Francis Veasey v. Mike Fisher , 307 F. App'x 614 ( 2009 )


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  •                                                                                                                            Opinions of the United
    2009 Decisions                                                                                                             States Court of Appeals
    for the Third Circuit
    1-22-2009
    Francis Veasey v. Mike Fisher
    Precedential or Non-Precedential: Non-Precedential
    Docket No. 08-2491
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    Recommended Citation
    "Francis Veasey v. Mike Fisher" (2009). 2009 Decisions. Paper 1998.
    http://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_2009/1998
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    DLD-63                                                         NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
    FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
    ___________
    No. 08-2491
    ___________
    FRANCIS VEASEY,
    Appellant
    v.
    MIKE FISHER;
    TOM CORBETT, Attorney General, Pennsylvania;
    JEFFERY BEARD, Secretary, Pennsylvania Department of Corrections;
    LOUIS FOLINO, Superintendent, SCI-Greene;
    DEAN GEEHRING, Superintendent, SCI-Greene;
    CAPTAIN WINFIELD, Shift Commander, SCI-Greene;
    LIEUTENANT TONY, Shift Supervisor, SCI-Greene;
    ____________________________________
    On Appeal from the United States District Court
    for the Western District of Pennsylvania
    (D.C. Civil No. 07-cv-01446)
    District Judge: Honorable Donetta W. Ambrose
    ____________________________________
    Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
    or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
    December 24, 2008
    Before: BARRY, AMBRO and SMITH, Circuit Judges
    (Opinion filed January 22, 2009)
    _________
    OPINION
    _________
    PER CURIAM
    Francis Edward Veasey filed pro se an action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging
    violations of his civil rights by the current and former Attorney General, the Secretary of
    the Pennsylvania Department of Corrections, and four employees of the Department of
    Corrections. For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.
    I. Background
    This action was filed while Veasey was incarcerated at the State Correctional
    Institution at Fayette. In his original complaint, filed in the Eastern District Court of
    Pennsylvania, Veasey alleged irregularities in the handling of his legal mail resulting
    from a change in policy in March 2002. Following a change in venue to the Western
    District of Pennsylvania, Defendants filed a motion to dismiss, or in the alternative,
    motion for summary judgment. Defendants’ motion argued that claims arising from
    events prior to February 1, 2005, were time barred and that Plaintiff failed to exhaust
    administrative remedies as required by the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. §
    1997e(a). In support of their motion, Defendants included an affidavit from Dorina
    Varner, the Assistant Chief Grievance Coordinator, who stated that Plaintiff did not
    exhaust his administrative remedies with regard to his legal mail. Plaintiff was ordered to
    file a response by January 11, 2008. Plaintiff did not file a response to Defendants’
    motion. The District Court adopted the Magistrate’s Judge’s conclusion that Plaintiff did
    not exhaust administrative remedies with regard to his legal mail and granted the
    Defendants’ motion. Plaintiff timely appealed.
    2
    II. Standards
    We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We exercise plenary
    review over a District Court’s grant of summary judgment and apply the same test applied
    by the District Court. Saldana v. Kmart Corp., 
    260 F.3d 228
    , 231 (3d Cir. 2001). Entry
    of summary judgment is appropriate when pleadings, discovery materials and affidavits
    show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled
    to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
    
    477 U.S. 317
    , 322 (1986). When a moving party demonstrates the absence of a genuine
    issue of material fact, the nonmoving party must go beyond the pleadings and point to
    “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). If
    that does not happen, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
    Celotex Corp., 477 at 323.
    III. Discussion
    No prisoner may file an action in federal court with respect to prison conditions
    without first exhausting all available administrative remedies. 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a).
    Exhaustion is mandatory. See Booth v. Churner 
    532 U.S. 731
    , 741 (2001). The
    exhaustion requirement includes a procedural-default component, and a prisoner must
    comply with the prison grievance procedures to properly exhaust his claims. Spruill v.
    Gillis, 
    372 F.3d 218
    , 230-31 (3d Cir. 2004). Pursuant to Pennsylvania’s Inmate
    Grievance System, Policy Number DC-ADM 804, an inmate must submit each grievance
    3
    through three administrative levels to exhaust it. 
    Id. at 232.
    Here, Veasey presented no evidence in response to the Defendants’ motion that he
    did not exhaust his administrative remedies. Defendants’ motion included the affidavit
    from the assistant grievance coordinator, averring that Veasey never exhausted a single
    grievance with regard to his inmate mail. In response to the motion, Veasey failed to
    point to any evidence suggesting that he did in fact exhaust administrative remedies
    concerning inmate mail. Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s order granting
    summary judgment on the basis of non-exhaustion.
    4