State v. Valiente-Mendoza , 2018 Ohio 3090 ( 2018 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Valiente-Mendoza, 2018-Ohio-3090.]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    SIXTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    WOOD COUNTY
    State of Ohio                                          Court of Appeals No. WD-16-067
    Appellee                                       Trial Court No. 2016CR432
    v.
    Juan Valiente-Mendoza                                  DECISION AND JUDGMENT
    Appellant                                      Decided: August 3, 2018
    *****
    Paul A. Dobson, Wood County Prosecuting Attorney, David T.
    Harold and Channa B. Beard, Assistant Prosecuting Attorneys,
    for appellee.
    Lawrence A. Gold, for appellant.
    *****
    OSOWIK, J.
    I. Introduction
    {¶ 1} Appellant, Juan Valiente-Mendoza, appeals the judgment of the Wood
    County Court of Common Pleas, sentencing him to 14 years in prison following a jury
    trial in which he was found guilty of one count each of possession of heroin, trafficking
    in heroin, possession of drugs, and trafficking in drugs. Finding no error, we affirm.
    A. Facts and Procedural Background
    {¶ 2} On the morning of September 1, 2016, Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper
    Ryan Stewart and Border Patrol Agent Matthew Siefert were parked in a crossover along
    the Ohio Turnpike in Wood County when they observed a white Chevrolet Suburban
    SUV traveling eastbound. The vehicle was being driven by appellant, who appeared to
    the officers to be unusually rigid in posture.
    {¶ 3} Suspecting that something may be afoot with respect to appellant, Stewart
    decided to pull out of the crossover and observe appellant. As the officers approached
    the Suburban, they noticed that appellant had switched from the left lane to the right lane
    of travel, and was operating the vehicle with his hazard lights flashing. Stewart drew
    near to the vehicle in an effort to ascertain the license plate number and run the vehicle’s
    registration. The officers noticed that the license plates were from California. As
    Stewart was looking at the license plate in order to take down the number, appellant
    abruptly pulled his vehicle onto the shoulder and stopped. The officers slowed down and
    pulled onto the shoulder about three-quarters of a mile ahead of appellant and began to
    observe the Suburban. Appellant had already pulled off of the shoulder and back onto the
    highway by the time Stewart stopped his marked cruiser. In Stewart’s estimation, it
    appeared as though appellant’s behavior was evasive. Consequently, the officers decided
    to continue to monitor appellant.
    {¶ 4} After pulling back onto the highway, appellant proceeded to the next exit,
    which was located between where he originally stopped and where the officers had pulled
    2.
    onto the shoulder. Stewart then waited for traffic to clear and proceeded onto a crossover
    and eventually onto the exit ramp. As the officers approached the tollgate, they noticed
    that the Suburban’s hazard lights were still activated. The officers also noticed that there
    was a female passenger, Ms. Alvarado-Franco, in the back seat, later identified as the
    owner of the Suburban. Steward proceeded to a tollgate lane adjacent to the one selected
    by appellant, where he was able to obtain a license plate number. While the registration
    was being ascertained, the officers noticed a stroller in the back of the vehicle, which
    appeared strange to Stewart since there were no small children in the vehicle.
    {¶ 5} After appellant cleared the tollgate, he immediately pulled to the shoulder of
    the toll area and stopped. Stewart proceeded past appellant and pulled his cruiser over.
    Meanwhile, appellant exited the Suburban, opened the hood, and began to look around
    the engine compartment as though he was experiencing mechanical problems with the
    vehicle. Observing appellant’s behavior, Stewart reversed his cruiser so that he could
    pull behind the Suburban and assist appellant. Stewart then parked his cruiser and
    activated his rear lights.
    {¶ 6} Upon exiting the cruiser and approaching the Suburban, Stewart noticed that
    Alvarado-Franco had made her way into the driver’s seat. Stewart also noticed that there
    were no children in the vehicle despite the presence of a stroller. Stewart inquired about
    the condition of the Suburban, and appellant informed him that the vehicle was shaking,
    possibly due to an issue with the brakes. Given his mechanical understanding, Stewart
    found it odd that appellant would examine the engine compartment to discover a potential
    3.
    issue with the vehicle’s brakes. In Stewart’s experience, brake issues are generally
    discovered upon inspecting the backside of the vehicle’s wheels.
    {¶ 7} Upon glancing under the hood of the Suburban, Stewart noticed an
    aluminum canister attached to the inside of the engine compartment with masking tape
    and wires leading to the vehicle’s battery. Stewart asked appellant about the canister, and
    appellant informed Stewart that it was for the battery. This piqued Stewart’s suspicion
    because, in his experience, drug traffickers occasionally hollow out a vehicle’s factory
    battery in order to conceal contraband inside. In such situations, a smaller battery is
    affixed to the engine compartment in order to power the vehicle.
