Savoy v. Stroughter ( 2022 )

Case: 21-30170 Document: 00516229702 Page: 1 Date Filed: 03/08/2022
United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
FILED
March 8, 2022
No. 21-30170
Lyle W. Cayce
Summary Calendar Clerk
Mary Delores Savoy,
Plaintiff—Appellant,
versus
Douglas Stroughter, Lieutenant Colonel; Haver Durr, Sergeant,
Defendants—Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Louisiana
USDC No. 3:18-CV-463
Before King, Costa, and Ho, Circuit Judges.
Per Curiam:*
Plaintiff-appellant Mary Delores Savoy appeals the summary
judgment dismissing her excessive force claim against defendants-appellees
Douglas Stroughter and Haver Durr. For the reasons discussed, we vacate
*
Pursuant to 5th Circuit Rule 47.5, the court has determined that this
opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited
circumstances set forth in 5th Circuit Rule 47.5.4.
Case: 21-30170 Document: 00516229702 Page: 2 Date Filed: 03/08/2022
No. 21-30170
the judgment and remand to the district court with instructions to rule on the
plaintiff’s motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).
I.
On April 13, 2018, Joseph Savoy 1 filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit
against the defendants claiming that they acted in retaliation against him in
violation of his rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments and used
excessive force against him in violation of his rights under the Fourth and
Eighth Amendments. He also filed related state-law claims.
The claims arose from an incident that occurred on July 31, 2017, in a
hallway of the Dixon Correctional Institution, where Joseph was a prisoner
and the defendants were employees. Following a verbal altercation between
Joseph and the defendants, the defendants used force against Joseph to
restrain him. Joseph claimed the defendants attacked him because he had
previously filed grievances against different prison guards. The defendants
responded that they had no knowledge about these prior grievances, but
rather, only restrained Joseph because he physically and verbally threatened
them and refused to listen to their verbal commands.
A video partially captured the incident. Important to this appeal, the
video was delivered by the defendants to the plaintiff in nine individual video
clips, with gaps in time between some of these clips. The appellant believes
the defendants withheld video clips of those gaps in time and sought to
compel their delivery. The magistrate judge denied that motion to compel,
and the appellant sought review of that denial with the district court under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 72(a).
1
Joseph has since passed away from unrelated causes. Mary Savoy, his relative,
now continues the suit.
2
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No. 21-30170
Without ruling on the 72(a) motion, the district court granted
summary judgment to the defendants, finding that they were entitled to
qualified immunity. First, the court found that Mary failed to submit any
evidence to support the claim that the defendants’ acts were in retaliation for
Joseph’s prior complaints, and thus, dismissed the retaliation claim. Then,
applying the factors outlined in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 6–7 (1992),
the court concluded that the uncontested facts—made up from the testimony
of the defendant-witnesses and video that partially captured the incident—
supported the officers’ reasonable perception that Joseph was a threat, so the
court granted the defendants qualified immunity on the excessive force
claim. Finally, because the court disposed of the federal claims, it stated in
its opinion that it would dismiss the state-law claims without prejudice,
however, in the court’s judgment, it dismissed all claims with prejudice.
Mary now appeals. She argues that there were questions of fact
regarding whether Joseph actually threatened the defendants. She also argues
that the district court erred by not granting the motion to compel and not
giving to the appellant a presumption of spoliation. Finally, the parties agree
that the state-law claims should have been dismissed without prejudice.
II.
We address only her second argument. The appellant contends that
the magistrate judge erred when it denied the motion to compel. The
appellees respond that the district court never ruled on the appellant’s 72(a)
motion, and thus, we are deprived of jurisdiction. Singletary v. B.R.X., Inc.,
828 F.2d 1135, 1137 (5th Cir. 1987). The appellees are correct. Absent a ruling
by the district court, we cannot review this issue. Thus, the appropriate
course is for us to remand to the district court for such a ruling. Cf., e.g., Davis
v. Davis, 826 F.3d 258, 270 (5th Cir. 2016) (remanding for further
consideration where the district court did not consider a necessary
3
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No. 21-30170
argument); Hutchinson v. Pfeil, 105 F.3d 562, 566 (10th Cir. 1997) (“Because
the district court did not rule on [appellant’s 72(a)] objections, we do not
reach the issue and instead remand to the district court for such a ruling.”).
If the district court finds that the magistrate judge did err in denying
the motion to compel, it is plausible that any resulting evidence would affect
the summary judgment ruling. So, the judgment should be vacated pending
resolution of the 72(a) motion.
III.
Because the district court did not rule on the appellant’s 72(a) motion,
we VACATE the judgment and REMAND this matter to the district court
to issue a ruling on the Motion for Review and Objections to Magistrate
Decision.
4