L.T. v. Chambers County Department of Human Resources ( 2023 )

Rel: April 14, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
ALABAMA COURT OF CIVIL APPEALS
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
_________________________
CL-2022-0687
_________________________
J.T.
v.
Chambers County Department of Human Resources
_________________________
CL-2022-0972
_________________________
L.T.
v.
Chambers County Department of Human Resources
Appeals from Chambers Juvenile Court
(JU-19-53.03)
CL-2022-0687 and CL-2022-0972
PER CURIAM.
In appeal number CL-2022-0972, L.T. ("the mother") appeals from
a judgment terminating her parental rights to I.M. ("the child"), one of
her three children; the Chambers Juvenile Court ("the juvenile court")
entered that judgment in an action docketed as JU-19-53.03 ("the .03
action"). In appeal number CL-2022-0687, J.T. ("the maternal
grandmother"), the child's maternal grandmother, appeals from an order
of the juvenile court denying her motion to intervene in the .03 action,
appeals from an interlocutory injunction that the juvenile court entered
in the .03 action, and purports to appeal from the judgment terminating
the mother's parental rights. We consolidated the appeals ex mero motu.
We dismiss the mother's appeal because the judgment from which
she appeals is not a final one. We dismiss the maternal grandmother's
appeal insofar as it challenges the denial of her motion to intervene
because she did not timely file her notice of appeal with respect to that
order, we dismiss her appeal insofar as she purports to appeal from the
judgment terminating the mother's parental rights because the maternal
grandmother does not have standing to appeal from that judgment, and
we reverse the order granting an interlocutory injunction as to the
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maternal grandmother because the juvenile court entered it without
affording her due process.
Background
The mother, who was thirty-seven years old when the juvenile court
tried this case on May 19, 2022, moved with the child from Georgia to
Chambers County in January 2019. The child's father was a resident of
Georgia before he died in December 2020. The mother gave birth to the
child in April 2014, and the child was eight years old when the juvenile
court tried this case. The mother has two other children that remained
in Georgia when she moved to Alabama in 2019. Those children, who
were fourteen and twelve years old when the juvenile court tried this
case, have a different father than the child. They were living with the
maternal grandmother in Georgia when this case was tried, although a
court has not transferred custody to her.
The mother testified that Georgia's Family and Children Services
("FCS") in Cobb County, Georgia, became involved with her family in
2016, apparently because the mother was using illegal drugs. FCS in
Cobb County removed the child from the mother's custody and gave her
a case plan requiring her to submit to random drug testing, submit to a
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drug-and-alcohol evaluation, comply with the recommendations made by
the drug-and-alcohol evaluator, attend parenting classes, maintain
stable housing, and maintain employment. FCS in Cobb County placed
the child with the maternal grandmother from June 2016 until June
2017. However, the maternal grandmother did not want to be a long-term
placement for the child, so FCS in Cobb County transferred the child to
his maternal aunt's custody in June 2017. The mother testified that she
had successfully completed the requirements of the case plan and that
FCS in Cobb County had returned the child to her custody later in 2017.
The mother testified that, in January 2018, she relapsed into using
illegal drugs, and FCS in Cherokee County, Georgia, removed the child
from her custody. Subsequently, after the mother moved to Troup
County, Georgia, FCS in Cherokee County transferred the child's case to
FCS in Troup County. After the mother completed the requirements of
her case plan in August 2018, FCS in Troup County returned the child to
her custody.
The mother moved to Alabama in January 2019. In February 2019,
FCS in Troup County asked the Chambers County Department of
Human Resources ("DHR") to locate the mother and the child to
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determine whether the mother needed further services because, FCS
said, she had an ongoing child-protection case in Troup County.
DHR located the mother and the child in March 2019 and sent a
caseworker to the mother's residence to check on the mother and the
child. The caseworker asked to see the child, but the mother refused and
started to close the door. The caseworker put her foot in the doorway to
block the door. The mother threatened to punch the caseworker if she did
not remove her foot from the doorway. The caseworker, who was
pregnant, backed away and called law enforcement. Before a law-
enforcement officer could arrive, however, the mother climbed out of a
window with the child and fled.
