State v. Carrasco ( 2022 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    GILBERT ARMENTA CARRASCO, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 21-0162
    FILED 1-27-2022
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR 2018-002261-001
    The Honorable Laura J. Giaquinto, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Linley Wilson
    Counsel for Appellee
    Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Mark E. Dwyer
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. CARRASCO
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Jennifer B. Campbell delivered the decision of the Court,
    in which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Chief Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
    C A M P B E L L, Judge:
    ¶1            This appeal is presented to us pursuant to Anders v. California,
    
    386 U.S. 738
     (1967), and State v. Leon, 
    104 Ariz. 297
     (1969). Defense counsel
    has searched the record on appeal and advised us there are no meritorious
    grounds for reversal. The defendant, Gilbert Carrasco, was given the
    opportunity to file a supplemental brief but did not do so. Our obligation is
    to review the entire record for reversible error, viewing the evidence in the
    light most favorable to sustaining the convictions and resolving all
    reasonable inferences against Carrasco. State v. Clark, 
    196 Ariz. 530
    , 537,
    ¶ 30 (App. 1999); State v. Guerra, 
    161 Ariz. 289
    , 293 (1989). Having done so,
    we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2           On a Friday night in March 2018, a few minutes before 9 p.m.,
    two cars approached the entry gate of a fenced parking lot at a Target
    warehouse in Phoenix. The driver of the second car, a Target employee,
    watched as the first car, a silver hatchback, rammed into the closed gate and
    squeezed through, knocking the gate off the tracks. The employee called
    911; another employee who was watching the hatchback on the lot’s
    surveillance cameras called the Phoenix police. They reported the
    hatchback was circling around inside the lot, driving “real fast” and “real
    crazy.”
    ¶3             Officers Goldsmith and Johnson arrived at 9:08 p.m. After
    trying unsuccessfully to open the broken entry gate, the officers gained
    entry though the lot’s exit gate about five minutes later. As they entered the
    fenced lot, they saw the silver hatchback inside, driving towards the exit.
    The officers stopped the car, finding Carrasco at the wheel and, in the back
    seat, his one-year-old daughter and a poodle. The driver side of his car was
    dented from front to rear and missing door handles and a side view mirror.
    Carrasco told Officer Goldsmith that he was “just trying to get [his] baby
    home” and that another police officer had led him into the parking lot.
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    STATE v. CARRASCO
    Decision of the Court
    ¶4             Carrasco’s eyes were bloodshot and watery; his breath
    smelled like alcohol; and his words were somewhat slurred. His behavior
    oscillated from calm to agitated and belligerent. He was swaying and
    unable to stand still, and he rambled about his life, his enemies, and his fear
    of being ambushed. Carrasco admitted to drinking alcohol earlier that
    morning and afternoon but denied being on drugs. The officers attempted
    to perform a field sobriety test, but Carrasco was uncooperative and nearly
    fell over at the start of the only task he attempted.
    ¶5            The officers arrested Carrasco and transported him to the
    station. During the car ride, Carrasco said the “only reason he [rammed into
    the gate] is because the Mexican Mafia was chasing him.” At 11:07 p.m.,
    Officer Mancha drew Carrasco’s blood, pursuant to a warrant. Carrasco’s
    blood alcohol content was .106, and his blood tested positive for
    unmetabolized THC and methamphetamine.
    ¶6            The State charged Carrasco with three counts of aggravated
    driving under the influence, each a class 6 felony. See A.R.S. § 28-
    1381(A)(1)–(3) (defining offenses for driving under the influence of alcohol
    or drugs while “impaired to the slightest degree,” with a blood “alcohol
    concentration of 0.08 or more within two hours of driving,” and while
    under the influence of certain drugs); see also A.R.S. § 28-1383(A)(3)(a)
    (offense aggravated if committed while person under age 15 is in vehicle).
    At a settlement conference in January 2019, Carrasco expressed intent to
    accept a plea bargain but requested a continuance of several days to put his
    affairs in order before going into custody. The court granted the
    continuance, but Carrasco absconded.
    ¶7            In May 2019, Carrasco was tried in absentia.1 Officers
    Goldsmith, Johnson, and Mancha testified on behalf of the State, as did the
    forensic scientist who tested the blood alcohol levels in Carrasco’s blood.
    The State also offered pictures of the car and the gate, recordings of the calls
    to 911 and the police, and footage from Officer Goldsmith’s body camera
    and the surveillance cameras. The jury found Carrasco guilty on all three
    counts, and after a hearing, the trial court found he had three prior felony
    convictions. Carrasco turned himself in later, in 2021, and the court then
    1The trial court warned Carrasco that he could be tried in absentia should
    he fail to appear. Carrasco acknowledged his duty to appear and to
    maintain contact with his attorney in his signed release order. Carrasco had
    contact with his counsel’s office the week after he first failed to appear, but
    then remained out of contact in the three months leading up to the trial. At
    sentencing, Carrasco admitted to absconding.
    3
    STATE v. CARRASCO
    Decision of the Court
    sentenced him to concurrent, presumptive terms of imprisonment of 3.75
    years for each of the three counts. Carrasco timely appealed.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8             After a thorough review of the record, we find no reversible
    error. Clark, 
    196 Ariz. at 541, ¶ 50
    . The record reflects that, at all critical
    stages of the proceedings against him, except the trial, Carrasco was present
    and represented by counsel. Regarding the trial, Carrasco waived his right
    to be present by voluntarily absconding, and he was still represented by
    counsel. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 9.1; see also State v. Sanchez, 
    116 Ariz. 118
    , 120
    (App. 1977) (affirming waiver finding where court warned defendant he
    could be tried in absentia, conditions of release required maintaining
    contact with his attorney, and he made no effort to ascertain trial date
    following continuance requested by his attorney). The evidence presented
    supports the convictions, and the sentences imposed fall within the range
    permitted by law. See A.R.S. § 13-703(C), (J). As far as the record reveals,
    these proceedings were conducted in compliance with Arizona’s Rules of
    Criminal Procedure and Carrasco’s constitutional and statutory rights.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶9            For the reasons above, we affirm Carrasco’s convictions and
    sentences.
    ¶10           Unless defense counsel finds an issue that may be
    appropriately submitted to the Arizona Supreme Court, his obligations are
    fulfilled once he informs Carrasco of the outcome of this appeal and his
    future options. State v. Shattuck, 
    140 Ariz. 582
    , 584–85 (1984). Carrasco has
    30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if he wishes, with a pro
    per motion for reconsideration or petition for review.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED:    JT
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