMENT, Circuit Judge:
    Jose   Iruegas-Valdez    (“Iruegas-Valdez”)   appeals   the     Board           of
    Immigration Appeals’ (“BIA”) affirmance of the Immigration Judge’s (“IJ”)
    denial of his application for withholding of removal and relief under the
    Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). For the reasons below, we VACATE the
    decision of the BIA and REMAND with instructions to apply the appropriate
    legal standards.
    No. 15-60532
    I
    In 1975, one-year-old Iruegas-Valdez, a Mexican national, entered the
    United States with his parents as a lawful permanent resident. In 1997, he
    was convicted of possession of a controlled substance and removed from the
    United States. He remained in Mexico for only two days before re-entering the
    country illegally. Ten years later, he was again removed after being convicted
    of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon and serving three years
    imprisonment.
    Iruegas-Valdez again re-entered the United States illegally but was
    quickly apprehended by the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). He
    was convicted of being unlawfully present in the United States and, after
    completing his sentence, was returned to DHS for removal procedures. He
    claimed asylum and requested a reasonable fear interview. The asylum officer
    conducting the interview found Iruegas-Valdez to be “credible” and to have a
    reasonable fear of persecution in his home country. The case was then referred
    to an IJ for determination.
    At the hearing, Iruegas-Valdez testified that he is afraid to return to
    Mexico because two of his cousins, Jose Luis Garza and Hector Moreno,
    betrayed a drug cartel known as the Zetas. Garza is related to Iruegas-Valdez
    through his father, Garza’s uncle having married Iruegas-Valdez’s first cousin,
    Alma Perez Iruegas. Moreno is Iruegas-Valdez’s second cousin on his mother’s
    side. Both Garza and Moreno had been high-ranking members of the Zetas
    before they fled to the United States with five million dollars in cash and some
    of the Zetas’ ledger books and became informants for the Drug Enforcement
    Administration in 2011. Iruegas-Valdez claimed that the cartel retaliated by
    massacring members of Garza and Moreno’s family: “The Zetas . . . sent 50
    trunks [sic] of people to in [sic] the Coahuila, where I was born. They went to
    2
    No. 15-60532
    town, and they picked up a lot of my family members.” He testified that at least
    ten of his close family members were killed, including his first cousin Arnoldo
    Perez Iruegas Velasco, who was beheaded, and Arnoldo’s wife who was eight
    months pregnant at the time. Iruegas-Valdez claims that at least 200 people
    associated with Garza’s and Moreno’s households were executed and that the
    cartel continues to “look for individuals, family members, as we speak.”
    Iruegas-Valdez also claimed that local police participated in the massacre.
    Iruegas-Valdez provided the IJ with numerous newspaper articles that
    describe the attacks and specifically list some of his family members among
    the deceased. Iruegas-Valdez’s mother, Maria Teresa Alonso Valdez (“Maria
    Alonso”), also testified at the hearing, and the IJ found her to be credible.
    The IJ held that Iruegas-Valdez was statutorily barred from seeking
    asylum because he had previously been convicted of an aggravated felony. But
    the IJ found that Iruegas-Valdez was still “eligible to apply for withholding of
    removal” because “the nature of the offense, the length of the sentence imposed
    . . . , and the circumstances under which this particular crime occurred does
    not support a finding that [Iruegas-Valdez] was convicted of a particularly
    serious crime.”
    The IJ then denied Iruegas-Valdez’s application for withholding of
    removal “[p]rimarily” because “the Respondent failed to testify credibility
    [sic].” The IJ also denied Iruegas-Valdez’s application for withholding of
    removal under CAT.
    On appeal, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision, specifically holding that
    Iruegas-Valdez had “not established that [the IJ’s] adverse credibility
    determination [was] clearly erroneous.” The BIA did not consider whether the
    additional evidence proffered by Iruegas-Valdez was enough to satisfy his
    burden of proof independent from his testimony, holding instead that because
    3
    No. 15-60532
    “the applicant’s testimony is not credible, he has failed to satisfy his burden of
    proof for withholding of removal.” Iruegas-Valdez timely appealed.
    II
    We have “authority to review only an order of the BIA, not the IJ, unless
    the IJ’s decision has some impact on the BIA’s decision.” Mikhael v. INS, 
    115 F.3d 299
    , 302 (5th Cir. 1997).
    On a petition for review of an order of the BIA, we review factual findings
    “to determine if they are supported by substantial evidence in the record.” 
    Id. (citing INS
    v. Elias-Zacarias, 
    502 U.S. 478
    , 481 (1992)). “Under substantial
    evidence review, we may not reverse the BIA’s factual determinations unless
    we find not only that the evidence supports a contrary conclusion, but that the
    evidence compels it. In other words, the alien must show that the evidence was
    so compelling that no reasonable factfinder could conclude against it.” Chun v.