    {¶ 8} As Stewart was talking with appellant, he noticed that Alvarado-Franco was
    attempting to start the vehicle. On her second attempt, Alvarado-Franco abruptly turned
    the vehicle off as the engine was starting to turn over, in what appeared to Stewart to be
    an attempt to prevent the vehicle from starting.
    {¶ 9} In light of the suspicious behavior Stewart had observed up to this point,
    Stewart asked appellant to see his identification. Appellant ultimately produced
    identification materials issued by the Mexican consulate.
    {¶ 10} Thereafter, Stewart asked appellant about his ultimate destination. With
    some hesitation, appellant informed Stewart that he was traveling to New York for one to
    two weeks on vacation. Stewart inquired as to whether appellant had any children, to
    which appellant responded that he had two adult daughters.
    4.
    {¶ 11} Meanwhile, Siefert had reached into the Suburban and started the vehicle
    for Alvarado-Franco. Siefert then engaged Alvarado-Franco in a conversation, during
    which Alvarado-Franco appeared “fidgety – a sign of nervousness – like she seemed to
    have a hard time sitting still.” Alvarado-Franco informed Siefert that she was traveling to
    New York for four or five days. As was the case with appellant, Alvarado-Franco
    produced identification from the Mexican consulate.
    {¶ 12} Given the suspicious activity from appellant and Alvarado-Franco, and in
    light of the conflicting lengths of stay that the two provided to Stewart and Siefert,
    Stewart called for the assistance of a canine unit. While waiting for the unit to arrive,
    Stewart conducted a criminal history check and Siefert conducted an immigration
    inspection. A canine sniff was ultimately performed, but the dog did not give a trained
    final response indicating the presence of narcotics.
    {¶ 13} After concluding his immigration inspection, Siefert approached appellant
    and reintroduced himself as a border patrol agent. During the conversation that ensued,
    appellant informed Siefert that he was in the United States illegally. Siefert then
    informed appellant that the consequences for his being in the country illegally would
    range from jail-time to being released depending upon his criminal and immigration
    history.
    {¶ 14} Two to three minutes into Siefert’s conversation with appellant, Siefert
    asked appellant for consent to search the Suburban. Appellant consented, and Siefert
    explained that he would be searching the entire vehicle including the engine
    5.
    compartment, to which Appellant again provided his consent. Siefert then sought
    Alvarado-Franco’s consent to search the vehicle. Because she did not appear to be as
    fluent in English as appellant, Siefert asked Alvarado-Franco if he could search the
    vehicle in Spanish. She consented.
    {¶ 15} Appellant and Alvarado-Franco were escorted to Stewart’s cruiser for
    officer safety, where they remained during the duration of the search. According to
    Siefert, a border patrol agent remained by their side during the search in case they
    decided to withdraw consent. As Stewart was searching the Suburban, Siefert continued
    his immigration inspection. Eventually, Siefert discovered that appellant had been
    previously deported on five or six occasions.
    {¶ 16} Stewart and another trooper conducted a search of the Suburban. During
    the search, Stewart noticed “a lot of tampering marks or tooling marks on the rear seat as
    well as the gas tank area.” The gas tank appeared to have recently been removed. Upon
    further investigation, Stewart found a pry mark on the edge of an interior piece of
    molding covering the driver’s side rear wheel well. Stewart removed the piece of
    molding to discover a package that was wrapped with the same type of masking tape
    Stewart observed on the canister attached to the engine compartment. The package was
    then opened, revealing a large quantity of what appeared to be heroin, as well as a
    package of pills.
    {¶ 17} A roadside analysis was performed on the substance, and it was confirmed
    to be heroin. A more thorough search was then conducted, revealing four more packages
    6.
    of pills. By the time the search of the vehicle was complete, the officers had seized 503.5
    grams of heroin and 3123.87 grams of Tramadol, a schedule IV controlled substance.
    {¶ 18} As a result of the foregoing, appellant was indicted on September 8, 2016,
    and charged with one count of possession of heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and
    (C)(6)(f), one count of trafficking in heroin in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and
    (C)(6)(g), one count of aggravated possession of drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.11(A)
    and (C)(1)(e), and one count of aggravated trafficking in drugs in violation of R.C.
    2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(1)(f). Each of these charges were felonies of the first degree to
    which major drug offender specifications under R.C. 2941.1410(A) were attached.
    {¶ 19} On September 21, 2016, appellant appeared before the trial court for
    arraignment. Appellant was found to be indigent and, because his primary language is
    Spanish, he was appointed an attorney who is fluent in Spanish. Thereafter, appellant
    entered pleas of not guilty to the above-referenced charges.
