Johnathan Renard Castaneda v. State ( 2015 )

ACCEPTED
01-14-00389-CR
FIRST COURT OF APPEALS
HOUSTON, TEXAS
1/28/2015 1:22:41 PM
CHRISTOPHER PRINE
CLERK
NOS. 01-14-00389-CR & 01-14-00390-CR
FILED IN
1st COURT OF APPEALS
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS HOUSTON, TEXAS
FOR THE FIRST DISTRICT OF TEXAS 1/28/2015 1:22:41 PM
CHRISTOPHER A. PRINE
Clerk
JOHNATHAN RENARD CASTANEDA
Appellant
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS
Appellee
On Appeal from Cause Numbers 1350501 & 1350815
From the 263rd District Court of Harris County, Texas
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT
Oral Argument Not Requested ALEXANDER BUNIN
Chief Public Defender
Harris County, Texas
JANI MASELLI WOOD
Assistant Public Defender
Harris County, Texas
TBN. 00791195
1201 Franklin Street, 13th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
Phone: (713) 368-0016
Fax: (713) 368-9278
Counsel for Appellant
IDENTITY OF PARTIES AND COUNSEL
APPELLANT: Johnathan Renard Castaneda
TDCJ# 01927329
Clements Unit
9601 Spur 591
Amarillo, TX 79107-9606
TRIAL PROSECUTOR: Matthew Roy Peneguy
Assistant District Attorney
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, 6th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
DEFENSE COUNSEL AT TRIAL: Robert Scott
Attorney at Law
5803 2nd St., Suite 101
Katy, TX 77493
PRESIDING JUDGE: Hon. Jim Wallace, Presiding Judge
263rd District Court
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, 17th floor
Houston, Texas 77002
DEFENSE COUNSEL ON APPEAL: Jani Maselli Wood1
Assistant Public Defender
Harris County, Texas
1201 Franklin, 15th Floor
Houston, Texas 77002
1
University of Houston Advanced Legal Writing Class, Fall 2014, assisted with the
research and drafting of this brief.
i
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Identity of Parties and Counsel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i
Table of Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii
Index of Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii
Statement of the Case. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Issues Presented. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Statement of Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Mr. Castaneda's Version of the Facts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The State's Version of the Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Conflicting testimony - the sexual assault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Other State's Witnesses. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Mitigation Witnesses Who Provided Affidavits with Motion for New Trial . . . . . . . . . . 12
Summary of the Argument.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Argument.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Issue One: A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction in the jury charge when requested. Mr. Castaneda's defense
counsel properly requested an instruction on the lesser included offense
of aggravated assault because Mr. Castaneda testified he did not intend
to kill Mr. Armstrong. The judge refused the request. Did the judge
improperly refuse the requested instruction?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of murder. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The evidence presented at trial supports the lesser included offense of aggravated assault.. . . 16
The error in the charge resulted in sufficient harm to warrant reversal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Issue Two: A jury may find a defendant not guilty of a greater offense,
but guilty of a lesser-included offense. The trial court denied Mr.
Castaneda's request for a jury instruction of the lesser-included offense
of manslaughter. Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying
this request?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
ii
The requested jury charge of manslaughter is, as a matter of law,
a lesser-included offense of murder.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
The record supports a conviction of only manslaughter.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
The error was harmful and requires reversal.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Issue Three: The jury charge must distinctly set forth the law applicable
to the case. The trial court submitted a jury charge that was confusing
and did not clearly instruct the jury that the state carried the burden of
disproving self-defense. Was Mr. Castaneda egregiously harmed by the
trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury on the law of self-
defense?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Relevant Facts. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Standard of Review. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
The Trial Court Committed Error by Submitting a Faulty Jury Instruction. . . . . . . . . . 27
Burden of Proof. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Harm Analysis: The Errors in the Jury Charge Amounted to Egregious Harm.. . . . . . . 31
A. The Jury Charge Itself. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
B. Arguments of Counsel. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
C. The Entirety of the Evidence. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Issue Four: Every defendant has a right to trial on legally sufficient
evidence, which supports a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt for
each element of the charged offense. Mr. Castaneda was convicted of
aggravated sexual assault absent evidence that a deadly weapon was used
and exhibited during the assault, an essential element to the charged
offense. Did the jury convict Mr. Castaneda on the basis of insufficient
evidence?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
The hypothetically correct charge required the State to prove Mr. Castaneda
used and exhibited a deadly weapon during the assault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
There was no proof Mr. Castaneda used and exhibited a deadly weapon
during the assault. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
iii
Issue Five: The trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion
for new trial if the motion and affidavits raise matters not determinable
from the record, and the accused could be entitled to relief. The trial
court failed to hold a hearing on the motion, which included affidavits
from available mitigation witnesses who defense counsel did not call to
testify. Did the court improperly deny Mr. Castaneda a hearing on his
motion for new trial?. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Issue Six: The DNA court cost assessed against appellant is an
unconstitutional tax on Mr. Castaneda.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Prayer. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
Certificate of Service.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
Certificate of Compliance.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50
iv
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES
Cases:
Almanza v. State,
686 S.W.2d 157 (1984).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18, 31
Barrera v. State,
982 S.W.2d 415 (Tex. Crim. App. 1998).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Barrios v. State,
283 S.W.3d 348 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Barrios v. State,
389 S.W.3d 382 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Barron v. State,
353 S.W.3d 879 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24, 25
Brooks v. State,
323 S.W.3d 893 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Burns v. State,
923 S.W.2d 233 (Tex. App.-[14th Dist.] 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Cardenas v. State,
423 S.W.3d 396 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
Cavazos v. State,
382 S.W.3d 377 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 20, 21, 22
Crumpton v. State,
301 S.W.3d 663 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Curry v. State,
30 S.W.3d 394 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36, 37, 38
v
Dowden v. State,
758 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Crim. App.1988) .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Drichas v. State,
175 S.W.3d 795 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Ex parte Lemke,
13 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
Ex parte Watson,
306 S.W.3d 259 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Forest v. State,
989 S.W.2d 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Gilder v. State,
14-13-01088-CR, 2014 WL 7204962
(Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 18, 2014, no. pet. h.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Gollihar v. State,
46 S.W.3d 243 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Gonzales v. State,
717 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Hayward v. State,
158 S.W.3d 476 (Tex. Crim. App.2005). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Hollander v. State,
414 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Jackson v. Virginia,
443 U.S. 307 (1979). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Johnson v. State,
423 S.W.3d 385 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
vi
Johnson v. State,
915 S.W.2d 653 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1996, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . 17, 18
LaFleur v. State,
106 S.W.3d 91 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37, 38
Lawson v. State,
775 S.W.2d 495 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, pet. refd).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17, 18
Lee v. State,
29 S.W.3d 570 (Tex. App. – Dallas 2000, no pet.).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Lucero v. State,
246 S.W.3d 86 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 42
Malik v. State,
953 S.W.2d 234 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Martinez v. State,
74 S.W.3d 19 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 42, 43
Matthews v. State,
999 S.W.2d 563 (Tex. App. – Houston, [14th Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . 31
McCain v. State, 22 S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38, 39
McKithan v. State,
324 S.W.3d 582 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Merchant v. State,
810 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet ref’d).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Milburn v. State,
15 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2000, pet. ref'd). . . . . . . . . . . 44
Miles v. State,
204 S.W.3d 822 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
vii
Moore v. State,
983 S.W.2d 15 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
Moore v. State,
969 S.W.2d 4 (Tex. Crim. App.1998). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Ngo v. State,
175 S.W.3d 738 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Patterson v. State,
769 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1989) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
Peraza v. State,
No. 01-12-00690-CR, 2014 WL 7476214
(Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 30, 2014, pet. filed). . . . . . . . . . . 46, 47, 48
Plummer v. State,
410 S.W.3d 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39
Reeves v. State,
420 S.W.3d 812 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27, 28, 29
Salazar v. State,
87 S.W.3d 680 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Smith v. State,
286 S.W.3d 333 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41, 42
Sweed v. State,
351 S.W.3d 63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Tidmore v. State,
976 S.W.2d 724 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, pet. ref’d). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Trevino v. State,
100 S.W.3d 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
viii
Wallace v. State,
106 S.W.3d 103 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Westbrook v. State,
846 S.W.2d 155 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1993, no pet.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Will. v. State,
547 S.W.2d 18 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Will. v. State,
314 S.W.3d 45 (Tex. App.-Tyler 2010, pet. ref' d).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Willis v. State,
936 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. App.-Tyler, 1996). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Winfrey v. State,
323 S.W.3d 875 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Wortham v. State,
412 S.W.3d 552 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16, 17
Statutes and Miscellaneous:
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 36.14. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26, 27
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 37.09. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15, 20, 21
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 102.020(A)(1) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
TEX. CRIM. PROC. ART. 102.020(H). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
TEX. GOV’T CODE ART. 411.1471(a)(1)(D). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. §772.006(A)(2) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
TEX. PEN. CODE §9.32(a)(2). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33, 34
ix
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §12.33(A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §19.02(A)(1). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(B). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04.. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(A)(L).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.02(B).. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(A). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Texas Criminal Patter Jury Charges—Defenses (2013), §B14.4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29, 31
x
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Johnathan Renard Castaneda was indicted for aggravated sexual assault of an
adult (1 C.R. at 12) and murder. (2 C.R. at 13).2 He was tried by a jury and was
convicted of both offenses on April 24, 2014. (1 C.R. at 69; 2 C.R. at 77). Mr.
Castaneda elected to have the court assess punishment. (7 R.R. at 5-8). At sentencing,
he admitted to a 2008 conviction for felony sexual assault as part of the aggravated
sexual assault conviction (7 R.R. at 5), cited in the first enhancement paragraph. (1
C.R. at 12, 73). He also admitted to a 2008 conviction of felony sexual assault of a
child as part of the murder conviction (7 R.R. at 5), cited in the first enhancement
paragraph. (2 C.R. at 13, 81). The court sentenced him to an automatic life sentence
for the enhanced aggravated sexual assault conviction (7 R.R. at 7-8; 1 C.R. at 73), and
45 years in prison for the murder. (7 R.R. at 8; 2 C.R. at 81).
