State ex rel. McBroom v. Indus. Comm. , 2018 Ohio 307 ( 2018 )


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  • [Cite as State ex rel. McBroom v. Indus. Comm., 
    2018-Ohio-307
    .]
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    The State ex rel. Gracie McBroom,                     :
    Relator,                              :
    v.                                                    :              No. 17AP-168
    Industrial Commission of Ohio,                        :           (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    Respondent.                           :
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Rendered on January 25, 2018
    Gracie McBroom, pro se.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis,
    for respondent.
    IN MANDAMUS
    ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    KLATT, J.
    {¶ 1} Relator, Gracie McBroom, sister of the deceased workers' compensation
    claimant, Joseph W. Allen, commenced this original action in mandamus seeking an
    order compelling respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"), to hold a
    hearing and determine whether she is entitled to death benefits arising from the
    claimant's workers' compensation claim. Thereafter, relator filed a motion for summary
    judgment. The commission filed a response to relator's motion, which relator seeks to
    have stricken.
    {¶ 2} Pursuant to Civ.R. 53 and Loc.R. 13(M) of the Tenth District Court of
    Appeals, we referred this matter to a magistrate who issued a decision, including findings
    No. 17AP-168                                                                               2
    of fact and conclusions of law, which is appended hereto. The magistrate found that
    summary judgment should be granted in relator's favor. Essentially, the magistrate
    determined that relator and the commission are in agreement that relator did not receive
    the hearing to which she is entitled. In addition, the parties agree that relator is entitled
    to a hearing on her request for death benefits.          Accordingly, the magistrate has
    recommended that we grant relator's motion for summary judgment. The magistrate has
    also recommended that we deny relator's motion to strike the commission's response to
    her motion for summary judgment.
    {¶ 3} No party has filed objections to the magistrate's decision.
    {¶ 4} Finding no error of law or other defect on the face of the magistrate's
    decision, we adopt the decision as our own, including the findings of fact and conclusions
    of law contained therein. In accordance with the magistrate's decision, we deny relator's
    motion to strike but grant her motion for summary judgment and issue a writ of
    mandamus ordering the commission to vacate those orders which erroneously refused to
    consider relator's request for death benefits and to hold a hearing to adjudicate her
    entitlement to death benefits.
    Motion to strike denied;
    motion for summary judgment granted;
    writ of mandamus granted.
    TYACK and BRUNNER, JJ., concur.
    No. 17AP-168                                                                               3
    APPENDIX
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
    TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
    The State ex rel. Gracie McBroom,             :
    Relator,                       :
    v.                                            :                    No. 17AP-168
    Industrial Commission of Ohio,                :               (REGULAR CALENDAR)
    Respondent.                    :
    MAGISTRATE'S DECISION
    Rendered on August 29, 2017
    Gracie McBroom, pro se.
    Michael DeWine, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Alatis,
    for respondent.
    IN MANDAMUS
    ON MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
    {¶ 5} Relator, Gracie McBroom, sister of the deceased workers' compensation
    claimant, Joseph W. Allen ("Allen"), filed this original action requesting this court issue a
    writ of mandamus ordering respondent, Industrial Commission of Ohio ("commission"),
    to hold a hearing and determine whether she is entitled to death benefits arising from
    Allen's workers' compensation claim.
    Findings of Fact:
    {¶ 6} 1. On or about March 13, 1973 Allen sustained a work-related injury for
    which he was awarded compensation benefits.
    {¶ 7} 2. At some point in time Allen died.
    No. 17AP-168                                                                                4
    {¶ 8} 3. Relator filed a motion seeking death benefits which may have arisen
    from Allen's workers' compensation claim.
    {¶ 9} 4. Apparently, a hearing was held at which time a district hearing officer
    denied relator a death allowance.
    {¶ 10} 5. Thereafter, relator asserted that she did not receive a copy of the order
    and, as a result, did not file an appeal.
    {¶ 11} 6. It is unclear exactly what transpired thereafter; however, it appears that
