State v. Md Helicopters Inc ( 2020 )


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  •                                IN THE
    SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF ARIZONA
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS,
    Plaintiff/Appellee,
    v.
    MD HELICOPTERS, INC.,
    Defendant/Appellant.
    No. CV-20-0112-PR
    Filed December 30, 2020
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    The Honorable Joshua D. Rogers, Judge
    The Honorable Margaret Benny, Judge Pro Tempore
    No. CV2015-095127
    AFFIRMED
    Opinion of the Court of Appeals, Division One
    
    248 Ariz. 533
    (App. 2020)
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL:
    James E. Berger (argued), King & Spalding LLP, New York, NY; Daniel G.
    Dowd, Cindy C. Albracht-Crogan, Stacey F. Gottlieb, Kevin C. Moyer,
    Cohen Dowd Quigley P.C., Phoenix, Attorneys for The State of the
    Netherlands
    Karl M. Tilleman (argued), Erin Bradham, Douglas D. Janicik, Dentons US
    LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for MD Helicopters, Inc.
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    C. Bradley Vynalek, Brian A. Howie, Lauren Elliot Stine, Daniel G. Roberts,
    Quarles & Brady LLP, Phoenix, Attorneys for Amicus Curiae Arizona
    Bankers Association and Canada Arizona Business Council
    VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER authored the opinion of the Court, in which
    JUSTICES GOULD, LOPEZ, BEENE, and JUDGE EPPICH joined.*
    JUSTICE MONTGOMERY authored a dissenting opinion in which
    JUSTICE BOLICK joined.
    VICE CHIEF JUSTICE TIMMER, opinion of the Court:
    ¶1            Arizona’s version of the Uniform Foreign-Country Money
    Judgments Recognition Act, A.R.S. §§ 12-3251 to -3254 (“Act”), authorizes
    courts to recognize judgments originating from a foreign country with a
    “reciprocal law” that is “similar” to the Act. § 12-3252(B)(2). We are
    asked whether reciprocity requires a legislative act or if court decisions
    authorizing such procedures can be considered. We hold that court-
    authorized procedures recognizing foreign-country money judgments in a
    manner similar to the Act can satisfy the reciprocity requirement.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2            The District Court of The Hague entered a monetary
    judgment in favor of the Netherlands’ National Police Services Agency and
    against MD Helicopters, Inc. (“MDHI”) in a breach-of-contract lawsuit.
    The Hague Court of Appeal upheld the judgment. The State of the
    Netherlands, as assignee of the judgment, filed suit in the superior court in
    Maricopa County seeking recognition of the Dutch judgment under both
    the Act and common law principles. The superior court entered summary
    *
    Chief Justice Brutinel is recused from this matter. Pursuant to article 6,
    section 3 of the Arizona Constitution, Hon. Karl C. Eppich, Judge of the
    Court of Appeals Division Two, was designated to sit in this matter.
    2
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    judgment for the Netherlands, recognizing the judgment under the Act and
    permitting its enforcement in Arizona.
    ¶3             The court of appeals affirmed. State of the Netherlands v. MD
    Helicopters, Inc., 
    248 Ariz. 533
    (App. 2020). In doing so, it rejected MDHI’s
    argument that the Act did not apply here because the Netherlands did not
    have a reciprocal, similar legislative act.
    Id. at 539 ¶ 16.
    The court
    concluded that the Netherlands’ legislatively enacted code of civil
    procedure, along with the court decisions applying it, combined to satisfy
    that requirement.
    Id. at 541–42 ¶¶ 23–24.
    Because the court based its
    decision on the Act, it did not address whether common law principles
    would also have authorized recognition of the judgment.
    Id. at 546 ¶ 41. ¶4
             We granted review to decide whether the Act’s reciprocity
    requirement is satisfied when a foreign country’s caselaw recognizes
    judgments in a manner that is similar to the Act, an issue of statewide
    importance.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶5              Arizona does not recognize or permit enforcement of a
    foreign-country money judgment unless the judgment creditor first
    domesticates that judgment in an Arizona court. See, e.g., A.R.S. § 12-3254
    (describing the process for domestication under the Act). Before 2015,
    Arizona courts only applied common law principles to decide whether to
    recognize foreign-country money judgments. See, e.g., Alberta Sec. Comm’n
    v. Ryckman, 
    200 Ariz. 540
    , 545 ¶ 15 (App. 2001) (applying Restatement
    (Third) of the Foreign Relations Laws of the United States §§ 481–82 (Am.
    Law Inst. 1987)). Under the common law, a court recognizes a judgment
    if the foreign jurisdiction that issued the judgment “afforded the defendant
    an opportunity for a hearing that comports with basic due process
    principles before a court of competent jurisdiction.”
    Id. ¶ 18.
    Whether
    that jurisdiction would recognize Arizona judgments if circumstances were
    reversed was not considered. See Restatement § 481 cmt. d.
    ¶6            In 2015, the Arizona Legislature passed the Act, which is
    based on the Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments Recognition Act.
