People v. Birdsell CA2/6 ( 2023 )


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  • Filed 2/23/23 P. v. Birdsell CA2/6
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL REPORTS
    California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibits courts and parties from citing or relying on opinions
    not certified for publication or ordered published, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinion
    has not been certified for publication or ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.
    IN THE COURT OF APPEAL OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA
    SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
    DIVISION SIX
    THE PEOPLE,                                                   2d Crim. No. B320387
    (Super. Ct. No. 21CR07906)
    Plaintiff and Respondent,                               (Santa Barbara County)
    v.
    DANIEL M. BIRDSELL,
    Defendant and Appellant.
    Appellant Daniel M. Birdsell pleaded guilty to one count of
    voluntary manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 192, subd. (a)1) and
    admitted that he personally and intentionally discharged a
    firearm (§ 12022.5, subd. (a)). The prosecutor dismissed a
    murder charge in exchange for his plea. Birdsell agreed to an
    aggregate sentence of 15 years in state prison. The trial court
    imposed a $10,000 restitution fine at sentencing. Birdsell
    maintains that the fine violates the plea agreement. We affirm
    the judgment.
    All statutory references are to the Penal Code unless
    1
    otherwise stated.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Birdsell shot his stepbrother, Jordan Savard, during an
    argument outside the family home in Lompoc. Savard died on
    the way to the hospital. Police arrested Birdsell the next day as
    he debarked a train in Oceanside. The People charged him with
    one count of murder with a firearm enhancement (§§ 187, subd.
    (a), 12022.5, subd. (a).) Birdsell later agreed to plead guilty to
    voluntary manslaughter (§ 192, subd. (a)). He also agreed to
    admit the firearm allegation and accept an aggregate prison term
    of 15 years.
    Section 2.f. of the parties’ form plea agreement is titled
    “Restitution, Statutory Fees, and Assessments.” It lists nine
    categories of restitution and other post-conviction assessments,
    each preceded by a space into which parties can place a check
    mark and insert a dollar amount.2 The parties checked only the
    2Section 2.f. states as follows: “f. Restitution, Statutory
    Fees, and Assessments [¶] I understand that the court will order
    me to pay the following amounts (if an amount is not yet known,
    ‘TBD’ for ‘to be determined’ is entered next to the $); I must
    prepare financial disclosure statements to assist the court in
    determining my ability to pay; and refusal or failure to prepare
    the required financial disclosure statements may be used against
    me at sentencing: [¶]
    1. ___ $ ___ to the Victim Restitution Fund
    2. ___ $ ___ restitution to actual victims
    3. ___ $ ___ restitution to the State of California, Victims of
    Crime Fund
    4. ___ $ ___ court operations assessment
    5. ___ $ ___ court facilities assessment
    6. ___ $ ___ base fine plus any applicable penalties,
    assessments, and surcharges
    7. ___ $ ___ other (specify): ___________________________
    8. ___ $ ___ other (specify): ___________________________
    2
    seventh category, “Other,” and inserted “TBD” as the amount.
    The plea agreement states nothing else about the monetary
    component of Birdsell’s sentence.
    Birdsell appeared at his preliminary hearing and entered
    his changed plea. The People did not raise the issue of
    restitution or any other assessment during its plea colloquy with
    appellant. The trial court accepted the plea and scheduled the
    case for sentencing.
    The trial court sentenced Birdsell to 15 years in state
    prison and imposed a restitution fine of $10,000, the maximum
    permitted by statute. It denied defense counsel’s request to lower
    the fine pursuant to People v. Duenas.3 Birdsell appealed the
    restitution order.
    DISCUSSION
    Birdsell contends the trial court violated the plea
    agreement when it imposed the maximum restitution fine. The
    minimum restitution fine for a felony conviction is $300 and the
    maximum is $10,000. (§ 1202.4, subd. (b)(1).) “[T]he parties to a
    criminal prosecution are free . . . to reach any agreement
    concerning the amount of restitution (whether by specifying the
    amount or by leaving it to the sentencing court’s discretion) they
    find mutually agreeable.” (People v. Crandell (2007) 
    40 Cal.4th 1301
    , 1309 (Crandell).) The fine imposed by the trial court may
    9. ___ $ ___ An (additional) amount to be determined by
    the court at sentencing or such other hearing as the court may
    set.”
    3 People v. Dueñas (2019) 
    30 Cal.App.5th 1157
     holds that
    the trial court must stay execution of a restitution fine unless or
    until the prosecutor demonstrates the defendant’s ability to pay.
    Appellant does not invoke Dueñas in this appeal.
    3
    not significantly exceed the agreed amount. (People v. Villalobos
    (2012) 
    54 Cal.4th 177
    , 182 (Villalobos), quoting People v. Walker
    (1991) 
    54 Cal.3d 1013
    , 1024 [“‘both parties, including the state,
    must abide by the terms of [a plea] agreement’”].)
    The People assert Birdsell waived any plea violation error
    by failing to object at sentencing. We disagree. A defendant may
    raise this issue for the first time on appeal where, as here, the
    trial court did not advise Birdsell of the right to withdraw his
    plea pursuant to section 1192.5, subdivision (c). (Villalobos,
    
