Russell Eric Lofland v. the State of Texas ( 2023 )

NUMBER 13-21-00382-CR
COURT OF APPEALS
THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG
RUSSELL ERIC LOFLAND, Appellant,
v.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee.
On appeal from the 36th District Court
of San Patricio County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Contreras and Justices Longoria and Silva
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Contreras
A jury convicted appellant Russell Eric Lofland of aggravated robbery, a first-
degree felony, and sentenced him to twenty-five years’ imprisonment in the Correctional
Institutions Division of the Texas Department of Criminal Justice. See TEX. PENAL CODE
ANN. §§ 12.32, 29.03(a), (b). By his sole issue, appellant contends that the evidence was
legally insufficient to support his conviction. We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
A grand jury indicted appellant on December 12, 2017. The indictment alleged that
“on or about the 22nd day of February, 2015, . . . while in the course of committing theft
of property and with intent to obtain or maintain control of said property,” appellant
“intentionally or knowingly cause[d] serious bodily injury to Elvin Young [Jr.] by striking
and hitting . . . Young in the face and head with the [appellant’s] hands and feet or [an]
object unknown by the grand jury.” On October 5, 2021, appellant pleaded not guilty, and
trial commenced. We summarize the testimony relevant to the disposition of this appeal.
A. Merry Spriggs Moreno’s Testimony
Merry Spriggs Moreno, Young’s sister, testified that Young was a fifty-year-old
man, about five feet tall, who had suffered from various disabilities throughout his life.
According to Moreno, Young also had a drinking problem and lived at home with his and
Moreno’s mother, Lucille Spriggs. Spriggs, Moreno noted, was displeased with Young’s
drinking habit, so, on occasion, Young would rent a room at the nearby Cedar Lodge
Motel to “hang out with his drinking buddies, and just have a good time.” Moreno last saw
her brother on February 21, 2015, at Spriggs’s house just as Young was preparing to
head to the Cedar Lodge in his red Ford Mustang. Moreno was not familiar with appellant
and did not believe Young knew him prior to that excursion to the Cedar Lodge.
Moreno testified that her brother “loved jewelry.” The State offered photographs as
Exhibits 2–6 depicting various pieces of jewelry, which Moreno confirmed belonged to her
brother. The jewelry included: (1) two rope chains, one of which was missing a fish
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pendant that usually adorned Young’s neck; (2) a few rings; and (3) a shrimp-shaped
charm. Moreno stated that the chains’ clasps appear broken in the photos. The State also
offered Exhibit 7 depicting a blood-covered fish pendant, which Moreno identified as the
one missing from Young’s chain.
B. Officer Derrell Harvill’s Testimony
In 2015, Officer Derrell Harvill was a patrol officer with the Aransas Pass Police
Department (APPD). On February 22, 2015, at about 3:00 a.m., Officer Harvill was
dispatched to the Cedar Lodge for a welfare check on Young, called in by Spriggs. 1
Officer Harvill testified that he arrived at the Cedar Lodge and parked behind a red
Mustang which had its engine running and “its lights on, with the doors open.” Two people,
later identified as appellant and his fiancé, Angel Kerns, were “loading stuff in[to] the
Mustang,” which was parked outside their motel room, room 16. Officer Harvill stated that
he went straight to room 21, situated about twenty or thirty feet to the left of room 16,
where Young was staying. Officer Harvill knocked on the door but received no answer.
He attempted to enter the room, but the door was locked. Officer Harvill noticed “a lot of
blood everywhere,” including on the porch, deck chair, ground, and exterior wall outside
of Young’s room, and he testified that the blood looked fresh. Officer Harvill’s body
camera footage was admitted into evidence and played for the jury; it showed the bloody
scene and another officer volunteering to go obtain the master key to enter Young’s room.
When the officers finally opened the door to room 21, they found Young next to the
bed lying face down. Officer Harvill checked for a pulse and found none. He asked his
1 It is not clear from the record what prompted Spriggs to call to request the welfare check.
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supervisor whether he should move Young to render aid, as Young’s body felt warm. The
officers called for emergency medical services (EMS). EMS arrived, flipped Young’s body,
and attempted to resuscitate him, to no avail. Photos of Young were admitted at trial.
Officer Harvill testified that Young’s face and head were bloodied.
