Mary Williams, Former Wife v. Ronald H. Sapp, Former Husband , 255 So. 3d 912 ( 2018 )


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  •           FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
    STATE OF FLORIDA
    _____________________________
    No. 1D17-1490
    _____________________________
    MARY WILLIAMS, Former Wife,
    Appellant,
    v.
    RONALD H. SAPP, Former
    Husband,
    Appellee.
    ___________________________
    On appeal from the Circuit Court for Baker County.
    Stanley H. Griffis, III, Judge.
    May 31, 2018
    M.K. THOMAS, J.
    Appellant, the former wife, appeals a Consent Final Judgment
    for Dissolution of Marriage and the denial of her Motion for
    Rehearing. She asserts reversible error claiming the trial court,
    through its sua sponte modification of the parties’ mediation
    settlement agreement without providing her notice and the
    opportunity to be heard, violated her due process rights. We agree
    and reverse and remand for further proceedings.
    Following years of protracted litigation in this family law
    matter, the parties attended court-ordered mediation on January
    11, 2017. After mediating for nine hours, the parties reached a
    successful resolution of all issues and generated a sixteen-page
    document setting forth the negotiated terms, including, but not
    limited to, time-sharing, parental responsibility, child support,
    asset distribution, insurance, tax exemptions, and attorney’s fees
    and costs. The parties meticulously initialed and executed all
    pages of the agreement. The court-appointed mediator and parties
    filed the executed settlement agreement, entitled “Consent Final
    Judgment for Dissolution of Marriage,” with the trial court. The
    mediator also filed a notice advising the trial court of an agreement
    reached for “total resolution.”
    The trial court had previously scheduled and noticed a “[f]ive-
    minute” status conference to occur the day after mediation.
    Following mediation and before the status conference, the former
    wife filed a waiver in which she: (1) stated that the parties had
    reached a complete resolution and requested the trial court to
    enter a final order in conformance with the Consent Final
    Judgment as executed by the parties the previous day; (2)
    “waive[d] notice of any and all hearings, waive[d] the formal
    setting of this cause for final hearing, and waive[d] the necessity
    of the Court entering an order Setting the Cause for Trial”; and (3)
    requested to be provided “Notice of the Final Hearing.”
    Neither the former wife nor her attorney attended the status
    conference. Counsel for the former husband appeared and
    purportedly presented the executed mediation agreement to the
    trial court (in the form of a Consent Final Judgment for
    Dissolution of Marriage) and requested approval. Scheduled as a
    status conference, the event was not recorded. The trial judge did
    not approve the executed settlement agreement reached at
    mediation, but instead initiated a sua sponte reworking of the
    agreement – striking through provisions, inserting handwritten
    amendments, and initialing the edits. The modifications directly
    contradicted the parties’ mediation agreement by granting shared
    parental responsibility, rather than sole parental responsibility to
    the former wife, and providing the former husband a tax
    exemption for one of the minor children, instead of tax exemptions
    to the former wife for both children. The trial court then entered
    the final order approving its altered version of the Consent Final
    Judgment.
    Upon receipt of the Final Judgment and realization that it no
    longer reflected the terms negotiated and memorialized by the
    2
    parties at mediation, the former wife timely filed a Motion for
    Rehearing. She asserted the trial court erred in modifying the
    agreement without notice and consent of the parties and requested
    a hearing on the matter. The trial court denied the motion on the
    sole basis that “[t]he wife and counsel failed to attend the trial.”
    On appeal, the former wife claims reversible error as a result
    of the trial court’s sua sponte modification of the Consent Final
    Judgment without notice and an opportunity to be heard, a
    violation of procedural due process. Furthermore, she argues the
    trial court abused its discretion by denying her Motion for
    Rehearing on the basis that she failed to attend trial when no trial
    had been set or noticed for that day. Both arguments are
    meritorious.
    Appellate courts review possible due process violations in
    family law cases de novo. Dep’t of Revenue ex rel. Thorman v.
    Holley, 
    86 So. 3d 1199
    , 1204 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012). Denials of
    motions for rehearing are reviewed for abuse of discretion.
    Trammell v. Ward, 
    667 So. 2d 223
    , 226 (Fla. 1st DCA 1995).
    Upon the trial court’s determination that it would not approve
    (without acquisition or contemplation of additional evidence) the
    settlement agreement as presented by the parties, the trial court
    should have terminated the status conference and noticed the
    cause for an evidentiary hearing. “Blindsiding a party by
    announcing on the day of the hearing that the court will entertain
    evidence at a hearing not noticed as an evidentiary hearing is the
    epitome of a due process violation.” Messing v. Nieradka, 
    230 So. 3d
    962, (Fla. 2d DCA 2017) (citing Jackson v. Leon Cty. Elections
    Canvassing Bd., 
    204 So. 3d 571
    , 578 (Fla. 1st DCA 2016)). “‘[T]he
    opportunity to be heard at an evidentiary hearing requires time to
    secure the attendance of witnesses and to prepare for the
    presentation of evidence and argument.’” 
    Jackson, 204 So. 3d at 578
    (quoting Crepage v. City of Lauderhill, 
    774 So. 2d 61
    , 65 (Fla.
    4th DCA 2000)). Here, the trial court not only failed to provide the
    former wife with requisite notice of an evidentiary hearing, but
    then proceeded, in her absence, to perform an unsolicited redraft
    of the executed mediation settlement agreement.
    3
    In asserting the trial court erred by not honoring the
    mediation agreement of the parties, the former wife does not
    contest the general rule in Florida that settlement provisions
    concerning child support, custody, and visitation must be reviewed
    and approved by the trial court as being in the best interest of the
    children. Griffith v. Griffith, 
    860 So. 2d 1069
    , 1071 (Fla. 1st DCA
    2003) (citing Feliciano v. Feliciano, 
    674 So. 2d 937
    (Fla. 4th DCA
    1996)). Instead, she correctly claims such discretion does not
    provide a trial judge with “virtually free hand to set aside the
    settlement agreement because the parties had minor children . . .”
    
    Id. at 1073.
    We do not address the sufficiency of evidence to support the
    trial court’s rejection and modification of the mediation agreement;
    we note only that the rejection and sua sponte modification by the
    trial court of the parties’ mediation agreement in this case should
    not have occurred in the absence of the former wife being given
    appropriate notice and an opportunity to be heard at a properly
    scheduled evidentiary hearing. The trial court’s denial of the
    former wife’s request for rehearing, on the basis she “failed to
    attend” a trial that was never scheduled or noticed, constitutes an
    abuse of discretion.
    On remand, the trial court must either approve the marital
    settlement agreement as negotiated by the parties or, if unable or
    unwilling to do so, conduct a properly noticed evidentiary hearing.
    The remaining claims of Appellant are hereby denied without
    further comment.
    For the aforementioned reasons, the Consent Final Judgment
    for Dissolution of Marriage is reversed, and the cause remanded to
    the trial court for further action as described herein.
    JAY and WINSOR, JJ., concur.
    _____________________________
    Not final until disposition of any timely and
    authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
    9.331.
    _____________________________
    4
    Michael M. Giel of Giel Family Law, P.A., Jacksonville, for
    Appellant.
    Ronald H. Sapp, pro se, Appellee.
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 17-1490

Citation Numbers: 255 So. 3d 912

Filed Date: 5/31/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021