    See 2015 Ariz. Sess. Laws ch. 170, § 1 (1st Reg. Sess.). It requires courts to
    recognize foreign-country money judgments subject to the Act unless a
    listed exception exists. §§ 12-3252 and -3253. Unlike the uniform act and
    common law, the Act includes a reciprocity requirement, § 12-3252(B)(2),
    which excludes from the Act any judgment that “[o]riginates from a foreign
    3
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    country that has not adopted or enacted a reciprocal law related to foreign-
    country money judgments that is similar to this chapter.” The Act does
    not address whether courts may domesticate excluded judgments under
    common law principles.
    ¶7            MDHI argues that § 12-3252(B)(2) prevents an Arizona court
    from recognizing a foreign-country money judgment unless it originates
    from a country that either entered a treaty with the United States or Arizona
    or enacted a statute similar to the Act. Because the Netherlands applies
    principles grounded in Dutch caselaw to recognize foreign-country money
    judgments, rather than relying exclusively on a treaty or statute, MDHI
    asserts that the Act’s reciprocity clause excludes the judgment here from
    recognition under the Act. In contrast, the Netherlands asserts, and the
    prior courts agreed, that judgment-recognition procedures established by
    caselaw that are similar to the Act satisfy the clause. See State of the
    
    Netherlands, 248 Ariz. at 539
    ¶ 16. It therefore contends that because Dutch
    caselaw establishes recognition principles similar to the Act, the Act applies
    to the judgment here.
    ¶8             Resolution of this dispute turns on the meaning of “a
    reciprocal law” in § 12-3252(B)(2), an issue we review de novo. See BMO
    Harris Bank, N.A. v. Wildwood Creek Ranch, LLC, 
    236 Ariz. 363
    , 365 ¶ 7 (2015).
    When interpreting statutes, our goal is to effectuate the legislature’s intent.
    SolarCity Corp. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Revenue, 
    243 Ariz. 477
    , 480 ¶ 8 (2018). To do
    so, “we interpret statutory language in view of the entire text, considering
    the context and related statutes on the same subject.” Molera v. Hobbs, 
    250 Ariz. 13
    , 24 ¶ 34 (2020) (citation omitted) (internal alterations omitted). “If
    the language is clear and has only one reasonable meaning, we will apply
    that meaning.”
    Id. If it yields
    more than one reasonable meaning, we
    apply secondary interpretive principles, such as examining “the statute’s
    subject matter, historical background, effect and consequences, and spirit
    and purpose.”
    Id. (quoting Rosas v.
    Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    249 Ariz. 26
    ,
    28 ¶ 13 (2020)).
    ¶9             We reject MDHI’s argument that “reciprocal” necessarily
    means a corresponding legislative enactment. The plain meaning of
    “reciprocal” does not itself direct the form of “law.” New York v. O’Neill,
    
    359 U.S. 1
    , 4 (1959), and State v. Jordan, 
    83 Ariz. 248
    , 251 (1958), relied on by
    MDHI, did not conclude otherwise by describing the Uniform Act to Secure
    the Attendance of Witnesses from Without a State in Criminal Proceedings
    as operative between states that had enacted the same or similar legislation.
    4
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    The reciprocity clause in that act uses different language, see A.R.S.
    § 13-4093(A), and, regardless, neither case addressed the meaning of the
    reciprocity clause. See 
    O’Neill, 359 U.S. at 4
    ; 
    Jordan, 83 Ariz. at 251
    .
    Whether § 12-3252(B)(2) requires a reciprocal legislative enactment
    depends entirely on the meaning of “law.”
    ¶10           “Law” may have a broad or narrow meaning, depending on
    context and legislative intent. See State ex rel. Conway v. Superior Court, 
    60 Ariz. 69
    , 75–77 (1942), overruled in part on other grounds by Adams v. Bolin, 
    74 Ariz. 269
    , 275 (1952). The term can include “constitutions, statutes, the
    common law and the various [rules of court]” or “an act of the legislature
    only.”
    Id. at 76;
    see also Law, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019)
    (defining “law” in relevant part as “[t]he aggregate of legislation, judicial
    precedents, and accepted legal principles,” or “[t]he set of rules or
    principles dealing with a specific area of a legal system”); Law, Webster’s
    Third New International Dictionary (3d ed. 2002) (defining “law” in
    relevant part as an “ordinance, statute, resolution, rule [or] judicial
    decision,” or the “common law”). Pinpointing whether the legislature
    intended “law” to have a broad meaning or a narrower one forms the crux
    of the dispute here.
    ¶11            Reading “law” in context, we agree with the Netherlands and
    the court of appeals that the legislature intended a broad meaning, which
    includes a foreign country’s jurisprudence. See State of the 
    Netherlands, 248 Ariz. at 540
    ¶ 21. First, interpreting “law” as including caselaw, rules,
    regulations, and the like avoids rendering “adopted” in § 12-3252(B)(2)
    redundant to “enacted” and thus superfluous. See Nicaise v. Sundaram, 
    245 Ariz. 566
    , 568 ¶ 11 (2019) (“A cardinal principle of statutory interpretation
    is to give meaning, if possible, to every word and provision so that no word
    or provision is rendered superfluous.”). Legislative bodies “enact” laws.