    {¶ 20} One month later, the state amended its indictment and reduced its charge in
    Counts 3 and 4, possession of drugs and trafficking in drugs, respectively, from first-
    degree felonies to second-degree felonies. The state also removed the major drug
    offender specifications from Counts 3 and 4.
    {¶ 21} Following pretrial discovery, appellant filed a motion to allocate additional
    interpreters for trial pursuant to Sup.R. 88. In the motion, appellant requested “at least
    two Spanish interpreters * * * for the duration of the two-day jury trial.”
    7.
    {¶ 22} Three days later, on November 7, 2016, appellant filed a motion to
    suppress, in which he argued that the narcotics that were seized following the search of
    the Chevrolet Suburban were only discovered after law enforcement engaged in an
    investigative stop without reasonable suspicion. According to appellant, the encounter
    amounted to a “fishing expedition” in that its duration exceeded beyond the point at
    which the officers had ensured the safety of appellant and Alvarado-Franco. According
    to appellant, the encounter should have ended once Stewart saw that the Suburban was
    still running.
    {¶ 23} A hearing on appellant’s motion to suppress was held on November 16,
    2016. At the hearing, the state elicited testimony from Stewart and Siefert, and appellant
    took the stand to support his motion to suppress. At the conclusion of the hearing, the
    trial court denied the motion to suppress after finding that appellant was not stopped by
    Stewart and Siefert, and concluding that the ensuing search was the product of appellant’s
    consent that had been intelligently, freely, and voluntarily given. Appellant’s two-day
    jury trial commenced immediately thereafter.
    {¶ 24} During its case-in-chief, the state recalled Stewart and Siefert.
    Additionally, the state called a criminalist for the State Highway Patrol Crime Lab,
    Jacqueline Smith. Smith was the individual responsible for analyzing the narcotics that
    were seized from the Suburban. During her testimony, Smith confirmed the weight of the
    heroin and Tramadol.
    8.
    {¶ 25} After presenting the foregoing evidence, the state rested. Appellant
    proceeded to move the trial court for an acquittal under Crim.R. 29, which the trial court
    denied. Appellant then rested without presenting any witnesses.
    {¶ 26} Following deliberations, the jury returned a verdict of guilty on all four
    counts contained in the indictment, as well as a finding in favor of the major drug
    offender specification under Count 2. The trial court then proceeded immediately to
    sentencing.
    {¶ 27} During sentencing, the court merged Counts 1 and 2, and also merged
    Counts 3 and 4. The state elected to proceed to sentencing on Counts 2 and 4. The court
    imposed a prison term of 11 years as to Count 2, which was mandatory on account of the
    major drug offender specification, and three years as to Count 4. The court ordered the
    prison sentences served consecutively, and also ordered appellant to pay a mandatory fine
    of $10,000 plus “the costs of prosecution.”
    B. Assignments of Error
    {¶ 28} Appellant has filed a timely notice of appeal from the trial court’s
    judgment, assigning the following errors for our review:
    I. The trial court violated Appellant’s constitutional right to be free
    from an unlawful search and seizure in denying his motion to suppress.
    II. Appellant received ineffective assistance of counsel in violation
    of his rights under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United
    9.
    States Constitution and Article I, § 10 of the Constitution of the State of
    Ohio.
    III. The trial court violated Appellant’s right to due process by
    denying his right to a qualified interpreter.
    IV. The trial court erred to the prejudice of Appellant in denying his
    Crim.R. 29 motion.
    V. The jury’s verdict was against the manifest weight of the
    evidence.
    VI. The trial court committed error to the prejudice of Appellant by
    imposing the costs of prosecution without consideration of Appellant’s
    present or future ability to pay.
    II. Analysis
    A. Motion to Suppress
    {¶ 29} In his first assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred in
    denying his motion to suppress.
    {¶ 30} “Appellate review of a motion to suppress presents mixed questions of law
    and fact. When considering a motion to suppress, the trial court assumes the role of trier
    of fact.” State v. Roberts, 
    110 Ohio St. 3d 71
    , 2006-Ohio-3665, 
    850 N.E.2d 1168
    , ¶ 100.
    The appellate court must accept the trial court’s findings of fact if supported by
    competent, credible evidence. State v. Steed, 2016-Ohio-8088, 
    75 N.E.3d 816
    , ¶ 11 (6th
    10.
    Dist.). A de novo standard applies to determine if the facts satisfy the applicable legal
    standard. State v. Bragg, 6th Dist. Lucas No. L-07-1162, 2007-Ohio-5993, ¶ 4.
    {¶ 31} “The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and the Ohio
    Constitution, Article I, Section 14, prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v.