Mr. Castaneda filed a timely Notice of Appeal on April 24, 2014. (1 C.R. 77; 2
C.R. at 85). Appellate counsel was appointed on April 25, 2014. (1 C.R. at 80; 2 C.R. at
88). She filed a timely Motion for New Trial on May 22, 2014. (1 C.R. at 82; 2 C.R. at
90), which was presented to the judge on May 23, 2014. (1 C.R. at 174; 2 C.R. at 182).
The court did not rule on the request for a hearing on the Motion for New Trial. (1
C.R. at 158; 2 C.R. at 174). No order granting or denying the motion was issued by the
court. (1 C.R. at 159; 2 C.R. at 174).
2
This appeal involves the consolidation of two charges, resulting in two clerk’s
records. The clerk's record for the aggravated sexual assault charge (Cause No. 1350501)
will be referred to as “1 C.R.” The clerk's record for the murder charge (Cause No.
1350815) will be referred to as “2 C.R.”
1
ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue One: A defendant is entitled to a lesser included offense
instruction in the jury charge when requested. Mr. Castaneda's defense
counsel properly requested an instruction on the lesser included offense
of aggravated assault because Mr. Castaneda testified he did not intend
to kill Mr. Armstrong. The judge refused the request. Did the judge
improperly refuse the requested instruction?
Issue Two: A jury may find a defendant not guilty of a greater offense,
but guilty of a lesser-included offense. The trial court denied Mr.
Castaneda's request for a jury instruction of the lesser-included offense
of manslaughter. Did the trial court commit reversible error by denying
this request?
Issue Three: The jury charge must distinctly set forth the law applicable
to the case. The trial court submitted a jury charge that was confusing
and did not clearly instruct the jury that the state carried the burden of
disproving self-defense. Was Mr. Castaneda egregiously harmed by the
trial court’s failure to properly instruct the jury on the law of self-
defense?
Issue Four: Every defendant has a right to trial on legally sufficient
evidence, which supports a conviction beyond a reasonable doubt for
each element of the charged offense. Mr. Castaneda was convicted of
aggravated sexual assault absent evidence that a deadly weapon was used
and exhibited during the assault, an essential element to the charged
offense. Did the jury convict Mr. Castaneda on the basis of insufficient
evidence?
Issue Five: The trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a motion
for new trial if the motion and affidavits raise matters not determinable
from the record, and the accused could be entitled to relief. The trial
court failed to hold a hearing on the motion, which included affidavits
from available mitigation witnesses who defense counsel did not call to
testify. Did the court improperly deny Mr. Castaneda a hearing on his
motion for new trial?
Issue Six: The DNA court cost assessed against appellant is an
unconstitutional tax on Mr. Castaneda.
2
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Mr. Castaneda and the State's star witness agree on two important facts: (1) the
deceased complainant was threatening people with a firearm in an attempt to find his
missing truck keys; and (2) Mr. Castaneda killed the deceased in response to these
threats. Their stories diverge in regard to the circumstances surrounding the death and
what happened in the aftermath.
Mr. Castaneda's Version of the Facts
Mr. Castaneda and the deceased complainant, Keith Armstrong, were
acquaintances. (6 R.R. at 13-14). In the late morning of June 8, 2012, Mr. Castaneda
was walking from the bus stop when Armstrong invited him over to his house. (6 R.R.
at 15-16). Mr. Castaneda went to Armstrong's house and had consensual sex with a
prostitute, Patricia Asberry. (6 R.R. at 19). He was supposed to pay $60 to Keith for
the sex but he failed to do so. (6 R.R. at 19). Mr. Castaneda then left alone to go to his
grandfather's house down the street. (6 R.R. at 20).
Later that afternoon around 2 or 3 p.m., Mr. Castaneda went back to
Armstrong's house. (6 R.R. at 22). Armstrong was upset about Mr. Castaneda not
paying him for the sex with Patricia. (6 R.R. at 22). Mr. Castaneda told Armstrong that
he could pay him after he purchased and sold some crack. (6 R.R. at 22).
Armstrong drove Mr. Castaneda around town searching for crack, but they did
not find any that met Mr. Castaneda's standards. (6 R.R. at 22-23). They then went
back to Armstrong's house, where another individual later arrived with crack cocaine
3
that Mr. Castaneda purchased. (6 R.R. at 25). Mr. Castaneda then left to make some
sales .(6 R.R. at 26).
Mr. Castaneda then headed back to his grandfather's house. (6 R.R. at 27). He
received a phone call from a woman that he was supposed to meet that night, so he
went to the bus stop near Armstrong's house. (6 R.R. at 27-28). As Mr. Castaneda was
passing by Armstrong's house, Armstrong was outside waiving a gun and told Mr.
Castaneda to come over to him. (6 R.R. at 28-30). Mr. Castaneda complied.
Armstrong told Mr. Castaneda that he wanted his truck keys; Mr. Castaneda said he
did not have them, and Armstrong ordered him into the house. (6 R.R. at 30-31).
Other residents of the house - Patricia Asbury, Margaret Stewart, and Charles Howard
- were also ordered to go inside. (6 R.R. at 28-31).
Armstrong locked the burglar bars of the front door and began looking for his
keys while everyone nervously waited. (6 R.R. at 32). He was angry, drunk, and
carrying a pistol. (6 R.R. at 35). Patricia and Margaret told Mr. Castaneda “to be still
because Keith might start tripping out about his keys.” (6 R.R. at 43).
After Armstrong could not find his keys, he began threatening individuals.
First, he put a gun to Patricia's head and she began to cry in fear. (6 R.R. at 37). Then
he approached Mr. Castaneda and told him, “I'm not saying that you have my keys,
but you're the only one who left.” (6 R.R. at 39). Mr. Castaneda emptied out his
pockets with the exception of his dope. (6 R.R. at 39-40). Armstrong told him to give
him the drugs but Mr. Castaneda refused. (6 R.R. at 41).
4
The altercation then escalated. Armstrong pointed the gun in Mr. Castaneda’s
face and repeated his demand to give him the drugs. (6 R.R. at 41). Mr. Castaneda,
who was scared at this point, tells Armstrong, “get that goddamn gun out of my face”
and he smacked it. (6 R.R. at 42-43). Armstrong got angry and pushed Mr. Castaneda
on the table. (6 R.R. at 43). As Mr. Castaneda stood up, Armstrong pointed the gun
about an inch from his chest. (6 R.R. at 43-44). Mr. Castaneda, thinking Armstrong
was going to kill him, grabbed the gun by the barrel with his left hand and hit
Armstrong a couple of times with his right. (6 R.R. at 45).
The two men then began to wrestle. Mr. Castaneda hit Armstrong with an
uppercut, which dazed Armstrong. (6 R.R. at 45). Then all of the other people in the
house - Charles Howard, Patricia Asbury, and Martha Stewart - jumped on Mr.
Castaneda and began to punch and hit him with objects in the house. (6 R.R. at
45-47).
Mr. Castaneda and Armstrong continued fighting while Mr. Castaneda held on
to the barrel of the gun. Mr. Castaneda kicked Armstrong in the testicles, which dazed
Armstrong. (6 R.R. at 49). Mr. Castaneda let go of the gun, punched Armstrong
multiple times, and then pushed him over. (6 R.R. at 49). Armstrong attempted to get
up. He was on his hands and knees when Mr. Castaneda kicked him multiple times
until Armstrong fell over. (6 R.R. at 61-62). Charles Howard, on his knees, was
grabbing Mr. Castaneda and trying to bring him to the ground. (6 R.R. at 62). Mr.
Castaneda heard someone say, “Grab the gun.” (6 R.R. at 62). Armstrong, still on the
5
ground, shot “like three times.” (6 R.R. at 62). In response, Mr. Castaneda grabbed a
pipe and hits Armstrong approximately five times. (6 R.R. at 62-63).
Mr. Castaneda shook Mr. Howard off of him by hitting him with a chair. (6
R.R. at 57). He tried to open the burglar bars on the front door but they were locked.
(6 R.R. at 57). Mr. Castaneda went to the side room where Margaret had gone (6 R.R.
at 57-58, 63). Mr. Howard came up behind Mr. Castaneda and put him in a chokehold
that nearly left Mr. Castaneda unconscious. (6 R.R. at 58, 63). Mr. Castaneda hit him
with a chair, which forced Howard to let him go. (6 R.R. at 58, 63).
Mr. Castaneda began looking through the house for the keys to the burglar
bars. (6 R.R. at 63). When he was back in Armstrong’s room, Mr. Castaneda heard
Margaret Stewart leave the house, so he followed after her. (6 R.R. at 63). Mr.
Castaneda testified that he chased Margaret to the neighbor's house because he was
“mad” and “pissed off” because he believed she had the keys the whole time. (6 R.R.
at 68-69).
Mr. Castaneda’s grandfather, Edward Mosely, confirmed that Mr. Castaneda
came to his house shortly afterward. (5 R.R. at 199-200). He testified that his grandson
was bleeding from his head and neck, his eye was swollen, he was “blistered up,” and
his “face was all scratched up.” (5 R.R. at 203-205). He testified that Mr. Castaneda
washed off the blood in his kitchen sink, asked for a clean shirt, and left after about 15
minutes. (5 R.R. at 220-223).
After Mr. Castaneda left his grandfather’s house, he went to the corner of the
driveway and observed the police and paramedics arrive. (6 R.R. at 71-72). He had
6
crack cocaine in his possession, so he did not want to talk to the police. (6 R.R. at 74).
He also did not “think it was worth talking to the police” because he did not know the
situation was as severe as it turned out to be and he “wasn’t thinking.” (6 R.R. at 74).
Mr. Castaneda then went to an abandoned house to spend the night. (6 R.R. at 74-75).
The next day Mr. Castaneda went to his mother’s house. (6 R.R. at 79). His
family told him he should talk to the police to tell them his side of the story, but Mr.
