Amber Nicole Douglas v. City of Mobile ( 2022 )


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  • Rel: December 16, 2022
    Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
    Readers are requested to notify the Reporter of Decisions, Alabama Appellate Courts, 300 Dexter Avenue,
    Montgomery, Alabama 36104-3741 ((334) 229-0650), of any typographical or other errors, in order that corrections
    may be made before the opinion is published in Southern Reporter.
    Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
    _________________________
    CR-20-1012
    _________________________
    Amber Nicole Douglas
    v.
    City of Mobile
    Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
    (CC-21-685)
    McCOOL, Judge.
    Amber Nicole Douglas appeals her conviction in the Mobile Circuit
    Court for menacing, see § 13A-6-23, Ala. Code 1975, and her resulting
    CR-20-1012
    sentence of 30 days in the Mobile County Metro Jail.1 Her sentence was
    suspended, and she was ordered to serve six months on probation. She
    was also ordered to pay a $100 fine, court costs, and $25 to the Victims
    Compensation Fund. Douglas was also ordered to have no contact with
    the Purple Cow store or the victim.
    The following evidence was presented at trial:
    Nyandra Merery, an employee of the Purple Cow gasoline service
    station and convenience store in Mobile, testified that she was working
    at the Purple Cow on July 1, 2019. Merery stated that there had recently
    been potential tension and discussion among the employees of the Purple
    Cow based on some prior incidents that had occurred between an
    employee's girlfriend and other employees. According to Merery, another
    employee at the Purple Cow, Bobby Jet, was in a relationship with
    Douglas. Merery testified that Douglas did not want Bobby working with
    female cashiers and that Douglas had been coming to the Purple Cow and
    "getting into … altercations." (R. 9.) Merery testified that, because of the
    tension caused by Douglas, the owner of the store viewed recordings from
    1Douglas     was originally charged and convicted in the Mobile
    Municipal Court of the offense of menacing. On March 22, 2021, Douglas
    filed a notice of appeal for a trial de novo in the Mobile Circuit Court.
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    CR-20-1012
    the video camera at the store. As a result, some time before July 1, the
    store owner held an employee meeting about the matter and banned
    Douglas from entering the store.
    Merery testified that on the evening of July 1, 2019, Bobby was
    assigned to relieve her from her shift. That evening, when she was
    supposed to be getting off work, Merery observed Bobby and Douglas
    arguing outside the front door of the store. Merery stated that Bobby then
    "slammed the door [open]" and walked to the back of the store. Douglas
    then opened the door and began stepping in and out of the door
    repeatedly, which caused the "notification noise" to keep alarming. (R.
    14.) According to Merery, Douglas started screaming, "Hello. Hello. I
    need some fucking gas. I know you fucking hear me." (R. 14.) Merery
    stated that Bobby was ignoring Douglas. Merery then walked to the back
    of the store to use the restroom before leaving the store. When Merery
    returned from the restroom, Douglas was no longer in the store. Merery
    stated that she then clocked out, retrieved her belongings, and went out
    the back door to her vehicle.
    According to Merery, as she got into her vehicle and "hit reverse,"
    Douglas "swung [her vehicle] around behind [Merery's vehicle]." (R. 16.)
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    CR-20-1012
    Merery stated that Merery's vehicle door was still open at this time.
    Douglas began screaming at Merery. Merery said that Douglas's vehicle
    was "right behind" Merery's vehicle and that Douglas had Merery's
    vehicle blocked in. (R. 17.) According to Merery, because the driver side
    of Douglas's vehicle was closest to Merery's vehicle, the distance between
    Douglas and Merery was approximately the distance between Merery's
    driver door to the back of Merery's vehicle. Merery testified that Douglas
    was screaming, "Bitch, what was you laughing at? Bitch, I will hit you
    upside the head with this – Bitch, I will crack your fucking skull and hit
    you upside the head with this tire iron." (R. 18.) As Douglas was
    screaming, she was waving an "iron object" out of her window. (R. 18.)
    Douglas did not get out of her own vehicle.
    Merery stated that she yelled, "[Douglas,] what's your problem?" (R.
