Joseph Ray Crawford v. State ( 2015 )


Menu:
  •                             NUMBER 13-15-00125-CR
    COURT OF APPEALS
    THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
    CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
    JOSEPH RAY CRAWFORD,                                                      Appellant,
    v.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS,                                                        Appellee.
    On appeal from the 24th District Court
    of Dewitt County, Texas.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    Before Justices Garza, Perkes and Longoria
    Memorandum Opinion by Justice Longoria
    Appellant Joseph Crawford was charged with retaliation against a witness, a third-
    degree felony offense. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 36.06(c) (West, Westlaw through
    2015 R.S.). Crawford was placed on probation. Years later, the State requested the trial
    court to revoke his probation. The parties reached a plea agreement, but the State
    withdrew from the agreement. In a single issue on appeal, Crawford argues that the trial
    court erred by allowing the State to withdraw from its plea bargain agreement. We affirm.
    I. BACKGROUND
    On August 25, 2006, Crawford entered an open guilty plea to the retaliation charge
    and received a ten-year sentence in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice—
    Institutional Division (TDCJID). His sentence was suspended, and Crawford was placed
    on probation for ten years. On April 29, 2014, the State filed a petition to revoke
    Crawford’s probation alleging that Crawford violated several terms of his probation.
    On December 8, 2014, the trial court held a hearing on the motion to revoke
    Crawford’s probation. Crawford and the State reached and signed a plea agreement
    regarding his probation being revoked. However, during the hearing, the State informed
    the court that a mistake had been made in the agreement. The plea agreement, as
    written, would have granted Crawford four years of credit on his ten-year sentence for
    time spent in Substance Abuse Felony Punishment Facilities. However, the State did not
    intend to give Crawford credit for his time in the substance facilities; the State intended
    Crawford to waive any credit he may have been entitled to receive for time spent in the
    facilities. After the trial court discussed the apparent mistake with both parties, the
    following exchange occurred:
    [Trial Court]: And so is it your wish to go ahead and reset this matter?
    [Crawford’s Counsel]: I believe it is. Is that what you want to do, Mr. Crawford?
    [Crawford]:   Yeah, because I didn't – we spent all this time to get that all
    understood and then when I get up here it's not understood no more
    so, yeah, I'm not taking that.
    2
    Therefore, the trial court allowed the State to withdraw its plea agreement and reset the
    case for a final contested hearing on February 25, 2015. At the hearing, the State
    asserted various grounds to revoke Crawford’s probation; Crawford pled not true to the
    allegations.   The trial court found the State’s allegations true, revoked Crawford’s
    probation, and sentenced him to ten years’ confinement in the TDCJID. This appeal
    followed.
    II. PLEA BARGAINS
    In his sole issue on appeal, Crawford argues that the trial court mistakenly allowed
    the State to withdraw from its signed plea bargain agreement.
    A.     Applicable Law
    “At its core, a plea bargain is a contract between the state and the defendant.”
    Moore v. State, 
    295 S.W.3d 329
    , 331 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). Both the State and the
    defendant are bound by the terms of the agreement “once it is accepted by the judge.”
    
    Id. But until
    the trial court accepts the plea bargain agreement in open court, the plea
    bargain is not binding on any party. See id.; Bitterman v. State, 
    180 S.W.3d 139
    , 142
    (Tex. Crim. App. 2005); Ortiz v. State, 
    933 S.W.2d 102
    , 104 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); see
    also TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 R.S.).
    B.     Discussion
    Crawford argues that the State should not have been allowed to withdraw its plea
    bargain agreement since the State had already entered into a binding contract.
    Furthermore, as Crawford suggests, it is true that “a unilateral mistake will not normally
    void a contract.” In re Green Tree Servicing LLC, 
    275 S.W.3d 592
    , 598 (Tex. App.—
    Texarkana 2008, no writ). However, there must first be a valid contract. In the hearing
    3
    on December 8, 2014, the trial court went through all of the required admonishments for
    a plea of “true.” See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 26.13(a). But before the trial court
    announced its acceptance or rejection of the plea agreement, the State informed the court
    of a mistake it made in drafting the agreement and the plea agreement was withdrawn.
    Since a plea bargain is only a tentative agreement until the judge accepts it, there was no
    binding contract and the State could properly withdraw from the agreement. See 
    Moore, 295 S.W.3d at 331
    ; 
    Ortiz, 933 S.W.2d at 104
    . Therefore, the trial court did not err in
    allowing the State to withdraw from the agreement.
    We overrule Crawford’s sole issue.
    III. CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
    Nora L. Longoria
    Justice
    Do not publish.
    TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b).
    Delivered and filed the
    29th day of December, 2015.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 13-15-00125-CR

Filed Date: 12/29/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/28/2016