Com. v. Diaz, C. ( 2017 )


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  • J-S81007-16
    NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
    COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA                   IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
    PENNSYLVANIA
    v.
    CYPRIAN DIAZ
    Appellant                   No. 1132 EDA 2016
    Appeal from the PCRA Order March 11, 2016
    In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
    Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0704571-2003
    BEFORE: BOWES AND MOULTON, JJ., AND STEVENS, P.J.E.*
    MEMORANDUM BY BOWES, J.:                        FILED FEBRUARY 22, 2017
    Cyprian Diaz appeals from the March 11, 2016 order denying him
    PCRA relief in this 2003 case.      The appeal concerns whether Appellant’s
    request for relief was properly treated as a petition for relief under the
    PCRA. We affirm.
    After a bench trial, Appellant was found guilty of first degree homicide
    and related offenses. The Commonwealth established that Appellant, while
    an adult, shot and killed his former wife and her husband.         Appellant
    unsuccessfully pursued relief on direct appeal.   Commonwealth v. Diaz,
    
    927 A.2d 649
    (Pa.Super. 2007) (unpublished memorandum). Appellant was
    granted leave to file a Petition for Allowance of Appeal Nunc Pro Tunc, which
    was ultimately denied by our Supreme Court on February 12, 2010.
    * Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
    J-S81007-16
    Commonwealth v. Diaz, 
    989 A.2d 914
    (Pa. 2010). Appellant also pursued
    PCRA relief, which was denied by the PCRA court and affirmed on appeal by
    this Court. Commonwealth v. Diaz, 
    96 A.3d 1079
    (Pa.Super. 2014). He
    filed for discretionary review with our Supreme Court, which was denied on
    May 15, 2014.        Commonwealth v. Diaz, 63 EAL 2014 (Pa. 2014)
    (unpublished in Atlantic Reporter).
    On December 11, 2015, Appellant filed the instant petition, styled as a
    request for habeas corpus relief.       On February 8, 2016, the trial court
    determined that the petition must be treated as a request for relief under
    the PCRA, and, since Appellant failed to plead and prove an exception to the
    one-year time bar, issued a notice of intent to dismiss informing him of
    those procedural defects.     On February 26, 2016, Appellant replied to the
    notice, again averring that his request for relief was not cognizable under
    the PCRA. The court thereafter denied the petition on March 11, 2016. This
    appeal followed. Appellant raises the following claims for our review:
    A. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in dismissing
    Appellant's petition for writ of Habeas Corpus Ad Subjiciendum
    where the verdict announced by the court of guilty on the first
    degree murder offense was in error in that the court did not
    have jurisdiction of the matter, where the criminal information
    filed in this action w[as] fatally defective since i[t] failed to recite
    all of the essential elements of the offense and failed to inform
    Appellant of the precise charge he was required to defend
    against at trial?
    B. Whether Appellant is illegally confined based on the verdict
    and sentence being vitiated and non-existent as a result of the
    fatally defective criminal information and eliminates all questions
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    J-S81007-16
    of w[ai]ver, timeliness and due diligence as bars to the relief
    sought?
    Appellant’s brief at 3.
    Our task is to determine if the court properly treated this petition as a
    request for relief under the PCRA.   This Court's “standard of review of the
    denial of a PCRA petition is limited to examining whether the evidence of
    record supports the court's determination and whether its decision is free of
    legal error.” Commonwealth v. Smith, 
    121 A.3d 1049
    , 1052 (Pa.Super.
    2015). Whether the present claim is cognizable under the PCRA is a matter
    of law subject to de novo review, not an abuse of discretion as maintained
    by Appellant. The following principles inform our determination of this legal
    question.
    It is well-settled that the PCRA is intended to be the sole means
    of achieving post-conviction relief. Unless the PCRA could not
    provide for a potential remedy, the PCRA statute subsumes the