    Emerson, 
    134 Ohio St. 3d 191
    , 2012-Ohio-5047, 
    981 N.E.2d 787
    , ¶ 15. When a police
    officer stops a vehicle and detains its occupants, a seizure within the meaning of those
    provisions has occurred. Delaware v. Prouse, 
    440 U.S. 648
    , 653, 
    99 S. Ct. 1391
    , 
    59 L. Ed. 2d 660
    (1979).
    {¶ 32} The Supreme Court of the United States has identified three categories of
    police-citizen interactions: (1) a consensual encounter, which requires no objective
    suspicion and does not implicate the Fourth Amendment; (2) a brief, investigatory
    detention or stop, which must be supported by a reasonable, articulable suspicion of
    criminal activity; and (3) an arrest, which must be supported by probable cause. Florida
    v. Royer, 
    460 U.S. 491
    , 501-507, 
    103 S. Ct. 1319
    , 
    75 L. Ed. 2d 229
    (1983); United States v.
    Mendenhall, 
    446 U.S. 544
    , 553, 
    100 S. Ct. 1870
    , 
    64 L. Ed. 2d 497
    (1980). Reasonable
    suspicion constitutes something less than probable cause. State v. Carlson, 102 Ohio
    App.3d 585, 590, 
    657 N.E.2d 591
    (9th Dist.1995). The propriety of an investigative stop
    must be viewed in light of the totality of the circumstances. State v. Bobo, 
    37 Ohio St. 3d 177
    , 
    524 N.E.2d 489
    (1988), paragraph one of the syllabus.
    {¶ 33} Here, appellant asserts that “both the stop and prolonged detention of the
    vehicle he was driving were undertaken without reasonable suspicion or probable cause.”
    11.
    Notably, appellant was not stopped by Stewart. Rather, Stewart and Siefert engaged
    appellant after he abruptly pulled his vehicle onto the shoulder of the road, got out of the
    vehicle, and began to look into the engine compartment as if there was a mechanical issue
    with the vehicle.
    Police officers without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity are
    allowed to intrude on a person’s privacy to carry out “community
    caretaking functions” to enhance public safety. The key to such
    permissible police action is the reasonableness required by the Fourth
    Amendment. When approaching a vehicle for safety reasons, the police
    officer must be able to point to reasonable, articulable facts upon which to
    base her safety concerns. State v. Norman, 
    136 Ohio App. 3d 46
    , 54, 
    735 N.E.2d 953
    (3d Dist.1999).
    {¶ 34} Given appellant’s erratic driving, the use of his hazard lights as he was
    driving along the highway, the fact that he pulled onto the shoulder on two occasions in a
    short time period, and his examination of the engine compartment while on the shoulder,
    we find that Stewart and Siefert acted reasonably when they approached appellant to
    provide assistance. This initial interaction between the officers and appellant amounted
    to a consensual encounter, which required no suspicion of criminal activity.
    {¶ 35} After approaching appellant to see if he needed assistance, Stewart made
    several observations that, when taken in their totality, created in Stewart an articulable
    and reasonable suspicion that appellant was engaged in drug trafficking sufficient to
    12.
    justify extending the encounter. Specifically, Stewart observed that there were no
    children in the vehicle despite the presence of a stroller, which Stewart indicated at trial
    was a common tactic employed by drug traffickers to deceive law enforcement officers.
    Stewart also noticed a canister attached inside the engine compartment using masking
    tape. Stewart testified during the suppression hearing that drug traffickers oftentimes
    utilize such devices as replacements for the car battery, which can then be hollowed out
    and used to hide contraband. Alvarado-Franco purposefully preventing the Suburban
    from starting, along with her nervous demeanor after Siefert started the vehicle, provided
    further support for Stewart’s suspicion of criminal activity. Also relevant in this inquiry
    is the inconsistency between appellant and Alvarado-Franco concerning the amount of
    time they were planning on spending in New York.
    {¶ 36} Taken together, the foregoing observations provided Stewart and Siefert
    with the reasonable suspicion necessary to extend the encounter in order to perform a
    canine sniff and an immigration inspection. Following the immigration inspection, it was
    determined that appellant was in the country illegally and had been previously deported
    several times. Thereafter, the officers asked both appellant and Alvarado-Franco for their
    consent to search the vehicle. Both individuals consented.
    {¶ 37} The state bears the burden of proving that consent to a search without a
    warrant was freely and voluntarily given. 
    Royer, supra
    , 460 U.S. at 497, 103 S.Ct.1319,
    
    75 L. Ed. 2d 229
    ; Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
    412 U.S. 218
    , 222, 
    93 S. Ct. 2041
    , 
    36 L. Ed. 2d 854
    (1973). “[T]he question whether a consent to search was in fact ‘voluntary‘
    13.
    or was the product of duress or coercion, express or implied, is a question of fact to be
    determined from the totality of all the circumstances.” Schneckloth at 227.
