Third District Court of Appeal
State of Florida
Opinion filed February 2, 2022.
Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
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No. 3D21-1769
Lower Tribunal No. F18-22263
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Charles A. Manetta, Sr.,
Appellant,
vs.
The State of Florida,
Appellee.
An Appeal under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.141(b)(2) from
the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Michelle Delancy, Judge.
Charles A. Manetta, Sr., in proper person.
Ashley Moody, Attorney General, and David Llanes, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Before LINDSEY, GORDO, and BOKOR, JJ.
LINDSEY, J.
Charles A. Manetta Sr. appeals summary denial of his pro se rule 3.850
motion for postconviction relief. We affirm.
In 2009, Manetta was convicted of one count of lewd and lascivious
molestation of a child under the age of twelve and two counts of lewd and
lascivious molestation of a child between twelve and sixteen years of age
under section 800.04, Florida Statutes (2021). 1 He was sentenced to 136.5
months in prison followed by fifteen years sexual offender probation. Also in
2009, the trial court entered an order designating Manetta as a sexual
offender and requiring him to register as a sexual offender forty-eight hours
following his release from prison. See § 943.0435, Florida Statutes (2021).
After his release from prison, Manetta was arrested for failing to timely
register as a sexual offender. If found guilty, he would also have been found
guilty of violating his probation. As part of a negotiated plea, Manetta pled
guilty to both the registration charge and the probation violation in exchange
for six months community control running concurrently with his fifteen-year
probation.
1
Lower Tribunal No. F05-31805. On direct appeal, this Court vacated the
judgment and sentence as to one of the counts of lewd and lascivious
molestation of a child between twelve and sixteen years of age. Manetta v.
State,
81 So. 3d 560 (Fla. 3d DCA 2012).
2
Then in February 2021 Manetta filed a postconviction motion
challenging his conviction for failing to register as a sexual offender. He
claimed his counsel was ineffective for failing to file a motion to dismiss the
charge, arguing that he was not statutorily required to register until after he
completed his fifteen years of probation. The trial court summarily denied
Manetta’s motion because (1) its 2009 order designated him as a sexual
offender and required that he register as such forty-eight hours following his
release from prison; and (2) section 943.0435(h) also required he register
forty-eight hours following his release from prison.
Pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.850(f)(5):
If the motion is legally sufficient but all grounds in the motion can
be conclusively resolved either as a matter of law or by reliance
upon the records in the case, the motion shall be denied without
a hearing by the entry of a final order. If the denial is based on
the records in the case, a copy of that portion of the files and
records that conclusively shows that the defendant is entitled to
no relief shall be attached to the final order.
We agree with the trial court that Manetta’s motion is conclusively
resolved both as a matter of law and on the attached files and records.
Manetta’s trial counsel cannot be deemed ineffective for failing to raise
meritless claims. See Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668 (1986)
(articulating the two-prong test for a defendant to succeed on a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel).
3
Affirmed.
4