At some point after finding Young’s body, Officer Harvill approached appellant and
Kerns and started asking them questions. Officer Harvill testified that the couple told him
they helped Young into Young’s motel room. At points of Officer Harvill’s body camera
footage, appellant can be heard stating he and Kerns found Young passed out on his
porch and helped him into his room from there. At other points, appellant suggested that
Young “pulled up here and said get me in the house,” so appellant obliged. Officer Harvill
testified that he observed no blood trail between appellant’s room and Young’s, nor any
blood in the red Mustang, which was determined to be Young’s vehicle. He agreed that
the Mustang was parked in front of appellant’s room even though there were available
parking spots in front of Young’s room. Officer Harvill noticed that appellant had blood on
his arm, which appellant attributed to his lip. According to Officer Harvill, appellant’s lip
looked “[s]wollen like he [had] been in a fight.” Given the circumstances, including
appellant being “the last person to see [Young] alive,” Officer Harvill detained appellant
and later transported him to the police station for further questioning.
Officer Harvill testified that during booking, appellant emptied his pockets, and the
pockets’ contents included several blood-covered pieces of jewelry, which Officer Harvill
photographed and collected as evidence. Those photographs were admitted at trial as
Exhibits 2–6. Moreno confirmed that the jewelry depicted in those exhibits belonged to
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Young.
C. Sergeant Antonio Davila’s Testimony
Antonio Davila is a sergeant in APPD. On February 22, 2015, Sergeant Davila was
the on-call detective. Sergeant Davila testified that he received a call at about 4:00 a.m.
that his services were required at the Cedar Lodge. Sergeant Davila arrived at the scene
as EMS was leaving. He noted that Young’s face looked like it had been hit with
something. He and another APPD detective, Frank Kent, photographed the scene and
“collect[ed] blood samples from all the areas that [they] had observed where there was
blood at.” Along with the blood samples, Sergeant Davila noticed and collected a gold,
blood-covered fish pendant on the porch outside of Young’s motel room. A picture of the
pendant was admitted at trial as Exhibit 7, and Moreno confirmed that the pendant
depicted was Young’s. Sergeant Davila also collected Young’s clothing and secured
Young’s Mustang.
In the Mustang, Sergeant Davila noticed some men’s and women’s clothing in the
back seat and a large glass bottle of Jack Daniels whiskey on the floor of the front
passenger side. Sergeant Davila was informed that appellant and Kerns claimed the
clothing as their own and told Officer Harvill when he arrived on the scene at about 3:00
a.m. that they were using the car to go to the laundromat. Sergeant Davila had the
Mustang towed back to the police station. There, he searched the vehicle and noticed the
Jack Daniels bottle had blood on “the main part of the body and on the neck part of” the
bottle. Save for the blood on the bottle, though, Sergeant Davila found no other blood in
the Mustang.
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Later on February 22, detectives Davila and Kent returned to the Cedar Lodge.
While there, they found the keys to Young’s room located in the grass outside the porch
area of room 21, which was notable because Young’s door was locked when Officer
Harvill arrived to conduct the welfare check. The detectives were also approached by the
motel owner, Robert Oxley, who told them that he went into appellant’s room and saw
“one of the coverings to the window [A/C] unit was removed.” He went to check the A/C
unit and “noticed a dark colored [object which] look[ed] like [a] wallet stuffed in between
the A[/]C unit and where the housing was located.” Oxley pointed it out to the detectives,
who then collected the wallet. Contained within the wallet was Young’s driver’s license.
Sergeant Davila also collected a bloody towel from appellant’s room.
Sergeant Davila testified that the medical examiner’s office called the next day to
inform him that Young’s autopsy was completed. Sergeant Davila went to the medical
examiner’s office to collect Young’s personal belongings and various DNA swabs and
fingernail clippings that had been taken during Young’s autopsy. Sergeant Davila stated
that he transported the evidence to the APPD station and turned it over to the evidence
technician. Sergeant Davila also collected appellant’s jeans and polo shirt from the
previous night for DNA analysis.
D. Samantha Perkins’s Testimony
In 2015, Samantha Perkins was the DNA supervisor and technical leader at the
Corpus Christi Crime Lab. Perkins testified that she tested various pieces of evidence for
DNA profiles. Perkins stated that the DNA profile collected from the blood on the jewelry
was consistent with Young’s. She noted that she tested DNA from two blood spots on
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appellant’s shirt, one of which was consistent with Young’s DNA, the other of which was
consistent with both Young’s and appellant’s DNA. Perkins also tested two blood spots
from appellant’s jeans. A spot on one of the legs was consistent with Young’s DNA, and
a spot tested from appellant’s front left pocket was consistent with both appellant’s and
Young’s DNA. Perkins tested ten fingernail clippings from Young, all of which were
consistent with only Young’s DNA, except one—“the right first digit fingernail[] DNA profile
was . . . a mixture” of appellant’s and Young’s DNA. The bloody towel in appellant’s room
was consistent with appellant’s DNA. Finally, Perkins described that DNA tested from a
“red stain” on the Jack Daniels bottle found in Young’s car was consistent with Young’s,
and DNA from the bottle cap and neck of the bottle were consistent with a mixture of
appellant’s and Kerns’s.
