United States v. Dennis Mobley , 663 F. App'x 488 ( 2016 )


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  •                  United States Court of Appeals
    For the Eighth Circuit
    ___________________________
    No. 15-3711
    ___________________________
    United States of America
    lllllllllllllllllllll Plaintiff - Appellee
    v.
    Dennis Augustus Keith Mobley
    lllllllllllllllllllll Defendant - Appellant
    ____________
    Appeal from United States District Court
    for the District of Minnesota - St. Paul
    ____________
    Submitted: October 17, 2016
    Filed: October 28, 2016
    [Unpublished]
    ____________
    Before RILEY, Chief Judge, WOLLMAN and BENTON, Circuit Judges.
    ____________
    PER CURIAM.
    Dennis Augustus Keith Mobley pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in
    possession of a firearm, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1) and 924(a)(2). The
    district court1 sentenced him to 60 months’ imprisonment. Mobley appeals, arguing
    that the district court failed to adequately explain its reasons for imposing an upward
    departure. We affirm.
    In early 2014, a joint task force began investigating a gang known as the 10z
    gang, which had been involved in illegal firearms possession and other crimes in
    Minneapolis, Minnesota, and was engaged in a violent feud with a rival gang. On
    March 6, 2015, during the course of the investigation, officers received information
    that Mobley was in possession of a firearm. At the time, Mobley was a felon
    prohibited from possessing firearms and was awaiting sentencing on a state felony
    conviction for aiding an offender. Specifically, Mobley had driven the get-away
    vehicle for an individual who had fired six rounds into two vehicles occupied by both
    adults and children and who later pleaded guilty to attempted murder. Officers found
    five individually wrapped bags of cocaine in the get-away vehicle.
    On March 6, officers located Mobley while he was driving a vehicle. The
    officers initiated a traffic stop, pursued Mobley on foot when he fled the vehicle, and
    eventually apprehended him. Mobley told the officers that gang members were upset
    with him for a shooting incident. The officers found in Mobley’s vehicle a loaded .40
    caliber, semiautomatic pistol with a round in the chamber and rounds in the magazine.
    Mobley’s presentence report (PSR) set forth his lengthy criminal history, which
    included several juvenile adjudications, numerous misdemeanors, and the following
    four adult felony convictions: first-degree property damage, being a prohibited person
    in possession of a firearm, third-degree drug possession, and the aiding-an-offender
    offense set forth above. The first offense occurred in December 2010, when Mobley
    pointed a gun at his brother (whose daughter was nearby) and broke the side windows
    1
    The Honorable Joan N. Ericksen, United States District Judge for the District
    of Minnesota.
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    of his brother’s two cars. The second offense occurred a few months later. An officer
    tried to initiate a traffic stop after Mobley drove through a red light. Mobley sped
    away and later fled on foot, discarding a loaded .25 caliber handgun as he ran. After
    being apprehended, Mobley admitted that he was a member of the 10z gang and said
    that he was being chased by members of a rival gang. While the first two cases were
    pending, Mobley was arrested for possession of cocaine and ecstasy. Mobley pleaded
    guilty to the three felonies and served concurrent sentences. He was released from
    prison in December 2013, following which he committed the aiding-an-offender
    offense in August 2014.
    The PSR determined that Mobley’s total offense level was 12, that his criminal
    history category was VI, and that his advisory sentencing range under the U.S.
    Sentencing Guidelines Manual (U.S.S.G. or Guidelines) was 30 to 37 months’
    imprisonment. The government’s sentencing memorandum argued that a criminal
    history category of VI substantially under-represented Mobley’s criminal history,
    primarily because it failed to take into account the violent and dangerous nature of
    Mobley’s offense conduct for aiding an offender. The government requested an
    upward departure under U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a), suggesting that Mobley’s offense level
    be increased by 5 and that the district court impose a sentence at the top of the
    adjusted advisory Guidelines range of 51 to 63 months’ imprisonment. Alternatively,
    the government argued that the district court should vary upward to a 63-month
    sentence.
    Before imposing sentence, the district court discussed Mobley’s extensive
    criminal history, noting that “[t]he basic themes are guns . . . and drugs.” The district
    court did not state that it was applying an upward departure under U.S.S.G.
    § 4A1.3(a), but indicated that a sentence within the advisory Guidelines range would
    be “a real understatement . . . of what the right sentence is here” and thereafter
    imposed a 60-month sentence. The district court indicated in its post-sentencing
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    statement of reasons that it had departed from the advisory Guidelines range on the
    basis of § 4A1.3(a), criminal history inadequacy.
    Mobley argues that the district court failed to explain its reasons for imposing
    an upward departure.2 Because Mobley did not object to the district court’s
    explanation, we review for plain error. See United States v. Walking Eagle, 
    553 F.3d 654
    , 657 (8th Cir. 2009) (reviewing the adequacy of a district court’s explanation of
    its reasons for imposing an upward departure for plain error because defendant had
    failed to object and thus “the district court had no opportunity to clarify its comments
    or to correct any potential error in the first instance” (quoting United States v.
    M.R.M., 
    513 F.3d 866
    , 870 (8th Cir. 2008))).
    Guidelines § 4A1.3(a)(1) permits an upward departure “[i]f reliable information
    indicates that the defendant’s criminal history category substantially under-represents
    the seriousness of [his] criminal history or the likelihood that [he] will commit other
    crimes.” We have said that when a district court imposes an upward departure under
    § 4A1.3(a)(1), it “first must proceed along the criminal history axis of the sentencing
    matrix, comparing the defendant’s criminal history with the criminal histories of other
    offenders in each higher category.” United States v. Johnson, 
    648 F.3d 940
    , 943 (8th
    Cir. 2011) (quoting Walking 
    Eagle, 553 F.3d at 657
    ). In cases like this one, in which
    the defendant’s criminal history places him in category VI, a district court may
    nevertheless impose an upward departure under § 4A1.3(a) if a departure is warranted
    by the extent and nature of the defendant’s criminal history. See U.S.S.G.
    § 4A1.3(a)(4)(B). In such cases, “the court should structure the departure by moving
    incrementally down the sentencing table to the next higher offense level in Criminal
    2
    Mobley also argued that the district court improperly relied on his criminal
    history when it varied above the advisory Guidelines range and that his sentence is
    substantively unreasonable because the district court gave significant weight to the
    improper factor of Mobley’s criminal history. The district court applied an upward
    departure based on U.S.S.G. § 4A1.3(a), however; it did not impose a variance.
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    History Category VI until it finds a guideline range appropriate to the case.” 
    Id. Although the
    procedure set forth in our case law and the Guidelines might suggest
    otherwise, “[t]his process does not ‘require a ritualistic exercise in which the
    sentencing court mechanically discusses each criminal history category [or offense
    level] it rejects en route to the category [or offense level] that it selects.’” Walking
    