    {¶ 38} Appellant insists that his consent was not freely and voluntarily given
    because he is not fluent in English. In support of his contention, appellant points to the
    fact that he required two interpreters during trial. We find no merit to this argument. The
    record demonstrates that Stewart conversed with appellant in English during the entire
    encounter with no difficulty. There is no indication that appellant failed to understand
    the questions he was being asked by Stewart. Furthermore, there is no evidence to
    establish that the consent obtained by the officers in this case was the product of coercion
    or duress.
    {¶ 39} Upon consideration of the totality of the circumstances in this case, we find
    that the trial court properly concluded that Stewart’s encounter with appellant, and his
    subsequent consensual search of the Suburban, did not violate the Fourth Amendment’s
    protections against unreasonable searches and seizures. Thus, we find that the trial court
    properly denied the motion to suppress.
    {¶ 40} Accordingly, appellant’s first assignment of error is not well-taken.
    B. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
    {¶ 41} In his second assignment of error, appellant argues that he received
    ineffective assistance from his trial counsel.
    {¶ 42} In order to demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, appellant must
    satisfy the two-prong test developed in Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687, 104
    14.
    S.Ct. 2052, 
    80 L. Ed. 2d 674
    (1984). That is, appellant must show that counsel’s
    performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and a reasonable
    probability exists that, but for counsel’s error, the result of the proceedings would have
    been different. 
    Id. at 687-688,
    694.
    {¶ 43} Here, appellant contends that counsel was ineffective for rejecting a plea
    offer that he had previously elected to accept. This argument is not supported by the
    record.
    {¶ 44} According to the transcript of the proceedings, the state made two
    alternative plea offers, and stated them for the record prior to the suppression hearing.
    Under the first option, the state offered to amend Counts 3 and 4 to felonies of the second
    degree, with sentencing parameters that would be more favorable to appellant. Further,
    the state would recommend the sentences be run concurrent to one another for an
    aggregate prison term of 11 years. Under the second option, the state would amend
    Counts 3 and 4 as outlined in the first option, and the major drug offender specifications
    under Counts 1 and 2 would be dismissed. Sentencing would be postponed and appellant
    would be given an opportunity to cooperate with law enforcement, which would impact
    the state’s subsequent sentencing recommendation.
    {¶ 45} After reciting the foregoing options, the following colloquy took place:
    THE COURT: All right. Understanding that, does he wish to accept
    either offer from the State?
    THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Yes, Your Honor.
    15.
    THE COURT: I am sorry?
    THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Yes, Your Honor.
    THE COURT: He does wish to accept one of those offers?
    THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Yes. Yes, 1, 2, and 3
    and 4 you say?
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: He clearly does not understand.
    THE COURT: There were two offers: A and B, all right?
    THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Yes.
    THE COURT: What I am asking is, does he wish to accept one of
    those offers?
    THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) B.
    [DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Your Honor, I need private consultation
    with my client.
    THE COURT: All right, let’s do it, please. We are late starting our
    suppression hearing.
    {¶ 46} After consulting with her client, defense counsel reiterated the plea offers
    on the record, and appellant once again indicated his desire to accept the second option
    and cooperate with law enforcement. During this process, defense counsel, who is fluent
    in Spanish, became concerned that the interpreter was not accurately interpreting
    appellant’s wishes. Consequently, another interpreter, Mr. Moore, was called upon to
    interpret the proceedings. Moore confirmed that appellant wished to accept the state’s
    16.
    second plea offer. A brief recess was taken in order to allow appellant to review and
    execute the plea agreement. After returning from the recess, the court engaged appellant
    as follows:
    THE COURT: Be seated. Mr. Mendoza, before we took that break,
    you indicated to me that you wished to accept the B offer from the State of
    Ohio. Now, I am being told that you do not wish to accept that?
    THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Yes, that’s correct.
    THE COURT: And, again, just to make sure you understand so the
    record is clear, the current charges you face have a possible 19 year prison
    sentence. With Offer B, you face a maximum of an 11 year prison sentence
    and, depending upon your cooperation, it could be much less than that, do
    you understand that?
    THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Yes.
    THE COURT: All right. And you are rejecting both offers, is that
    correct?
    THE DEFENDANT: (Through Interpreter) Yes.