E. Dr. Adel Shaker’s Testimony
In 2015, Adel Shaker, M.D., was the Nueces County Medical Examiner. He
testified that he conducted Young’s autopsy on February 23, 2015. During his
examination of Young, Dr. Shaker found an “H shape laceration in [Young’s] midfrontal
scalp” and that Young’s septum was fractured. Dr. Shaker stated that below the laceration
was a deep hematoma, indicative of “strong blunt force trauma.” Blunt force trauma, Dr.
Shaker explained, could be caused by an object or a punch or kick. Dr. Shaker testified
that Young was not a healthy person—he had high blood pressure, heart disease, and a
heavy heart.
On cross-examination, Dr. Shaker noted that Young’s blood alcohol content (BAC)
at the time of his examination was 0.292%. He testified that BAC was itself potentially life-
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threatening. He also informed the jury that Young was on blood pressure medication and
anxiolytics, which should not be mixed with alcohol. Dr. Shaker’s autopsy report was
admitted into evidence and shows a presumed cause of death as “[c]ombined drug
toxicity.” The manner of death was listed as “undetermined.” On re-direct examination,
the State asked Dr. Shaker whether, given Young’s health condition, “the trauma [Young]
suffered played a role in his demise?” Dr. Shaker answered affirmatively, suggesting that
tachycardia, or an accelerated heart rate, associated with a fight can cause ventricle
fibrillation, “which is a final stage [in] stopping the heart.” The State then rested its case.
F. Angel Kerns’s Testimony
Kerns testified for the defense. She stated she and appellant met Young on
February 21, 2015. The three spent the afternoon drinking. At some point, they ran out of
alcohol and went to buy more. They returned to the Cedar Lodge and continued drinking.
According to Kerns, she and appellant left around 7:00 or 8:00 p.m. to go to a bar. When
the couple returned between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m., they saw Young face-down outside of
his room with the door ajar. They exchanged no words with Young and did not call EMS
because they only thought Young was passed out from drinking. Kerns testified that she
and appellant placed Young in his room and then retired to their room. She noted that
soon thereafter, the police knocked on her and appellant’s door to arrest them.
On cross-examination, Kerns testified that she was in the red Mustang when the
police arrived because she and appellant were heading out to do laundry.
The defense rested. The jury convicted appellant of aggravated robbery and
sentenced him to twenty-five years’ incarceration. This appeal followed.
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II. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
By his sole issue, appellant argues that the evidence was legally insufficient to
support his conviction for aggravated robbery “in that the evidence supporting the finding
an assault or theft took place . . . and the evidence that an assault was committed with
the intent of facilitating a theft is so weak that the verdict seems clearly wrong and
manifestly unjust.”
A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law
“In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we consider
the evidence ‘in the light most favorable to the verdict’ to determine whether any rational
trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable
doubt.” Delagarza v. State, 635 S.W.3d 716, 723 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg
2021, pet. ref’d) (quoting Stahmann v. State, 602 S.W.3d 573, 577 (Tex. Crim. App.
2020)); see Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). We consider both direct and
circumstantial evidence as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from the
evidence and are not mere speculation. Villa v. State, 514 S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim.
App. 2017); Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). “We resolve
any evidentiary inconsistencies in favor of the verdict, keeping in mind that the factfinder
is the exclusive judge of the facts, the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to give
their testimony.” Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at 723 (first citing Walker v. State, 594 S.W.3d
330, 335 (Tex. Crim. App. 2020); and then citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.04).
“The sufficiency of the evidence is measured by comparing the evidence produced
at trial to ‘the essential elements of the offense as defined by the hypothetically correct
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jury charge.’” Curlee v. State, 620 S.W.3d 767, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021) (quoting Malik
v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “A hypothetically correct jury
charge ‘accurately sets out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not
unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s
theories of liability, and adequately describes the particular offense for which the
defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).
