State v. Reed ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    DIAMORRIO REED, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 16-0792
    FILED 8-10-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2014-002039-001
    The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Joseph T. Maziarz
    Counsel for Appellee
    The Law Office of Kyle T. Green PLLC, Tempe
    By Kyle Green
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. REED
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Maria Elena Cruz and Retired Judge Patricia A. Orozco1
    joined.
    J O N E S, Judge:
    ¶1            Diamorrio Reed appeals his convictions and sentences for two
    counts of sexual conduct with a minor, one count of kidnapping, and one
    count of sexual abuse, arguing the trial court abused its discretion in
    denying his motion to strike the entire jury panel for cause due to a
    potential juror’s emotional outburst that occurred during voir dire. For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS2 AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            In December 2014, Reed was charged with two counts of
    sexual conduct with a minor, one count of kidnapping, and one count of
    sexual abuse, arising out of events occurring in 2002. Trial was held in
    October and November 2014. In the course of voir dire, the trial judge asked
    potential jurors whether “there [was] anything about the nature of this case
    that would make it difficult for . . . [them] to serve as a fair and impartial
    juror.” Prospective Juror 78 responded affirmatively, stating:
    [In] December of 2013 my husband was killed by a hit and
    run, and the justice system didn’t — wasn’t fair. And I think
    anyone who is guilty and says they’re not guilty, I would not
    be fair. I want them all that are guilty to hang, which should
    1      The Honorable Patricia A. Orozco, Retired Judge of the Court of
    Appeals, Division One, has been authorized to sit in this matter pursuant
    to Article 6, Sections 3 and 20, of the Arizona Constitution.
    2       “We view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in
    the light most favorable to sustaining the jury’s verdicts.” State v. Miles, 
    211 Ariz. 475
    , 476, ¶ 2 (App. 2005) (citing State v. Riley, 
    196 Ariz. 40
    , 42, ¶ 2 (App.
    1999)).
    2
    STATE v. REED
    Decision of the Court
    be killed the same way or whatever they did, the same thing
    done to them.
    ...
    It was just a week ago. Seventeenth was when this, when the
    jury let the guy walk. So I’m very angry with the justice
    system right now, and I think people who are guilty should
    pay for what they’ve done.
    She then expressed her belief that if the State had enough evidence to go to
    trial, the defendant must be guilty. On follow-up, Prospective Juror 78
    reiterated her frustration that guilty people do not always get convicted and
    affirmed “they should pay for what they’ve done and not be able to walk
    out.” Prospective Juror 78 was later stricken for cause.
    ¶3             Reed then moved to strike the entire jury panel for cause
    based upon the emotional answers given in open court, fearing the
    statements’ impact upon the remaining jurors before they even had a
    chance to hear evidence. The State opposed the motion, noting that “[j]ust
    because . . . the [potential] jurors were emotional when they responded to
    certain questions does not mean necessarily that anybody on the panel was
    tainted.”
    ¶4             The judge acknowledged “there were some greater emotions”
    in this case than typically seen in jury selection. However, rather than strike
    the entire panel, he indicated his inclination to explore, through additional
    questioning of the remaining jurors, whether they had actually been
    affected by Prospective Juror 78’s remarks. Defense counsel did not agree
    further questioning would resolve the issue but did not object to the
    additional questioning.
    ¶5           In exploring the issue, the trial judge was careful not to
    reference Prospective Juror 78’s comments specifically; rather, the judge
    asked the remaining potential jurors:
    We have had some jurors who have given some very strong
    opinions, or who have had some emotional reactions to some
    of the questions that have been asked today. My question for
    you is, are any of you going to be affected by either the strong
    opinion or the emotional reaction that a juror earlier today
    might have given that might cause you to be unable to be fair
    and impartial?
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    STATE v. REED
    Decision of the Court
    None of the remaining jurors responded, and the trial court denied Reed’s
    motion to strike.
    ¶6             Reed was ultimately convicted as charged and sentenced to a
    total of eighty-eight years’ imprisonment. Reed timely appealed, and this
    Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)
    sections 12-120.21(A)(1),3 13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            Reed argues the trial court erred by not striking the entire jury
    panel. Reed asserts Prospective Juror 78’s comments tainted the entire
    panel of prospective jurors, making it impossible to receive a fair trial in
    violation of his due process rights.