Castaneda was scared and thought he needed to hire a lawyer. (6 R.R. at 80). He was
arrested three days later. (6 R.R. at 79-80).
Mr. Castaneda admitted to lying to the police during their questioning of him.
He testified that he lied to the police when he told them: he kicked down the
bathroom door where Patricia was hiding (6 R.R. at 89-90); he paid Armstrong for sex
with Patricia (6 R.R. at 98); he had sex with Patricia on Wednesday and Thursday (6
R.R. at 102-103); and he hit Armstrong with the gun and chair. (6 R.R. at 115,
118-119). He admitted he did not tell the police about Armstrong firing the gun three
times at him (6 R.R. at 109).
The State's Version of the Facts
Patricia Asberry was the only State's witness who could testify first-hand to the
events that occurred in Armstrong's house that night. At the time of her testimony,
she was housed in the Harris County jail for felony prostitution. (4 R.R. at 94-95). She
had 15 prior prostitution convictions, two felony convictions for forged checks, and
felony convictions for felony drug sales, namely cocaine. (4 R.R. at 95-98, 188-189).
She was serving a 25-year parole term when she was arrested for the felony
7
prostitution offense she was charged with at the time of trial. (4 R.R. at 98, 201). She
admitted to being a regular crack smoker while on parole and during the period when
the incident occurred. (4 R.R. at 202).
Asberry said that she had consensual sex with Mr. Castaneda on Wednesday
night, the day before the incident. (4 R.R. at 124-125). This occurred at Armstrong's
house in the back bedroom, which she rented. (4 R.R. at 101, 125).
Asberry testified that Mr. Castaneda next came over to Armstrong's house on
Thursday afternoon to charge his cell phone. (4 R.R. at 135-136). She said that Mr.
Castaneda and Armstrong left two or three times afterward to buy liquor and beer and
crack. (4 R.R. at 137).
When it was getting dark, Mr. Castaneda left the house for about 15 to 30
minutes according to Asberry. (4 R.R. at 139-140). About this time, Keith Armstrong
began looking for his car keys and was getting upset. (4 R.R. at 141-142). After Mr.
Castaneda came back, Armstrong told everyone to go in the house and he grabbed his
gun from his room. (4 R.R. at 142-143). Armstrong came out into the living room,
pointed the gun at Ms. Asberry's head, and told her he wanted the keys. (4 R.R. at
145). She began crying and insisted that she did not have them. (4 R.R. at 145).
Then Armstrong went over to Mr. Castaneda with the gun behind his back and
told him he wanted his keys. (4 R.R. at 146). According to Ms. Asberry, Mr. Castaneda
raised up from the chair he was sitting and hit Armstrong, knocking him across the
room to the couch. (4 R.R. at 146). She said Armstrong never threatened Mr.
Castaneda with the gun. (4 R.R. at 146-147). Mr. Castaneda was “steady whooping”
8
Armstrong and then slammed him on the floor. (4 R.R. at 150). According to Asberry,
Keith Armstrong no longer had the gun at this point and was no longer moving after
he hit the floor. (4 R.R. at 149, 152). She testified that Mr. Castaneda kicked his teeth
out, began hitting him with the pipe, and then hit him in the head with a stove and
music box. (4 R.R. at 152). Asberry tried to stop Mr. Castaneda by hitting him in the
back of the head. (4 R.R. at 152). He responded by hitting her with the pipe and
asking her, “you going to take up for him.” (4 R.R. at 152, 158).
Asberry testified that she went back to her bathroom and locked it. (4 R.R. at
161-162). She heard Margaret hollering “I don't know where no gun is” and Mr.
Castaneda asking where the gun was. (4 R.R. at 162). She testified that it was quiet for
a few minutes and then Mr. Castaneda kicked in the bathroom door where she was
hiding. (4 R.R. at 165-166). Mr. Castaneda had a pipe in his hand according to
Asberry. (4 R.R. at 168). She testified that Mr. Castaneda then sexually assaulted her.
(4 R.R. at 169-173). He stopped and left after hearing the burglar bar door slam. (4
R.R. at 175). Asberry then went outside to see the ambulance and tell the police what
happened. (4 R.R. at 177-178).
Conflicting testimony - the sexual assault
Right after defending himself, Mr. Castaneda left the house on Van Fleet Street
and went to his Grandfather’s home. There was never a sexual encounter with Ms.
Asberry later that day. However, during trial, Ms. Asberry testified that after Mr.
Castaneda defended himself against Mr. Armstrong, he had sex with her without her
consent. (4 R.R. at 172). Mr. Castaneda came to the bathroom where Ms. Asberry was
9
hiding. He opened the door and told her to come out of the bathroom; Ms. Asberry
did so without objection. (4 R.R. at 169). Mr. Castaneda had a metal bar in his hand
when he first saw Ms. Asberry. However, he put the metal bar down on the table next
to him during the alleged encounter. (4 R.R. at 176). Mr. Castaneda was acting
different than the first time Ms. Asberry met him. (4 R.R. at 140). His whole attitude
had changed. His voice was different. He was not the same person. (4 R.R. at 167).
The jury found Mr. Castaneda guilty of sexually assaulting Ms. Asberry and the
murder of Mr. Armstrong. (6 R.R. at 187-88).
Other State's Witnesses
Officer G. Salcido was the first police officer who arrived at the crime scene. (3
R.R. at 47). He was trying to get information from Margaret, who was sitting on the
side of the street, when Asberry walked by the scene (3 R.R. at 48). Asberry said she
had been raped. (3 R.R. at 49-50). Salcido and another officer searched the house, and
found a person lying on the floor in a pool of blood, and an older gentleman in the
house. (3 R.R. at 52-53). Salcido testified that the house was “all torn up,” and “it was
all chaos in there.” Salcido later transported Asberry to the hospital. (3 R.R. at 56).
Owen Tompkins was the crime scene officer who documented the crime scene.
(3 R.R. at 77). He described the house as “extremely bloody … fairly unkempt itself,
not very clean.” (3 R.R. at 82). He testified that Armstrong, the decedent, did not
appear to have been disturbed from where he initially fell. (4 R.R. at 18). He did not
find a gun or any bullets or shell casings. (4 R.R. at 63). He found broken table legs
10
covered in blood (4 R.R. at 29), broken chair legs covered in blood (4 R.R. at 33-34),
and a metal table leg covered in blood. (4 R.R. at 47-48).
Mark Stahlin was the homicide officer on the case. (4 R.R. at 268). He said that
the house where the homicide occurred “looked like a tornado had gone through.
Nothing really was in its place. … There was blood on the walls, blood on the carpet.
The complainant, Baron Armstrong, was laying on the floor.” (4 R.R. at 273). There
were broken off items from a wooden chair near the decedent. (4 R.R. at 283-284).
There was a wooden table lying on its side. (4 R.R. at 285). There were metal table legs
close to the body and further away. (4 R.R. at 286). He did not locate any semen in the
back bedroom, nor did he find any evidence of sexual assault. (4 R.R. at 302, 305). He
did find a car key and house keys in Armstrong's bedroom. (4 R.R. at 308).
Sergeant C.E. Elliott was another homicide officer who worked the case. (5
R.R. at 84). He took photos of Mr. Castaneda when he was arrested three days after
the incident. (5 R.R. at 110). There were no injuries to Mr. Castaneda's back according
to Elliott. (5 R.R. at 112). There was a scratch across his right forearm with dried
blood. (5 R.R. at 113). He also had an abrasion on his right hand knuckle. (5 R.R. at
114).
Dr. Albert Chu was the assistant medical examiner for the Harris County
Institute of Forensic Sciences who examined Armstrong. (5 R.R. at 118, 122). He
testified that Armstrong's cause of death was blunt trauma of the head and neck. (5
R.R. at 153). There was bleeding of different layers of the brain, which can cause
death. (5 R.R. at 153). He testified that there was “quite a bit of facial trauma” and a
11
deformed shape of the head due to fractures of the facial bones. (5 R.R. at 134). He
also had multiple abrasions across the back of the head. (5 R.R. at 139). In Chu's
opinion, Armstrong had been struck multiple times. (5 R.R. at 141-142).
Dr. Jennifer Love is a forensic anthropologist at the Harris County Institute of
Forensic Sciences who examined Armstrong. (5 R.R. at 164). She testified that
Armstrong’s fractures were “consistent with a minimum of five impacts to the face.”
(5 R.R. at 174). There were a few fractures to the skull that were likely a result of the
impact to the face. (5 R.R. at 175). Three ribs were fractured. (5 R.R. at 177). There
were several fractures in his neck. (5 R.R. at 181).
Mitigation Witnesses Who Provided Affidavits with Motion for New Trial
Defense counsel called no mitigation witnesses at the punishment phase of the
trial (7 R.R. at 7), but multiple witnesses were available to testify about mitigating
circumstances regarding Mr. Castaneda. (2 C.R. at 91-92). Mr. Castaneda received an
automatic life sentence for the enhanced aggravated sexual assault conviction (7 R.R.
at 7-8; 1 C.R. at 73), and 45 years in prison for murder. (7 R.R. at 8; 2 C.R. at 81).
Linda Castaneda is Mr. Castaneda’s mother. (2 C.R. at 120). Her affidavit
attached to the Motion for New Trial said that she could testify about his history of
bipolar and schizophrenia. (2 C.R. at 120).
Shandr'a Mosley Banks is a relative of Mr. Castaneda’s. (2 C.R. at 123). She
stated in her affidavit that Mr. Castaneda had been medicated for mental health issues
since elementary school; he was struck by a car shortly after being diagnosed with
bipolar and schizophrenia when he was a young man; he has been treated for those
12
mental illnesses for many years; and she saw him the afternoon after the incident and
could testify about injuries he had suffered as a result. (2 C.R. at 123-124).
Ruthie Hudson is Mr. Castaneda’s grandmother. (2 C.R. at 127). She stated in
her affidavit that Mr. Castaneda was diagnosed with ADHD and bipolar, and received
treatment at DePelchin Center. (2 C.R. at 127). She could also testify to the wounds
she saw he received after the incident. (2 C.R. at 127).
