State v. Bridges , 2017 Ohio 539 ( 2017 )


Menu:
  • [Cite as State v. Bridges, 2017-Ohio-539.]
    Court of Appeals of Ohio
    EIGHTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    COUNTY OF CUYAHOGA
    JOURNAL ENTRY AND OPINION
    No. 104723
    STATE OF OHIO
    PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE
    vs.
    CURTIS BRIDGES
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT
    JUDGMENT:
    AFFIRMED
    Criminal Appeal from the
    Cuyahoga County Court of Common Pleas
    Case No. CR-01-407434-B
    BEFORE: Celebrezze, J., E.T. Gallagher, P.J., and S. Gallagher, J.
    RELEASED AND JOURNALIZED: February 16, 2017
    ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT
    Myron P. Watson
    614 W. Superior Avenue, Suite 1144
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
    Michael C. O’Malley
    Cuyahoga County Prosecutor
    BY: Amy Venesile
    Assistant Prosecuting Attorney
    The Justice Center, 9th Floor
    1200 Ontario Street
    Cleveland, Ohio 44113
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., J.:
    {¶1} Defendant-appellant, Curtis Bridges (“Bridges”), brings this appeal
    challenging the trial court’s judgment denying his “motion to vacate void judgment of
    sentence.” Specifically, Bridges argues that the trial court’s sentence violated his rights
    under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution. After a
    thorough review of the record and law, this court affirms.
    I. Factual and Procedural History
    {¶2} In Cuyahoga C.P. No. CR-01-407434-B, Bridges was convicted of trafficking
    in and possession of cocaine exceeding 1,000 grams; each count contained a major drug
    offender specification.    The trial court merged the specifications for sentencing
    purposes.   In July 2001, the trial court sentenced Bridges to an aggregate 25-year prison
    term: a mandatory term of ten years on each count and five years on the major drug
    offender specification; the trial court ordered the counts to run consecutively to one
    another and consecutively to the specification.   The trial court’s sentencing journal entry
    provided, in relevant part, “postrelease control is a part of this prison sentence for the
    maximum period allowed for the above felony(s) under R.C. 2967.28.”
    {¶3} This court affirmed Bridges’s convictions and the trial court’s sentence on
    direct appeal.   State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 80171, 2002-Ohio-3771
    (“Bridges I”), appeal not accepted, 
    97 Ohio St. 3d 1484
    , 2002-Ohio-6866, 
    780 N.E.2d 287
    .
    {¶4} On May 30, 2008, Bridges filed a motion to vacate his sentence arguing that
    the trial court failed to properly impose postrelease control.         Specifically, Bridges argued
    that the trial court merely stated that postrelease control was a part of his sentence without
    advising him that his first-degree felonies carried a mandatory five-year term of
    postrelease control.
    {¶5} The trial court granted Bridges’s motion, finding that Bridges was not
    advised — either during the July 31, 2001 sentencing hearing or in the trial court’s
    August 3, 2001 sentencing journal entry — of the length of the period of postrelease
    control that he would be subjected to.         The trial court concluded that a new sentencing
    hearing was required pursuant to State v. Siwik, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 92341,
    2009-Ohio-3896.1
    {¶6} The trial court held a de novo resentencing hearing on December 14, 2009.
    The state conceded that the trafficking and possession counts merge for sentencing
    purposes; the state elected to sentence Bridges on the trafficking count.              The trial court
    sentenced Bridges to a mandatory prison term of ten years on the trafficking count and a
    prison term of ten years on the major drug offender specification.2 The trial court
    ordered Bridges to serve the prison term for the specification consecutively to the prison
    1  In Siwik, the trial court’s sentencing journal entry failed to specifically state the required
    period of postrelease control for the defendant-appellant’s convictions; this court vacated the sentence
    and remanded the matter to the trial court for resentencing pursuant to State v. Simpkins, 117 Ohio
    St.3d 420, 2008-Ohio-1197, 
    884 N.E.2d 568
    . Siwik at ¶ 22.
    2   The December 2009 sentence was imposed by a different judge than the judge who
    originally sentenced Bridges in 2001.
    term for the trafficking count, for an aggregate prison term of 20 years.   The trial court
    notified Bridges that his sentence included postrelease control for a period of five years.
    The trial court credited Bridges with “nearly nine years” of time served.
    {¶7} In State v. Bridges, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94469, 2010-Ohio-6359
    (“Bridges II”), Bridges appealed the trial court’s sentence, raising the following four
    assignments of error:
    I. [Bridges’s] rights under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments were
    violated when he was sentenced to an enhanced sentence on the major drug
    offender specification upon his resentencing.
    II. [Bridges] was denied due process of law when the court, who was not
    the original sentencing judge, proceeded to resentence [him] to a greater
    sentence than that of the original judge.
    III. [Bridges’s] constitutional rights were violated when [he] was subjected
    to multiple punishments as a major drug offender.
    IV. [Bridges] was denied due process of law when the court added an
    additional forfeiture of items which differed from its oral pronouncement of
    sentence.
    