    See Enact, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “enact” as
    meaning “[t]o make into law by authoritative act; to pass”); Cronin v.
    Sheldon, 
    195 Ariz. 531
    , 537 ¶ 28 (1999) (acknowledging that “the legislature
    has the authority to enact laws”). If the legislature intended to restrict the
    meaning of “law” to legislative enactments, “adopted” would add nothing
    to § 12-3252(B)(2). But courts “adopt” rules, procedures, and common law
    principles, and executive agencies “adopt” rules and regulations. See State
    of the 
    Netherlands, 248 Ariz. at 539
    –40 ¶ 19 (citing examples); see also Dobson
    Bay Club II DD, LLC v. La Sonrisa de Siena, LLC, 
    242 Ariz. 108
    , 111 ¶ 15 (2017)
    (“We adopt the Restatement Second § 356(1) to test the enforceability of a
    stipulated damages provision.” (emphasis added)); Ariz. Const. art. 6, § 2
    5
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    (“The supreme court shall sit in accordance with rules adopted by it.”
    (emphasis added)). Interpreting “law” as including these authorities
    gives “adopted” a meaning distinct from “enacted.”
    ¶12           MDHI briefly asserts that a treaty could also be “a reciprocal
    law.” Countries, however, do not “enact” or “adopt” treaties but rather
    enter into such agreements. Cf. Begay v. Miller, 
    70 Ariz. 380
    , 385 (1950)
    (addressing Indian tribe’s sovereign “power to enter into treaties with
    foreign nations”); U.S. Const. art. 1, § 10, cl. 3 (“No State shall, without the
    Consent of Congress . . . enter into any Agreement or Compact with . . . a
    foreign Power . . . .”).
    ¶13           Second, the legislature did not include any language in
    § 12-3252(B)(2) restricting “law” to a legislative act or treaty. See Collins v.
    Stockwell, 
    137 Ariz. 416
    , 420 (1983) (“Courts will not read into a statute
    something that is not within the manifest intent of the Legislature as
    gathered from the statute itself.”). The absence of restrictive language is
    particularly telling as the legislature was indisputably aware that “law”
    includes more than statutes. See, e.g., 
    Conway, 60 Ariz. at 75
    –76 (including
    the common law within the meaning of “law”); A.R.S. § 12-122 (“The
    superior court, in addition to the powers conferred by constitution, rule or
    statute, may proceed according to the common law.”). And the legislature
    knew that Arizona historically recognized foreign-country money
    judgments under common law principles of comity. See Ariz. H.R. B.
    Summ. for S.B. 1447, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mar. 18, 2015) (explaining that
    the Act “allows a court to give a foreign-country judgment greater effect
    than it is currently required to” and “outlines policy for listing today[’]s
    generally-accepted policies and preserves the right for courts to recognize
    further bases”).
    ¶14           Third, the focus of § 12-3252(B)(2) is on ensuring that a foreign
    country would recognize Arizona judgments under circumstances similar
    to those in the Act. No reason appears why the legislature would restrict
    the myriad types of “law” under which a foreign country may recognize an
    Arizona judgment. See 
    Molera, 250 Ariz. at 24
    ¶ 34 (providing that the
    “spirit and purpose” of the statute is a pertinent consideration to
    interpretation (quoting 
    Rosas, 249 Ariz. at 28
    ¶ 13)).
    ¶15            We are not persuaded by MDHI’s contrary arguments. It
    contends that because § 12-3252(B)(2) refers to “a reciprocal law,” only a
    single act, like a statute or treaty, can fulfill that requirement. But in our
    6
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    statutes, words phrased singularly include the plural, so “a” does not
    necessarily mean one singular act. See A.R.S. § 1-214(B) (“Words in the
    singular number include the plural, and words in the plural number
    include the singular.”). Mirroring the uniform act, the Act is phrased
    primarily in the singular throughout, and nothing indicates a legislative
    intent to exclude plural references. See, e.g., § 12-3253(C)(3) (permitting a
    court to refuse recognition of a judgment “repugnant to the public policy of
    this state or of the United States” (emphasis added)). But see § 12-3253(E)(4)
    (providing that a foreign-country money judgment may not be refused for
    lack of personal jurisdiction if the defendant was a business entity
    “organized under the laws of[] the foreign country” (emphasis added)).
    For example, § 12-3252(A) provides that the Act applies to judgments that
    are final, conclusive, and enforceable “under the law of the foreign
    country,” which, as in Arizona, may consist of a combination of legislation
    and court rules. See, e.g., Ariz. R. Civ. P. 58 (entry of judgment); A.R.S.
    § 12-1611 (renewal of judgments).
    ¶16             MDHI also argues that “foreign country” in § 12-3252(B)(2)
    excludes foreign courts, meaning “a reciprocal law” that is “adopted or
    enacted” by that country must be a legislative enactment or treaty. The
    Act defines “foreign country” as “a government” other than the United
    States, its territories and possessions and any other government where “a
    judgment of that government’s courts” is “subject to determination under
    the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution.” See § 12-
    3251(1)(c). MDHI reasons that “government,” and by extension “foreign
    country,” necessarily excludes courts, otherwise the reference to “courts”
    would be redundant. It further points out that § 12-3253’s references to
    “foreign court” rather than “foreign country” when describing
    circumstances in which judgments cannot or may not be recognized further
    demonstrates that the legislature intended to differentiate the terms. See,
    e.g., § 12-3253(B)(2) (“A court may not recognize a foreign-country
    judgment if any of the following applies: . . . [t]he foreign court did not have
    personal jurisdiction over the defendant.”).