Courtney Hutchinson and Shunta Richardson are Mr. Castaneda’s cousins. (2
C.R. at 118, 131). They both could testify to his mental illness. (2 C.R. at 118, 131).
Mary Banks is Mr. Castaneda's aunt; her affidavit stated that Mr. Castaneda was
hit by a car, which resulted in head injuries. (2 C.R. at 108).
J’onze Re’Banks has known Mr. Castaneda for 16 years. (2 C.R. at 134). He
discussed Mr. Castaneda’s struggles with mental illness and his various positive
character traits in his affidavit (2 C.R. at 134).
13
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Two complicated serious felonies were tried together - aggravated sexual assault
and murder. The jury charge had numerous errors. Two, the failure to include the
lesser-included offenses of aggravated assault and manslaughter were objected to.
The evidence was raised to support those instructions and the trial court erred by
failing to include them. The requested self-defense instruction was so complicated
that it failed to sufficiently apprise the jury of the proper standard and burden.
The evidence to support the aggravated portion of the sexual assault conviction
was insufficient because there was no evidence to support the weapon was used or
exhibited during the charged conduct. It was on a table - but its mere presence is
insufficient to support that conviction.
During the punishment phase of the trial, no witnesses were offered in support
of Mr. Castaneda. Post-trial, a motion for new trial was filed with numerous affidavits
of witnesses who could have testified to Mr. Castaneda’s personal struggles. The trial
court refused to have a hearing despite new evidence bing proffered. Finally, the cost
bill has a $25- DNA testing fee. Under law from this court, that cost should be
stricken.
14
ARGUMENT
Issue One: A defendant is entitled to a lesser-included offense
instruction in the jury charge when requested. Mr. Castaneda's
defense counsel properly requested an instruction on the lesser
included offense of aggravated assault because Mr. Castaneda
testified he did not intend to kill Mr. Armstrong. The judge
refused the request. Did the judge improperly refuse the requested
instruction?
Mr. Castaneda’s request for an instruction on aggravated assault was denied by
the trial court. (6 R.R. at 144). A trial court may instruct the jury on a lesser included
offense if (1) the offense in question is a lesser included offense under Article 37.09 of
the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure and (2) there is some evidence that would
permit a rational jury to find that the defendant is not guilty of the greater offense but
is guilty of the lesser included offense. Hayward v. State, 158 S.W.3d 476, 478 (Tex.
Crim. App.2005); Moore v. State, 969 S.W.2d 4, 8 (Tex. Crim. App.1998). If both
prongs of the test are met, the error is reviewed for harm. Trevino v. State, 100 S.W.3d
232, 242 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003).
Because the lesser included offense of aggravated assault meets both prongs of
the test and Mr. Castaneda was harmed by the error in not including the offense in the
charge, the judgment and murder conviction must be reversed, and the case remanded
for a new trial based on the proper charge.
Aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of murder
An instruction is required on a lesser included offense where the proof required
for the greater offense includes the proof necessary to establish the lesser included
offense. Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 367 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). A person
15
commits aggravated assault if he intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes serious
bodily injury to another. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.02(A)(L). A person commits
murder if he intentionally or knowingly causes another's death or intends to cause
serious bodily injury and commits an act clearly dangerous to human life that causes
the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(B).
Comparing the statutory definitions, the elements required to prove aggravated
assault are included in the elements necessary to establish murder. Therefore,
aggravated assault is a lesser included offense of murder. Salazar v. State, 87 S.W.3d
680, 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). See Barrios v. State, 389 S.W.3d 382, 399 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana 2012, pet. ref’d)(explaining that “all of the elements of aggravated
assault were required to prove murder in this case, aggravated assault is a
lesser-included offense of murder...”) citing Dowden v. State, 758 S.W.2d 264, 269 (Tex.
Crim. App.1988) and Forest v. State, 989 S.W.2d 365, 367–68 (Tex. Crim. App.1999).
The evidence presented at trial supports the lesser included offense of aggravated assault
The second prong of the test is satisfied if there is some evidence that would
allow a rational jury to find that the defendant is only guilty of aggravated assault.
Salazar, 87 S.W.3d at 683. The court may not consider the credibility of the evidence.
Wortham v. State, 412 S.W.3d 552, 558 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Anything more than a
scintilla of evidence entitles Mr. Castaneda to the lesser charge, regardless of whether
the evidence is weak, impeached, or contradicted. Id.; Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377,
383 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012).
The requisite intent of the defendant is a predominant factor in determining
whether an aggravated assault charge applies. Lesser included offenses have been
16
allowed where the defendant presented evidence that negated an element of intent in
the charged offense. Wortham, 412 S.W.3d at 558. Often, the lack of intent is
established through the defendant's testimony.
An aggravated assault instruction is proper even if the defendant killed the
deceased. For example, the court in Lawson v. State allowed a lesser included offense of
aggravated assault where Lawson testified that he did not intend to kill or shoot the
deceased. Lawson v. State, 775 S.W.2d 495, 499 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, pet. refd). This
testimony negated the intent element of the charge. Id. At trial, Lawson confessed
that he shot the deceased, but claimed the killing was an accident. Id. at 496. The
deceased had threatened Lawson with a pistol, and Lawson fought back by jabbing
and pounding the deceased. Id. During the fight, the pistol discharged, killing the
deceased. Id. At trial, the court allowed charges on manslaughter and self-defense, but
denied the requested aggravated assault charge. Id. The appellate court held that
Lawson was entitled to the requested aggravated assault charge, and the jury was free
to believe or reject Lawson's testimony. Id. at 500.
Emphasis on the defendant's testimony is also used to establish intent, rather
than negate it. In Johnson v. State, the defendant testified that when the deceased
slapped him, he loaded the gun and shot. Johnson v. State, 915 S.W.2d 653, 658 (Tex.
App.-Houston [14th Dist.) 1996, pet. ref’d). The defendant testified that he did not
intend to kill the deceased, but did intend to get the deceased off of him. Id. The court
noted that an aggravated assault charge would be required if there was testimony
indicating a lack of intent to kill the deceased. Id. at 660. However, the defendant's
testimony showed a deliberate intent to kill the deceased. Id.. Because the defendant's
17
testimony established rather than negated intent, the court denied the requested
aggravated assault instruction. Id.
Mr. Castaneda’s testimony negates intent rather than establishes intent. Similar
to the defendant in Lawson v. State, Mr. Castaneda specifically testified that he did not
intend to kill Mr. Armstrong. Identical to Lawson, who fought back when the
deceased threatened him with a pistol, Mr. Castaneda fought back when Mr.
Armstrong threatened him with a pistol. Unlike the defendant in Johnson, who testified
that he intended to shoot the deceased, Mr. Castaneda did not testify that he intended
to hurt Mr. Armstrong.
Because a juror could rely on Mr. Castaneda’s testimony to find that Mr.
Castaneda did not intend to kill Mr. Armstrong, Mr. Castaneda was entitled to a
charge on the lesser included offense of aggravated assault. The credibility of Mr.
Castaneda's testimony negating intent rests in the hands of the jury; they alone decide
whether Mr. Castaneda was guilty of murder or aggravated assault.
The error in the charge resulted in sufficient harm to warrant reversal
If error is found in the charge, the degree of harm necessary for reversal
depends on whether the appellant objected to the charge during trial. Almanza v. State,
686 S.W.2d 157, 171 (1984). If the error in the charge was timely objected to, reversal
is required so long as the error is not harmless. Id. The error is not harmless if it is
“calculated to injure the rights of defendant.” Id. The defendant's harm must be
calculated in light of the entire jury charge, the state of the evidence, the argument of
counsel, and any other relevant information revealed by the trial record. Id. Harm
exists when the penalty imposed for the charged offense exceeds the potential penalty
18
for the lesser-included offense. Williams v. State, 314 S.W.3d 45, 53 (Tex. App.-Tyler
2010, pet. ref' d).
Mr. Castaneda's defense counsel properly objected to the error in the charge
during trial. (6 R.R. at 144). Therefore, Mr. Castaneda is entitled to reversal so long
as the error was not harmless.
The error here is apparent. The penalty imposed for murder far exceeds the
penalty imposed for aggravated assault. Aggravated assault is a second degree felony
punishable by imprisonment for any term of not more than 20 years or less than 2
years. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 22.02(B), 12.33(A). Instead, Mr. Castaneda was
sentenced to 45 years in prison for murder (7 R.R. at 8). Even if the jury rejected the
self-defense charge, there was still evidence that Mr. Castaneda did not act with the
intent to kill. If Mr. Castaneda's actions merely amounted to aggravated assault, his
maximum sentence would be less than half of the sentence he received. Therefore,
Mr. Castaneda was harmed when the lesser-included offense of aggravated assault was
denied.
19
Issue Two: A jury may find a defendant not guilty of a greater
offense, but guilty of a lesser-included offense. The trial court
denied Mr. Castaneda's request for a jury instruction of the
lesser-included offense of manslaughter. Did the trial court
commit reversible error by denying this request?
Mr. Castaneda requested manslaughter be included in the charge and the court
denied the request. (6 R.R. at 143-45). There is a two-pronged test to determine
whether a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction on a lesser-included offense. See
TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 37.09, and discussion supra;. First, does the proof
necessary to establish the charged offense also include the lesser offense? Cavazos v.
State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 382 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012). The court answers this question by
comparing the elements alleged in the indictment with the elements of the lesser
offense. Id. Second, the court must determine if there is some evidence from which a
rational jury could acquit the defendant of the greater offense, but find him guilty of
the lesser-included offense. Sweed v. State, 351 S.W.3d 63, 67-68 (Tex. Crim. App.
2011). The first step is a question of law, and does not depend on evidence presented
at trial. Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 382. The second step is a question of fact and is based
on the evidence presented at trial. Id. at 383.
The requested jury charge of manslaughter is, as a matter of law, a lesser-included offense of murder.