    INS, 
    40 F.3d 76
    , 78 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citations omitted). The BIA’s
    legal determinations are reviewed de novo. Kompany v. Gonzales, 236 F. App’x
    33, 37 (5th Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
    III
    As an initial matter, “8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C) limits our jurisdiction to
    review final removal orders against aliens who are removable by reason of
    having committed certain criminal offenses,” including aggravated felonies.
    Hernandez-De La Cruz v. Lynch, 
    819 F.3d 784
    , 787 (5th Cir. 2016); see also 8
    U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii). Because Iruegas-Valdez concedes that he is an
    aggravated felon, we lack jurisdiction over his challenge to the BIA’s denial of
    his application for withholding of removal and CAT relief, except to the extent
    he raises legal or constitutional questions. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
    Accordingly, we have no authority to consider Iruegas-Valdez’s argument that
    4
    No. 15-60532
    the BIA lacked substantial evidence to support its conclusion that his
    testimony was not credible.
    By contrast, we have jurisdiction to review legal questions, including
    whether the Board applied an inappropriate standard or failed to make
    necessary findings. Iruegas-Valdez contends that the Board failed to address
    whether, even without testimony, the record evidence demonstrates that he is
    more likely than not to be persecuted on account of his membership in a
    particular social group. He also contends that the Board failed to address
    whether, regardless of government acquiescence, active participation by public
    officials acting under color of law supports his eligibility for protection from
    torture.
    A
    Congress has forbidden the Attorney General from removing an alien
    otherwise subject to deportation “to a country if the Attorney General decides
    that the alien’s life or freedom would be threatened in that country because of
    the alien’s race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
    or political opinion.” 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). The alien carries the burden of
    proof in these proceedings. 
    Id. § 1231(b)(3)(C).
    Here, Iruegas-Valdez argues
    that he has satisfied that burden of proof.
    The government contends that Iruegas-Valdez’s argument that—even
    ignoring the applicant’s own testimony—he has established “that it is more
    likely than not that he will be persecuted on account of his membership in a
    social group consisting of ‘family of Hector Moreno and Jose Luis Garza,’ is not
    properly before this Court.” We agree. The BIA based its denial of the
    applicant’s petition for withholding of removal solely on the IJ’s credibility
    determination: it did not consider the testimony of Maria Alonso or the
    newspaper articles submitted to the IJ. As such, it did not decide whether
    5
    No. 15-60532
    “family members of Moreno and Garza” constitute a particular social group or
    whether Iruegas-Valdez’s fear of persecution is “on account of” his membership
    in that particular social group. On the contrary, the BIA explicitly held that
    “[g]iven the Immigration Judge’s adverse credibility finding, [it] need not
    address the respondent’s challenge to the Immigration Judge’s determination
    that the other proposed particular social group, family members of [Moreno
    and Garza], is not valid.”
    The Supreme Court addressed an almost identical situation in INS v.
    Orlando Ventura, 
    537 U.S. 12
    (2002) (per curiam). In that case, the BIA
    “determined that respondent Fredy Orlando Ventura failed to qualify for . . .
    statutory protection because any persecution that he faced when he left
    Guatemala . . . was not ‘on account of’ a ‘political opinion.’” 
    Id. at 13
    (emphases
    omitted). The Ninth Circuit reversed but “went on to consider an alternative
    argument that the Government had made before the Immigration Judge” but
    which had not been considered by the BIA itself. 
    Id. The Supreme
    Court determined that this was a violation of “well-
    established principles of administrative law.” 
    Id. at 16.
    A “‘judicial judgment
    cannot be made to do service for an administrative judgment.’ Nor can an
    ‘appellate court . . . intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively
    entrusted to an administrative agency.’” 
    Id. (alteration in
    original) (quoting
    SEC v. Chenery Corp., 
    318 U.S. 80
    , 88 (1943)). As such, “a court of appeals
    should remand a case to an agency for decision of a matter that statutes place
    primarily in agency hands.” 
    Id. Here, as
    in Ventura, the BIA specifically refused to consider an
    alternative argument that had been raised before the IJ—namely that the
    evidence external to Iruegas-Valdez’s testimony established that removal to
    Mexico would put his life in jeopardy because he was a family member of
    6
    No. 15-60532
    Moreno and Garza. Congress has explicitly delegated such determinations to
    the Attorney General, not the courts. 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3)(A). It would
    therefore be a violation of “well-established principles of administrative law”
    for us to reach this issue. 
    Ventura, 537 U.S. at 16
    .
