Reginald Thadeous Blevins v. State of Alabama ( 2023 )

REL: May 5, 2023
Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the advance sheets of Southern Reporter.
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Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
OCTOBER TERM, 2022-2023
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Reginald Thadeous Blevins
v.
State of Alabama
Appeal from Mobile Circuit Court
(CC-20-1246)
KELLUM, Judge.
Reginald Thadeous Blevins was convicted of robbery in the first
degree, see § 13A-8-41(a)(1), Ala. Code 1975, and assault in the second
degree, see § 13A-6-21(a)(2), Ala. Code 1975. The trial court sentenced
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him, as a habitual felony offender, to life imprisonment without the
possibility of parole for each of his convictions.
On appeal, Blevins raises only two issues for our review, both
relating to his sentencing. First, Blevins contends that the trial court
erred in sentencing him under the Habitual Felony Offender Act ("the
HFOA"), § 13A-5-9, Ala. Code 1975, without requiring the State to
provide certified copies of his prior convictions to satisfy its burden of
proof.1 The record reflects that Blevins testified on his own behalf at trial
and that, during cross-examination, he admitted that he had previously
been convicted of unlawful possession of a controlled substance, robbery
in the third degree, shooting into an occupied vehicle, assault in the
second degree, and murder. It is well settled that " '[t]he admission by a
defendant of a prior conviction constitutes proper proof to enhance that
defendant's sentence under the Habitual Offender Act.' " Nix v. State,
747 So. 2d 351, 357 (Ala. Crim. App. 1999) (quoting Daniel v. State, 623
So. 2d 438, 441 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993)). "A defendant's admission is a
proper method of proving a prior conviction for purposes of the Habitual
1Blevins raised this issue at the sentencing hearing; therefore, it is
properly before this Court for review.
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Felony Offender Act." Faircloth v. State, 471 So. 2d 485, 493 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1984), aff'd, 471 So. 2d 493 (Ala. 1985). See also Ex parte Jones, 520
So. 2d 553, 554 (Ala. 1988) ("[W]here a defendant admits prior convictions
under oath the State is relieved of its normal burden of proof regarding
the prior convictions."); Hayes v. State, 647 So. 2d 11, 13 (Ala. Crim. App.
1994) ("For determining habitual felony offender status, a defendant's
prior convictions may be proved by his admissions to those prior
convictions at trial."); and Whitt v. State, 461 So. 2d 29, 30 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1984) ("By admitting the prior convictions, the appellant relieved
the State of the burden of proving the prior convictions." (internal
quotation marks and citation omitted)).
Although Blevins recognizes this general rule, he nonetheless
argues that, in this case, his admissions were invalid and did not relieve
the State of presenting certified copies of his prior convictions because,
he says, the prosecutor committed misconduct when cross-examining him
about those convictions. Specifically, he argues that twice when he
hesitated in answering a question about a prior conviction, the prosecutor
indicated that he could provide Blevins with documentation of the
conviction, but the prosecutor did not have any documentation relating
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to the prior convictions. According to Blevins, "[i]t was improper for [the
prosecutor] to feign that he possessed something in front of the jury and
the Court if he did not possess it." (Blevins's brief, p. 20.) However,
Blevins did not object to the prosecutor's questioning him about his prior
convictions or otherwise raise this specific issue in the trial court.
Therefore, this issue was not properly preserved for review and will not
be considered. See Ex parte Coulliette, 857 So. 2d 793, 794 (Ala. 2003)
(" 'Review on appeal is restricted to questions and issues properly and
timely raised at trial.' Newsome v. State, 570 So. 2d 703, 717 (Ala. Crim.
App. 1989). 'An issue raised for the first time on appeal is not subject to
appellate review because it has not been properly preserved and
presented.' Pate v. State, 601 So. 2d 210, 213 (Ala. Crim. App. 1992).").
Blevins also contends that his sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole for his conviction for assault in the
second degree, a Class C felony, see § 13A-6-21(b), Ala. Code 1975, was
illegal under the HFOA. Although Blevins did not raise this issue in the
trial court, it is a jurisdictional issue that may be raised at any time. See
Ex parte McGowan, 346 So. 3d 10, 13 (Ala. 2021) ("This Court has
routinely held that the imposition of a sentence in a criminal case that is
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not authorized by statute creates a jurisdictional defect that is
nonwaivable and that can be raised at any time."). And Blevins is correct
that his sentence is illegal. Section 13A-5-9(c), Ala. Code 1975, provides,
in relevant part:
"(c) In all cases when it is shown that a criminal
defendant has been previously convicted of any three felonies
that are Class A, Class B, or Class C felonies and after such
convictions has committed another Class A, Class B, or Class
C felony, he or she must be punished as follows:
"(1) On conviction of a Class C felony, he or
she must be punished by imprisonment for life or
for any term of not more than 99 years but not less
than 15 years."
The maximum sentence Blevins could receive for his assault conviction
was life imprisonment. Therefore, his sentence of life imprisonment
without the possibility of parole was illegal.
Based on the foregoing, we affirm Blevins's convictions for robbery
in the first degree and assault in the second degree and his sentence for
the robbery conviction. However, we remand this cause for the trial court
to conduct another sentencing hearing, at which Blevins is entitled to be
present and to be represented by counsel, and to resentence Blevins for
his assault conviction in accordance with § 13A-5-9(c)(1). Due return
shall be filed within 63 days of the date of this opinion and shall include
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the transcript of the resentencing hearing and a copy of the trial court's
amended sentencing order.
AFFIRMED IN PART; REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS.
Windom, P.J., and McCool, Cole, and Minor, JJ., concur.
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