    {¶ 47} Upon consideration of the foregoing, we find that appellant’s trial counsel
    did not reject the state’s plea offer. Rather, it appears that appellant, upon further
    reflection, decided not to proceed with the plea agreement. Appellant acknowledges this
    in his brief, but complains that the trial court failed to question him when he rejected the
    state’s offers to ensure that he knowingly rejected the offers. This argument fails,
    17.
    because the trial court was not required to ensure appellant knowingly rejected the plea
    offer. State v. Hills, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 98848, 2013-Ohio-2902, ¶ 18 (“Although
    Crim.R. 11 places an obligation on the court to inform a defendant that a guilty plea
    waives certain constitutional rights, the court has no duty to inform a defendant of the
    consequences of rejecting a plea.”).
    {¶ 48} Because appellant, rather than defense counsel, rejected the state’s plea
    offers after a full explanation of their terms, we find no merit to his ineffective assistance
    of counsel argument. Accordingly, appellant’s second assignment of error is not well-
    taken.
    C. Qualified Interpreter
    {¶ 49} In his third assignment of error, appellant contends that the trial court erred
    by denying his right to a qualified interpreter.
    {¶ 50} Regarding the appointment of an interpreter, R.C. 2311.14(A)(1) provides:
    “Whenever because of a hearing, speech or other impairment a party to or witness in a
    legal proceeding cannot readily understand or communicate, the court shall appoint a
    qualified interpreter to assist such person.” Likewise, Sup.R. 88(A)(1) requires the
    appointment of a foreign language interpreter when “[a] party or witness who is limited
    English proficient or non-English speaking requests a foreign language interpreter and
    the court determines the services of the interpreter are necessary for the meaningful
    participation of the party or witness.” Further, Sup.R. 88(F)(1) mandates the appointment
    of two or more foreign language interpreters when the case or court function will last
    18.
    more two or more hours and requires continuous, simultaneous, or consecutive
    interpretation.
    {¶ 51} The decision to appoint a translator, whether to assist a witness or a
    defendant, is within the trial court’s sound discretion. State v. Mota, 6th Dist. L-04-1354,
    2006-Ohio-3800, ¶ 23; State v. Saah, 
    67 Ohio App. 3d 86
    , 95, 
    585 N.E.2d 999
    (8th
    Dist.1990). An appellate court will not upset the decision of the trial court regarding the
    need for an interpreter absent an abuse of discretion. 
    Id. An abuse
    of discretion connotes
    that the court’s attitude was arbitrary, unreasonable or unconscionable. Blakemore v.
    Blakemore, 
    5 Ohio St. 3d 217
    , 219, 
    450 N.E.2d 1140
    (1983).
    {¶ 52} In the present case, appellant acknowledges that the trial court appointed
    two interpreters, Mr. Zuniga and Mr. Moore, in this case. However, he asserts that
    Zuniga was not a qualified interpreter, as required by R.C. 2311.14(A)(1). The record
    belies this assertion.
    {¶ 53} Regarding the qualification of interpreters, Sup.R. 88(D) outlines what has
    been described as a “hierarchy for preferred interpreter candidates.” State v. Gaspareno,
    2016-Ohio-990, 
    61 N.E.3d 550
    , ¶ 63 (3d Dist.). At the top of the hierarchy, the rule
    provides for the appointment of “a Supreme Court certified foreign language interpreter
    to participate in-person at the case or court function.” Sup.R. 88(D)(1). When a
    Supreme Court certified interpreter is unavailable or nonexistent, a court may appoint a
    provisionally qualified foreign language interpreter. Sup.R. 88(D)(2). If no such
    provisionally qualified foreign language interpreter is available, a court may appoint a
    19.
    language-skilled foreign language interpreter. Sup.R. 88(D)(3). Finally, if none of the
    foregoing types of interpreters are available, a court may appoint an interpreter to
    participate in the case or court function through telephonic interpretation. Sup.R.
    88(D)(4).
    {¶ 54} Prior to the suppression hearing and jury trial, the trial court administered
    an oath to Zuniga and examined Zuniga’s qualifications. The court began by asking
    Zuniga about his experience in interpreting in courts. Zuniga explained that he had acted
    as an interpreter in courts in Toledo, as well as in hospitals, schools, and businesses,
    through the International Institute. The court then asked Zuniga if he was certified by the
    Ohio Supreme Court. Zuniga responded in the affirmative. The record also confirms that
    Moore was certified by the Ohio Supreme Court.
    {¶ 55} Upon examination of the record, it is clear that the interpreters appointed in
    this case were not only qualified, but were actually Supreme Court certified as required
    under Sup.R. 88(D)(1). Given the trial court’s appointment of two Supreme Court
    qualified foreign language interpreters, we find no merit to appellant’s contention that the
    trial court failed to appoint qualified interpreters.
    {¶ 56} Accordingly, appellant’s third assignment of error is not well-taken.