    18.) However, Douglas pulled away. Merery then started to close her door
    and put her vehicle into reverse, but Douglas returned and blocked
    Merery in again with her vehicle. According to Merery, Douglas blocked
    her in "six or seven times." (R. 19.) Merery called the police. Merery
    testified that she was scared for her safety because she thought Douglas
    was going to hit her with the tire iron. When Merery got on the phone
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    CR-20-1012
    with the police, she was able to drive to the front of the store once
    Douglas's vehicle was not behind her vehicle. Merery testified that, as
    she was driving to the front of the store to "go to an open area and go
    underneath the gas pump" area, Douglas "almost hit [Merery's vehicle]
    with her car." (R. 21.) Merery stated that if she had not hit the gas pedal
    "real fast," Douglas "would have smashed into [her vehicle.]" (R. 21.)
    Douglas then drove off and Merery stayed on the phone with the police
    dispatcher until the police arrived at the scene.
    Merery testified that, when the officer arrived to the scene, he
    talked to her, viewed the video evidence from the store's surveillance
    cameras, and then "authorized a complaint for harassment"; however,
    when Merery went to the magistrate's office to obtain the warrant as
    directed by the officer, the magistrate changed the charge "from
    harassment to menacing." (R. 24.)
    The City rested its case and the defense moved for a judgment of
    acquittal, claiming that there was no evidence indicating that Douglas
    took any physical action that would place Merery in fear of imminent
    serious physical injury. The court denied Douglas's motion for a judgment
    of acquittal.
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    CR-20-1012
    Bobby Jet testified on Douglas's behalf. Bobby testified that he
    came into the store on the night of July 1, 2019, with Douglas and their
    child, who was in his baby carrier. Bobby denied arguing with Douglas.
    Bobby claimed that Douglas was standing at the counter talking to him
    when Merery came up to them and began "cursing" at Douglas. (R. 45.)
    Bobby claimed that Douglas and Merery both left out of the front door of
    the store. Bobby stated that Douglas placed the child back into their
    vehicle and got into her vehicle. He testified that Merery then went to
    the back of the store, got into her vehicle, and drove her vehicle to the
    front of the store where she pulled up behind Douglas's vehicle, blocking
    Douglas in. Bobby stated that he knows that there was not a tire tool in
    Douglas's vehicle. According to Bobby, before the July 1, 2019, incident,
    management had not told him that Douglas was banned from the store;
    rather, he claimed, management told him to "control [his] woman." (R.
    50.)
    Douglas also testified in her own behalf. She denied arguing with
    Bobby on the night of the incident, and she claimed that she went inside
    the store with her baby to get a drink. Douglas testified that she was at
    the counter talking to Bobby when Merery, who was on her way out the
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    CR-20-1012
    front door, turned around and began cursing her. Douglas claimed that
    Merery threatened to get a taser out of her vehicle, so Douglas "ran out"
    the front door to her own vehicle, put her baby in her vehicle, and called
    9-1-1 to report the threat. Douglas claimed that she pulled around to the
    back of the store to get Merery's license-plate number, but "did not pull
    up to block [Merery] in." (R. 57.) She claimed that her passenger side door
    was closest to Merery's vehicle, and that she "got [Merery's] license plate
    [information] real quick and went back to the same parking spot that
    [she] was in" at the front of the store. (R. 57.) Douglas claimed that she
    did not have a tire tool in her hands or in her vehicle. Douglas claimed
    that, after she had returned to the front of the store, Merery drove to the
    front of the store and blocked Douglas's vehicle in, requiring Douglas to
    "inch" back to try to get out of the parking spot. (R. 58.) She stated that
    she eventually called 9-1-1 again, told them that she had to leave because
    she was in fear for her life, and gave the officers her address and phone
    number to contact her.
    At the conclusion of the trial, the circuit court found that Douglas
    was guilty of the charge of menacing. This appeal followed.
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    CR-20-1012
    On appeal, Douglas's sole contention is that there was insufficient
    evidence presented to convict her of the offense of menacing because, she
    says, the City failed to establish that she used "physical action" and that
    she placed Merery in "fear of imminent serious physical injury."
    (Douglas's brief, at 8.)
    Because this was a bench trial, the trial judge was the trier of fact.
    This Court has held:
    " ' "When evidence is presented ore tenus to the trial court, the
    court's findings of fact based on that evidence are presumed
    to be correct," Ex parte Perkins, 
    646 So. 2d 46
    , 47 (Ala. 1994);
    "[w]e indulge a presumption that the trial court properly ruled
    on the weight and probative force of the evidence," Bradley v.
