Sandra R,, Sergio C. v. Dcs , 246 Ariz. 180 ( 2019 )


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  •                                     IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C., Appellants,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, M.R., F.M., J.M., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 18-0147
    FILED 1-29-2019
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JD20586
    JS19097
    The Honorable Alison Bachus, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    John L. Popilek, P.C., Scottsdale
    By John L. Popilek
    Counsel for Appellant Sandra R.
    Law Office of H. Clark Jones LLC, Mesa
    By H. Clark Jones
    Counsel for Appellant Sergio C.
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Tucson
    By Autumn L. Spritzer
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    OPINION
    Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
    M c M U R D I E, Judge:
    ¶1             Sandra R. (“Mother”) appeals the termination of her parental
    rights to her three children: M.R., born in 2008; F.M., born in 2015; and J.M.,
    born in 2017. Sergio C. (“Father”) appeals the termination of his rights to
    their two children in common, F.M. and J.M. 1 We affirm the termination
    orders and hold: (1) the court committed harmless error by allowing the
    Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) to introduce statements from scientific
    articles without meeting the foundation requirements of Arizona Rule of
    Evidence 803(18); (2) sufficient evidence supports the abuse finding related
    to the shaken-baby injury (nonaccidental trauma) even though the evidence
    did not prove which parent abused the child; and (3) under Alma S. v. DCS,
    
    245 Ariz. 146
    (2018), the “constitutional nexus” requirement established by
    Linda V. v. ADES, 
    211 Ariz. 76
    (App. 2005), is considered under the totality
    of the circumstances in determining whether termination is in the best
    interests of the child.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            In 2013, Mother and her five-year-old daughter M.R. began
    living with Father. Mother subsequently gave birth to F.M. and J.M. In April
    2017, six-week-old J.M. slept most of the day and vomited “a lot” that
    evening. Mother noticed that J.M.’s arms began shaking at various times.
    Assuming it was a stomach issue, Father went to the store to buy tea for
    J.M. Meanwhile, J.M.’s condition worsened. J.M. turned pale, started
    moaning, could not fully open her eyes, and her arms became stiff. After
    Father returned from the store, Mother and Father took J.M. to an
    urgent-care center where they waited more than 40 minutes for the doctor
    to evaluate her. Upon examination, the doctor told Mother and Father to
    immediately take J.M. to Phoenix Children’s Hospital (“PCH”).
    1     M.R.’s father’s parental rights were terminated in the same
    proceeding. He is not a party to this appeal.
    2
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶3            At PCH, a scan revealed that J.M had a large subdural
    hemorrhage on the left side of her brain and a smaller subdural hemorrhage
    on the right. She also had damage to her optic nerve and severe retinal
    hemorrhaging in both eyes. The hemorrhaging caused her brain to shift out
    of position and compress her brainstem. Because J.M.’s life was in danger,
    doctors had to perform emergency neurosurgery. After surgery,
    Dr. Melissa Jones, a pediatrician with a specialty in child abuse pediatrics,
    evaluated J.M. After ruling out possible medical causes, Dr. Jones
    determined the injuries resulted from abusive head trauma and Mother and
    Father provided no alternative explanation for the cause of J.M.’s injuries.
    PCH reported the injuries, and DCS took custody of all three children and
    filed dependency petitions. The juvenile court later established the case
    plan as severance and adoption.
    ¶4            In July 2017, DCS petitioned to terminate Mother’s rights to
    J.M., F.M., and M.R., and Father’s rights to J.M. and F.M., under the abuse
    ground. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. (“A.R.S.”) § 8-533(B). Over seven months, DCS
    offered Mother and Father services, including hair-follicle testing to rule
    out drug abuse, psychological evaluations, individual counseling, and a
    parent aide during visits with the children. Although Mother and Father
    participated in services, in discussions with counselors, they continued to
    minimize J.M.’s severe injuries and provided no further explanation for
    how the injury occurred.
    ¶5             The juvenile court held a three-day termination hearing.
    Dr. Jones testified for DCS, opining that J.M.’s injuries resulted from
    nonaccidental trauma. Dr. Ruth Bristol, J.M.’s pediatric neurosurgeon,
    testified on the manner and extent of J.M.’s injuries. Mother and Father’s
    expert, Dr. Joseph Scheller, a pediatric neurologist with specialties in
    pediatric neurology and neuroimaging, opined that J.M.’s injuries most
    likely resulted from an unusual complication of a birth injury. The court
    took the matter under advisement and later issued an order terminating
    Mother’s rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R., and Father’s rights to J.M. and F.M.