    ¶17           Like the court of appeals, we are unpersuaded. See State of
    the 
    Netherlands, 248 Ariz. at 539
    ¶ 18. A “foreign country” means “a
    government,” see § 12-3252(1), and governments include courts. See
    Government, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining “government”
    in relevant part as meaning “the political organs of a country regardless of
    their function or level”).     By referring to a “government’s courts,”
    § 12-3251(1)(c) recognizes that courts belong to government. Section
    7
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    12-3251(2) also acknowledges that courts are part of government by
    defining a “foreign-country judgment” as one issued by “a court of a
    foreign country.” The references to “foreign courts” in § 12-3253 do not
    suggest otherwise by identifying the part of government issuing the
    judgments at issue. Singling out the component of government that issues
    money judgments (i.e., courts) when discussing those judgments does not
    make the terms “government” and “courts” redundant if the former term
    includes the latter.
    ¶18           MDHI finally argues that interpreting “a reciprocal law” as
    including caselaw and court practices thwarts the legislature’s intent to
    only recognize foreign-country money judgments from rendering countries
    that provide a “guarantee of reciprocity” through legislation. In support,
    MDHI relies on remarks during a senate committee hearing on Senate Bill
    1447, which resulted in the Act. There, a representative of the Arizona
    Bankers Association, who requested the bill, stated the bill was prompted
    by Alberta, Canada’s desire “to have a reciprocal arrangement with
    Arizona.”     He also stated that any country wanting a “reciprocal
    arrangement” with Arizona would qualify if it met the Act’s requirements
    of “essentially” having court systems that parallel those in the United
    States.    The bill’s sponsoring senator added that three states had
    “agreements” with Alberta like ones the Act would authorize. Because
    Alberta recognizes foreign judgments under its Reciprocal Enforcement of
    Judgments Act, R.S.A. 2000, ch. R-6, MDHI asserts that the hearing remarks
    reflect the legislature’s intent that only governments that “establish a
    mutual relationship with Arizona [through legislation] should be allowed
    to enjoy the [Act’s] benefits.”
    ¶19             Neither the language in § 12-3252(B)(2) nor the Act’s limited
    legislative history supports MDHI’s contention. As previously explained,
    nothing in § 12-3252(B)(2) restricts “a reciprocal law” to legislation. And
    neither the sponsoring senator nor the banking representative specified that
    any “reciprocal arrangement” or “agreement” had to take the form of
    legislation. Regardless, their remarks do not necessarily reflect the intent
    of the legislators who voted to enact Senate Bill 1447. See Hayes v. Cont’l
    Ins. Co., 
    178 Ariz. 264
    , 269–70 (1994) (“When seeking to ascertain the intent
    of legislators, courts normally give little or no weight to comments made at
    committee hearings by nonlegislators.”); City of Tucson v. Woods, 
    191 Ariz. 523
    , 528 (App. 1997) (“[A] single member of the legislature is not able to
    testify regarding the intent of the legislature in passing a law.”).
    8
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶20            Significantly, Alberta’s Reciprocal Enforcement of Judgments
    Act does not itself guarantee recognition of Arizona money judgments.
    That act provides that “[w]hen the Lieutenant Governor in Council is
    satisfied that reciprocal provision will be made by a jurisdiction” for
    enforcement of Alberta judgments, the Lieutenant Governor in Council
    “may by order declare it to be a reciprocating jurisdiction.” R.S.A. 2000,
    ch. R-6, § 8. No limits are placed on the Lieutenant Governor in Council’s
    discretion, and an order may be revoked in his or her discretion.
    Id. Although the Lieutenant
    Governor in Council has recognized Arizona as a
    reciprocating jurisdiction, see Alberta Regulation 344/85, the act itself does
    not provide Arizona judgment creditors with the “guarantee” MDHI
    asserts is required by “a reciprocal law.”
    ¶21            Our dissenting colleagues argue that “a reciprocal law”
    precludes caselaw because other states with broader reciprocity clauses
    consider caselaw, meaning our legislature must have intended a different
    result by using more restrictive language. See infra ¶¶ 28, 33–36. But
    even if other states’ reciprocity clauses are broader than § 12-3252(B)(2), that
    circumstance has no bearing on our legislature’s intent. Nothing in the
    legislative history suggests the legislature was aware of other states’
    reciprocity clauses or intended to be more restrictive than other states.
    Any comparison with other states’ reciprocity clauses to determine
    legislative intent is therefore of little use in interpreting the Act. And
    notably, the legislative history reflects a legislative intent to permit greater
    recognition of foreign-country money judgments; no mention is made of an
    intent to be more restrictive than other states. See Ariz. S.B. Summ. for S.B.
