Untitled Texas Attorney General Opinion ( 1986 )


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  •                                     The Attorne,y General of Texas
    JIM MATTOX                                          Algust 22, 1986
    Attorney General
    Supreme Court Building            Honorable 0. Ii."Ike" Harris           Opinion No. JM-538
    P. 0. BOX 12548
    Austin, TX. 78711. 2548
    Chairman
    512/475-2501                      Economic Development Committee         Rt?: Duties and liabilities of
    Telex 9101874.1367                Texas State Senate                     a police officer who is also a
    Telecopier   512/475-0266         P. 0. Box 12068, Caritol Station       firefighter emergency .medical
    Austin. Texas   78711                  technician
    714 Jackson, Suite 700
    Dallas. TX. 75202.4508            Dear Senator Harris:
    21417428944
    You request an opinion about the duties and responsibilities of a
    public safety offics::who primarily works as a firefighter emergency
    4824 Alberta Ave.. Suite 160
    El Paso, TX. 799052793
    medical technician md whose duties also include working as a police
    91515353484                       officer. You wish to know how such an officer should respond in an
    emergency, that is, if a public safety officer, while working as a
    police officer, must,use deadly force and critically injures a person,
    whether the offiwr      is legally obligated in his capacity as
    firefighter emergency medical technician to treat the injured person
    and try to save his life. -See V.T.C.S. art. 1269m. 552, 5.
    806 Broadway, Suite 312                Section 9.51 oE the Penal Code sets out the circumstances under
    Lubbock, TX. 79401.3479           which a peace officw: may use force or deadly force to make an arrest
    8061747-5238
    or prevent escape a:Iteran arrest. See also Penal Code 999.31, 9.32,
    9.34, 9.42, 9.43. rhe peace officer may use that degree of force or
    4309 N. Tenth. Suite 6            deadly force which ze reasonably believes is immediately necessary to
    McAllen, TX. i8501-1685           make the arrest 01' prevent escape but he is not allowed to use
    5121682.4547                      excessive force. Peal Code 59.51; Code Grin. Proc. art. 6.06; Ford
    v. State, 538 S.W.2e.l
    633 (Tex. Grim. App. 1976).
    2Oil Main Plaza, Suite 400
    San Antonio, TX. 78205-2797            Once the 0ffice.ecritically injures someone, that person would,
    51212254191                       in the usual case, kle unable to offer any more resistance. At that
    point, there is no conflict between a peace officer's right to use
    An Equal Opportunity/
    force to effect an arrest, and any duty a fireman emergency medical
    Affirmative   Action   Employer   technician may have ::oadminister first aid and save the individual's
    life.
    Moreover, at Least one court has held that policemen have a duty
    to render first aid to a person against whom he used force in
    effecting an arrest,. In McQurter v. City of Atlanta, 
    572 F. Supp. 1401
    (N.D. Ga. 1983). the plaintiff sued individual policemen, their
    super&sors and empil;yer&der section 1983, 42 U.S.C,, alleging that
    the police used excessive force in arresting her husband, resulting in
    p. 2476
    Iionorable0. H. "Ike" Harris -'Page 2   (JM-538)
    his death. The court found that the force was excessive and violated
    the decedent's constitutiotal rights. The failure of the police
    officers to provide the acrestee medical attention after he was
    critically injured evidences1 deliberate indifference to his serious
    medical needs and therefore ialsoviolated his constitutional rights.
    See Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    (1976). The court in Mc&rter
    -
    stated as follows:
    All of the officers had basic first aid training.
    Prevailing standards of police work require that the
    officer on the scene render first aid to any injured
    subject and obtain emergency professionals to assist
    in more aggravated cases.
    McQurter v. City of 
    Atlanta, 572 F. Supp. at 1418
    (dicta).
    The reasoning of McQurl:erwas followed in Smith v. Dooley, 591 F.
    S"PP. 1157 (W.D. La. 1984), aff'd mem. 
    778 F.2d 788
    (5th Cir. 1985).
    This case arose out of the use of excessive force against a jail
    inmate who resisted being transported to the state penitentiary. The
    peace officers who used force against the inmate failed to get medical
    attention for him. The courf stated as follows:
    Both the McQurtel, case and the Dailey v. Byrnes
    case 
    1605 F.2d 85
    & (5th Cir. 1979)l stand for the
    proposition that police officials have a duty to
    secure medical at,tention for an injured detainee
    or inmate, even %,hen the injuries result from the
    justified applicat:Lonof force by the officers.
    Smith v. Dooley, 
    591 F. Supp. 1157
    , 1170 (W.D. La. 1984) aff'd mem.
    778 F.Zd 788 (5th Cir. 1985) (dicta).
    In both McQurter and ;+th v. Dooley the courts found that peace
    officers had used excessive force against an individual. They also
    determined that on the facts of each case the officers' failure to
    provide medical attention to that person constituted deliberate
    indifference to his serious medical needs. See Estelle v. Gamble, 
    429 U.S. 97
    (1976). The twcl cases state InTroad         terms the peace
    officer's duty to provide cr secure medical aid, and they do not limit
    the duty to cases where failure to do so constitutes deliberate
    indifference to the arrestfe's serious medical needs. A peace officer
    who uses deadly force agair.stan individual and critically injures him
    has a duty as a peace offic.erto provide or secure medical aid for him
    and attempt to save his liie. Failure to provide medical aid in such
    a case would as a general matter constitute deliberate indifference to
    a serious medical need. In addition, the cases suggest that this duty
    exists even where the injury is not critical or life-threatening.
    p. 2477
    Honorable 0. H. "Ike" Harris - Page 3   (JM-538)
    You also ask whether the administration of emergency aid to the
    injured person would "legally interfere with the crime scene." You
    have not identified any ststutes which you wish us to consider. A
    prohibition against tamperir,gwith or fabricating physical evidence is
    found in,section 37.09 of tt,ePenal Code, which provides in part:
    (a) A person commits an offense if, knowing
    than an investigation or official proceeding is
    pending or in proE;ress,he:
    (1) --
    altem,  destroys, or conceals any
    record, documnt,   or thing with intent to
    impair its ve&ry, legibility, or availability
    as evidence ir;the investigation or official
    proceeding; or
    (2)  maker;,presents, or uses any record,
    document, or thing with knowledge of its
    falsity and with intent to affect the course or
    outcome of the investigation or official
    proceeding.
    . . . .
    (c) An offens@!under this section is a Class A
    misdemeanor. (Emphasis added).
    Penal Code 537.09. We will assume without deciding that this statute
    is relevant to the scenaricsabout which you inquire. One element of
    this offense is that physi:al evidence be destroyed "with intent to
    impair its merits, legibility or availability as evidence. . . ." A
    peace officer who gives emergency medical aid to save an injured
    person's life, ease suffming,      or otherwise limit the physical
    consequences of the injury would not be guilty of this offense unless
    he had the requisite intent to impair physical evidence. _  See Penal
    Code 596.01, 6.02(a), 6.03(.1:1.
    You finally ask about the possibility that a grand jury would
    view the administration of emergency aid as evidence that the officer
    did not consider his lifs?.in danger. You ask us to anticipate
    decisions that grand jurie:rmight make in the future. The question
    cannot be answered in an attorney general opinion. Some of the
    matters already discussed il this opinion may, however, be relevant to
    grand jury deliberations cn the use of force by peace officers in
    arresting an individual or preventing his escape. See Penal Code
    99.51. Particularly notewc'rthyis the statement in Smxh v. Dooley,
    