    Mother and Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to
    Article 6, Section 9 of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A),
    12-120.21(A)(1), and -2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6            To terminate a parent-child relationship, the court must find
    at least one statutory ground for termination under A.R.S. § 8-533(B) by
    clear and convincing evidence. Kent K. v. Bobby M., 
    210 Ariz. 279
    , 284, ¶ 22
    (2005). The court must also find termination is in the child’s best interests
    3
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    by a preponderance of the evidence. 
    Id. We review
    the court’s termination
    determination for an abuse of discretion and will affirm unless no
    reasonable evidence supports the court’s findings. Mary Lou C. v. ADES, 
    207 Ariz. 43
    , 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004). The juvenile court “is in the best position to
    weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses,
    and resolve disputed facts.” ADES v. Oscar O., 
    209 Ariz. 332
    , 334, ¶ 4 (App.
    2004).
    A.     The Court Committed Harmless Error by Allowing DCS to
    Cross-Examine Mother and Father’s Expert Witness with
    Publications in His Field Without Laying Proper Foundation.
    ¶7           Mother and Father assert that DCS failed to lay proper
    foundation for the scientific articles it used to impeach Mother’s and
    Father’s expert witness, Dr. Scheller. Although we agree the court erred by
    not requiring DCS to lay the proper foundation for the publications, we
    conclude the error was harmless. See Monica C. v. ADES, 
    211 Ariz. 89
    , 94,
    ¶ 22 (App. 2005) (harmless error applies in juvenile proceedings).
    ¶8              This court will affirm the juvenile court’s evidentiary rulings
    “absent a clear abuse of its discretion and resulting prejudice.” Lashonda M.
    v. ADES, 
    210 Ariz. 77
    , 82–83, ¶ 19 (App. 2005). Abuse of discretion occurs
    when a court’s decision is “manifestly unreasonable” or based on
    “untenable” grounds. 
    Id. (quoting Quigley
    v. City Court of Tucson, 
    132 Ariz. 35
    , 37 (1982)).
    ¶9           Arizona Rule of Evidence 803(18) governs the admission of
    hearsay statements from learned treatises, periodicals, or pamphlets. Rule
    803(18) provides that statements from such publications may be read into
    evidence, but not received as an exhibit, if:
    (A) the statement is called to the attention of an expert witness
    on cross-examination or relied on by the expert on direct
    examination; and
    (B) the publication is established as a reliable authority by the
    expert’s admission or testimony, by another expert’s
    testimony, or by judicial notice.
    “The learned treatise exception to the hearsay rule stems from
    [the] . . . independent guarantees of trustworthiness of such works.” Rossell
    v. Volkswagen of Am., 
    147 Ariz. 160
    , 173 (1985). By requiring the proponent
    to elicit an expert’s recognition of the publication’s reliability, Rule
    803(18)(B) provides the proper method to verify the statement’s
    4
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    trustworthiness. See State v. West, 
    238 Ariz. 482
    , 500–501, ¶¶ 68, 70 (App.
    2015).
    ¶10          Mother and Father argue DCS failed to lay the proper
    foundation before recounting statements from the scientific articles in the
    following two instances:
    [DCS Counsel:]       Okay. In Jones’ study, he concluded,
    again, that these are rare, but cannot be
    diagnosed unless nonaccidental head
    injury had been questioned thoroughly,
    do you agree with that statement?
    [Dr. Scheller:]      Yes and no. It’s sort of -- it’s a very
    complicated statement that he said. And
    I’m happy to explain why or I’ll just
    say --
    *      *     *
    [DCS Counsel:]       And you’re familiar with the Feldman
    study that was published in September
    of 2001?
    [Dr. Scheller:]      Yes, 2001. Because he’s published a real
    lot of studies.
    *      *     *
    [DCS Counsel:]       And [Feldman’s] study found chronic or
    mixed chronic and acute subdural
    hematoma were found only in abused
    children in his study, that’s what he
    found, correct?
    [Dr. Scheller:]      Yes.
    Mother timely objected to each line of questioning, citing DCS’s failure to
    establish that the publications containing the articles were reliable as
    required by Rule 803(18)(B). The court overruled each objection and found
    Dr. Scheller’s knowledge of the studies provided adequate foundation to
    question him about the contents.