In April 2019, DHR learned that the child had been in Georgia with
his father for several weeks and that the child had returned to Chambers
County. Caseworkers from DHR went to the mother's residence; however,
she would not let them enter the residence. The caseworkers sought
assistance from law-enforcement officers, who came to the mother's
residence, arrested her, and charged her with resisting arrest and
obstructing governmental operations. Law enforcement later dismissed
those charges.
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When the caseworkers entered the mother's residence following her
arrest, they found that the mother did not have any food in the residence,
that the residence did not have water service, and that the only source of
electricity was the battery from the mother's automobile, from which
someone had run a cable to the residence. Aside from the child, no one
else was in the residence. DHR placed the child in foster care and, on
April 16, 2019, commenced a dependency action ("the .01 action")
regarding the child in the juvenile court. In August 2019, the maternal
grandmother filed a motion to intervene in the .01 action, which the
juvenile court granted on August 28, 2019.
DHR requested that FCS do a home study on the maternal
grandmother pursuant to the Interstate Compact on the Placement of
Children ("ICPC"), § 44-2-20 et seq., Ala. Code 1975. FCS did the home
study and recommended that DHR not place the child with the maternal
grandmother because, according to the FCS caseworker, the maternal
grandmother did not have the capacity to protect the child from the
mother, had demonstrated a lack of commitment to the child when she
had custody of him in 2016 and 2017, had expressed her belief that child-
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welfare authorities were corrupt, and may not cooperate with FCS in its
efforts to ensure the child's safety and well-being.
The maternal grandmother subsequently asked FCS to reopen her
home study. A representative of FCS contacted DHR, informed DHR that
the maternal grandmother had requested that FCS reopen her home
study, and informed DHR that FCS could not reopen the home study
without a request from DHR. DHR did not request that FCS reopen the
home study.
On April 8, 2020, after receiving FCS's home study regarding the
maternal grandmother, DHR filed a motion asking the juvenile court to
dismiss the maternal grandmother as a party to the .01 action. DHR
sought to dismiss the maternal grandmother as a party because, DHR
said, it could not place the child in the maternal grandmother's custody
because, DHR said, FCS had recommended that DHR not place the child
with the maternal grandmother and because, DHR said, the maternal
grandmother had not visited the child or sought to visit the child since
filing her motion to intervene in August 2019. On April 8, 2020, the
juvenile court entered a judgment dismissing the maternal grandmother
as a party to the .01 action. On April 15, 2020, the maternal grandmother
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filed a postjudgment motion challenging her dismissal from the .01
action. Her postjudgment motion was denied by operation of law on April
29, 2020. On June 29, 2020, more than fourteen days after the denial of
her postjudgment motion, the maternal grandmother appealed to this
court from the judgment dismissing her as a party to the .01 action.
This court docketed the maternal grandmother's appeal from the
judgment dismissing her as a party to the .01 action as appeal number
2190723. After calling for letter briefs regarding the timeliness of the
maternal grandmother's notice of appeal, this court, on November 9,
2020, dismissed that appeal because the maternal grandmother had not
timely filed her notice of appeal from that judgment. This court issued its
certificate of judgment in appeal number 2190723 on December 4, 2020.
In the meantime, the maternal grandmother had commenced a
dependency action regarding the child ("the .02 action") in the juvenile
court. The record does not indicate what occurred in the .02 action.
On April 16, 2020, DHR commenced the .03 action seeking the
termination of the mother's and the father's parental rights to the child.
On October 30, 2020, the maternal grandmother filed a combined motion
and pleading titled "Motion to Intervene, Petition for Termination of
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Parental Rights and, in the alternative, Petition for Custody." The
juvenile court treated the maternal grandmother's petition for
termination of parental rights and petition for custody in that document
as pleadings commencing a separate action, which the juvenile court
docketed as the .04 action involving the child ("the .04 action"). On
November 2, 2020, the juvenile court entered an order denying the
maternal grandmother's motion to intervene in the .03 action on the
ground that it was moot because, the juvenile court said, the maternal
grandmother had commenced the .04 action seeking the termination of
the mother's and the father's parental rights to the child and seeking
custody of the child. The maternal grandmother did not file a notice of
appeal from that November 2, 2020, order within fourteen days after the
juvenile court entered it. As noted above, the father died in December
2020.