    although the commission determined that relator did not receive notice, no hearing was
    ever held on her request for a death allowance.
    {¶ 12} 7. On March 6, 2017, relator filed this mandamus action asking this court to
    order the commission to find that she is entitled to death benefits or, in the alternative, to
    order the commission to hold a hearing on the matter.
    {¶ 13} 8. On May 23, 2017, the magistrate held a conference with the parties to
    discuss their positions and attempt to resolve the case.
    {¶ 14} 9. During the course of that conference, the parties ultimately agreed that
    relator should have a hearing on her motion. The parties agreed to submit a joint
    stipulation to return the matter to the commission to hold a hearing to determine whether
    relator is entitled to death benefits.
    {¶ 15} 10. Pursuant to those discussions, the assistant attorney general drafted a
    stipulation of dismissal, stating:
    In accordance with Civ.R. 41(A)(1)(b), the parties hereby
    stipulate that this action is dismissed with prejudice after
    advising, and to allow, pro se movant, Gracie McBroom, to
    consider retaining legal counsel in this matter. Further, by
    agreement of the parties, the Industrial Commission of Ohio
    will issue the following order in Claim Number 73-34234:
    It is hereby ordered that the Staff Hearing Officer order,
    issued 12/13/2016, findings mailed 12/16/2016, and the
    order of the Ohio Industrial Commission, findings mailed
    02/25/2017, which adjudicated the issue of death allowance,
    are vacated.
    Previously, by order mailed on 02/02/2017, a Staff Hearing
    Officer vacated the District Hearing Officer order, issued
    03/24/2016, findings mailed 03/30/2016, which denied Ms.
    No. 17AP-168                                                                               5
    McBroom's request for death benefits. In that order, the Staff
    Hearing Officer granted Ms. McBroom relief pursuant to
    R.C. 4123.522 because the Ohio Industrial Commission
    failed to provide Ms. McBroom notice of the 03/24/2016
    District Hearing Officer hearing. However, the Staff Hearing
    Officer did not vacate the orders noted above, which were
    issued in response to Ms. McBroom's appeals from the
    District Hearing Officer and Staff Hearing Officer orders
    denying death benefits. To adjudicate the issue of death
    allowance properly, the Industrial Commission now vacates
    the Staff Hearing Officer order, issued 12/13/2016, findings
    mailed 12/16/2016, and the order of the Ohio Industrial
    Commission, findings mailed 02/25/2017.
    It is further ordered that a new hearing before a District
    Hearing Officer be scheduled to adjudicate Ms. McBroom's
    application for death allowance, filed 12/10/2015. The
    hearing officer is directed to adjudicate whether Decedent's
    death was causally related to the allowed conditions in this
    claim and whether Ms. McBroom was dependent on
    Decedent at the time of his death.
    The District Hearing Officer's order will be subject to the
    usual rights of administrative appeal as provided in R.C.
    4123.511.
    {¶ 16} 11. Although the stipulation of dismissal specifically provides that the
    commission will hold a hearing to adjudicate whether Allen's death was causally related to
    the allowed conditions in his claim and whether relator was dependent on Allen at the
    time of his death, relator refused to sign that document.
    {¶ 17} 12. Relator telephoned the magistrate to explain her refusal to sign the
    stipulation. Relator indicated that she objected to the specificity contained within that
    stipulation. Specifically, relator objected to the identification of all the orders which the
    commission should be ordered to vacate before holding the hearing. In relator's opinion,
    the commission should not have to be told what to do in that much detail.
    {¶ 18} 13. Instead of attempting to prepare a new stipulation of dismissal, relator
    filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings or, in the alternative, motion for summary
    judgment on June 28, 2017.
    {¶ 19} 14. The magistrate issued a notice of summary judgment which was sent to
    the parties.
    No. 17AP-168                                                                                6
    {¶ 20} 15. Because the assistant attorney general had been out of town on vacation,
    he contacted relator and asked for permission to seek an extension of time to respond to
    her motion. Relator verbally agreed to the extension.
    {¶ 21} 16. Respondent requested and was granted an extension of time to reply to
    relator's motion.
    {¶ 22} 17. On July 17, 2017, relator filed a letter with the magistrate objecting to
    respondent's request for an extension of time to reply to her motion. Although relator
    acknowledges that she agreed respondent could have an extension of time and that he was
