Welton v. State, Dept. of Corrections ( 2014 )


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  •      Notice: This opinion is subject to correction before publication in the P ACIFIC R EPORTER .
    Readers are requested to bring errors to the attention of the Clerk of the Appellate Courts,
    303 K Street, Anchorage, Alaska 99501, phone (907) 264-0608, fax (907) 264-0878, email
    corrections@appellate.courts.state.ak.us.
    THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ALASKA
    SUZETTE WELTON,             )
    ) Supreme Court Nos. S-14822/14827/14924
    Appellant,    )
    )   Superior Court Nos. 3AN-12-06735 CI,
    v.	                     )   3AN-12-04547 CI, and 3AN-12-06727 CI
    )
    )   OPINION
    STATE OF ALASKA,            )
    DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIO NS, )
    )     No. 6861 – January 3, 2014
    Appellee.     )
    )
    Appeal in File No. S-14822 from the Superior Court of the
    State of Alaska, Third Judicial District, Anchorage, Mark
    Rindner, Judge. Appeal in File No. S-14827 from the
    Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
    Eric A. Aarseth, Judge. Appeal in File No. S-14924 from the
    Superior Court of the State of Alaska, Third Judicial District,
    Anchorage, Catherine M. Easter, Judge.
    Appearances:    Suzette Welton, pro se, Eagle River,
    Appellant. Matthias Cicotte, Assistant Attorney General, and
    Michael C. Geraghty, Attorney General, Juneau, for
    Appellee.
    Before: Fabe, Chief Justice, Winfree, Stowers, Maassen, and
    Bolger, Justices.
    BOLGER, Justice.
    I.     INTRODUCTION
    A Hiland Mountain Correctional Center (Hiland) inmate, Doctor Suzette
    Welton, has filed three appeals to this court arguing that the dismissal of her
    administrative appeals for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was error. In all three cases,
    Welton appealed to the superior court from decisions in Department of Corrections
    (DOC) grievance proceedings.         In order to qualify for the administrative appeal
    procedure, Welton had to show that (1) she was alleging a violation of her constitutional
    rights, and that (2) the proceeding was adjudicative in nature and (3) produced a record
    capable of appellate review.1 We agree with the superior courts that the underlying DOC
    grievance proceedings are not adjudicative proceedings, and they do not produce a
    record that is capable of appellate review.
    II.    FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS
    A.     Case 14827
    Welton legally changed her name in December 2008 from “Suzette Mishell
    Welton” to “Doctor Suzette Mishell Welton” and subsequently “requested that the DOC
    change[] all her documentation and communication to reflect the addition of Doctor.”
    In November 2011, Welton filed a Prisoner Grievance regarding the name correction
    issue, to which it appears she received no response. She next filed a grievance appeal,
    which was denied. Welton appealed to the superior court in December 2011, which
    dismissed her case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the grounds that the DOC
    grievance procedure was not sufficiently adjudicatory and the record produced by that
    procedure was not susceptible of review in an administrative appeal.
    1
    Brandon v. State, Dep’t of Corr., 
    938 P.2d 1029
    , 1032 (Alaska 1997)
    (citation omitted).
    -2-                                      6861
    B.     Case 14924
    Welton filed a Prisoner Grievance in September 2011, because she was not
    allowed to use a CD-ROM on DOC computers for purposes of a correspondence course.
    When the grievance was unsuccessful, Welton filed a grievance appeal. In February
    2012, Hiland denied the appeal. Welton appealed to the superior court in March 2012.
    The superior court dismissed Welton’s case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction,
    finding that the DOC “grievance policy is not sufficiently adjudicative.”
    C.    Case 14822
    Welton bought communion bread from an external vendor in October 2011.
    She filed a grievance with Hiland in December 2011, alleging that prison officials were
    not allowing her access to it. Hiland officials denied her grievance, as well as her
    grievance appeal.
    In April 2012, Welton filed an administrative appeal with the superior court
    seeking review of the communion bread grievance. The trial court dismissed her appeal
    for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, finding that DOC’s policy governing grievances
    “is not sufficiently adjudicative,” thus failing to meet the Brandon test.
    III.   STANDARD OF REVIEW
    “This appeal requires an interpretation of AS 22.10.020(d), which defines
    the superior court’s appellate jurisdiction. On questions of statutory interpretation this
    court exercises its independent judgment.”2
    IV.    DISCUSSION
    Superior court appellate jurisdiction is governed by AS 22.10.020(d), which
    states that “[t]he superior court has jurisdiction in all matters appealed to it from a[n] . . .
    administrative agency when appeal is provided by law . . . .” There is no statutory
    2
    Owen v. Matsumoto, 
    859 P.2d 1308
    , 1309 (Alaska 1993) (citation omitted).
    -3-                                         6861
    provision for an appeal from a DOC administrative decision, so AS 22.10.020(d) does
    not confer subject matter jurisdiction on the superior court to review appeals from DOC
    decisions.3 However, an exception to that rule has been created by this court’s decisions
    in McGinnis v. Stevens,4 Department of Corrections v. Kraus,5 and Owen v. Matsumoto.6
    Under the exception, an Alaska inmate has a right to judicial review of
    DOC administrative decisions “when issues of constitutional magnitude are raised.” 7 In
    Brandon, we stated the test for when the exception is applicable: “an administrative
    appeal [from a DOC determination] is appropriate where there is an alleged violation of
    fundamental constitutional rights in an adjudicative proceeding producing a record
    capable of review.”8 Here, as noted above, the three superior courts dismissed each of
    Welton’s cases for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. All three courts applied the
    Brandon three-part test and found either or both of the latter two prongs not satisfied.
    We have previously declined direct appellate review of DOC grievance
    proceedings in cases that did not involve issues of constitutional magnitude.9 In this
    case, however, we assume without deciding that all three of Welton’s appeals allege
    violations of her fundamental constitutional rights and that the first Brandon prong is
    3
    