    ¶11          DCS asserts it was not obligated to follow Rule 803(18)’s
    foundation requirements during the cross-examination because it “did not
    5
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    seek to admit the articles into evidence.” We reject this argument. By asking
    Dr. Scheller to confirm its paraphrased descriptions of the articles’ findings,
    DCS put the truth of the findings themselves at issue. See Ariz. R. Evid.
    801(c) (hearsay means an out-of-court statement offered to prove the truth
    of the matter asserted in the statement); Ariz. R. Evid. 802 (hearsay
    generally inadmissible); 
    West, 238 Ariz. at 501
    , ¶ 71 (superior court properly
    sustained objection to prosecutor’s reference to the findings of a “great deal
    of literature” in scientific journals); Sharman v. Skaggs Cos., 
    124 Ariz. 165
    ,
    168–69 (App. 1979) (discussion of a report’s findings on cross-examination
    introduced hearsay statements from report). Thus, before recounting the
    articles’ findings, DCS was required to first lay proper foundation
    concerning the reliability of the publications in which those articles
    appeared, or the reliability of the studies within the articles. DCS did not
    lay the required foundation, and the court erred by overruling Mother’s
    and Father’s objections to DCS’s improper cross-examination.
    ¶12           Although the court should have required DCS to establish the
    publications’ reliability before receiving evidence of the articles’ findings,
    we nonetheless conclude that the error was harmless. Dr. Scheller conceded
    his familiarity with each authority, was able to answer DCS’s follow-up
    questions, and at times challenged DCS’s attempts to restrict his
    explanations of the articles’ findings. While Mother and Father take issue
    with whether the referenced publications were current and credible, their
    respective counsel did not develop these arguments on redirect
    examination despite the opportunity to do so. And although the juvenile
    court ultimately rejected Dr. Scheller’s opinion, it based that decision on the
    testimony of J.M.’s treating physicians and Dr. Scheller’s concessions
    surrounding the cause of J.M.’s injuries, not whether Dr. Scheller’s opinion
    was contrary to the weight of published authority.
    B.     Sufficient Evidence Supports the Court’s Order Terminating
    Mother’s and Father’s Rights Based on Abuse or Failure to Protect
    from Abuse.
    ¶13          Mother and Father argue insufficient evidence supports the
    court’s termination order under the abuse ground. A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2)
    provides:
    B.    Evidence sufficient to justify the termination of the
    parent-child relationship shall include . . .
    *       *      *
    6
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    2.     [t]hat the parent has neglected or wilfully abused a
    child. This abuse includes serious physical or emotional
    injury or situations in which the parent knew or reasonably
    should have known that a person was abusing or neglecting
    a child.
    If a parent abuses or neglects their child, the court may terminate that
    parent’s rights to their other children on this basis, even if there is no
    evidence that the other children were abused. Linda 
    V., 211 Ariz. at 79
    , ¶ 14.
    ¶14           Reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that J.M.’s
    injuries were caused by abuse. While in Mother and Father’s exclusive care,
    J.M. suffered a large subdural hemorrhage on the left side of her brain and
    a smaller subdural hemorrhage on the right. She also had significant
    midline shift and herniation of her brain, meaning there was so much
    pressure in the brain that it started to shift out of its normal position. J.M.
    required emergency neurosurgery to relieve the pressure because it had
    become so great that her skull could no longer contain the brain and its
    contents without threatening her life. She also had diffused retinal
    hemorrhages (or bleeding) in all quadrants of the retina and all layers of the
    retina. Her head injuries negatively affected a multitude of systems in her
    body. Post-trauma, doctors diagnosed her with cerebral palsy because she
    had significant motor impairment. She also suffers from regular epileptic
    seizures and is blind. She now requires occupational therapy, feeding
    therapy, and 24-hour monitoring. Dr. Bristol testified that J.M. will likely
    require long-term, full-time care for the foreseeable future.
    ¶15            At the termination hearing, Dr. Jones opined that J.M.’s
    injuries occurred within a few days before her hospital admission and
    resulted from nonaccidental trauma. After reviewing the family’s medical
    history and J.M.’s birth records, Dr. Jones found no alternative medical
    explanation for her injuries. Similarly, Dr. Bristol testified that J.M.’s
    injuries were most likely caused by recent trauma. Dr. Jones added that
    J.M.’s lack of external injuries did not rule out abuse.