    not asking for more time than they had discussed, she asserted that counsel never
    properly served her with that request for an extension. Based on her argument that
    respondent's request for an extension was invalid, it appears that relator wants this court
    to strike respondent's response to her motion.
    {¶ 23} 18. On July 19, 2017, counsel for the commission filed its response again
    acknowledging that it is not opposed to the relief requested, but asserting that relator's
    motion is vague and unclear. Specifically, in arguing that relator's motion should be
    denied, respondent stated:
    As the parties discussed at the Court's pre-trial conference
    on May 23, 2017, the commission has recently expressed that
    it is not opposed to the relief requested in McBroom's initial
    complaint inasmuch as the commission is willing to vacate
    the necessary orders denying McBroom a hearing and to
    conduct a hearing to determine McBroom's entitlement to
    death benefits. However, McBroom's recent motions are
    vague and unclear; and they lack the factual and legal
    substance necessary for her to prevail on same.
    {¶ 24} 19. The matter is currently before the magistrate on relator's purported
    motion to strike respondent's response to her motion for summary judgment and relator's
    motion for summary judgment.
    Conclusions of Law:
    {¶ 25} For the reasons that follow, and in accordance with the parties' agreement
    as to the procedural facts and relief warranted, it is this magistrate's decision that this
    court should grant relator summary judgment.
    {¶ 26} The Supreme Court of Ohio has set forth three requirements which must be
    met in establishing a right to a writ of mandamus: (1) that relator has a clear legal right to
    No. 17AP-168                                                                                7
    the relief prayed for; (2) that respondent is under a clear legal duty to perform the act
    requested; and (3) that relator has no plain and adequate remedy in the ordinary course
    of the law. State ex rel. Berger v. McMonagle, 
    6 Ohio St.3d 28
     (1983).
    {¶ 27} A motion for summary judgment requires the moving party to set forth the
    legal and factual basis supporting the motion. To do so, the moving party must identify
    portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.
    Dresher v. Burt, 
    75 Ohio St.3d 280
     (1996). Accordingly, any party moving for summary
    judgment must satisfy a three-prong inquiry showing: (1) that there is no genuine issue as
    to any material facts; (2) that the parties are entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and
    (3) that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, which conclusion is adverse to
    the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made. Harless v. Willis
    Day Warehousing Co., 
    54 Ohio St.2d 64
     (1978).
    {¶ 28} As noted in the findings of fact, the parties agree that relator did not receive
    the hearing to which she was entitled. During the conference with the magistrate, the
    parties specifically agreed that they would enter into a stipulation of dismissal whereby
    the commission's prior orders would have no force and effect and a hearing would be held
    regarding relator's request for death benefits. Although the assistant attorney general
    drafted a stipulation of dismissal which did, in fact, provide the result agreed to by the
    parties, relator objected to some of the language in that order and, as a result, refused to
    sign it.   However, the fact remains that there are no material issues of fact to be
    determined in this mandamus action and the parties agree that relator should have the
    hearing which she requests.
    {¶ 29} Based on the foregoing, it is this magistrate's decision that this court should
    deny relator's purported motion to strike respondent's response and grant summary
    judgment in favor of relator and issue a writ of mandamus ordering the commission to
    vacate those orders which erroneously refused to consider relator's request for death
    benefits and hold a hearing to adjudicate her entitlement to death benefits.
    /S/ MAGISTRATE
    STEPHANIE BISCA
    No. 17AP-168                                                                       8
    NOTICE TO THE PARTIES
    Civ.R. 53(D)(3)(a)(iii) provides that a party shall not assign as
    error on appeal the court's adoption of any factual finding or
    legal conclusion, whether or not specifically designated as a
    finding of fact or conclusion of law under Civ.R.
    53(D)(3)(a)(ii), unless the party timely and specifically objects
    to that factual finding or legal conclusion as required by Civ.R.
    53(D)(3)(b).
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 16AP-168

Citation Numbers: 2018 Ohio 307

Judges: Klatt

Filed Date: 1/25/2018

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/25/2018