An offense is lesser included if, in relevant part, it “is established by proof of
the same or less than all the facts required to establish the commission of the offense
charged” or “if it differs from the charged offense only in respect to a lesser culpable
mental state.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 37.09(1),(3). An offense qualifies
under Article 37.09(1) as lesser included if the indictment for the greater offense either
alleges all of the elements of the lesser-included offense, or the court determines they
20
are nonetheless functionally the same or less than those required to prove the charged
offense. See Ex parte Watson, 306 S.W.3d 259, 273 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009); see also
McKithan v. State, 324 S.W.3d 582, 588 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
In Cavazos v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals was faced with a similar
question as the one here: is manslaughter a lesser-included offense of murder, thus
rendering the jury charge of only murder reversible error? Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 384.
The differences between manslaughter and the charged offense in Cavazos are that
murder includes intent to cause serious bodily injury and the commission of an act
clearly dangerous to human life, whereas manslaughter requires recklessness, which 1s
a conscious disregard of a substantial and unjustifiable risk regarding circumstances or
results surrounding the conduct. Id.
The Court determined that shooting the victim with a firearm, which was the
commission of an act clearly dangerous to human life, is the circumstance surrounding
the conduct, not the result itself, and would be the same under either murder or
manslaughter. Id. The Court then determined the intent element of both crimes. Id.
The defendant in that case shot the victim with a deadly weapon, implying that he had
the intent to cause the victim's death. Id. In comparison, the definition of recklessness
is disregarding a risk that circumstances exist or that a result will occur. Id.
The Court concluded that causing death while consciously disregarding a risk
that death will occur differs from intending to cause serious bodily injury with death
resulting only in the respect that a less culpable mental state establishes its
commission. Id. (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. ART. 37.09(3)). The Court
concluded that manslaughter is a lesser-included offense of murder. Id.
21
In the case sub judice, the base elements of murder, as alleged in the indictment,
are: (1) Johnathan Renard Castaneda (2) did unlawfully intend to cause serious bodily
injury to Baron Keith Armstrong and (3) did cause the death of Mr. Armstrong by (4)
intentionally and knowingly committing an act clearly dangerous to human life,
namely striking Mr. Armstrong with his hand and with an unknown object (2 C.R. at
13). In comparison, the base elements of manslaughter are (1) a person (2) recklessly
(3) causing the death of an individual. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.04.
Just as was the case in Cavazos, the only difference between the two offenses are
the intent to cause serious bodily injury and the commission of an act clearly
dangerous to human life, as compared to the recklessness element of manslaughter.
This Court can use the same reasoning applied in Cavazos to determine that causing
death while consciously disregarding a risk that death will occur differs from intending
to cause serious bodily injury with death resulting only in the respect that a less
culpable mental state establishes its commission. Manslaughter is a lesser-included
offense of murder in this case.
The record supports a conviction of only manslaughter.
The second step in the “lesser-included offense” analysis is to determine if
there is any evidence raised that the defendant was guilty of only the lesser offense.
Cavazos, 382 S.W.3d at 385. More specifically, courts have held that manslaughter is a
lesser-included offense of murder only if there is some evidence of sudden passion in
the case arising from adequate cause. Westbrook v. State, 846 S.W.2d 155, 159 (Tex.
App.-Fort Worth 1993, no pet.). Both “adequate cause” and “sudden passion” are
defined as:
22
(1) “Adequate cause” means cause that would commonly produce a
degree of anger, rage, resentment, or terror in a person of ordinary
temper, sufficient to render the mind incapable of cool reflection.
(2) “Sudden passion” means passion directly caused by ... the individual
killed or another acting with the person killed which passion arises at the
time of the offense and is not solely the result of former provocation.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §19.02(A)(1). Any evidence that the defendant acted under
the immediate influence of passion, without time for cool reflection, arising from
adequate provocation, supports sudden passion. See Burns v. State, 923 S.W.2d 233, 236
(Tex. App.-[14th Dist.] 1996). Something more than the presence of simple fear is
required; there must be evidence that the defendant's state of mind rendered him
incapable of cool reflection. See Gonzales v. State, 717 S.W.2d 355, 357-58 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1986).
In order for a manslaughter charge to be proper, there must be evidence
presented at trial of the condition of the defendant’s mind at the time of the offense.
Merchant v. State, 810 S.W.2d 305, 310 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, pet ref’d). In Willis v.
State, the Court reasoned that no “sudden passion” was present because the
“[a]ppellant’s statement did not demonstrate such a sudden passion arising from
adequate case.” Willis v. State, 936 S.W.2d 302, 309 (Tex. App.-Tyler, 1996). Further,
“[a]ppellant never state[d] that the incident caused him to be afraid or angry, or that
he acted under any emotional distress.” Id.
The record in this case contains direct evidence that Mr. Castaneda was under
the immediate influence of sudden passion arising from an adequate cause. Mr.
Castaneda testified at trial about the fear and anger he felt during his altercation with
Mr. Armstrong:
23
Q: (Mr. Scott) So once he put the gun in your face, what does it do to you
psychologically, meaning what are you thinking?
A: (Mr. Castaneda) I'm scared. I flip out. My whole demeanor changed .....
Q: Did you think he was going to kill you or not?
A: Yes, sir, I did.
Q: So you're in fear of your life, right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: ... And your actions, I gather then, were protective at that point in time,
correct?
A: Yes, sir.
(6 R.R. at 42-43, 45). The present case is distinguishable from that in Willis. Mr.
Castaneda acted with sudden passion when he entered into the physical altercation
with Mr. Armstrong. Further, Mr. Castaneda's actions arose from adequate cause;
namely, Mr. Armstrong threatening everyone in the house with a gun. There was
direct testimony in this case that Mr. Castaneda was experiencing intense emotions
when he was locked in the house on Van Fleet, and he acted under sudden passion
when the gun was pointed at him.
The error was harmful and requires reversal.
The defense attorney made a specific request to the trial court following the
close of evidence and prior to closing arguments. (6 R.R. at 144-45). The trial court
denied defense counsel's request for the lesser-included offense instruction. (6 R.R. at
145). Because a timely objection was made to the jury charge, a showing of “some
harm” to a defendant will mandate reversal. Barron v. State, 353 S.W.3d 879, 883 (Tex.
24
Crim. App. 2011). Mr. Castaneda received 45 years for murder - a conviction of a
lesser offense might well have resulted in a shorter sentence. Therefore Mr.
Castaneda should be acquitted of the murder conviction.
25
Issue Three: The jury charge must distinctly set forth the law
applicable to the case. The trial court submitted a jury charge that
was confusing and did not clearly instruct the jury that the state
carried the burden of disproving self-defense. Was Mr. Castaneda
egregiously harmed by the trial court’s failure to properly instruct
the jury on the law of self-defense?
Relevant Facts
Mr. Castaneda was indicted for the murder of Baron Keith Armstrong. (2 C.R.
at 13). Patricia Asberry was the only witness called by the State who was at the house
when the murder occurred. (4 R.R. at 93). Asberry testified that the decedent,
Armstrong, was very angry and pointed a gun at her head in an attempt to find his
keys. (4 R.R. at 142, 145). She testified that after Armstrong pointed the gun at her
head, Armstrong walked over to Mr. Castaneda and told him that he wanted his keys.
(4 R.R. at 146). Asberry said that the gun was behind Armstrong’s back (4 R.R. at
146); Mr. Castaneda said that Armstrong pointed the gun at his face and an inch from
his chest. (6 R.R. at 41, 43-44). He said that Armstrong later shot the gun while he was
on the ground after being beaten by Mr. Castaneda. (6 R.R. at 62). In response, Mr.
Castaneda grabbed a pipe and hit Armstrong approximately five times. (6 R.R. at 62-
63). Armstrong died as a result of the beating.
The jury charge included an instruction on self-defense (2 C.R. at 69-71).
Standard of Review
Article 36.14 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure states in part:
[I]n each felony case … tried in a court of record, the judge shall, before the
argument begins, deliver to the jury…a written charge distinctly setting forth
the law applicable to the case.
26
In analyzing a jury charge issue, an appellate court’s first duty is to decide
whether error exists. Barrios v. State, 283 S.W.3d 348, 350 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). If
error exists, the court then analyzes that error for harm. Id. If the appellant did not
object to the charge, the appeal courts examine the record for egregious harm. Id.
Errors that result in egregious harm are those that affect “the very basis of the case,”
“deprive the defendant of a valuable right,” or “vitally affect a defensive theory.” Ngo
v. State, 175 S.W.3d 738, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).
The Trial Court Committed Error by Submitting a Faulty Jury Instruction
A “trial judge must ‘distinctly set[ ] forth the law applicable to the case’ in the
jury charge.” Reeves v. State, 420 S.W.3d 812, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citing TEX.
CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 36.14). “‘It is not the function of the charge merely to avoid
misleading or confusing the jury; it is the function of the charge to lead and to prevent
confusion.’” Id. (quoting Williams v. State, 547 S.W.2d 18, 20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)).
The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that if a trial court signals that self-
defense is the law applicable to the case, then “any flaw in the charge on self-defense
amounts to an error in the charge.” Barrera v. State, 982 S.W.2d 415, 416 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1998). In Barrera, “the failure to apply the law of self-defense to the facts of the
case and to instruct the jury to acquit if they held a reasonable doubt on self-defense
was error.” Id.
“While generally, ‘in the absence of evidence to the contrary, we will assume
that the jury followed its written instructions,’ this presupposes that the instructions
are understandable.” Reeves, 420 S.W.3d 818 (quoting Miles v. State, 204 S.W.3d 822,
827-28 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).
27
In the Reeves case, Judge Cochran criticized a self-defense provocation jury
instruction from Harris County. She noted that the “first application paragraph
contains 156 words in one sentence. The second paragraph contains 125 words in one
sentence. Neither is comprehensible.” Reeves at 818.