    writ of habeas corpus. Issues that are cognizable under the
    PCRA must be raised in a timely PCRA petition and cannot be
    raised in a habeas corpus petition.        Phrased differently, a
    defendant cannot escape the PCRA time-bar by titling his
    petition or motion as a writ of habeas corpus.
    Commonwealth v. Taylor, 
    65 A.3d 462
    , 465–66 (Pa.Super. 2013)
    (citations and footnote omitted).
    Herein, Appellant alleges that the claim raised is not cognizable under
    the PCRA because he is illegally confined.     He reaches this conclusion by
    arguing that 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102, which provides the applicable sentences for
    homicide, violates due process and is void for vagueness because it does not
    -3-
    J-S81007-16
    directly state that the punishment of life imprisonment is ineligible for
    parole. 18 Pa.C.S. § 1102(a)(1) (“[A] person who has been convicted of a
    murder of the first degree . . . shall be sentenced to death or to a term of
    life imprisonment”); 61 Pa.C.S. § 6137(a)(1) (“The board may . . . release
    on parole any inmate . . . except an inmate condemned to death or serving
    life imprisonment[.]”).      Additionally, Appellant claims that the criminal
    information simply charged him with homicide generally, and did not clearly
    specify the various elements of first degree homicide. Appellant avers that
    these defects violated his due process right to fair notice and as a result
    divested the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction. Hence, his conviction
    was illegal, and, in turn, so is his confinement.
    The court properly treated this request for relief as a PCRA petition.
    Issues that may be brought under the PCRA must be brought under the
    PCRA.       The PCRA specifically states that a claim that “the conviction or
    sentence resulted from . . . [a] proceeding in a tribunal without jurisdiction”
    is cognizable.      42 Pa.C.S. § 9543(a)(2)(viii).    Due process claims are
    similarly    cognizable   under   the   PCRA.   42   Pa.C.S.   §   9543(a)(2)(i).
    Additionally, the salient facts necessary to forward that claim were clearly
    known during the time period in which he was permitted to seek PCRA relief.
    See Commonwealth v. Dickerson, 
    900 A.2d 407
    (Pa.Super. 2006)
    (rejecting untimely PCRA claim that trial court lacked subject matter
    jurisdiction; the facts upon which the claim is predicated were known and
    -4-
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    thus the claim was not subject to any exception).          Hence, while Appellant
    has failed to plead and prove an exception to the time-bar, he could not
    have done so in any event.
    Additionally, while the PCRA court properly concluded that it lacked
    jurisdiction to address the substance of his claim, we note that subject
    matter jurisdiction simply requires “that the court be competent to hear the
    case and that the defendant be provided with a ‘formal and specific
    accusation of the crimes charged.’” Commonwealth v. Hatchin, 
    709 A.2d 405
    , 408 (Pa.Super. 1998) (quoting Commonwealth v. Little, 
    314 A.2d 270
    , 273 (Pa. 1974)). Both requirements were met. An information need
    not specify a particular degree of murder. Commonwealth v. Chambers,
    
    852 A.2d 1197
    (Pa.Super. 2004). Assuming arguendo that a citizen must be
    informed of parole eligibility as a matter of due process, the fact that parole
    eligibility   is   codified   elsewhere   constitutes   adequate   notice.   See
    Commonwealth v. Bell, 
    645 A.2d 211
    (Pa. 1994) (rejecting due process
    claim that mandatory minimum statute is unconstitutionally vague because
    it failed to expressly provide a maximum, as “one can be reasonably implied
    when . . . read together” with other pertinent statutes).
    Accordingly, the PCRA court properly concluded that the instant
    petition is cognizable under the PCRA and that it lacked jurisdiction.        Its
    decision is free of legal error and we affirm.
    Order affirmed.
    -5-
    J-S81007-16
    Judgment Entered.
    Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
    Prothonotary
    Date: 2/22/2017
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: Com. v. Diaz, C. No. 1132 EDA 2016

Filed Date: 2/22/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/22/2017