    State, 
    494 So. 2d 750
    , 761 (Ala. Crim. App. 1985), aff'd, 
    494 So. 2d 772
     (Ala. 1986); and we make " 'all the reasonable
    inferences and credibility choices supportive of the decision of
    the trial court.' " Kennedy v. State, 
    640 So. 2d 22
    , 26 (Ala.
    Crim. App. 1993), quoting Bradley, 494 So. 2d at 761.
    " ' "Where evidence is presented to the trial court ore tenus in
    a nonjury case, a presumption of correctness exists as to the
    court's conclusions on issues of fact; its determination will not
    be disturbed unless clearly erroneous, without supporting
    evidence, manifestly unjust, or against the great weight of the
    evidence." ' " Ex parte Jackson, 886 So. 2d [155] at 159 [(Ala.
    2004)], quoting State v. Hill, 
    690 So. 2d 1201
    , 1203 (Ala.
    1996), quoting in turn Ex parte Agee, 
    669 So. 2d 102
    , 104
    (Ala.1995).
    " 'However, "[t]he ore tenus presumption of correctness
    applies to findings of fact, not to conclusions of law." City of
    Russellville Zoning Bd. of Adjustment v. Vernon, 
    842 So. 2d 627
    , 629 (Ala. 2002). "[T]he ore tenus rule does not extend to
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    CR-20-1012
    cloak a trial judge's conclusions of law, or incorrect application
    of law to the facts, with a presumption of correctness."
    Eubanks v. Hale, 
    752 So. 2d 1113
    , 1144–45 (Ala. 1999).
    " ' "[W]hen the trial court improperly applies the law to the
    facts, no presumption of correctness exists as to the court's
    judgment." ' " Ex parte Jackson, 886 So. 2d at 159, quoting
    Hill, 
    690 So. 2d at 1203
    , quoting in turn, Ex parte Agee, 669
    So. 2d at 104. Thus, we review the trial court's conclusions of
    law and its application of law to the facts under the de novo
    standard of review.' "
    Bailey v. City of Ragland, 
    136 So. 3d 498
    , 502 (Ala. Crim. App. 2013),
    quoting Washington v. State, 
    922 So.2d 145
    , 157–58 (Ala. Crim. App.
    2005).
    Section 13A-6-23(a), Ala. Code 1975, provides that "[a] person
    commits the crime of menacing if, by physical action, he intentionally
    places or attempts to place another person in fear of imminent serious
    physical injury." "Serious physical injury" is defined, in pertinent part,
    as "physical injury which creates a substantial risk of death, or which
    causes serious and protracted disfigurement, protracted impairment of
    health, or protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily
    organ."
    Douglas relies on the Alabama Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte
    Pate, 
    145 So. 3d 733
     (Ala. 2013) to support her contention that there was
    insufficient evidence establishing that she used "physical action" and
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    CR-20-1012
    that she placed Merery in "fear of imminent serious physical injury." In
    Pate, the Alabama Supreme Court held that an appellant's arming
    himself, "without more, was not sufficient to establish the physical-action
    element of menacing." 145 So. 3d at 738. However, this case is
    distinguishable from Pate. In the present case, Douglas did not merely
    arm herself. Rather, evidence was presented that established that
    Douglas pulled her vehicle in behind Merery's vehicle, blocking Merery's
    vehicle into the parking space so that Merery could not leave. Merery
    testified that Douglas then rolled down her window, held a tire iron out
    of the window, and screamed at Merery that she would "crack [her]
    fucking skull and hit [her] upside the head with th[e] tire iron." (R. 18.)
    At the time, the distance between the women was the distance between
    Merery's open driver's door to the back of her vehicle. Although Douglas
    and Bobby provided evidence to the contrary, any "conflict between the
    State's evidence and that offered by the appellant [goes] to the weight of
    the evidence and [creates] questions of fact to be resolved by the [trier of
    fact]." Rowell v. State, 
    647 So. 2d 67
    , 69-70 (Ala. Crim. App. 1994).
    Therefore, considering all the evidence presented by the City, there was
    sufficient evidence to support the element of physical action for the
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    CR-20-1012
    offense of menacing. Because the City established a prima facie case of
    menacing, we will not disturb the fact finder's determination of guilt.
    Based on the foregoing, the judgment of the circuit court is
    affirmed.
    AFFIRMED.
    Windom, P.J., and Kellum, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.
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