    1447, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mar. 25, 2015) (stating the Act is modeled on
    the uniform act, which “allows a court to give a foreign-country judgment
    greater effect than it is currently required to” and “outlines policy for listing
    today[’]s generally-accepted policies and preserves the right for courts to
    recognize further bases”).
    ¶22           In sum, “a reciprocal law related to foreign-country money
    judgments” means a foreign country’s formally recognized and enforced
    rule that authorizes recognition of Arizona money judgments. That rule
    can be established by a foreign country’s caselaw. To avoid exclusion
    under § 12-3252(B)(2), the law must recognize such judgments in a manner
    “similar” to the Act. In essence, § 12-3252(B)(2) provides that an Arizona
    court will only recognize a foreign-country money judgment if it is assured
    that the rendering foreign country would recognize an Arizona judgment
    if circumstances were reversed.
    9
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶23           We now turn to the facts of this case. Article 431 of the Dutch
    Code of Civil Procedure, enacted by the Dutch Legislature, generally
    prohibits enforcement of foreign judgments but authorizes the Dutch courts
    to “deal[] with and settle[] de novo” such matters. Pursuant to this
    delegation, Dutch courts developed principles for recognizing foreign-
    country money judgments, which is necessary to later enforce such
    judgments. See State of the 
    Netherlands, 248 Ariz. at 541
    ¶ 24. MDHI does
    not contest that Dutch caselaw has recognized foreign-country money
    judgments, including United States judgments, for nearly a century under
    principles “similar to” the Act. See
    id. at 541–42 ¶¶ 24–26
    (describing
    similarities and listing Dutch cases that recognized money judgments
    entered by United States courts). Although Dutch courts could cease
    applying such principles, just as countries could rescind reciprocal
    legislation or Alberta’s Lieutenant Governor in Council could revoke
    recognition of Arizona judgments, their steadfast recognition of foreign-
    country money judgments constitutes “a reciprocal law” that is “similar to”
    the Act.
    ¶24           The dissent argues that although formally adopted court
    procedures, evidentiary rules, and the like can be “similar to” the Act,
    caselaw cannot meet that requirement. See infra ¶ 27. It asserts that
    because the legislature did not enact the uniform act’s “savings clause,”
    which provides that foreign-country money judgments outside that act
    may still be recognized under common law principles, the Act prohibits
    recognizing foreign-country money judgments under the common law.
    See infra ¶¶ 29, 38. And because Dutch courts recognize foreign-country
    money judgments under principles developed in caselaw, the Dutch
    system, according to the dissent, is dissimilar to the Act. See infra ¶ 41.
    ¶25             We find the dissent’s reasoning flawed. Whether the lack of
    a savings clause in the Act evidences a legislative intent to prohibit
    recognition of all foreign-country money judgments under common law
    principles is not properly before us because we denied review of that issue
    in this case. Regardless, even if the legislature intended to entirely
    displace the common law for recognizing judgments in Arizona, it does not
    logically follow that foreign caselaw cannot establish a reciprocal law
    similar to the Act. The Act did not eschew the common law but codified
    “the most prevalent common law rules” for recognizing foreign-country
    money judgments. See Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgments
    Recognition Act § 11 prefatory note (2005) (Unif. Law Comm’n prefatory
    note); see also § 12-3253 (codifying common law considerations like whether
    10
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    Opinion of the Court
    the judgment emanated from a court of competent jurisdiction providing
    due process of law); Alberta Sec. 
    Comm’n, 200 Ariz. at 545
    ¶ 15 (citing
    common law principles later codified in the Act). The key inquiry is
    whether the foreign system similarly adheres to the Act’s recognition rules.
    See Ariz. S.B. Summ. for S.B. 1447, 52d Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Mar. 25, 2015)
    (“Though the Act applies to judgment from any foreign court, it does not
    allow recognition of judgments rendered under a system not providing
    impartial tribunals or is incompatible with the requirements of due process
    of law.”). As the court of appeals concluded, and we agree, the Dutch
    system meets that standard. See State of the 
    Netherlands, 248 Ariz. at 541
    –
    42 ¶¶ 24–26.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶26           We affirm the trial court and the court of appeals. Both
    parties ask for attorney fees pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-341.01(A). We award
    fees to the Netherlands as the prevailing party.
    11
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BOLICK
    Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
    MONTGOMERY, J., joined by BOLICK, J., concurring in part and
    dissenting in part:
    ¶27            While it may be possible for a foreign court to adopt rules of
    procedure or evidence or some process that would satisfy the requirements
    of Arizona’s Uniform Foreign-Country Money Judgment Act (“Act”), I
    respectfully dissent from the Majority’s conclusion that Dutch caselaw
    satisfies the requirements in the matter before us.
    ¶28            There are two main reasons for my dissent. First, the
    Majority’s conclusion that Dutch caselaw is similar enough to the Act does
    not adequately account for the significant differences between the Arizona
    legislature’s version unanimously passed without amendment in 2015 and
    the Act as originally proposed in 2005 by the National Conference of
    Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (“NCCUSL Act”). See Unif.