    ¶16          Dr. Scheller disagreed and testified that J.M.’s injuries
    resulted from a subdural hematoma at birth that began spontaneously
    re-bleeding some weeks later, which in turn caused her retinal
    hemorrhages. Dr. Scheller conceded that this occurrence would be “an
    unusual complication” and that no other non-traumatic medical condition
    could have caused J.M.’s injuries.
    7
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶17           Dr. Jones and Dr. Bristol opined on Dr. Scheller’s conclusion,
    testifying that such an occurrence under the circumstances present with
    J.M. would be “very, very rare.” Dr. Jones testified that “children [who]
    have spontaneous re-bleeding [also] have some other complicating factor
    with their brain.” Dr. Bristol testified that in her experience as a pediatric
    neurosurgeon she had “not seen a spontaneous re-bleed to that degree.”
    Dr. Jones opined that J.M.’s presentation and injuries did not correspond to
    Dr. Scheller’s theory, particularly the diffuse nature of J.M.’s retinal
    hemorrhages, which was consistent with “massive trauma with
    acceleration and deceleration.” Regarding J.M.’s eye injuries, Dr. Jones
    stated that:
    [T]here had to be [a] significant force that led to that pattern
    of retinal hemorrhages. You can get retinal hemorrhages from
    many different causes, but the only times we see [J.M.’s]
    pattern of retinal hemorrhages in the pediatric population is
    from abusive head trauma, severe motor vehicle collisions or
    there’s some case reports of children who have fallen out of
    two or three story windows onto concrete.
    Dr. Jones specifically distinguished Dr. Scheller’s theory, testifying that
    “when the pressure is high in the brain, you can get retinal hemorrhages,”
    but they are typically “in the . . . most recessed part of the
    retina . . . surrounding the optic nerve,” which was “not the same pattern
    that [J.M.] had.”
    ¶18            Throughout the investigation, dependency, and termination
    hearings, Mother and Father maintained that J.M. had suffered no accidents
    or injuries that would explain her injuries. At J.M.’s first health checkup (a
    few weeks before her traumatic brain injury), the doctor examining J.M.
    noted no concerns. Likewise, Mother and Father maintained that J.M. only
    began showing symptoms the evening they took her to the hospital. In sum,
    reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that J.M.’s
    injuries were the result of nonaccidental trauma.
    ¶19            Based on its conclusion that J.M.’s injuries were the result of
    nonaccidental trauma, the court also found that Mother or Father, or both,
    intentionally abused J.M. or knew or reasonably should have known that
    the other parent abused her, “as she was in their sole care when she suffered
    life-threatening injuries.” The court also found that, despite the “timing,
    extent, mechanics and presentation of [J.M.’s] injuries,” Mother and Father
    continued to deny that abusive conduct occurred, presented a “united
    front,” and remained committed to each other and their relationship. And
    8
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    because neither parent had “shown a willingness to leave the other to
    protect the children from the other parent,” the court concluded that “both
    parents have demonstrated their lack of protective capacities for all of the
    children, not only [J.M.].”
    ¶20           Mother and Father have consistently maintained that they
    were J.M.’s only caregivers since her birth. Mother and Father continuously
    denied J.M. was abused, even after they were confronted with PCH’s
    medical assessments of J.M.’s injuries. Despite strong evidence that at least
    one of them caused J.M.’s injuries, Mother and Father made no attempt to
    distance themselves from one another. To the contrary, in the months
    following the incident with J.M., Mother and Father deepened their
    commitment to one another by marrying. Given this record, reasonable
    evidence supports the juvenile court’s determination that: (1) one or both
    parents willfully abused J.M. by causing J.M.’s physical injuries; and (2) one
    or both parents failed to protect J.M. after they knew or reasonably should
    have known J.M. had been abused. See Maricopa County Juv. Action Nos.
    JS-4118/JD-529, 
    134 Ariz. 407
    , 408–09 (App. 1982) (where mother refused to
    obtain a divorce or otherwise separate herself from husband who had
    committed abuse, her “knowing failure” to protect her children from abuse
    by her husband justified termination of her parental rights); see also Mario
    G. v. ADES, 
    227 Ariz. 282
    , 287–88, ¶¶ 19–25 (App. 2011) (finding a father’s
    failure to protect one child from abuse justified termination of his rights to
    another child); Linda 
    V., 211 Ariz. at 79
    , ¶ 14 (parents “who permit another
    person to abuse or neglect their children” may have their parental rights
    terminated). Once DCS established Mother and Father abused or failed to
    take steps to protect J.M. after the abuse occurred, the statutory grounds to
    terminate Mother’s and Father’s rights to the other children were also met.