The application paragraph of the jury instruction in this case stated:
Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant, Johnathan Renard Castaneda, did cause the
death of Baron Keith Armstrong with his hand or with an unknown
object, as alleged, but you further find from the evidence, as viewed
from the standpoint of the defendant at the time, from the words or
conduct, or both of Baron Keith Armstrong it reasonably appeared to
the defendant that his life or person was in danger and there was created
in his mind a reasonable expectation or fear of death or serious bodily
injury from the use of unlawful deadly force at the hands of Baron Keith
Armstrong, and that acting under such apprehension … he struck Baron
Keith Armstrong with his hand or an unknown object, then you should
acquit the defendant on the grounds of self-defense; or if you have a
reasonable doubt as to whether or not the defendant was acting in self-
defense on said occasion and under the circumstances, then you should
give the defendant the benefit of the doubt and say by your verdict, not
guilty.
If you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that at
the time and place in question the defendant did not reasonably believe
that he was in danger of death or serious bodily injury, or that the
defendant … did not reasonably believe that the degree of force actually
used by him was immediately necessary to protect himself against Baron
Keith Armstrong’s use or attempted use of unlawful deadly force, then
you should find against the defendant on the issue of self-defense.
(2 C.R. at 70-72)
Admittedly the self-defense instruction in this case does not rise to the level of
the “six-page forest of legal ‘argle-bargle,’” in Reeves. Id. at 817. However, it does rival
Reeves in one respect: the length of the application paragraph. The Court noted that
the application paragraphs in Reeves included a 156- and 125-word run-on sentence.
The application paragraph in this case is a single 219-word sentence.
28
Also like Reeves, the application paragraph in this case did not clearly state the
law. Importantly, the charge is missing any mention of who carries the burden of
proving that Mr. Castaneda did or did not act in self-defense. When self-defense is at
issue, the “defendant has the initial burden of producing some evidence to justify
submission of a self-defense instruction. The State must then persuade the jury
beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant did not act in self-defense.” Tidmore v.
State, 976 S.W.2d 724, 729 (Tex. App.—Tyler 1998, pet. ref’d).
The self-defense instruction in this case did begin the application paragraph
with, “Therefore, if you find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt,” but the
jury could have understood the instruction to mean that Mr. Castaneda rather than the
State bore the burden of proving self-defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
The Texas Criminal Pattern Jury Charge on “Defenses” provides a more clearly
articulated burden of proof for self-defense. It states:
Burden of Proof
The defendant is not required to prove self-defense. Rather, the
state must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, that self-defense
does not apply to the defendant’s conduct.
Texas Criminal Patter Jury Charges—Defenses (2013), §B14.4, at 206§§.
If such an instruction was given to the jury in this case, it would have been clear that
the State — not Mr. Castaneda — bore the burden of proof, and what exactly was to
be proven.
Two other provisions of the charge could have also caused confusion for the
jury. The charge defined the various elements of murder and applied the facts to the
case on the page prior to discussing the elements and application of self-defense (2
29
C.R. at 67-68). In the application paragraph on murder alone, the charge said, “If you
find from the evidence beyond a reasonable doubt that … Castaneda … did cause the
death of Baron Keith Armstrong … then you will find the defendant guilty of murder,
as charged in the indictment” (2 C.R. at 68). In this initial application paragraph,
provided before the self-defense charge, there was no mention that self-defense was
an issue. A preferable charge would have indicated that the jury needs to apply the law
of self-defense to the murder charge, as in: “If you find from the evidence beyond a
reasonable doubt that … Castaneda … did cause the death of Baron Keith Armstrong
… then you will find the defendant guilty of murder, as charged in the indictment, if
you do not find beyond a reasonable doubt that Mr. Castaneda acted in self-defense.”
A final provision of the charge that may have caused confusion was the section
on non-provocation and no duty to retreat. The provision says that a “person who has
a right to be present at the location where the deadly force is used … and who is not
engaged in criminal activity at the time the deadly force is used is not required to
retreat before using deadly force.” Mr. Castaneda testified to possessing crack cocaine
at the time he engaged in self-defense, and as a result the jury could have understood
the charge to mean that Mr. Castaneda had a duty to retreat because of that criminal
activity which had nothing to do with the altercation. However, that section did end
by noting, “You are not to consider whether the defendant failed to retreat.” But the
conflict between the provisions of the charge and the facts of the case could have left
the jury confused.
In conclusion, the trial court committed error since the jury instruction was
confusing in various respects and did not clearly state the law.
30
Harm Analysis: The Errors in the Jury Charge Amounted to Egregious Harm
Trial counsel did not object to the charge in this case. As a result, this Court
must review the error under the “egregious harm” standard of Almanza. Almanza v.
State, 686 S.W.2d 157 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985). Egregious harm consists of those
errors that affect the very basis of the case, deprive the defendant of a valuable right,
vitally affect a defensive theory, or make the case for punishment clearly and
significantly more persuasive. Lee v. State, 29 S.W.3d 570, 578 (Tex. App. – Dallas
2000, no pet.); Matthews v. State, 999 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. App. – Houston, [14th
Dist.] 1999, pet. ref’d).
To determine whether the record establishes that the appellant suffered
egregious harm, a reviewing court must consider 1) the complete jury
charge, 2) the arguments of counsel, 3) the entirety of the evidence,
including the contested issues and weight of the probative evidence, and
4) any other relevant factors revealed by the record as a whole. Neither
party bears a burden of production or persuasion with respect to an
Almanza harm analysis, the question being simply what the record
demonstrates.
Hollander v. State, 414 S.W.3d 746 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013) (citations omitted).
However, the Fourteenth Court of Appeals has determined this exact instruction is
sufficient - but not necessarily clear. See Gilder v. State, 14-13-01088-CR, 2014 WL
7204962, at *4 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Dec. 18, 2014, no. pet.
h.)(explaining “[w]hile the instruction in this case is sufficient, the Texas Pattern Jury
Charge contains a more clear charge on self-defense. See Comm. on Pattern Jury Charges,
State Bar of Tex., Texas Criminal Pattern Jury Charges: Defenses § B14.4 (2013)”).
31
A. The Jury Charge Itself
The charge in this case consisted of five parts: 1) the abstract that included the
statutory definitions and elements of the offense; 2) the self-defense instruction; 3) the
application paragraph; 4) an instruction on the use of prior offense evidence; and 5)
general instructions. The charge was confusing and failed to properly state the law.
As previously mentioned, there were various provisions in the charge that could
have confused the jury. The initial application paragraph on murder failed to mention
that the jury should consider self-defense. There was also a confusing duty to retreat
provision.
Nowhere in the application paragraph of the self-defense charge was it stated
that the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the
defendant did not act in self-defense, but rather simply said, “if you have a reasonable
doubt….” The general instructions stated: “The prosecution has the burden of
proving the defendant guilty and it must do so by proving each and every element of
the offense charged beyond a reasonable doubt and if it fails to do so, you must acquit
the defendant.” Self-defense is not an element of the offense. No reference to the
prosecution’s burden regarding self-defense is mentioned. Whether the state or
defendant has the burden of proving if the defendant did or did not act in self-defense
is critically important and could make all the difference in terms of whether or not the
defendant is acquitted.
B. Arguments of Counsel
Neither the State nor defense counsel mentioned whose burden it was to prove
or disprove self-defense during opening statements. (3 R.R. at 15-24). The State did
32
not mention that Mr. Castaneda was going to claim self-defense, but defense counsel
did. Counsel noted that, “to defend himself my client and the man got into a fight
when the man was trying to kill him with the gun.” (3 R.R. at 22). Defense counsel
went on to note that the other members of the house jumped on Mr. Castaneda and
“he was having a fight with the landlord slash pimp slash dope dealer. And then
ultimately the man was killed.” (3 R.R. at 22-23). Defense counsel concluded opening
remarks by stating, “There was a fight. And if it had not been for my client’s ability to
fight with Mr. Armstrong, he would be dead now and he would have been gunned
down in that residence on Van Fleet Street. And it’s that pure and simple.” (3 R.R. at
24).
During closing arguments, the State did not mention that it carried the burden
to disprove self-defense, though the State did argue as to why this case did not involve
self-defense. Much of the State’s arguments focused on self-defense requiring
“reasonable” force and that it be “immediately necessary.” (6 R.R. at 155-156). The
State claimed that the force used by Mr. Castaneda was “not to a reasonable degree.
It’s excessive, overkill. It’s murder.” (6 R.R. at 158). He later said that the force must
be “immediately necessary” and has “got to be a reasonable belief of an ordinary
person in that position.” (6 R.R. at 178).
Unfortunately that is not an accurate description of the law. The self-defense
statutes say nothing about “an ordinary person in that position.” The deadly force
statute says that a person is justified in using deadly force against another “when and
to the degree the actor reasonably believes the deadly force is immediately necessary: to
33
protect the actor against the other’s use of attempted use of unlawful deadly force.”
TEX. PEN. CODE §9.32(a)(2) (emphasis added).
While the prosecutor misstated the law in its closing, the charge did accurately
state that the situation should be “viewed from the standpoint of the defendant at the
time” and the jury should consider if it “reasonably appeared to the defendant that his
life or person was in danger and there was created in his mind a reasonable expectation
or fear of death or serious bodily injury….” (2 C.R. at 71). The effect of the
prosecutor’s misstatement of the law was to effectively lower the standard of self-
defense by substituting an “ordinary person” standard for the law, which requires the
jury to consider the views of the actor – “ordinary” or not. This could make it harder
for Mr. Castaneda to prevail on his self-defense claim.
Defense counsel did not specifically tell the jury that the State has the burden
of disproving self-defense, but he did attempt to explain self-defense. Counsel stated
that a person “can use deadly force against anyone if it’s a reasonable response to a
deadly force that is being levied against you or the perception of deadly force.” (6 R.R.
at 168). When defense counsel attempted to say that the jury should consider the
views of Mr. Castaneda “and what is his perception of what’s going on,” the court
sustained the State’s objection alleging defense counsel’s characterization was a
misstatement of law because the jury should only consider “what an ordinary person
in the defendant’s position” would consider. (6 R.R. at 167). Once again, the self-
defense statute says nothing about considering an “ordinary person.” The objection
should not have been sustained.
34
C. The Entirety of the Evidence
Asberry and Mr. Castaneda — the only two witnesses who were at the scene
when the murder occurred and who testified — agreed that the complainant was
angry, he had a gun, and he pointed it Asberry. They agree that Armstrong’s actions
resulted in Asberry crying in fear.