    D. Crim.R. 29 and Manifest Weight
    {¶ 57} In his fourth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
    in denying his Crim.R. 29 motion at the close of the state’s case-in-chief. In his fifth
    20.
    assignment of error, appellant argues that the jury’s verdict was against the manifest
    weight of the evidence.
    {¶ 58} A motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) is a challenge to the
    sufficiency of the evidence. See State v. Brinkley, 
    105 Ohio St. 3d 231
    , 2005-Ohio-1507,
    
    824 N.E.2d 959
    , ¶ 39. The denial of a motion for acquittal under Crim.R. 29(A) “is
    governed by the same standard as the one for determining whether a verdict is supported
    by sufficient evidence.” State v. Tenace, 
    109 Ohio St. 3d 255
    , 2006-Ohio-2417, 
    847 N.E.2d 386
    , ¶ 37.
    {¶ 59} In reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we view the
    evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether “any rational
    trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime proven beyond a
    reasonable doubt.” (Internal citations omitted.) State v. Smith, 
    80 Ohio St. 3d 89
    , 113,
    
    684 N.E.2d 668
    (1997). In making that determination, the appellate court will not weigh
    the evidence or assess the credibility of the witnesses. State v. Were, 
    118 Ohio St. 3d 448
    ,
    2008-Ohio-2762, 
    890 N.E.2d 263
    , ¶ 132. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support
    a conviction is a question of law. State v. Thompkins, 
    78 Ohio St. 3d 380
    , 386, 
    678 N.E.2d 541
    (1997).
    {¶ 60} When reviewing a manifest weight of the evidence issue, we sit as a
    “thirteenth juror.” 
    Id. at 387.
    That is, we review the entire record, weigh the evidence
    and all reasonable inferences, and consider the credibility of witnesses. 
    Id. Our role
    is to
    determine “whether in resolving conflicts in the evidence, the [trier of fact] clearly lost its
    21.
    way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
    reversed and a new trial ordered.” 
    Id. We reverse
    a conviction on manifest weight
    grounds for only the most “exceptional case in which the evidence weighs heavily against
    the conviction.” 
    Id. at 387.
    {¶ 61} Here, appellant was convicted of one count of possession of heroin in
    violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(6)(f), one count of trafficking in heroin in violation
    of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(6)(g), one count of aggravated possession of drugs in
    violation of R.C. 2925.11(A) and (C)(2)(c), and one count of aggravated trafficking in
    drugs in violation of R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) and (C)(2)(d). R.C. 2925.11(A) provides: “No
    person shall knowingly obtain, possess, or use a controlled substance or a controlled
    substance analog.” R.C. 2925.03(A)(2) states:
    (A) No person shall knowingly do any of the following:
    ***
    (2) Prepare for shipment, ship, transport, deliver, prepare for
    distribution, or distribute a controlled substance or a controlled substance
    analog, when the offender knows or has reasonable cause to believe that the
    controlled substance or a controlled substance analog is intended for sale or
    resale by the offender or another person.
    {¶ 62} Appellant does not dispute the sufficiency of the state’s evidence with
    respect to the presence of controlled substances (heroin and Tramadol) in the Chevrolet
    Suburban he was driving at the time of his encounter with Stewart and Siefert. Instead,
    22.
    appellant maintains that the state failed to introduce sufficient evidence to demonstrate
    that he knowingly possessed and distributed such substances. Appellant contends that he
    was simply the driver of the vehicle, which was registered to Alvarado-Franco, and that
    he had no knowledge of the drugs that were hidden inside the vehicle.
    {¶ 63} Under R.C. 2901.22(B),
    A person acts knowingly, regardless of purpose, when the person is
    aware that the person’s conduct will probably cause a certain result or will
    probably be of a certain nature. A person has knowledge of circumstances
    when the person is aware that such circumstances probably exist. When
    knowledge of the existence of a particular fact is an element of an offense,
    such knowledge is established if a person subjectively believes that there is
    a high probability of its existence and fails to make inquiry or acts with a
    conscious purpose to avoid learning the fact.
    {¶ 64} “‘Possess’ or ‘possession’ means having control over a thing or substance,
    but may not be inferred solely from mere access to the thing or substance through
    ownership or occupation of the premises upon which the thing or substance is found.”
    R.C. 2925.01(K). A court must look at all of the attendant facts and circumstances in
    order to determine if a defendant knowingly possessed a controlled substance. State v.
    Pippen, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 81630, 2003-Ohio-1736, ¶ 8.
    {¶ 65} Possession may be actual or constructive. State v. Fykes, 6th Dist. Wood
    No. WD-07-072, 2009-Ohio-2926, ¶ 36, citing State v. Kingsland, 
    177 Ohio App. 3d 655
    ,
    23.
