GURNETT, MICHAEL A. v. BARGNESI, HONORABLE JAMES F. ( 2017 )


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  •         SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
    Appellate Division, Fourth Judicial Department
    38
    OP 16-00837
    PRESENT: SMITH, J.P., DEJOSEPH, NEMOYER, TROUTMAN, AND SCUDDER, JJ.
    IN THE MATTER OF MICHAEL A. GURNETT, PETITIONER,
    V                                MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
    JAMES F. BARGNESI, ACTING NIAGARA COUNTY COURT
    JUDGE, IN HIS CAPACITY AS LICENSING OFFICER FOR
    PISTOL PERMITS IN NIAGARA COUNTY AND INDIVIDUALLY,
    RESPONDENT.
    JAMES OSTROWSKI, BUFFALO, FOR PETITIONER.
    ERIC T. SCHNEIDERMAN, ATTORNEY GENERAL, ALBANY (JONATHAN D. HITSOUS OF
    COUNSEL), FOR RESPONDENT.
    Proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78 (initiated in the
    Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the Fourth Judicial
    Department pursuant to CPLR 506 [b] [1]) to annul a determination of
    respondent. The determination revoked the pistol permit of
    petitioner.
    It is hereby ORDERED that the determination is unanimously
    confirmed without costs and the petition is dismissed.
    Memorandum: Petitioner commenced this CPLR article 78 proceeding
    seeking, inter alia, to annul the determination revoking his pistol
    permit. We reject the contention of petitioner that he was denied his
    right to due process of law. “It is well settled that a formal
    hearing is not required prior to the revocation of a pistol permit
    [where, as here,] the licensee is given notice of the charges and has
    an adequate opportunity to submit proof in response” (Matter of Chomyn
    v Boller, 137 AD3d 1705, 1706, appeal dismissed 27 NY3d 1119, lv
    denied 28 NY3d 908 [internal quotation marks omitted]; see Matter of
    Cuda v Dwyer, 107 AD3d 1409, 1409-1410; Matter of Strom v Erie County
    Pistol Permit Dept., 6 AD3d 1110, 1111). Contrary to petitioner’s
    further contention, we conclude that the determination is neither
    arbitrary and capricious nor an abuse of discretion (see Chomyn, 137
    AD3d at 1706). “It is well established that ‘[a licensing officer] is
    vested with broad discretion in determining whether to revoke a pistol
    permit and may do so for any good cause,’ including ‘a finding that
    the petitioner lack[s] the essential temperament or character which
    should be present in one entrusted with a dangerous [weapon] . . . ,
    or that he or she does not possess the maturity, prudence,
    carefulness, good character, temperament, demeanor and judgment
    necessary to have a pistol permit’ ” (Matter of Peters v Randall, 111
    -2-                           38
    OP 16-00837
    AD3d 1391, 1392; see Chomyn, 137 AD3d at 1706). Here, the record
    before the licensing officer demonstrated that petitioner had been
    involved in several verbal or physical altercations with his then
    wife, that the second of such altercations had resulted in
    petitioner’s being charged with harassment in the second degree and
    the issuance of a temporary order of protection, and that the third
    had occurred in violation of that temporary order of protection,
    giving rise to a charge of criminal contempt. Further, the transcript
    of petitioner’s appearance before the licencing officer supports the
    determination that the petitioner lacked credibility and was not
    forthcoming about his history of mental health treatment and his
    apparently ongoing treatment for depression. Finally, to the extent
    that the contention is properly before us, we conclude that
    petitioner’s contention that the revocation of his pistol permit
    violates his rights under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments of the
    United States Constitution is without merit (see Chomyn, 137 AD3d at
    1706-1707; Cuda, 107 AD3d at 1410; see also Kachalsky v County of
    Westchester, 701 F3d 81, 93-101, cert denied ___ US ___, 
    133 S Ct 1806
    ).
    Entered:   February 3, 2017                    Frances E. Cafarell
    Clerk of the Court
    

Document Info

Docket Number: OP 16-00837

Filed Date: 2/3/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/3/2017