The two disagreed on the details of what happened next. Asberry said that
Armstrong had the gun when he walked over to Mr. Castaneda but did not point it at
him. Mr. Castaneda said that Armstrong pointed the gun at his head and chest.
Asberry did not say any shots were fired and that Mr. Castaneda continued to hit
Armstrong with a pipe after he was not moving on the floor. Mr. Castaneda said that
Armstrong shot at him, provoking him to hit Armstrong some more while Armstrong
was on the ground.
The forensic evidence documented Armstrong’s significant physical damage to
his face, neck, and skull. The medical examiner testified that the cause of death was
blunt force trauma to the head and neck.
In conclusion, Mr. Castaneda was egregiously harmed by the confusing charge
that failed to clearly tell the jury that the State carried the burden of proving that Mr.
Castaneda did not act in self-defense.
35
Issue Four: Every defendant has a right to trial on legally
sufficient evidence, which supports a conviction beyond a
reasonable doubt for each element of the charged offense. Mr.
Castaneda was convicted of aggravated sexual assault absent
evidence that a deadly weapon was used and exhibited during the
assault, an essential element to the charged offense. Did the jury
convict Mr. Castaneda on the basis of insufficient evidence?
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantees the right to trial on legally sufficient
evidence. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 316 (1979); Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893,
916 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010). Therefore, this court must ensure that the evidence
presented actually supports the conclusion that Mr. Castaneda committed aggravated
sexual assault. See Winfrey v. State, 323 S.W.3d 875, 882 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010).
Viewing all of the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, evidence is
insufficient to support a conviction if no rational trier of fact could have found that
each element of the charged offense was proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Brooks,
323 S.W.3d at 917.
Sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as
defined by the hypothetically correct jury charge for the case. Malik v. State, 953
S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). A hypothetically correct charge has its basis
in the indictment allegations. Gollihar v. State, 46 S.W.3d 243, 255 (Tex. Crim. App.
2001). It accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, and does not
unnecessarily increase the State's burden of proof. Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240.
The hypothetically correct charge required the State to prove Mr. Castaneda used and exhibited a
deadly weapon during the assault
A hypothetically correct charge for this case results from the statutory elements
of aggravated sexual assault outlined in the Texas Penal Code, as modified by the
36
indictment. See Curry v. State, 30 S.W.3d 394, 404 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). A person
commits aggravated sexual assault if he:
1. intentionally or knowingly causes the penetration of the anus or sexual
organ of another person by any means,
2. without that person's consent; and
3. uses or exhibits a deadly weapon during the commission of the assault.
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.021(A). The indictment requires the State to prove:
1. Mr. Castaneda unlawfully, intentionally and knowingly caused the
penetration of the anus of Ms. Asberry by placing his sexual organ in the
anus of Ms. Asberry,
2. without the consent of Ms. Asberry; and namely,
3. Mr. Castaneda compelled Ms. Asberry to submit and participate by the
use of physical force and violence and in the course of the same criminal
episode, Mr. Castaneda used and exhibited a deadly weapon, namely a
metal bar (I C.R. at 12).
Therefore, the State must prove as an essential element of the charged offense
that Mr. Castaneda used and exhibited a deadly weapon during the assault. There was
insufficient evidence to convict Mr. Castaneda of aggravated sexual assault because
the State failed to prove this element.
There was no proof Mr. Castaneda used and exhibited a deadly weapon during the assault
Even if the jury could link Mr. Castaneda to an assault, he did not ‘use or
exhibit’ a deadly weapon during the course of the assault. When the jury is the fact
finder, there must be an express finding of a deadly weapon. LaFleur v. State, 106
37
S.W.3d 91, 92 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003). To sustain a deadly weapon finding, the
evidence must demonstrate that: (1) the object meets the statutory definition of a
deadly weapon, (2) the deadly weapon was used or exhibited during the crime, and (3)
other people were put in actual danger. Drichas v. State, 175 S.W.3d 795, 798 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2005). These requirements do not increase the State's burden of proof, but
keeps it exactly the same. In contrast, if the State did not have to sustain a deadly
weapon finding, the burden of proof would decrease. See Curry, 30 S.W.3d at 405
(noting that deleting the phrase “by using and threatening to use deadly force namely,
a firearm” from the hypothetical jury charge would improperly decrease the State's
burden of proof).
While the metal bar could meet the statutory definition of a deadly weapon, it
was not “used or exhibited” during the crime, and did not put Ms. Asberry in actual
danger.3 To “exhibit” a weapon, the defendant must consciously show or display the
weapon during the commission of the crime. Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941
(Tex. Crim. App. 1989). Mere possession does not amount to use or exhibition.
Plummer v. State, 410 S.W.3d 855, 864 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); McCain v. State, 22
S.W.3d 497, 503 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).
The object’s intended use under the specific circumstances helps determine
whether it is a deadly weapon. The determining factor is whether the weapon was
3
There was an express finding that the metal bar was a deadly weapon when it was
included in the indictment. However, including the deadly weapon language in the
indictment does not amount to “use of exhibition” of the weapon to help facilitate the
charged offense. There is an extra step here that must be proved, and cannot be assumed.
See Crumpton v. State, 301 S.W.3d 663, 669 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (Meyers, J. dissenting)
(noting to simply connect the indictment, listing a deadly weapon, to the verdict, and skip
over the intermediate material that the jury considered, yields an incomplete analysis).
38
used in facilitating the underlying crime. McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503. There must be
some connection between the conscious exhibition of the weapon, and the
commission of the offense. Plummer v. State, 410 S.W.3d 855, 864 (Tex. Crim. App.
2013). The defendant must use the weapon to instill apprehension in the victim.
McCain, 22 S.W.3d at 503. Therefore, the jury must look beyond the mere fact that a
metal bar existed; the jury must consider all of the evidence surrounding the situation.
For example, the victim in McCain v. State saw a knife sticking out of the
defendant's back pocket during a robbery. Id. The victim believed the object was a
knife, and that defendant would cut her with it. Id. at 499. The court concluded that a
juror could rationally conclude that the knife was exhibited during the criminal
transaction to instill a sense of apprehension in the victim, reducing the likelihood of
resistance during the encounter. Id. at 503.
Unlike the defendant in McCain, who kept the knife in his back pocket during
the robbery, Mr. Castaneda put the metal bar down on a table during the charged
assault. (4 R.R. at 170). Mr. Castaneda did not keep the metal bar in his hand, nor on
his person when Ms. Asberry said he assaulted her my forcing her to engage in anal
sex. (4 R.R. at 170). Mr. Castaneda never consciously displayed the metal bar during
the assault. Mr. Castaneda never threatened Ms. Asberry with the metal bar during the
charged sexual assault. Mr. Castaneda never hit Ms. Asberry with the metal bar,
although the complainant stated the metal bar was within his reach during the assault.
(4 R.R. at 176). Further, unlike the victim in McCain, who believed the defendant
would cut her with the knife, there was no evidence presented that Ms. Asberry feared
Mr. Castaneda would hit her with the metal bar.
39
At most, the evidence here shows: (1) Mr. Castaneda previously had consensual
sex with Ms. Asberry; (2) Mr. Castaneda did have a metal bar on a table during the
assault; (3) Ms. Asberry did not feel threatened by the metal bar itself. Therefore, even
if the jury believed Ms. Asberry's testimony that an assault occurred, a rational juror
could not find that Mr. Castaneda compelled Ms. Asberry to participate in the episode
by using and exhibiting a metal pole that put Ms. Asberry in actual danger. The
evidence, even when viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, is legally
insufficient to support a conviction of aggravated sexual assault beyond a reasonable
doubt.
40
Issue Five: The trial court must hold an evidentiary hearing on a
motion for new trial if the motion and affidavits raise matters not
determinable from the record, and the accused could be entitled to
relief. The trial court failed to hold a hearing on the motion, which
included affidavits from available mitigation witnesses who
defense counsel did not call to testify. Did the court improperly
deny Mr. Castaneda a hearing on his motion for new trial?
Mr. Castaneda was entitled to a hearing on the Motion for New Trial because
his motion was supported by numerous affidavits from mitigation witnesses who were
not called to testify at the punishment phase of the trial. The Motion for New Trial
claims that defense counsel was ineffective for failing to call these mitigation
witnesses. Innumerable cases have determined that defense counsel's failure to call
witnesses to provide mitigation testimony amounts to ineffective assistance of
counsel.
“A defendant is entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his motion for new trial if
the motion and accompanying affidavit(s) raise matters not determinable from the
record, upon which the accused could be entitled to relief.” Lucero v. State, 246 S.W.3d
86, 94 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008) (citing Wallace v. State, 106 S.W.3d 103, 108 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2003)). Affidavits must specifically set out the factual basis of the claim, but they
“need not establish a prima facie case.” Smith v. State, 286 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2009). Affidavits need only give rise to “reasonable grounds in support of the
claim.” Id. “The purpose of the hearing is to give the defendant an opportunity to
fully develop the matters raised in the motion.” Wallace, 106 S.W.3d at 108 (citing
Martinez v. State, 74 S.W.3d 19, 22 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Appellate courts review a
trial court's decision regarding granting a hearing on a motion for new trial under an
41
abuse of discretion standard. Lucero, 246 S.W.3d at 94 (citing Martinez, 74 S.W.3d at
22).
A defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in a motion for new trial
will be entitled to a hearing if he alleges “sufficient facts from which a trial court could
reasonably conclude both that counsel failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney
and that, but for counsel's failure, there is a reasonable likelihood that the outcome of
his trial would have been different.” Smith, 286 S.W.3d at 340.
In Martinez, the defendant was convicted of possessing five to fifty pounds of
marijuana and sentenced by a jury to eight years in prison. Martinez, 74 S.W.3d at 20.