A hypothetically correct charge would instruct the jury that a person commits the
offense of robbery if, “in the course of committing theft . . . and with intent to obtain or
maintain control of the property, he . . . intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly causes
bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1). “A person commits an
offense [of theft] if he unlawfully appropriates property with intent to deprive the owner of
property.” Id. § 31.03(a). The offense of robbery becomes an aggravated robbery if,
among other things, the person “causes serious bodily injury to another.” Id. § 29.03(a)(1).
“‘Serious bodily injury’ means,” among other things, “bodily injury that creates a
substantial risk of death or that causes death.” Id. § 1.07(a)(46).
“A person acts . . . with intent[] with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a
result of his conduct when it is his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct
or cause the result.” Id. § 6.03(a). “A person acts knowingly . . . with respect to a result of
his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result.”
Id. § 6.03(b). A jury may infer a defendant’s knowledge or intent from direct or
circumstantial evidence, including the accused’s acts, words, and conduct. Garza v.
State, 398 S.W.3d 738, 744 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, pet. ref’d).
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B. Analysis
Appellant argues that there was legally insufficient evidence (1) that he committed
theft, (2) that he committed an assault, and (3) “to prove a nexus between an assault and
theft.” We disagree.
As to evidence of theft, after being transported to the APPD station, appellant was
asked to empty his pockets. Contained within his pockets were blood-covered pieces of
jewelry. Perkins testified that the DNA from the blood matched Young’s. Moreno testified
that Young “loved jewelry” and described the pieces he was wearing when she last saw
him. When shown Exhibits 2–6, Moreno confirmed the jewelry collected from appellant at
the APPD station belonged to her brother. Moreno stated, and Exhibits 4–6 confirm, that
the clasp to at least one of Young’s chains was broken. Moreover, Young’s wallet was
found in the A/C unit in appellant’s motel room. And Officer Harvill testified that, when he
arrived at the Cedar Lodge, appellant and Kerns were loading personal belongings into
Young’s Mustang, which was running and parked in front of appellant’s, rather than
Young’s room. This evidence sufficed to prove that property was appropriated from
Young. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03(a). The jury was free to infer, among other
things, that the presence of blood on the jewelry, the chain’s broken clasp, appellant’s
possession of the jewelry, Young’s wallet hidden in appellant’s room, and appellant’s
loading up and using Young’s Mustang proved that appropriation was intended and
unlawful. See id.; Garza, 398 S.W.3d at 744. Indeed, Kerns testified that Young was non-
responsive and she and appellant exchanged no words with Young when moving him into
his room, and yet Young’s bloody jewelry, wallet, and car ended up in appellant’s
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possession with no indication that Young willingly provided appellant with the same. And
there was no explanation given by appellant for his possession of the jewelry. See
Hardesty v. State, 656 S.W.2d 73, 77 (Tex. Crim. App. 1983) (providing that recent and
unexplained possession of property supports an inference of guilt).
There is also sufficient evidence to prove appellant caused Young to suffer serious
bodily injury. 2 See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.03(a)(1); Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d
274, 285 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009) (“[T]he State may prove the defendant’s identity . . . by
either direct or circumstantial evidence, coupled with all reasonable inferences from that
evidence.”). Officer Harvill testified that there was a significant amount of blood right
outside of Young’s motel room door. Sergeant Davila testified that Young looked as
though he was hit in his face, and photographs of Young corroborate that testimony. Dr.
Shaker testified that Young had a fractured septum, a laceration on his forehead, and a
deep hematoma underneath it, indicative of significant blunt force trauma. While he
testified that Young’s cause of death was combined drug toxicity, Dr. Shaker agreed that,
given the condition of Young’s health, “the trauma [Young] suffered played a role in his
demise.” Perkins testified that (1) blood found on appellant’s polo shirt and jeans was
positive for both appellant’s and Young’s DNA, (2) appellant’s DNA was found under one
of Young’s fingernails, and (3) Young’s blood was found on the Jack Daniels bottle that
was in the car. Sergeant Davila testified there was no other blood found in the Mustang.
Further, Officer Harvill testified that appellant’s lip looked swollen, as though he had been
2We note that appellant focuses his argument on the lack of sufficient evidence that he perpetrated
an assault on Young, not that Young suffered serious bodily injury.
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in a fight. And Perkins testified that blood from a towel found in appellant’s motel room
came back as belonging to appellant. See Jones v. State, 458 S.W.3d 625, 632 (Tex.