On April 8, 2021, the mother filed a motion to dismiss all the actions
in the juvenile court involving the child because, she alleged, the juvenile
court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction under Alabama's Uniform Child
Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act, § 30-3B-101 et seq., Ala. Code
1975, because, she said, the child had not lived in Alabama for six months
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before DHR commenced the .01 action. She submitted an affidavit in
support of her motion in which she testified that the child had lived in
Georgia from his birth in April 2014 until January 2019, when she and
the child had moved to Alabama. She further testified that the child had
lived in Alabama less than six months when DHR commenced the .01
action on April 16, 2019. It appears that the juvenile court held the
actions involving the child in abeyance pending a Georgia court accepting
jurisdiction over the child.
The maternal grandmother subsequently commenced dependency
actions regarding the child in the juvenile courts of three different
Georgia counties: Cobb, Troup, and Cherokee. Each of those courts
declined to exercise jurisdiction over the maternal grandmother's actions.
On April 12, 2022, the Juvenile Court of Cherokee County, Georgia, not
only declined to accept jurisdiction because it found that Cherokee
County was not a convenient forum, but also ruled that the juvenile court
in Chambers County, Alabama, was the most convenient forum and
should adjudicate actions involving the child.
On April 14, 2022, the juvenile court set the .03 action for trial on
May 19, 2022. On May 4, 2022, the maternal grandmother filed a motion
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to consolidate the .03 and .04 actions for trial. On May 9, 2022, the
juvenile court entered an order denying the maternal grandmother's
motion to consolidate. The juvenile court noted that, if DHR prevailed on
the termination-of-parental-rights claim it had pleaded in the .03 action,
that adjudication would render the .04 action moot. On May 12, 2022, the
maternal grandmother filed a motion asking the juvenile court to
reconsider its May 9, 2022, order denying her motion to consolidate the
.03 and .04 actions or, in the alternative, to reconsider its November 2,
2020, order denying her motion to intervene. On May 17, 2022, the
juvenile court entered an order denying the maternal grandmother's
motion to reconsider.
On May 18, 2022, after the mother and the maternal grandmother
had appeared as guests on a program broadcast on the Internet ("the
Internet program") and discussed the .03 action, DHR filed a motion to
hold the mother and the maternal grandmother in contempt, to impose
sanctions on them, and to issue an ex parte order directing the mother
and the maternal grandmother not to make any further public
statements about the .03 action. The motion was not verified and was not
accompanied by a written certification by DHR's attorney stating the
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efforts, if any, that had been made to give the mother and the maternal
grandmother notice and the reasons supporting the claim that notice
should not be required. Later on May 18, 2022, the juvenile court entered
an order ("the May 18, 2022, order") in response to DHR's motion, without
giving the mother or the maternal grandmother notice and without
holding a hearing. In pertinent part, that order states:
"1. The mother and the [maternal] grandmother are
hereby ordered to have no contact of any kind with [the
Internet program], any representative of that [Internet
program], or any person at all about this case, except their
legal counsel and those with whom their legal counsel is [sic]
allowed to work.
"….
"3. The court will set this for hearing on the motion of
any party. Until the court orders otherwise, this order shall
remain in full force and effect and shall be given broad
application to protect the dignity of the Court and the privacy
of this child.
"4. The Court will set a sanction hearing for things
already done by separate order.
"5. Any violation of this order will meet immediate and
strict action by the Court."
(Emphasis added.)
The juvenile court tried the termination-of parental rights claim in
the .03 action on May 19, 2022. After each party had rested their case at
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the trial, the juvenile court orally announced from the bench that it was
going to terminate the mother's parental rights.