Martinez filed a “Motion for New Trial and Hearing Thereon,” alleging ineffective
assistance of counsel because his trial counsel did not timely inform him that the state
had made a plea bargain offer recommending four years incarceration. Id. The motion
included an affidavit from Martinez alleging that he was informed of the plea offer
“the day before he was set to go to trial, and that the offer was increased to eight years
the next morning.” Id. The affidavit also stated that if he had known about jury
verdicts in that county, and he had sufficient time to discussion the “pros and cons”
of going to trial, he would have been able to more effectively consider the plea offer
and would have accepted it. Id.
The Court of Appeals held that “the affidavit was deficient and his motion was
insufficient to put the trial court on notice that reasonable grounds existed to believe
that counsel's representation may have been ineffective.” Id. at 21. The court noted
three reasons why the affidavit was insufficient: 1) it stated that the defendant agreed
with “trial counsel's decision not to accept or reject the plea offer, and to wait to see
42
what would happen the next morning,” the day of trial; 2) it “failed to state
unconditionally” that he would have accepted the plea offer if he knew about it in a
timely manner; and 3) the affidavit “failed to establish when the plea offer was made
by the state relative to when it was communicated to appellant and when the offer was
withdrawn.” Id.
The Court of Criminal Appeals concluded that “the court of appeals erred in its
analysis of the sufficiency of appellant's affidavit supporting his new trial motion,” and
reversed and remanded the case with instructions to abate the appeal and remand it to
the trial court to conduct a hearing on the motion for new trial. Id. at 22. The court
noted that “defense counsel's failure to inform the defendant of a plea offer can
constitute ineffective assistance of counsel and warrant reinstatement of the plea
offer.” Id. (citing Ex parte Lemke, 13 S.W.3d 791 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000)). That was the
claim on which the Motion for New Trial was based and which the affidavit
supported. As such, the “particulars of precisely when the plea offer was conveyed to
defense counsel and the amount of time it remained available for acceptance are
among factual matters that should be fully developed at a hearing.” Id.
The trial record and affidavits that accompanied the Motion for New Trial in
this case make an equally strong or stronger case than Martinez for a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel. As such, the trial court should have granted an
evidentiary hearing on the motion.
The Motion for New Trial was based on an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim for failure to present punishment evidence (2 C.R. at 102). The record shows
that trial counsel did not call any mitigation witnesses at the punishment phase of the
43
trial, but does not evidence any acknowledgment of available mitigation witnesses. (7
R.R. at 7). Defense counsel simply said, “Defense rests and closes, Judge.” (7 R.R. at
7). Multiple witnesses were available to testify about mitigating circumstances
regarding Mr. Castaneda, as evidenced by the affidavits that accompanied the motion
for new trial. Affidavits were provided by Mr. Castaneda's mother (2 C.R. at 120); his
grandmother (2 C.R. at 127); two cousins (2 C.R. at 118, 131); another relative (2 C.R.
at 123); and a friend of 16 years. (2 C.R. at 134). All could have testified to Mr.
Castaneda’s long-term mental illness, brain injuries caused by a car accident, and
positive character traits. None of this evidence was presented to the court during the
punishment phase or during an evidentiary hearing on the Motion for New Trial.
Numerous courts have held that failure to investigate and present mitigation
witnesses during the punishment phase amounts to ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Fourteenth Court of Appeals held that defense counsel was ineffective for failing
to present any mitigating evidence at the punishment phase where the defendant was
convicted of a first-degree felony of possession with intent to deliver at least 400
grams of cocaine. Milburn v. State, 15 S.W.3d 267 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.]
2000, pet. ref'd). Two years prior to the Milburn decision, the same court held that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate any mitigation evidence for the
punishment phase where the defendant received a 99-year sentence for delivery of less
than 28 grams of cocaine with a prior felony conviction. Moore v. State, 983 S.W.2d 15
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1998, no pet.). The court cited voluminous federal
case law in agreement. Id. at 23-24.
44
As previously noted, a defendant alleging ineffective assistance of counsel in a
motion for new trial will be entitled to a hearing if he alleges “sufficient facts from
which a trial court could reasonably conclude both that counsel failed to act as a
reasonably competent attorney and that, but for counsel's failure, there is a reasonable
likelihood that the outcome of his trial would have been different.” Smith, 286 S.W.3d
at 340 (emphasis in original).
The failure of defense counsel to investigate and present available mitigation
witnesses means that counsel failed to act as a reasonably competent attorney. While
Mr. Castaneda did receive a mandatory life sentence for one of his convictions in this
case (7 R.R. at 7-8; 1 C.R. at 73), his murder conviction resulted in a 45-year prison
sentence, which could have been reduced if his family and friends were presented at
punishment to testify about his history of mental illness, brain injuries, and his good
character traits.
Since the timely Motion for New Trial was supported by numerous affidavits
from mitigation witnesses who were not called to testify at the punishment phase, the
trial court should have granted an evidentiary hearing on the motion to determine if
trial counsel was ineffective and a new punishment hearing should be granted.
45
Issue Six: The DNA court cost assessed against appellant is an
unconstitutional tax on Mr. Castaneda.
Preservation of Error
Challenges to court costs can be raised for the first time on appeal and
“[c]onvicted defendants have constructive notice of mandatory court costs set by
statute and the opportunity to object to the assessment of court costs against them for
the first time on appeal or in a proceeding under Article 103.008 of the Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure.” Cardenas v. State, 423 S.W.3d 396, 399 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
In a companion case decided the same day, the Court further explained that because
the cost bill is most likely unavailable at the time of the judgment, an “[a]ppellant need
not have objected at trial to raise a claim challenging the bases of assessed costs on
appeal.” Johnson v. State, 423 S.W.3d 385, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).
Applicable Law
The bill of costs for the sexual assault conviction reflect a $250 DNA fee. (1
C.R. at 75). TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ART. 102.020(A)(1) provides that “[a] person
shall pay as a cost of court $250 on conviction of an offense listed in Section
411.1471(a)(1), Government Code.” Aggravated sexual assault is listed in Section
411.1471(a)(1)(D), Government Code. Thus the $250 cost was properly included in
the bills of cost.
However in Peraza v. State, this Court held the DNA Record Fee was not a
legitimate court cost, but was instead an unconstitutional tax. Peraza v. State, No.
01-12-00690-CR, 2014 WL 7476214 (Tex. App. - Houston [1st Dist.] Dec. 30, 2014,
pet. filed), In reaching this conclusion, this Court relied on Ex parte Carson, 159
46
S.W.2d 126, 130 (1942), wherein the Court of Criminal Appeals found that a $1 law
library fee was “neither necessary nor incidental to the trial of a criminal case” and as
such was “not a legitimate” cost of court.
In Peraza, the Court first addressed the thirty-five percent of the funds which
are to be deposited in state highway fund. The Court determined that these funds
“may be used for any function of TxDOT” and are not specifically limited to “defray
the costs associated with collecting, storing, and testing DNA samples” Peraza at 6 &
7 (emphasis in original). After examining the TxDOT's mission statement and the
various statutes listing TxDOT's responsibilities, the Court held that because “the
responsibilities of TxDOT are far more remote from a criminal trial than the county
law libraries which were to be used by the judges and attorneys for trial preparation in
Carson”…it could not be “reasonably concluded that the portion of the revenue
collected through the ‘DNA Record Fee’ and dedicated to the state highway fund
constitutes a proper court cost to be assessed against appellant or any other criminal
defendant.” Id. at 7.
The Court then turned to the remaining sixty-five percent which is deposited in
the criminal justice planning account. TEX. CRIM. PROC. ART. 102.020(H). "The
criminal justice planning account is administered by the Criminal Justice Division
(“CJD”) of the Governor's Office. Peraza at 8 citing TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN.
§772.006(A)(2) (Vernon 2012). Once again looking at the administering organization's
mission, the Court determined “[t]he CJD …uses this money to ‘[s]upport a wide
range of projects designed to reduce crime and improve the criminal and juvenile
justice systems.’” Peraza at 9. The Court then found “the criminal justice planning
47
account, which is funded by the ‘DNA Record Fee,’ [does not ]pass[ ] constitutional
muster” stating:
…the money from the criminal justice planning fund is not required to
be directed to the courts or to services necessarily or incidentally related
to criminal trials. And often times such revenue is given to programs
that, as the court in Carson specifically noted, could not possibly relate to
legitimate court costs. See 159 S.W.2d at 127 (costs for training and
education not legitimate court costs that may be assessed against criminal
defendants).
Id., at 10. This court cost should be struck from the cost bill.
PRAYER
Mr. Castaneda prays this Court reverse and remand for a new trial, or
alternatively remand for a hearing on the motion for new trial or grant a new
punishment hearing.
Respectfully submitted,
ALEXANDER BUNIN
Chief Public Defender
Harris County Texas
/s/ Jani Maselli Wood
______________________
JANI MASELLI WOOD
Assistant Public Defender
Harris County Texas
State Bar Texas Number 00791195
1201 Franklin, 13th Floor
Houston Texas 77002
Jani.Maselli@pdo.hctx.net
(713) 368-0016
(713) 368-4322
TBA No. 00791195
48
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
Pursuant to Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.5, this certifies that on January 28, 2015, a
copy of the foregoing was emailed to counsel for the state (through texfile.com) at the
following address:
Alan Curry
Assistant District Attorney
1201 Franklin Street, 6th Floor
Houston, TX 77002
curry_alan@dao.hctx.net
/s/ Jani Maselli Wood
___________________________________
JANI MASELLI WOOD
49
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE
Pursuant to proposed Rule 9.4(i)(3), undersigned counsel certifies that
this brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4(e)(i).
1. Exclusive of the portions exempted by Tex. R. App. Proc. 9.4 (i)(1), this
brief contains 13, 567 words printed in a proportionally spaced typeface.
2. This brief is printed in a proportionally spaced, serif typeface using
Garamond 14 point font in text and Garamond 14 point font in footnotes produced
by Corel WordPerfect software.
3. Undersigned counsel understands that a material misrepresentation in
completing this certificate, or circumvention of the type-volume limits in Tex. R. App.
Proc. 9.4(j), may result in the Court's striking this brief and imposing sanctions against
the person who signed it.
/s/ Jani J Maselli Wood
___________________________________
JANI J. MASELLI WOOD
50