    ¶8               Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 18.4(a) provides that
    “[e]ither party may challenge the panel on the ground that in its selection
    there has been a material departure from the requirements of law.” In
    doing so, the party challenging the panel must show either that the jury was
    unlawfully empaneled or that the jurors could not be fair and impartial. See
    State v. Greenwalt, 
    128 Ariz. 150
    , 167 (1981); see also U.S. Const. amend. VI
    (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy
    and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the
    crime shall have been committed.”); Ariz. Const. art. 2, § 24 (“In criminal
    prosecutions, the accused shall have the right to . . . have a speedy public
    trial by an impartial jury.”). We review a ruling on a motion to strike a jury
    panel for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Glassel, 
    211 Ariz. 33
    , 45, ¶ 36
    (2005) (citing State v. Carlson, 
    202 Ariz. 570
    , 579, ¶ 29 (2002)). The trial court
    is in the best position to assess the impact of a prospective juror’s comments
    on others. State v. Doerr, 
    193 Ariz. 56
    , 62, ¶ 23 (1998). Therefore, we will
    not find an abuse of discretion “unless the record affirmatively shows that
    . . . a fair and impartial jury was not secured.” State v. Lujan, 
    184 Ariz. 556
    ,
    560 (App. 1995) (quoting State v. Arnett, 
    119 Ariz. 38
    , 50 (1978)).
    ¶9            We do not find fault with Reed’s characterization of
    Prospective Juror 78’s comments as provocative, biased, inflammatory, and
    inconsistent with Reed’s constitutional right to a presumption of innocence.
    But “[u]nless there are objective indications of jurors’ prejudice, we will not
    presume its existence.” State v. Tison, 
    129 Ariz. 526
    , 535 (1981). Reed does
    not identify any objective evidence of prejudice. None of the remaining
    3     Absent material changes from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s
    current version.
    4
    STATE v. REED
    Decision of the Court
    panel members displayed any emotional reaction or otherwise responded
    to Prospective Juror 78’s diatribe. Moreover, no juror ultimately empaneled
    indicated an inability to be fair and impartial, even after having been
    present during Prospective Juror 78’s comments and observing her
    emotional reaction. “Although the court should remove for cause any juror
    who expresses serious misgivings about the ability to be fair and impartial”
    — just as the trial court did here with Prospective Juror 78 — the court need
    not remove jurors who otherwise indicate they can be fair and impartial.
    State v. Blackman, 
    201 Ariz. 527
    , 533, ¶ 12 (App. 2002) (citing State v. Smith,
    
    182 Ariz. 113
    , 115 (App. 1995), and State v. Reasoner, 
    154 Ariz. 377
    , 384 (App.
    1987)).
    ¶10            “Excusing jurors is within the sound discretion of the trial
    court, and its actions will not be disturbed absent ‘a clear and prejudicial
    abuse of that discretion.’” 
    Lujan, 184 Ariz. at 560
    (quoting 
    Arnett, 119 Ariz. at 50
    ). Prospective Juror 78 acknowledged her own inability to be fair and
    impartial given her own experience with the justice system and
    presumptions she bore regarding a defendant’s guilt simply by virtue of
    being charged with a crime and exercising his right to a jury trial; but such
    “non-expert” opinion statements are not presumed to taint the jury pool.
    See 
    Doerr, 193 Ariz. at 62
    , ¶¶ 19-20. Furthermore, in the absence of objective
    indicia that Prospective Juror 78’s comments affected the other jurors’
    ability to be fair and impartial, Reed cannot establish prejudice.
    Accordingly, we find no abuse of discretion. See Bauta v. State, 
    698 So. 2d 860
    , 861-62 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (finding no abuse of discretion in the
    trial court’s denial of the defendant’s motion to discharge the jury panel
    following a prospective juror’s emotional outburst where further
    examination of the remaining jury panel members revealed their objectivity
    had not been affected by the outburst).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶11           Reed’s convictions and sentences are affirmed.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5