    B
    We likewise decline to consider whether Iruegas-Valdez is eligible for
    relief under CAT because the BIA failed to apply the appropriate legal
    standard. An applicant for withholding of removal under CAT bears the burden
    of proving “that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if
    removed to the proposed country of removal.” 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(2).
    “Torture” includes “any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical
    or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as . . .
    punishing him . . . for an act he . . . or a third person has committed or is
    suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him . . . or a third
    person.” 
    Id. § 1208.18(a)(1).
    It includes “intentional infliction or threatened
    infliction of severe physical pain or suffering,” as well as “threat[s] of imminent
    death.” 
    Id. § 1208.18(a)(4).
          To qualify under CAT, the pain or suffering in question must be inflicted
    “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public
    official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 
    Id. § 1208.18(a)(1).
    A
    public official acquiesces to torture when he or she has prior “awareness of such
    activity and thereafter breach[es] his or her legal responsibility to intervene to
    prevent such activity.” 
    Id. § 1208.18(a)(7).
    An applicant may satisfy his burden
    of proving acquiescence by demonstrating “a government’s willful blindness of
    torturous activity.” Hakim v. Holder, 
    628 F.3d 151
    , 155 (5th Cir. 2010) (citing
    Ontunez-Tursios v. Ashcroft, 
    303 F.3d 341
    , 354 (5th Cir. 2002)).
    7
    No. 15-60532
    “Thus relief under the [CAT] requires a two part analysis—first, is it
    more likely than not that the alien will be tortured upon return to his
    homeland; and second, is there sufficient state action involved in that torture.”
    Garcia v. Holder, 
    756 F.3d 885
    , 891 (5th Cir. 2014) (citing Tamara-Gomez v.
    Gonzales, 
    447 F.3d 343
    , 350-51 (5th Cir. 2006)).
    Failing to clearly bifurcate its CAT analysis, the BIA focused primarily
    on the second prong, concluding that the applicant’s evidence did not prove
    that the government would torture him: “while corruption and increased levels
    of gang criminality exists [in Mexico], the government is actively fighting the
    drug cartels.” In reaching this conclusion, the BIA seemed to adopt the analysis
    of the IJ who listed various steps the government had taken since the Allende
    massacre to stamp out the Zetas and their government lackeys: increasing the
    number of federal troops, dismissing the entire municipal police force, and
    arresting two local police officers for their alleged involvement in the attack.
    The IJ then concluded that “[t]hese kinds of actions do not indicate that the
    Mexican government has simply looked the other way and willfully permitted
    the Zetas to act with impunity.”
    But “willful blindness” is not the only way to prove sufficient state action.
    The regulations specifically list a number of different avenues which the BIA
    failed to consider: torture occurs whenever severe physical or mental pain is
    “inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a
    public official or other person acting in an official capacity.” 8 C.F.R. §
    1208.18(a)(1). “[G]overnment acquiescence need not necessarily be an officially
    sanctioned state action; instead, an act is under color of law when it constitutes
    a misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
    because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law.” 
    Garcia, 756 F.3d at 891-92
    . “[A]cts motivated by an officer’s personal objectives are ‘under
    8
    No. 15-60532
    color of law’ when the officer uses his official capacity to further those
    objectives.” 
    Id. at 892
    (citing Marmorato v. Holder, 376 F. App’x 380, 385 (5th
    Cir. 2010) (per curiam)). Nor does our precedent require that the public official
    in question “be the nation’s president or some other official at the upper
    echelons of power. Rather . . . the use of official authority by low-level officials,
    such a[s] police officers, can work to place actions under the color of law even
    where they are without state sanction.” 
    Id. (alterations in
    original) (quoting
    Ramirez-Peyro v. Holder, 
    574 F.3d 893
    , 901 (8th Cir. 2009)).
    Iruegas-Valdez has provided evidence that police officers were active
    participants in the Allende massacre. He also provided evidence that the
    governor of Coahuila, Humberto Moreira, was a close ally of the Zetas and
    specifically allowed the attack. But neither the IJ nor the BIA considered
    whether this evidence established that the applicant was more likely than not
    to be tortured “by” or with the “consent of” government officials. This
    constituted “error regarding what [Iruegas-Valdez] was required to show to
    obtain CAT protection.” 
    Id. at 893.
    Thus, we will “vacate the BIA’s decision and
    remand for the agency to properly consider this evidence under the under color
    of law legal standard.” 
    Id. IV In
    conclusion, we lack jurisdiction to review the BIA’s credibility
    determination. With respect to the remaining issues, we VACATE the decision
    of the BIA and REMAND for consideration pursuant to the appropriate legal
    standards as detailed above.
    9