    A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2); Linda 
    V., 211 Ariz. at 79
    , ¶ 14. Accordingly, reasonable
    evidence supports the court’s finding that termination of Mother’s rights to
    J.M., F.M., and M.R., and Father’s rights to J.M. and F.M., was justified
    under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2).
    C.     Alma S. v. DCS Requires Courts to Consider the Connection
    Between the Prior Abuse of One Child and the Risk of Future
    Abuse to the Other Children During the Best-Interests Inquiry.
    ¶21           Mother and Father argue insufficient evidence supports the
    juvenile court’s finding that there was a “nexus” between the abuse of J.M.
    and the risk of abuse to F.M. and M.R. In the past, this court has expressly
    held that termination of parental rights to a child who has not been the
    direct target of abuse requires the party seeking termination of rights to
    show, at the statutory-grounds stage, “a constitutional nexus between the
    9
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    prior abuse and the risk of future abuse to the child at issue.” Seth M. v.
    Arienne M., 
    245 Ariz. 245
    , 248, ¶ 11 (App. 2018) (quoting Tina T. v. DCS, 
    236 Ariz. 295
    , 299, ¶ 17 (App. 2014)); Mario 
    G., 227 Ariz. at 285
    , ¶ 16. This court
    recently revisited the constitutional nexus requirement, noting that it “first
    appeared in a footnote in the Linda V. opinion, although that opinion does
    not identify any legal source for such a requirement and it is not present in
    the statute itself.” Seth 
    M., 245 Ariz. at 248
    , ¶ 11 (citing Linda 
    V., 211 Ariz. at 80
    , ¶ 17, n.3).
    ¶22            The uncertainty expressed in Seth M. towards requiring this
    showing at the statutory-grounds stage was realized when our supreme
    court issued its decision in Alma S. v. DCS. In Alma S., the supreme court
    held “the substantive grounds for termination listed in § 8-533(B) [are
    synonymous] with parental unfitness,” and once the juvenile court finds a
    parent to be unfit, the best-interests analysis is 
    triggered. 245 Ariz. at 150
    –
    51, ¶¶ 9, 12. Alma S. thus makes clear that, at the statutory-grounds stage,
    the juvenile court should only determine whether the party seeking
    termination has met its burden of proving a parent unfit under one of the
    grounds for termination. See Alma 
    S., 245 Ariz. at 154
    , ¶ 32–33 (Bolick, J.,
    concurring in the result) (“However, the Court today holds that all that
    must be proven by clear and convincing evidence is that the parent engaged
    in one of the statutory grounds for termination, which by itself ‘constitute[s]
    a finding of parental fitness.’” (alteration in original) (quoting 
    id. at 150,
    ¶ 11)). Considerations outside the scope of A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(2)—such as
    whether a connection exists between a parent’s abuse of one of their
    children and the risk of abuse to their other children—are left to the
    best-interests inquiry. This conclusion not only comports with Alma S.’s
    discussion of the two-step termination inquiry, but also Linda V.’s original
    application of a “nexus” requirement. See Linda 
    V., 211 Ariz. at 80
    , ¶ 17, n.3
    (addressing the need to demonstrate a nexus between prior abuse and the
    risk of future abuse in the court’s best-interests analysis).
    D.     Reasonable Evidence Supports the Court’s Finding that
    Termination of Mother’s and Father’s Parental Rights Served the
    Children’s Best Interests.