    2008-Ohio-4148, 
    895 N.E.2d 633
    , ¶ 13 (4th Dist.). Actual possession occurs when the
    defendant has the items within his immediate physical control, whereas constructive
    possession occurs when the defendant is able to exercise dominion and control over an
    item, even if the individual does not have the item within his immediate physical
    possession. 
    Id. “In order
    for constructive possession to exist, there must be evidence
    demonstrating that the defendant was conscious of the presence of the object. Although a
    defendant’s mere proximity to an item is in itself insufficient to establish constructive
    possession, proximity to the item may constitute some evidence of constructive
    possession.” 
    Id. {¶ 66}
    Here, the state introduced evidence that demonstrated appellant’s
    constructive possession of the drugs discovered in the Suburban. The drugs were
    discovered in close proximity to appellant. Further, the interaction between appellant and
    the officers in this case was fraught with attempts to deceive the officers and evade
    detection of criminal activity, which demonstrated the fact that appellant was conscious
    of the presence of the drugs in the vehicle. Initially, appellant attempted to convince
    Stewart that his vehicle was not operating properly by abruptly pulling onto the shoulder
    of the highway. Then, when Stewart approached appellant’s vehicle, he was provided
    conflicting stories as to where appellant and Alvarado-Franco were traveling.
    Meanwhile, Alvarado-Franco was attempting to continue the false narrative of a
    mechanical issue by turning the engine over but turning the key back in the ignition
    before the engine could start.
    24.
    {¶ 67} Given the foregoing evidence, we find that a rational trier of fact could
    have found that appellant was conscious of the drugs hidden inside the Suburban. Thus,
    we find that there was sufficient evidence that appellant knowingly possessed the drugs.
    Further, because we do not find that this is the exceptional case in which the jury clearly
    lost its way and created such a manifest miscarriage of justice that the conviction must be
    reversed and a new trial ordered, we find that the jury’s verdict was not against the
    manifest weight of the evidence.
    {¶ 68} Accordingly, appellant’s fourth and fifth assignments of error are not well-
    taken.
    E. Costs
    {¶ 69} In his sixth assignment of error, appellant argues that the trial court erred
    by imposing the costs of prosecution without consideration of his present or future ability
    to pay.
    {¶ 70} R.C. 2947.23(A)(1)(a) provides, “In all criminal cases * * * the judge or
    magistrate shall include in the sentence the costs of prosecution, including any costs
    under section 2947.231 of the Revised Code, and render a judgment against the defendant
    for such costs.” This section “requires a sentencing court to impose the costs of
    prosecution against all convicted defendants.” State v. Wright, 6th Dist. Wood No.
    WD-11-079, 2013-Ohio-1273, ¶ 5, citing State v. White, 
    103 Ohio St. 3d 580
    , 2004-Ohio-
    5989, 
    817 N.E.2d 393
    , ¶ 8. Because the imposition of costs pursuant to R.C. 2947.23 is
    mandatory, this court has held that “[t]he trial court is not required to hold a hearing or
    25.
    otherwise determine an offender’s ability to pay before ordering him to pay such costs.”
    State v. Riegsecker, 6th Dist. Fulton No. F-03-022, 2004-Ohio-3808, ¶ 10. Therefore, we
    hold that the trial court did not err by ordering appellant to pay the costs of prosecution
    without first determining his ability to pay.
    {¶ 71} Appellant also states that the trial court erred in ordering him to pay
    appointed counsel fees and the costs of confinement without first determining his ability
    to pay such costs. In its sentencing entry, the trial court merely ordered appellant to “pay
    the costs of this prosecution.” Because the trial court did not order appellant to pay
    appointed counsel fees and the costs of confinement, appellant’s argument as to those
    costs is misplaced.
    {¶ 72} Accordingly, appellant’s sixth assignment of error is not well-taken.
    III. Conclusion
    {¶ 73} For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the Wood County Court of
    Common Pleas is affirmed. Appellant is ordered to pay the costs of this appeal pursuant
    to App.R. 24.
    Judgment affirmed.
    26.
    State v. Valiente-Mendoza
    C.A. No. WD-16-067
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to App.R. 27.
    See also 6th Dist.Loc.App.R. 4.
    Arlene Singer, J.                              _______________________________
    JUDGE
    Thomas J. Osowik, J.
    _______________________________
    James D. Jensen, J.                                        JUDGE
    CONCUR.
    _______________________________
    JUDGE
    This decision is subject to further editing by the Supreme Court of
    Ohio’s Reporter of Decisions. Parties interested in viewing the final reported
    version are advised to visit the Ohio Supreme Court’s web site at:
    http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/ROD/docs/.
    27.