    Foreign-Country Money Judg. Recog. Act (Unif. Law Comm’n 2005).
    Arizona’s version has a more stringent reciprocity requirement than any
    other state in the country and omits specific language that would
    accommodate the recognition of foreign judgments based on common law
    principles. While the latter difference does not necessarily mean that an
    Arizona court could not recognize a foreign judgment based on the
    common law—an issue we did not accept for review—it does bear on the
    comparison between the recognition of judgments pre-dating passage of
    the Act, the requirements of the Act, and Dutch caselaw today.
    ¶29            Second, the Majority’s conclusion does not account for the
    simple fact that, with passage of the Act, the Arizona legislature changed
    the means by which foreign judgments are recognized in Arizona from the
    common law approach to the statutory framework as set forth, whether
    exclusive or not. Given that Dutch caselaw reflects a common law
    approach, the Dutch process is more like what Arizona utilized before the
    Act. Therefore, the Dutch means for recognizing foreign judgments, being
    the same or similar to what we had before the Act, cannot be similar enough
    to the Act to warrant recognition of the judgment before us. Otherwise,
    either the entire action by the legislature in passing the Act was without
    effect, leaving the means for recognizing a foreign judgment no different
    now than it was before, or the Majority’s reading of the Act’s reciprocity
    requirement of similarity renders it meaningless.
    12
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BOLICK
    Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
    ¶30            As an initial point, I concur with the Majority’s interpretive
    principles, set forth at supra ¶¶ 8 and 9, as well as the balance of the
    Majority’s refutation of points raised by MDHI. See supra ¶¶ 7, 9, 10, 12,
    13, 16, 17, and 19. However, when considering the “subject matter,
    historical background, effect and consequences, and spirit and purpose” of
    the Act, Molera v. Hobbs, 
    250 Ariz. 13
    , 24 ¶ 34 (2020) (quoting Rosas v. Ariz.
    Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    246 Ariz. 26
    , 28 ¶ 13 (2020)), I depart from the Majority’s
    conclusion. Supra ¶ 23.
    ¶31            The Arizona legislature did not consider its version of the
    NCCUSL Act in a vacuum nor did it adopt the version approved by the
    NCCUSL in 2005. At the time Arizona passed its Act in 2015, twenty other
    states had adopted the NCCUSL Act or a version thereof 1 and the
    legislature specifically referenced the NCCUSL Act as a source for the
    introduced legislation. See Ariz. State Senate Fact Sheet for S.B. 1447, 52d
    Leg., 1st Reg. Sess. (Apr. 14, 2015). Instead of mirroring the NCCUSL Act,
    our legislature added a reciprocity requirement at A.R.S. § 12-3252 and
    declined to include Section 11 of the NCCUSL Act, entitled “Savings
    Clause.” Arizona also declined to include the Uniformity of Interpretation
    provision at Section 10, which states that “[i]n applying and construing this
    uniform act, consideration must be given to the need to promote uniformity
    of the law with respect to its subject matter among states that enact it.”
    ¶32            With respect to the requirement for reciprocity, the prefatory
    note to the NCCUSL Act states:
    [T]he drafters revisited the decision made in the 1962 Act not
    to require reciprocity as a condition to recognition of the
    foreign-country money judgments covered by the Act. After
    much discussion, the drafters decided that the approach of
    the 1962 Act continues to be the wisest course with regard to
    this issue. While recognition of U.S. judgments continues to
    be problematic in a number of foreign countries, there was
    insufficient evidence to establish that a reciprocity
    requirement would have a greater effect on encouraging
    foreign recognition of U.S. judgments than does the approach
    1 The number is now up to twenty-five. https: //www.uniformlaws.org/
    committees/community-home?CommunityKey=ae280c30-094a-4d8f-
    b722-8dcd614a8f3e
    13
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BOLICK
    Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
    taken by the Act. At the same time, the certainty and
    uniformity provided by the approach of the 1962 Act, and
    continued in this Act, creates a stability in this area that
    facilitates international commercial transactions.
    ¶33            Nonetheless, Arizona included a reciprocity requirement, as
    did six other states—Florida, Maine, Massachusetts, Ohio, Tennessee, and
    Texas. Fl. Stat. § 55.605(2)(g); Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 8505(2)(G); Mass. Gen.
    Laws Ch. 235 § 23A(7); Ohio Rev. Code § 2329.92(B); Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-
    6-204(c)(9); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 36A.004(c)(9).2
    ¶34              Of the states requiring reciprocity, Arizona is the only one
    that expressly requires “a reciprocal law.” A.R.S. § 12-3252(B)(2) (emphasis
    added). Specifically, § 12-3252(B)(2) excludes recognition for judgments
    that “originate[] from a foreign country that has not adopted or enacted a
    reciprocal law related to foreign-country money judgments that is similar
    to this chapter.” The other states only require that the foreign jurisdiction
    rendering the judgment “recognize” a judgment from that state. See Fl.