    591 F. Supp. 1157
    (W.D. La. 1984) aff'd mem. 
    778 F.2d 788
    (5th Cir.
    1985) that
    P. 2478
    Honorable 0. H. "Ike" Harris - Page 4       (JM-538)
    ,
    police officials have a duty to secure medical
    attention for an injured detainee or inmate, even
    when the injuries result from the justi=
    application of f&e    by the officers.    (dicta)
    (Emphasis 
    added). 591 F. Supp. at 1170
    . The :Eacts of Smith v. Dooley and McQurtet v.
    City of 
    Atlanta, supra
    . show that an individual may be violent and
    dangerous to others so that a peace officer may justifiably use some
    force, and thereafter the ,m:resteemay be completely subdued and in
    need of medical attention. IJe assume that grand jurors will evaluate
    the facts of each incident :.naccordance with their oath to
    diligently inquire:into, and true presentment make,
    of all such mattms and things as shall be given
    you in charge. . I .
    Code Grim. Proc. art. 19.34
    SUMMARY
    A police offims, who must use deadly force
    against a person md injures him critically, has a
    duty under sectlo:>1983, 42 U.S.C., to provide or
    secure medical attention for that person, and                 --.
    attempt to save hl.si
    life.
    JIM     MATTOX
    Attorney General of Texas
    JACK HIGHTOWER
    First Assistant Attorney General
    MARY KELLER
    Executive Assistant Attome), General
    RICK GILPIN
    Chairman, Opinion Committee
    Prepared by Susan L. Garriscn
    Assistant Attorney General
    p. 2479
    

Document Info

Docket Number: JM-538

Judges: Jim Mattox

Filed Date: 7/2/1986

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/18/2017