App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d) (concluding that evidence of victim’s and
appellant’s DNA on discarded clothing near scene of crime, along with reasonable
inferences from that evidence, sufficed to prove appellant was attacker). Given this
evidence, a reasonable juror could have inferred that appellant and Young engaged in a
fight near room 21, and appellant struck Young with his hands, feet, a Jack Daniels bottle,
or another object that caused Young to suffer serious bodily injury. See id.; Delagarza,
635 S.W.3d at 723; Garza, 398 S.W.3d at 744.
Appellant argues that Kerns’s testimony that she and appellant found Young lying
on the porch outside of his motel room “impl[ies] that she and [a]ppellant found . . . Young
after the injuries to his forehead had occurred.” But the jury is the sole “judge of the facts,
the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to give their testimony.” Delagarza, 635
S.W.3d at 723. Here, the jury was free to disregard all or parts of Kerns’s testimony as
incredible. See Febus v. State, 542 S.W.3d 568, 572 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018) (“A jury may
accept one version of the facts and reject another, and it may reject any part of a witness’s
testimony.”). Notably, Kerns testified that when they found Young, she and appellant did
not call for emergency services because they thought Young was merely passed out from
being drunk. But the blood all over room 21’s porch and Young’s face suggests otherwise
and challenges any supposed implication that Young was found only after suffering
injuries. Moreover, Officer Harvill’s body camera footage shows appellant making
inconsistent statements as to how he came to purportedly help Young into room 21. In
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one rendition, appellant and Kerns came back from a bar, found Young lying face down
on his porch, and helped him into his room. Later, however, appellant stated that Young
“pulled up here and said get me in the house,” so appellant obliged. Even if appellant was
consistent in his statements, the jury was free to believe or disbelieve them, and the
evidence was otherwise sufficient to prove appellant was Young’s attacker. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1); Febus, 542 S.W.3d at 572; Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at
723.
Finally, appellant contends that “[e]ven assuming the evidence is sufficient to prove
[a]ppellant committed an assault and a theft, to be convicted of robbery, the State must
prove a nexus between an assault and the theft.” Appellant argues that there is insufficient
“evidence that appellant formed the requisite intent to steal Young’s jewelry or vehicle
either before or during the commission of the assault.” Instead, he suggests that, at best,
“[a] rational trier of fact could conclude that picking up the jewelry was an afterthought
following a fight between two intoxicated persons over some disagreement.”
As noted, a person commits robbery if “in the course of committing theft . . . and
with intent to obtain or maintain control of the property, he . . . intentionally, knowingly, or
recklessly causes bodily injury to another.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 29.02(a)(1). The
penal code defines “[i]n the course of committing theft” as “conduct that occurs in an
attempt to commit, during the commission, or in immediate flight after the attempt or
commission of theft.” Id. § 29.01(1). To support his argument that a nexus between an
assault and theft must exist to sustain a conviction, appellant cites Cooper v. State, 67
S.W.3d 221, 223 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). Apart from reciting the general nexus
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requirement between an assault and theft, however, Cooper stands for the rule “that a
theft occurring immediately after an assault will support an inference that the assault was
intended to facilitate the theft” for purposes of proving robbery. Id. at 224; see Walter v.
State, 581 S.W.3d 957, 974 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2019, pet. ref’d) (noting that the nexus
requirement “may be inferred when both offenses [an assault and theft] occur in close
temporal proximity”). And that “inference will not be negated by evidence of an alternative
motive that the jury could rationally disregard.” Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 224. That is because
“[t]he appellant’s motive in committing the assault . . . may be probative of the nexus
element, but it is not itself an element of the offense of robbery.” Sorrells v. State, 343
S.W.3d 152, 158 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011). The relevant question is whether the assault
took place “in the course of committing theft,” not whether the theft was appellant’s motive
for the assault. See id.In Cooper, appellant was a recent parolee who was living with his uncle, E.W.
Cooper, 67 S.W.3d at 222. One morning, E.W. took appellant “to help him work on a
fence.” Id. “As [E.W.] was about to put a fence post into the ground, appellant struck him
from behind without any warning. A struggle followed and both men fell to the ground.”
Id. When E.W. “released his grip on appellant, appellant stood up, walked to [E.W.]’s
truck, got into it, and drove away.” Id. Appellant was found about an hour later in a nearby
town trying to fix the truck, which had broken down. Id. The Beaumont court of appeals
held that those facts did not suffice to prove the nexus element of aggravated robbery.
The court of criminal appeals disagreed, noting that the jury could have rationally
disbelieved appellant’s testimony that “at the time of the attack, he was hearing voices,”
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“thought his uncle was hitting a child,” “didn’t know what [he] was doing,” and “just ran
and jumped in the truck and just took off,” and the evidence was otherwise sufficient to
support a conclusion that the assault was committed in the course of the commission of
the theft of E.W.’s truck. Id. at 224.