    Stat. § 55.605(2)(g) (“An out-of-country foreign judgment need not be
    recognized if . . . [t]he foreign jurisdiction where the judgment was rendered
    would not give recognition to a similar judgment rendered in this state”);
    Me. Rev. Stat. tit. 14, § 8505(2)(G) (“A foreign judgment need not be
    recognized if . . . [t]he foreign court rendering the judgment would not
    recognize a comparable judgment of this State.”); Mass. Gen. Laws Ch. 235,
    § 23A(7) (“A foreign judgment shall not be recognized if . . . judgments of
    this state are not recognized in the courts of the foreign state.”); Ohio Rev.
    Code § 2329.92(B) (providing that the court has the discretion to recognize
    judgments rendered “in a foreign country that does not have a procedure
    for recognizing judgments made by courts of other countries and their
    political subdivisions in its statutes, rules, or common law that is
    substantially similar to sections 2329.90 to 2329.94 of the Revised Code”);
    Tenn. Code Ann. § 26-6-204(c)(9) (“A court of this state need not recognize
    a foreign-country judgment if . . . [t]he foreign jurisdiction where the
    judgment was rendered would not give recognition to a similar judgment
    rendered in this state.”); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 36A.004(c)(9)
    (providing that a court is not required to recognize a foreign judgment if the
    jurisdiction that rendered it would not recognize a judgment from Texas)
    (emphasis added)).
    2   All cites to state statutes are to current versions, unless otherwise noted.
    14
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BOLICK
    Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
    ¶35           Courts that have considered whether a foreign judgment is
    entitled to recognition in states with the different, broader recognition
    language have understandably focused on the foreign country’s judicial
    process. In Reading Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources Corp.,
    the Court of Appeals of Texas relied on Canadian caselaw to find
    reciprocity. 
    976 S.W.2d 702
    , 710–11 (Tex. Ct. App. 1998). Canadian
    caselaw sets forth five instances in which Canada would recognize a foreign
    judgment.
    Id. Because Texas law
    merely required that the foreign
    jurisdiction would “recognize” a Texas judgment, the court held that the
    Canadian judicial practice of recognizing foreign judgments was sufficient
    for reciprocity.
    Id. See also Genujo
    Lok Beteiligungs GmbH v. Zorn, 
    943 A.2d 573
    , 581 (Me. 2008) (finding reciprocity because “German courts
    would likely recognize a comparable judgment from Maine”); Chabert v.
    Bacquié, 
    694 So. 2d 805
    , 815 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (requiring the party
    challenging recognition to establish that “a French court would refuse to
    recognize an American judgment against a non-French party sought to be
    enforced in a French court”); McCord v. Jet Spray Int’l Corp., 
    874 F. Supp. 436
    ,
    439–40 (D. Mass. 1994) (holding that Belgian procedures amounted to
    “recognition” sufficient for reciprocity).
    ¶36            There is an obvious difference in language between requiring
    “a reciprocal law . . . similar to the Act” and merely calling for
    “recognition.” Yet, the Majority’s approach, see supra ¶¶ 10–15, disregards
    that difference and gives Arizona’s reciprocity provision, which demands
    the former, the same meaning as provisions in other states that only call for
    the latter. The Majority’s point that the legislative history of the Act does
    not reflect awareness of what other states were doing with respect to
    reciprocity is beside the point. See supra ¶ 21. We must give meaning to
    the words chosen by our legislature and our analysis should account for
    those choices accordingly.
    ¶37            Were we to apply a plain-meaning analysis and give effect to
    the unique language chosen by our legislature, this Court would not be the
    first to interpret a reciprocity requirement to render a result that might not
    necessarily align with the legislature’s expectations.           For instance,
    Colorado courts originally interpreted a “foreign state” in its version of the
    Act so narrowly that it did not allow recognition of judgments from any
    other country. Milhoux v. Linder, 
    902 P.2d 856
    , 859 (Colo. App. 1995)
    (reasoning that because Colorado law required a “reciprocal agreement”
    15
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BOLICK
    Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
    between the United States and a foreign country and no such agreement
    existed, no foreign judgments could be recognized under its version of the
    Act). Consequently, the court held that “the district court was not
    required by the Recognition Act to recognize the Belgian judgment.”
    Id. at 860.
    In response, the Colorado legislature repealed the restrictive
    reciprocity requirement in 2008. See Ledtroit Law v. Kim, 
    360 P.3d 247
    , 254
    n.1 (Colo. App. 2015) (“The Recognition Act has since been amended to
    eliminate the reciprocity requirement.”). If the standard set out in A.R.S.
    § 12-3252 proves likewise unworkable, it is up to the legislature to rectify
    the consequence. Orca Commc’ns Unlimited, LLC v. Noder, 
    236 Ariz. 180
    ,
    182 ¶ 11 (2014) (“The choice of the appropriate wording rests with the
    Legislature, and the court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
    Legislature.”) (quoting City of Phoenix v. Butler, 
    110 Ariz. 160
    , 162 (1973)).
    Similar to Colorado, Arizona can repeal and replace § 12-3252 to better
    achieve its goals if the legislature so desires.