    Eagle, 553 F.3d at 657
    (quoting United States v. Azure, 
    536 F.3d 922
    , 931 (8th Cir.
    2008)).
    We find no plain error in the district court’s explanation of its decision to depart
    upward. The district court noted that Mobley had taken “a very difficult road with
    respect to the criminal justice system,” with all of his adult felony offenses involving
    guns and drugs. The district court discussed each those offenses, finding special
    significance in the circumstances of Mobley’s aiding-an-offender offense. After
    taking into account Mobley’s extensive criminal history, the repeated nature of his
    drug- and firearm-related offenses, and the fact that Mobley committed the federal
    offense while awaiting sentencing on a state offense that involved aiding an offender
    who committed attempted murder, the district court ultimately departed upward,
    because “[t]he guidelines [we]re not quite right” and because “the guidelines [we]re
    a real understatement of . . . what the right sentence is here.”
    We conclude that the district court’s otherwise adequate explanation of
    departing upward was not undercut by its lack of mention that it had moved
    incrementally down the sentencing table to find the appropriate advisory Guidelines
    range. See Walking 
    Eagle, 553 F.3d at 658
    (“Although the district court did not
    specifically mention that it had considered each intermediate criminal history
    category, its findings were adequate to explain and support the departure in this
    particular case.” (quoting United States v. Collins, 
    104 F.3d 143
    , 145 (8th Cir.
    1997))).
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    Mobley also argues that the district court failed to justify the imposition of a 5-
    offense-level upward departure. Mobley relies on several of our cases that were
    decided at a time when we reversed district courts for imposing sentences outside the
    advisory Guidelines range in the absence of what we considered to be a justification
    for the extent of deviation. For example, we required that any “extraordinary
    reduction . . . be supported by extraordinary circumstances.” See, e.g., United States
    v. Likens, 
    464 F.3d 823
    , 825 (8th Cir. 2006) (citing United States v. Dalton, 
    404 F.3d 1029
    , 1033 (8th Cir. 2005)). We were then told by the Supreme Court that the “rule
    requiring ‘proportional’ justifications for departures from the Guidelines range is not
    consistent with [the Court’s] remedial opinion in United States v. Booker, 
    543 U.S. 220
    (2005).” Gall v. United States, 
    552 U.S. 38
    , 46 (2007). In the present case, the
    district court provided sufficient justification for the upward departure and imposed
    a substantively reasonable sentence. See 
    Johnson, 648 F.3d at 944
    (holding that the
    district court’s explanation of its decision to impose an upward departure provided
    “sufficient indicia of why the intermediary categories [were] inappropriate” (quoting
    
    Azure, 536 F.3d at 932
    )).
    The sentence is affirmed.
    ______________________________
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