    Brandon, 938 P.2d at 1031
    .
    4
    
    543 P.2d 1221
    (Alaska 1975).
    5
    
    759 P.2d 539
    (Alaska 1988).
    6
    
    859 P.2d 1308
    (Alaska 1993).
    7
    
    Brandon, 938 P.2d at 1031
    (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    8
    
    Id. at 1032
    (citation omitted).
    9
    See Hays v. State, 
    830 P.2d 783
    , 785 (Alaska 1992); Hertz v. Carothers,
    
    784 P.2d 659
    , 660 (Alaska 1990).
    -4-                                     6861
    satisfied. We must now decide whether the DOC grievance procedure is an adjudicatory
    proceeding producing a record sufficient for judicial review.
    The DOC argues that its prisoner grievance policy10 does not implement an
    adjudicative proceeding producing a record capable of review. In Brandon, we stated:
    The essential elements of adjudication include adequate
    notice to persons to be bound by the adjudication, the parties’
    rights to present and rebut evidence and argument, a
    formulation of issues of law and fact in terms of specific
    parties and specific transactions, a rule of finality specifying
    the point in the proceeding when presentations end and a
    final decision is rendered, and any other procedural elements
    necessary for a conclusive determination of the matter in
    question.[11]
    The DOC correctly notes that, here, there was no hearing or similar proceeding at which
    the parties could “present and rebut evidence and argument.”12 Neither party had the
    opportunity to examine witnesses, and the grievance process did not involve the
    “formulation of issues of law and fact.”13 There was no burden of proof to be met nor
    legal elements to be proven. The grievance procedures provide for nothing more than
    a paper record of Hiland’s “efforts to resolve issues at the lowest possible level.”14
    10
    See State of Alaska, Dep’t of Corrections, Policies and Procedures 808.03
    (2006), available at http://www.correct.state.ak.us/corrections/pnp/pdf/808.03.pdf.
    
    11 938 P.2d at 1032-33
    (quoting Johnson v. Alaska State Dep’t of Fish &
    Game, 
    836 P.2d 896
    , 908 n.17 (Alaska 1991)).
    12
    
    Id. 13 Id.
    14
    Policies and Procedures 808.03 at 1.
    -5-                                      6861
    Indeed, this court has already held that where, as here, there is only a paper
    record of the case, the Kraus/McGinnis/Owen exception does not apply.15 In Owen, a
    prisoner disputed his sentence calculation in a letter, and when he received an
    unsatisfactory response, he appealed to the superior court.16 We affirmed the superior
    court’s decision to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that the
    latter two Brandon prongs were not satisfied.17 The DOC grievance proceedings in this
    case are similar to the DOC sentence calculations we considered in Owen; the decision
    process produces only a paper record.
    In McGinnis v. Stevens, we stressed that appellate review of a DOC
    disciplinary proceeding was appropriate because there was a tape-recorded hearing to
    review.18 We observed that “[a] verbatim record of the proceedings will furnish a more
    complete and accurate source of information than” a written record would.19 Later, in
    Kraus, we reasoned that such “[a] review on the record, as distinct from the de novo
    reception of evidence, is a characteristic of appeals.”20      Thus the existence of a
    comprehensive, reliable record facilitates an administrative appeal.
    Here, the limited paper record produced by the DOC’s informal grievance
    process is inadequate for appellate review, and the grievance process itself lacks several
    15
    See Owen v. Matsumoto, 
    859 P.2d 1308
    , 1308-10 (Alaska 1993).
    16
    
    Id. at 1308.
    17
    
    Id. at 1310.
    18
    
    543 P.2d 1221
    , 1236 (Alaska 1975); see also Dep’t of Corr. v. Kraus, 
    759 P.2d 539
    , 540 (Alaska 1988).
    19
    
    McGinnis, 543 P.2d at 1236
    .
    
    20 759 P.2d at 540
    (citations omitted).
    -6-                                       6861
    important hallmarks of an adjudication. Thus, an administrative appeal will provide
    inadequate process for Welton’s claims.
    We do not intend this ruling to foreclose Welton from pursuing her claims.
    We assume that she may file an independent civil action requesting the same relief she
    requests in these cases. At oral argument, counsel for the State represented that the State
    will not assert that such an action is barred by Welton’s failure to exhaust her
    administrative remedies. In a civil action, both parties will have the right to a full and
    fair hearing on these claims. Our ruling simply recognizes that the present record is
    inadequate to support meaningful appellate review.
    V.     CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, we AFFIRM the superior court decisions
    dismissing Welton’s administrative appeals from DOC grievance proceedings.
    -7-                                       6861