In re Agwumezie ( 2022 )


Menu:
  • Notice: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
    Atlantic and Maryland Reporters. Users are requested to notify the Clerk of the
    Court of any formal errors so that corrections may be made before the bound
    volumes go to press.
    DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS
    No. 21-BG-88
    IN RE CHARLES C. AGWUMEZIE, RESPONDENT.
    A Member of the Bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
    (Bar 
    Registration No. 990751
    )
    On Report and Recommendation of the Board on Professional
    Responsibility Ad Hoc Hearing Committee
    Approving Petition for Negotiated Discipline
    (DDNs 174-18 & 89-19)
    (Decided: February 3, 2022)
    Before BECKWITH and EASTERLY, Associate Judges, and FISHER, Senior
    Judge.
    PER CURIAM: “An opinion imposing negotiated discipline may not be cited
    as precedent in contested-discipline cases except as provided in” D.C. App. R. 28(g).
    See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d). This opinion may, however, be cited as precedent in
    negotiated-discipline cases.
    This appeal presents issues very similar to those that were recently addressed
    by this court in In re Mensah, 
    262 A.3d 1100
     (D.C. 2021). Although we consider
    Respondent’s misconduct to be more extensive than Mensah’s, and do not forget our
    2
    holding that “in virtually all cases of [intentional or reckless] misappropriation,
    disbarment will be the only appropriate sanction,” In re Addams, 
    579 A.2d 190
    , 191
    (D.C. 1990) (en banc), we approve the petition for negotiated discipline and impose
    a three-year suspension with a requirement that Respondent demonstrate his fitness
    to practice law before he may be reinstated.
    Disciplinary Counsel and Respondent Charles Agwumezie filed an amended
    petition for negotiated discipline wherein Respondent admitted that he recklessly
    misappropriated entrusted client funds and violated D.C. R. Prof. Conduct 1.5(b)
    (written statement of fees, scope of representation, and expenses), 1.7(b)(4) (conflict
    of interest), 1.15(a) (commingling, reckless misappropriation, and record-keeping),
    8.1(b) (knowingly failing to respond reasonably to Disciplinary Counsel’s lawful
    demands for information), and 8.4(d) (serious interference with the administration
    of justice). Respondent and Disciplinary Counsel agreed to the proposed three-year
    suspension with a fitness requirement.
    The Committee reviewed the petition as required by D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1.
    It highlighted, among other things, Respondent’s lack of prior discipline; the fact
    that no client or third party had complained to the Office of Disciplinary Counsel;
    and Disciplinary Counsel’s determinations that: (1) “the evidence supports the
    conclusion that Respondent’s misappropriations were not dishonest and did not
    3
    involve improper gains,” (2) it “could not show that Respondent had retained or
    failed to return the funds owed to clients or third parties,” and (3) Respondent had
    “taken remedial measures by attending a practice management class and by adopting
    accounting procedures to keep better track of funds in his trust account.”
    The parties agreed that “these ‘usual’ mitigating circumstances” would be
    “unlikely to overcome the presumption of disbarment for reckless misappropriation
    in a contested matter.” Nevertheless, they submitted that a three-year suspension
    with a fitness requirement “provide[d] the parties a certain outcome without the need
    for a prolonged and expensive adjudicative process.” The Committee emphasized
    that the agreed-upon sanction was “the most serious sanction other than disbarment,
    and the fitness requirement protects the public, the courts, and the integrity of the
    profession by ensuring that Respondent will not resume the practice of law in the
    District of Columbia until the Court determines that he is fit to do so.” The
    Committee concluded that the negotiated discipline was justified and not unduly
    lenient and recommended that the court impose it.
    Upon receipt of the Committee’s Report and Recommendation, this court
    requested the views of the Board on the appropriateness of the proposed sanction.
    See D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d). The Board filed its own Report and Recommendation
    acknowledging that “there is no question whether the stipulated misconduct would
    4
    warrant disbarment in a contested case[;] it would.” Nevertheless, a majority of the
    Board opined that “Respondent’s willingness to immediately accept a sanction —
    the most severe sanction saved for disbarment — that may very well result in him
    never practicing law again is substantial mitigation,” and further that “acceptance of
    the proposed disposition reflects sound policy as it presents the combined benefits
    of more quickly removing Respondent from practice while conserving disciplinary
    resources.”    The Board majority concluded that the proposed sanction was
    “justified” under the circumstances and recommended that we approve the petition
    for negotiated discipline. 1
    If the Committee recommends approval of a petition for negotiated
    discipline, this court reviews “in accordance with its procedures for the imposition
    of uncontested discipline.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1(d). Under those procedures, “if
    no exceptions are filed to the Board’s report, the [c]ourt will enter an order imposing
    the discipline recommended by the Board upon the expiration of the time permitted
    for filing exceptions.” D.C. Bar R. XI, § 9(h)(2). “This rule is not absolute — we
    would not impose discipline that is clearly against the law or the public interest, for
    1
    The dissenters thought that Respondent’s misconduct was too serious to
    permit a sanction less than disbarment. We agree that the nature and seriousness of
    the misconduct must be considered when determining whether the proposed sanction
    is justified. Those factors must be considered again if Respondent seeks
    reinstatement. See In re Yum, 
    187 A.3d 1289
    , 1292 (D.C. 2018).
    5
    example, merely because no party took exception to it . . . .” In re Stephens, 
    247 A.3d 698
    , 701 (D.C. 2021) (per curiam). Nevertheless, if “there are no exceptions
    to the Board’s report and recommendation, our deferential standard of review
    becomes even more deferential.” In re Viehe, 
    762 A.2d 542
    , 543 (D.C. 2000) (per
    curiam).
    As numerous opinions illustrate, the procedures for imposing attorney
    discipline in contested matters can be very lengthy and costly to both sides. Such
    lengthy delay does not serve the interests of anyone — clients, respondents, or the
    public at large. In 2008, this court established procedures to govern negotiated
    discipline. D.C. Bar R. XI, § 12.1. This new process, which did not exist when
    Addams was decided, was intended “to encourage efficient and timely resolution of
    attorney-discipline matters.” In re Mensah, 262 A.3d at 1103. We will not reiterate
    the considerations that persuaded us to allow more flexibility with respect to sanction
    in Mensah, except to recognize once again “the mitigating nature of an attorney’s
    willingness to acknowledge misconduct and accept an appropriate sanction.” Id. at
    1104.
    In Mensah we held that the negotiated discipline process provides flexibility
    that “may in certain circumstances permit a sanction of less than disbarment in
    negotiated-discipline cases involving reckless misappropriation.” Mensah, 262
    6
    A.3d at 1105. For the reasons stated by the Committee and the Board, we determine
    that the proposed sanction is justified under the circumstances of this case. We do
    not suggest, however, that a sanction short of disbarment for reckless
    misappropriation will always be justified in a case of negotiated discipline.
    Accordingly, it is
    ORDERED that Respondent Charles C. Agwumezie is hereby suspended
    from the practice of law in the District of Columbia for three years with
    reinstatement conditioned on his demonstrating fitness to practice law. We direct
    Respondent’s attention to the provisions of D.C. Bar R. XI, § 14(g); he will not be
    eligible to apply for reinstatement until three years after he files an affidavit that
    complies with D.C. Bar R. XI, § 16 and Board Rule 9.
    So ordered.
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 21-BG-88

Filed Date: 2/3/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 2/3/2022