On May 23, 2022, the maternal grandmother filed a notice of appeal
to this court in the .03 action. When the maternal grandmother filed her
notice of appeal, no party had requested a hearing regarding the May 18,
2022, order, the juvenile court had not yet held a hearing regarding the
sanctions referred to in the May 18, 2022, order, and the juvenile court
had not entered a final judgment adjudicating DHR's termination-of-
parental-rights claim in the .03 action.
On August 24, 2022, the juvenile court entered a written judgment
terminating the mother's parental rights and vesting DHR with legal
custody of the child. That judgment stated that the May 18, 2022, order
"remains in place." That judgment did not adjudicate DHR's motion to
hold the mother and the maternal grandmother in contempt and to
impose sanctions on the mother and the maternal grandmother and
stated that a hearing on those issues had not been set.
The mother filed a notice of appeal on September 6, 2022.
Analysis
The Maternal Grandmother's Appeal
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The maternal grandmother first argues that the juvenile court
erred in denying her motion to intervene in its November 2, 2020, order.
" '[A] denial of a motion to intervene is always an appealable order.' " Jim
Parker Bldg. Co. v. G & S Glass & Supply Co., 69 So. 3d 124, 130 (Ala.
2011) (quoting Farmers Ins. Exch. v. Raine, 905 So. 2d 832, 833 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2004)). However, the maternal grandmother's notice of appeal did
not invoke this court's jurisdiction to review the November 2, 2020, order
denying her motion to intervene because she did not file it within
fourteen days after the juvenile court entered that order. See Rule 4(a)(1),
Ala. R. App. P. (providing that the time for appealing a judgment in a
juvenile case is fourteen days); Rule 28(D), Ala. R. Juv. P. (same). The
timely filing of a notice of appeal is jurisdictional. See R.P.M. v. P.D.A.,
112 So. 3d 49, 51 (Ala. Civ. App. 2012). Rule 2(a)(1), Ala. R. App. P.,
provides that "[a]n appeal shall be dismissed if the notice of appeal was
not timely filed to invoke the jurisdiction of the appellate court."
Therefore, insofar as the maternal grandmother seeks review of the
November 2, 2020, order denying her motion to intervene, we dismiss her
appeal.
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The maternal grandmother next argues that the juvenile court
erred because, she says, as a relative of the child, she was entitled to a
custodial preference that the juvenile court did not accord her.
Apparently, the maternal grandmother is arguing that the juvenile
court's judgment terminating the mother's parental rights is erroneous
because, she says, the juvenile court did not accord her a custodial
preference in making a custodial disposition of the child. " 'One must have
been a party to the judgment below in order to have standing to appeal
any issue arising out of that judgment.' " Phoenix East Assoc., Inc. v.
Perdido Dunes Tower, LLC, 295 So. 3d 1016, 1026 (Ala. 2019) (quoting
Mars Hill Baptist Church of Anniston, Alabama, Inc. v. Mars Hill
Missionary Baptist Church, 761 So. 2d 975, 980 (Ala. 1980)). The
maternal grandmother does not have standing to appeal from the
judgment terminating the mother's parental rights because the maternal
grandmother was not a party to that judgment. Therefore, we dismiss the
maternal grandmother's appeal insofar as she challenges the custodial
disposition of the child in the judgment terminating the mother's
parental rights.
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Finally, the maternal grandmother argues, among other things,
that the juvenile court erred in entering the May 18, 2022, order
restraining her from discussing the .03 action, except with designated
persons, without affording her notice and an opportunity to be heard. The
May 18, 2022, order did not resolve all the claims in the action; therefore,
it was interlocutory. Generally, an appeal will lie only from a final
judgment -- i.e., one that adjudicates all the claims and controversies
between the parties. See Logan v. Logan, 40 So. 3d 721, 723 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2009). However, "an interlocutory order granting an injunction is
appealable." Ex parte State Dep't of Rev., 886 So. 2d 817, 819 (Ala. Civ.
App. 2003). Moreover, "when '[a] nonparty ... has been enjoined by an
order of the trial court,' he or she may appeal from that order." T.C.M. v.