    Id. at 
    6-7, 14, 20. This court affirmed the trial court’s judgment.
    {¶8} Bridges filed motions for judicial release on July 10, 2013; July 30, 2014;
    December 24, 2014; and July 17, 2015.         The trial court denied Bridges’s motions,
    finding that Bridges was not eligible for judicial release because he was serving a
    mandatory sentence.
    {¶9} On May 31, 2016, Bridges filed a “motion to vacate void judgment of
    sentence.”   In his motion, Bridges argued that the trial court’s December 2009 sentence
    was contrary to law because the trial court increased his sentence for the major drug
    offender specification after he had already served the sentence for the specification.   The
    trial court denied Bridges’s motion on June 10, 2016.
    {¶10} Bridges filed the instant appeal challenging the trial court’s judgment
    denying his motion to vacate void judgment of sentence. Bridges assigns one error for
    review:
    I. The trial court erred when it denied [Bridges’s] motion to vacate
    sentence.
    II. Law and Analysis
    A. Trial Court’s Sentence
    {¶11} In his sole assignment of error, Bridges challenges the ten-year sentence the
    trial court imposed in December 2009 on the major drug offender specification.
    Specifically, Bridges argues that the trial court’s ten-year sentence on the major drug
    offender specification was a void judgment. Bridges contends that the trial court was
    without jurisdiction to modify his sentence for the major drug offender specification at
    the 2009 sentencing hearing because he had already completed the five-year sentence
    imposed for the major drug offender specification in 2001.
    {¶12} After reviewing the record, it is evident that Bridges’s argument is barred by
    res judicata.   Bridges raised this exact same argument in Bridges II, and this court has
    already decided the issue.
    {¶13} In Bridges II, Bridges argued that (1) his rights under the Fifth and
    Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution were violated when the trial
    court enhanced his sentence for the major drug offender specification at resentencing, and
    (2) the trial court could not increase his sentence in 2009 because he had partially served
    the sentence imposed in 2001.            Bridges II, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 94469,
    2010-Ohio-6359, at  6, 11. This court rejected Bridges’s arguments, explaining that
    “this is not a case where a valid sentence is being increased.        Rather, the original
    sentence was vacated and a de novo sentencing hearing was held at which Bridges
    received a newly imposed sentence with credit for time served.” 
    Id. at 
    11. This court
    affirmed the sentence imposed at the 2009 resentencing hearing. 
    Id. at 
    1.
    {¶14} “Res judicata bars the relitigation of an issue already decided.” State v.
    Peterson, 8th Dist. Cuyahoga No. 103503, 2016-Ohio-4698,  6, citing Russell v.
    Mitchell, 
    84 Ohio St. 3d 328
    , 329, 
    703 N.E.2d 1249
    (1999). The Ohio Supreme Court
    declined to review Bridges’s discretionary appeal. State v. Bridges, 
    128 Ohio St. 3d 1503
    , 2011-Ohio-2420, 
    947 N.E.2d 685
    . Thus, our holding in Bridges II remains the
    law of the case.     State v. Davis, 
    139 Ohio St. 3d 122
    , 2014-Ohio-1615, 
    9 N.E.3d 1031
    , ¶
    27 (the decision of a reviewing court in a case remains the law of that case on the legal
    questions involved for all subsequent proceedings in the case at both the trial and
    reviewing levels).
    {¶15} Based on the foregoing analysis, Bridges’s sole assignment of error is
    overruled.
    {¶16} Judgment affirmed.
    It is ordered that appellee recover from appellant costs herein taxed.
    The court finds there were reasonable grounds for this appeal.
    It is ordered that a special mandate issue out of this court directing the common
    pleas court to carry this judgment into execution. Case remanded to the trial court for
    execution of sentence.
    A certified copy of this entry shall constitute the mandate pursuant to Rule 27 of
    the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    FRANK D. CELEBREZZE, JR., JUDGE
    EILEEN T. GALLAGHER, P.J., and
    SEAN C. GALLAGHER, J., CONCUR
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 104723

Citation Numbers: 2017 Ohio 539

Judges: Celebrezze

Filed Date: 2/16/2017

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/16/2017