    ¶23            Once the court finds a parent unfit under at least one statutory
    ground for termination, “the interests of the parent and child diverge,” and
    the court proceeds to balance the unfit parent’s “interest in the care and
    custody of his or her child . . . . against the independent and often adverse
    interests of the child in a safe and stable home life.” Kent 
    K., 210 Ariz. at 286
    ,
    ¶ 35. “[A] determination of the child’s best interest must include a finding
    as to how the child would benefit from a severance or be harmed by the
    10
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    continuation of the relationship.” Maricopa County Juv. Action No. JS-500274,
    
    167 Ariz. 1
    , 5 (1990) (emphasis omitted). Courts “must consider the totality
    of the circumstances existing at the time of the severance determination,
    including the child’s adoptability and the parent’s rehabilitation.” Alma 
    S., 245 Ariz. at 148
    , ¶ 1. In cases where termination of a parent’s rights to one
    child is predicated on the parent’s abuse of another child, courts must also
    consider the connection between that abuse and the risk of future abuse to
    the child at issue. See Seth 
    M., 245 Ariz. at 248
    , ¶ 11; Mario 
    G., 227 Ariz. at 285
    , ¶ 16; Linda 
    V., 211 Ariz. at 79
    –80 ¶¶ 14–15, 17. “When a current
    placement meets the child’s needs and the child’s prospective adoption is
    otherwise legally possible and likely, a juvenile court may find that
    termination of parental rights, so as to permit adoption, is in the child’s best
    interests.” Demetrius L. v. Joshlynn F., 
    239 Ariz. 1
    , 4, ¶ 12 (2016). Finally,
    “[t]he existence and effect of a bonded relationship between a biological
    parent and a child, although a factor to consider, is not dispositive in
    addressing best interests.” Dominique M. v. DCS, 
    240 Ariz. 96
    , 98, ¶ 12 (App.
    2016).
    ¶24           Here, based on its finding that Mother or Father abused J.M.
    or that they failed to protect J.M. from abuse, the juvenile court found that
    it had “grave concerns about the parents’ protective capacities in the
    future.” Mother and Father argue that the risk of abuse to F.M. and M.R. is
    remote because J.M. was a vulnerable infant, unlike the older children. But
    the juvenile court rejected this argument and concluded that by failing to
    take steps to protect J.M. from the unidentified abusing parent, “Mother
    and Father have demonstrated they cannot or will not protect their
    children.” The court specifically found that:
    Although [M.R. and F.M.] are no longer infants, [they] are
    young children who are vulnerable. [M.R.] has already been
    the victim of child abuse by Mother in the past.[2] Mother and
    Father . . . have not been forthcoming about the cause of
    [J.M.’s] injuries.
    2      In 2011, while Mother went shopping, she left M.R., who was two
    years old at the time, unsupervised inside her car for 40 minutes. The
    temperature outside was 106 degrees. A police officer removed M.R. from
    the car before she suffered any serious injury, but Mother was arrested and
    subsequently pled guilty to child abuse.
    11
    SANDRA R., SERGIO C. v. DCS, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    The court also found that “given the parents’ persistent denials that any
    abuse occurred,” both J.M. and her older siblings remained at risk of future
    abuse.
    ¶25           Reasonable evidence in the record supports these findings.
    M.R. was nine years old at the time of the termination hearing and F.M. was
    almost three—both still dependent on Mother and Father to meet their
    needs. Both parents’ actions after learning the nature of J.M.’s injuries
    demonstrated they could not recognize danger and keep the children safe.
    As J.M.’s primary caregivers, Mother and Father are the only ones in a
    position to explain how her injuries occurred. Mother and Father have
    refused to acknowledge abuse occurred or that at least one of them was
    responsible. Instead, they have remained together, and neither parent has
    taken steps to prevent the children from being returned to the same
    situation that led to J.M.’s near-fatal injuries. On this record, we conclude
    reasonable evidence supports the court’s finding that the abuse to J.M. bore
    a substantial connection to the risk of future abuse to the other children in
    Mother’s and Father’s care.
    ¶26            Moreover, reasonable evidence concerning the children’s
    adoptability supports the juvenile court’s best-interests finding. The case
    manager testified that F.M. and M.R. were in a kinship placement that was
    meeting their needs and the foster parents wished to adopt them. Due to
    J.M.’s special needs, she was in a separate placement for a medically-fragile
    child that was providing her the specialized care she required. Although
    J.M.’s placement was not willing to adopt, DCS identified other potential
    adoptive placements for her. Considering the children’s stability in their
    current placements, and the availability of adoptive placements, the case
    manager testified that termination would provide the children with “a safe,
    secure environment, where all of their needs will be met.” Reasonable
    evidence supports the court’s finding that termination was also in the
    children’s best interests because of their adoptability.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶27           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the juvenile court’s order
    terminating Mother’s rights to J.M., F.M., and M.R. and Father’s rights to
    J.M. and F.M.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA    12