    ¶38           Our legislature chose to omit the Savings Clause as proposed
    by the NCCUSL, which provides that “[t]his [act] does not prevent the
    recognition under principles of comity or otherwise of a foreign-country
    judgment not within the scope of this [act].” The following comment
    notes:
    Section 11 makes clear that no negative implication should be
    read from the fact that this Act does not provide for
    recognition of other foreign-country judgments. Rather, this
    Act simply does not address the issue of whether foreign-
    country judgments not within its scope . . . should be
    recognized. Courts are free to recognize those foreign-
    country judgments not within the scope of this Act under
    common law principles of comity or other applicable law.
    Almost every state that has adopted the NCCUSL Act or a variant thereof
    has included a savings clause.3 And as the majority notes, prior to 2015,
    3  Ala. Code § 6-9-260; Alaska Stat. § 09.30.150; Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 1723;
    Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-62-111; Conn. Gen. Stat. § 50a-37; Del. Code Ann. tit.
    10, § 4807; D.C. Code § 15-371; Ga. Code Ann. § 9-12-119; Haw. Rev. Stat.
    § 658F-10; Idaho Code § 10-1411; 735 Ill. Comp. Stat. Ann. 5/12-671; Ind.
    Code § 34-54-12-9; Iowa Code § 626B.111; Me. Stat. tit. 14 § 8508; Md. Code
    Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 10-707; Mich. Comp. Laws § 691.1141; Minn. Stat.
    16
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BOLICK
    Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
    the only means available for securing recognition of a foreign judgment in
    Arizona was provided by the common law. See supra ¶ 5. Therefore, by
    omitting a savings clause to retain the use of common law principles, the
    legislature afforded parties a different (and much narrower) means by
    which a foreign judgment can be recognized in Arizona. The Majority’s
    cite to legislative history for the proposition that the legislature intended to
    actually give courts the ability to give greater recognition to foreign
    judgments, see supra ¶ 13, underscores the problem with omitting a Savings
    Clause or similar language and is not a basis to read into the statute what
    the legislature failed to include.
    ¶39            While I agree with the Majority’s conclusion that the term
    “adopted” is rendered “superfluous” if caselaw and court practices cannot
    amount to “a reciprocal law,” see supra ¶ 11, I disagree with the ultimate
    conclusion that Dutch court practices and caselaw as they are today satisfy
    the Act’s requirements. Supra ¶ 23. The apparent source of authority for
    Dutch courts to consider foreign judgments, Article 431 of the Dutch Civil
    Code of Procedure, is inapplicable.
    Id. Article 431 explicitly
    refers to
    enforcement of judgments, not recognition. Article 431(1) states that “no
    decision rendered by foreign courts . . . can be enforced within The
    Netherlands.” (emphasis added). Article 431(2) is equally unavailing,
    stating that “[d]isputes may be litigated again in the Dutch courts.”
    Relitigating an underlying dispute involving enforcement is hardly similar
    to the statutory process established by the Act for recognition of a judgment
    rendered after a dispute has been litigated.
    ¶40           As for the particular Dutch court process for considering
    foreign judgments, the Netherlands Supreme Court refers to it as
    “disguised exequatur proceedings.” Dutch Supreme Court, 26 September
    2014, ECLI:NL:HR:2014:2838 (Gazprombank). Even if there may be a
    circumstance where a foreign country’s caselaw could constitute “a
    reciprocal law,” a process characterized as “disguised” is hardly similar to
    the explicit and formal process of recognizing a foreign judgment as
    afforded by Arizona’s Act.
    § 548.63; Mo. Stat. Ann. § 511.787; Mont. Code Ann. § 25-9-608; Nev. Rev.
    Stat. § 17.820; N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:49A-16.11; N.M. Stat. Ann. § 39-4D-10;
    N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 5307; N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1C-1852; Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 12-718.11;
    Or. Rev. Stat. § 24.395; 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 22008; Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-
    460; Va. Code Ann. § 8.01-465.13:10; Wash. Rev. Code § 6.40A.090.
    17
    THE STATE OF THE NETHERLANDS V. MD HELICOPTERS, INC.
    JUSTICE MONTGOMERY, joined by JUSTICE BOLICK
    Concurring in part and Dissenting in part
    ¶41            What the Dutch system is similar to is what Arizona relied on
    prior to the 2015 Act, namely application of the common law to determine
    whether to recognize a foreign judgment. See supra ¶ 5. With the passage
    of the Arizona Act, though, the legislature instituted a different process for
    recognizing foreign judgments that, by omitting the Savings Clause, does
    not reference the use of common law principles. Therefore, the Dutch
    system, reflecting an approach “similar” to the method Arizona previously
    utilized for foreign judgment recognition, cannot be similar to the system
    now in place. To conclude otherwise renders the process of passing the
    Act as drafted by the legislature, as well as the resulting distinctive and
    narrow terms, superfluous.
    ¶42           Where the legislature has omitted language that may make it
    easier to achieve a policy objective or added language that may make a
    declared policy objective more challenging to achieve or outright frustrate
    it, they need to correct it. If the ultimate consequence of our forbearance
    is more careful deliberation in the crafting of legislation to begin with, so
    much the better for the people of Arizona.
    ¶43          I would remand to the court of appeals for a determination of
    whether the Act is the exclusive means by which a foreign money judgment
    can be recognized.
    18