W.L.K., 208 So. 3d 39, 43 (Ala. Civ. App. 2016) (quoting D.F.H. v. J.D.G.,
125 So. 3d 146, 149 (Ala. Civ. App. 2013)).
Neither the portion of DHR's motion requesting an "ex parte gag
order" binding the maternal grandmother nor the trial court's order
granting that motion set forth a statutory basis for such relief. We agree
with the maternal grandmother that §§ 12-15-131, 12-15-138, and 12-15-
141, Ala. Code 1975, do not support the issuance of the May 18, 2022,
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order. Section 12-15-131 provides for the entry of an order "restraining
the conduct of any party over whom the juvenile court has obtained
jurisdiction," but the maternal grandmother was not a party to the .03
action. Moreover, that section requires notice and a hearing before entry
of a restraining order, neither of which the juvenile court provided to the
maternal grandmother. Section 12-15-138 authorizes a juvenile court to
enter an ex parte order of restraint "to protect the health or safety of a
child subject to the proceeding," but DHR's motion did not allege that
such an order was necessary to protect the health or the safety of the
child in this case. Section 12-15-141 authorizes a juvenile court to enter
an ex parte order of restraint on an emergency basis "upon a showing of
verified written or verbal evidence of abuse or neglect injurious to the
health or safety of a child subject to a juvenile court proceeding and the
likelihood that the abuse or neglect will continue unless the order is
issued," but DHR's motion did not contain verified allegations that an ex
parte order of restraint was needed to protect the child from abuse or
neglect.1
1We recognize that § 12-15-133(g), Ala. Code 1975, subjects a person
to criminal and civil sanctions for, among other things, disclosing
information that "is directly or indirectly derived from the records of the
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The juvenile court stated that it entered the May 18, 2022, order "to
protect the dignity of the Court and the privacy of this child." Every court
in Alabama has the authority to issue orders to prevent hindrance of its
proceedings, § 12-1-7(1), Ala. Code 1975, and "[t]o control ... all other
persons connected with a judicial proceeding before it in every matter
appertaining thereto." § 12-1-7(4), Ala. Code 1975. Furthermore, a
juvenile court may admit a person other than a party, such as a witness,
to a juvenile court hearing "on condition that the persons refrain from
divulging any information which would identify the child under the
jurisdiction of the juvenile court or family involved." § 12-15-129, Ala.
Code 1975. Assuming, without deciding, that the juvenile court relied on
these statutes, or the general intent of the legislature that juvenile court
records shall be confidential, see § 12-15-216, Ala. Code 1975, we find
nothing in these statutes that authorizes the juvenile court to enter an
ex parte gag order against a non-party to protect the dignity of the court
or the privacy of a child.
juvenile court or acquired in the course of official duties," but that Code
section does not specifically provide for the entry of an "ex parte gag
order." Thus, the procedure for obtaining injunctive relief related to this
Code section is provided by Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P., as discussed herein.
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Turning to the general authority of a juvenile court to enter ex parte
orders of restraint, in pertinent part, Rule 1(A), Ala. R. Juv. P., provides:
"If no procedure is specifically provided in these Rules or by statute, the
Alabama Rules of Civil Procedure shall be applicable in those matters
that are considered civil in nature …." The .03 action is civil in nature,
and no rule of juvenile procedure or statute governs the procedure for an
ex parte order of restraint such as the one DHR sought in this case.
Therefore, Rule 65, Ala. R. Civ. P., applies in the present case. See Ex
parte S.L.P., [Ms. 2210005, Nov. 22, 2021] ___ So. 3d ___ (Ala. Civ. App.
2021) (applying Rule 65 in a juvenile action).
Rule 65(a)(1), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides: "No preliminary injunction
shall be issued without notice to the adverse party." In pertinent part,
Rule 65(b), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides:
"A temporary restraining order may be granted without
written or oral notice to the adverse party or that party's
attorney only if (1) it clearly appears from specific facts shown
by affidavit or by the verified complaint that immediate and
irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the applicant
before the adverse party or that party's attorney can be heard
in opposition, and (2) the applicant's attorney certifies to the
court in writing the efforts, if any, which have been made to
give the notice and the reasons supporting the claim that
notice should not be required."