    supra,
     54 Cal.4th at p. 182.)
    Birdsell argues that leaving the “Victim Restitution Fund”
    category blank on the plea form meant the parties intended the
    court to impose the minimum fine. We decline to infer intent
    from their silence. (See Villalobos, 
    supra,
     54 Cal.4th at p. 183
    [“[M]ere silence by the parties and trial court concerning a
    statutorily mandated punishment does not make exclusion of the
    punishment a negotiated term of a plea agreement”].) The record
    leaves no clue whether the parties contemplated a precise fine
    during their negotiations. They did not refer to restitution
    during the plea colloquy or at any time before Birdsell received
    his sentence. And contrary to Birdsell’s claim, inserting “TBD”
    into the “Other” category on the plea form suggests the parties
    intended to leave the amount to the court’s discretion.
    Consequently, the court could impose a fine above the
    minimum so long as it considered the statutory factors.
    (§ 1202.4, subd. (d).) The court cited the seriousness of Birdsell’s
    offense and the decision of the victim’s family not to seek a
    separate restitution order as factors supporting the maximum
    fine. The transcript of proceedings confirms it did so.
    Birdsell also contends the court should have advised him
    that pleading guilty would result in a restitution fine between
    $300 and $10,000. We agree with him. (See People v. Walker,
    4
    
    supra,
     54 Cal.3d at p. 1030 [trial courts “should always admonish
    the defendant of the statutory minimum [$300] and maximum
    $10,000 restitution fine as one of the consequences of any guilty
    plea, and should give the section 1192.5 admonition whenever
    required by that statute”]; accord, Crandell, 
    supra,
     40 Cal.4th at
    p. 1310; Villalobos, 
    supra,
     54 Cal.4th at p. 185.) The court’s
    failure to properly advise Birdsell about the statutory range of
    fines, however, speaks nothing of whether the parties negotiated
    a specific amount within that range. (See Villalobos, at p. 185 [“a
    trial court’s advisement error does not mean that imposition of a
    substantial fine violates a plea agreement. . . . [A]dvisement error
    and violation of a plea bargain are two different things”].)
    DISPOSITION
    Judgment is affirmed.
    NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.
    BALTODANO, J.
    We concur:
    GILBERT, P.J.
    YEGAN, J.
    5
    Von N. Deroian, Judge
    Superior Court County of Santa Barbara
    ______________________________
    Heather E. Shallenberger, under appointment by the Court
    of Appeal, for Defendant and Appellant.
    Rob Bonta, Attorney General, Lance E. Winters, Chief
    Assistant Attorney General, Susan Sullivan Pithey, Assistant
    Attorney General, Noah P. Hill, and Eric J. Kohm, Deputy
    Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and Respondent.
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: B320387

Filed Date: 2/23/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/23/2023