In Sorrells, Reynolds was waiting outside a nightclub for her boyfriend, Rice, to
retrieve their vehicle. Sorrells, 343 S.W.3d at 153. While waiting, Reynolds leaned up
against a parked Mercedes SUV. Id. Appellant exited the club, told Reynolds to “get the
f*** off the car,” and pistol whipped her; a scuffle ensued. Id. At some point, Rice arrived
and joined the fray, and appellant aimed his gun at Rice. Id. Rice punched appellant, the
two started fighting, and then a third person came over and punched Rice. Id. Reynolds
left to seek help. Id. When she returned, the fight had ended, and Rice told her that his
lion medallion necklace had been stolen. Id. Rice’s friend, Fritz, testified that he saw Rice
getting attacked, joined the fight, and he too got hit across the head with a pistol. Id. at
154. Sometime during the fight, he saw Rice’s medallion on the ground. Id. Officer Riley
testified that he arrived at the scene and, within minutes, found three suspects walking
down the alley behind the club. Id. One of the suspects had Rice’s lion medallion in his
coat pocket. Id. This Court held that there was insufficient evidence proving a nexus
between appellant’s assault and the theft of the medallion because appellant’s motive
was evidently to keep Reynolds off his SUV and Rice from interfering. The Texas Court
of Criminal Appeals disagreed and reversed our decision, holding that:
Based on Rice’s testimony that the necklace was missing immediately after
the assault, and Fritz’s testimony that he saw the necklace on the ground
during the course of the assault, a rational juror could draw a reasonable
inference that the assault and the theft occurred simultaneously, and thus
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the assault was committed during the commission of theft.
Id. at 158.
Here, even assuming appellant had no motive or intent to steal any of Young’s
property before or during the assault as appellant suggests, there is sufficient evidence
that appellant caused Young’s serious bodily injury “in the course of committing theft.”
See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §§ 29.01(1); 29.02(a)(1); Sorrells, 343 S.W.3d at 157; Cooper,
67 S.W.3d at 224. First, Officer Harvill arrived at the Cedar Lodge at about 3:00 a.m. on
February 22, 2015, and noted that Young’s body was “still warm,” as though he was only
recently deceased. Officer Harvill also stated that the blood outside of Young’s room
looked fresh. Kerns testified that she and appellant returned to the Cedar Lodge from a
bar between 2:00 and 3:00 a.m. when they saw Young passed out on his porch and
helped him into his room. Within the next hour or so, appellant was found with Young’s
jewelry and loading up Young’s Mustang, purportedly to go do laundry at 3:00 a.m. The
jewelry was covered in Young’s blood and at least one of the chains’ clasps was broken
as though it had been yanked from Young’s neck. The fish pendant found on the porch
bolsters that prospect. Young’s wallet was tucked away inside the A/C unit in appellant’s
motel room. And Young’s car was parked and running outside of appellant’s room being
loaded up for departure. We conclude that a rational juror could draw reasonable
inferences from this evidence that the assault of Young was committed in the course of
committing theft. See id.; Walter, 581 S.W.3d at 974; see also Razor v. State, No. 03-13-
00568-CR, 2015 WL 3857293, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin June 17, 2015, no pet.) (mem.
op., not designated for publication) (concluding that evidence was sufficient to prove the
nexus requirement between an assault and theft where, following a rendezvous with
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appellant, a prostitute was hit in the back of her head in an isolated alley and knocked
unconscious, she knew appellant was behind her when she was hit, she woke up with a
bloody head with all her belongings missing, and appellant’s DNA was found on her body);
Abdullah v. State, No. 06-13-00257-CR, 2014 WL 6450482, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
Nov. 18, 2014, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (concluding that
evidence was sufficient to prove the nexus requirement between the assault and theft
where mother and daughter were assaulted while entering their home, and mother
noticed when police arrived soon after that her wallet was missing from her unlocked car
in the driveway).
In sum, viewing the evidence in a light favorable to the jury’s verdict, we conclude
that a rational juror could have found the essential elements of the crime of aggravated
robbery beyond a reasonable doubt. See Delagarza, 635 S.W.3d at 723; Stahmann, 602
S.W.3d at 577. We overrule appellant’s sole issue.
III. CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
DORI CONTRERAS
Chief Justice
Do not publish.
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2 (b).
Delivered and filed on the
23rd day of February, 2023.
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