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DHR did not adhere to the requirements for obtaining a
preliminary injunction because it did not give the mother and the
maternal grandmother notice of its motion seeking an order restraining
them. See Rule 65(a)(1); Funliner of Alabama, L.L.C. v. Pickard, 873 So.
2d 198, 219 (Ala. 2003) ("Notice to the adverse party before a preliminary
injunction is issued is mandatory, pursuant to Rule 65(a), Ala. R. Civ.
P."). DHR also did not adhere to the requirements for obtaining a
temporary restraining order because DHR did not file an affidavit by its
attorney certifying to the juvenile court the efforts, if any, that had been
made to give the mother and the maternal grandmother notice and the
reasons supporting DHR's claim that notice should not be required. See
Rule 65(b); Ex parte S.L.P., supra (holding that a juvenile court had
erred in entering a temporary restraining order because the party
seeking the temporary restraining order and his attorney had not
complied with the requirements of Rule 65(b)). Accordingly, regardless
of whether the May 18, 2022, order is characterized as a temporary
restraining order or as a preliminary injunction, the juvenile court erred
in entering it because DHR had not met the requirements for obtaining
either. Therefore, we reverse the May 18, 2022, order to the extent it
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purports to bind the maternal grandmother and remand the cause to the
juvenile court.
The Mother's Appeal
Insofar as the juvenile court's August 24, 2022, judgment purported
to maintain the May 18, 2022, order in effect, the August 24, 2022,
judgment is void because the juvenile court no longer had jurisdiction
over the May 18, 2022, order. See Johnson v. Willis, 893 So. 2d 1138,
1141 (Ala. 2004) (holding that the filing of a notice of appeal following
the entry of a preliminary injunction deprived the trial court of
jurisdiction to make the injunction permanent). The filing of the
maternal grandmother's notice of appeal on May 23, 2022, deprived the
juvenile court of jurisdiction over the May 18, 2022, order. " '[W]hile an
appeal is pending, the trial court "can do nothing in respect to any
matter or question which is involved in the appeal, and which may be
adjudged by the appellate court." ' " Id. (quoting Reynolds v. Colonial
Bank, 874 So. 2d 497, 503 (Ala. 2003), quoting in turn Foster v. Greer &
Sons, Inc., 446 So. 2d 605, 608 (Ala. 1984)). Because the maternal
grandmother's notice of appeal invoked our jurisdiction to review the
May 18, 2022, order, the juvenile court could take no action regarding
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that order. The maternal grandmother did not have standing to appeal
any issue pertaining to the termination of the mother's parental rights
and, therefore, the juvenile court retained jurisdiction over DHR's
termination-of-parental-rights claim despite the filing of the maternal
grandmother's notice of appeal.
As noted above, the general rule is that an appeal will lie only from
a final judgment that adjudicates all the claims and controversies
between the parties. See Logan, supra. The August 24, 2022, judgment
terminating the mother's parental rights was not a final judgment
because it did not adjudicate DHR's pending contempt claim. See A.C. v.
C.C., 34 So. 3d 1281, 1287 (Ala. Civ. App. 2009) (holding that the
pendency of an unadjudicated contempt claim rendered a judgment
finding a child dependent nonfinal and, consequently, dismissing the
appeal from that judgment). Accordingly, we dismiss the mother's
appeal.
Conclusion
In summary, in the maternal grandmother's appeal, we reverse the
juvenile court's May 18, 2022, order to the extent that it purports to bind
the maternal grandmother, we remand the cause to the juvenile court,
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and we dismiss all other aspects of the maternal grandmother's appeal.
We also dismiss the mother's appeal because she has appealed from a
nonfinal judgment.
CL-2022-0687 -- APPEAL DISMISSED IN PART; REVERSED AND
REMANDED.
Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Edwards, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ.,
concur.
CL-2022-0972 -- APPEAL DISMISSED.
Thompson, P.J., and Moore, Hanson, and Fridy, JJ., concur.
Edwards, J., concurs in the result, without opinion.
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