Ledo v. Ledo ( 2015 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Matter of:
    VICTOR LEDO, Petitioner/Appellant,
    v.
    IRMA LEDO, Respondent/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV 14-0331 FC
    FILED 5-7-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC2011-000009
    The Honorable Christopher A. Coury, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Victor Ledo, Mesa
    Petitioner/Appellant
    Irma de la Cruz Ledo, Apache Junction
    Respondent/Appellee
    LEDO v. LEDO
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Donn Kessler delivered the decision of the Court, in which Presiding
    Judge John C. Gemmill and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.
    K E S S L E R, Judge:
    ¶1           Victor Ledo (“Husband”) appeals from the superior court’s
    post-judgment order affirming his obligation to pay Irma Ledo (“Wife”)
    $35,534 as reimbursement for funds he received from the sale of their
    community property. For the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Husband filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in
    January 2011. Prior to trial, at a settlement conference in May 2013, all
    pending issues were resolved under a Rule 69 agreement. See Ariz. R. Fam.
    L. P. 69. The current dispute arises from the disposition of $127,000 in net
    proceeds received from the sale of the parties’ California residence in 2009.
    Husband transferred $78,500 of those funds into his personal savings
    account. Pursuant to the Rule 69 agreement, Husband was to receive credit
    against the proceeds if he could provide documentation to support his
    claim that he had used all or part of those proceeds to satisfy community
    debts:
    Within forty-five days, [Husband] shall provide to [Wife] an
    allocation as to what, if any, of those funds were spent on the
    community and how those funds were spent. The parties
    agree that whatever amount was spent on the community,
    [Husband] will receive credit for having spent on the
    community and whatever funds are unallocated or not spent
    on the community [Wife] will be entitled to reimbursement
    for, for her portion of the community share of those funds.
    [Husband] will provide bank statements, receipts, credit card
    receipts and whatever other tangible receipts he can provide with
    respect to those expenditures.
    (Emphasis added.) Although the superior court found his submission of
    expenses was untimely and disorganized, it admitted and considered the
    accounting documentation in the interests of justice, so as not to prejudice,
    or afford a windfall to, either party. The court thereafter ordered Husband
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    to pay Wife an equalization payment of $59,784.97, which represented 50%
    of the unallocated funds from the California property sale proceeds after
    offsets, but allowed for Father to file simultaneous motions to correct
    mistake, Ariz. R. Fam. L. P. 85, and to appoint a Special Master, Ariz. R.
    Fam. L. P. 72, if he desired further consideration of the issue.
    ¶3             At Husband’s request, the superior court appointed a Special
    Master, and granted him full authority to make recommended findings and
    orders regarding the financial accounting of the community funds and
    whether Husband was entitled to any additional reduction of his
    equalization payment. See Ariz. R. Fam. L. P. 72. In the meantime,
    Husband’s 50% interest in the proceeds from the sale of other community
    properties was held in escrow pending resolution of the dispute. The
    Special Master held an evidentiary hearing in January 2014, and after
    hearing testimony and reviewing the records, found that Husband failed to
    meet his burden of proving he was entitled to any additional offset. As a
    result, the Special Master recommended releasing all the funds in escrow to
    Wife.
    ¶4            After the evidentiary hearing, Wife filed an application for
    attorneys’ fees and costs. In her request, Wife also sought sanctions against
    Husband for failure to disclose certain requested documents. The Special
    Master denied Wife’s request:
    [P]ursuant to an analysis of existing orders in this case and
    balancing the parties’ finances it does not appear to the
    Special Master that an award of attorney’s fees and costs . . .
    would be appropriate.
    In her request for attorney’s fees and costs [Wife] seeks
    a sanction against [Husband] for the failure to disclose
    requested documents pertaining to this controversy. The
    Special Master has recommended that [Husband] not receive
    any further credits. The Special Master has recommended
    that the remaining funds held in escrow be awarded to [Wife].
    The Special Master’s recommendation is based upon
    [Husband]’s failure to provide the documentary evidence to
    support his claim. In the opinion of the Special Master that is
    sanction enough for this matter.
    ¶5             Husband filed an objection to the Special Master’s report and
    recommendations, arguing there was no legal authority to deny Husband
    credit for the documented expenses or to impose a sanction. The superior
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    court found the record supported the Special Master’s recommendations
    and awarded Wife $33,008.97.1 In addition, the court found that Husband
    misconstrued the language in the Special Master’s report, and that no
    sanction was actually imposed:
    [In] the Special Master Report, the Special Master wrote: “In the
    opinion of the Special Master that is sanction enough for this
    matter.” [Husband] construes this language to mean that the
    award of the remaining funds in escrow to [Wife] is a sanction
    against him. Although the Court views the use of the term
    “sanction” as an unfortunate choice of words, particularly for
    a self-represented litigant such as [Husband], the Court finds
    that [Husband] has taken this out of context and
    misconstrued the ruling. . . . The Special Master considered
    the equities of the situation, and concluded that it would not
    be equitable for [Wife] — who was receiving the remaining
    funds in escrow, pending Court approval — to receive an
    additional award of attorneys’ fees. In this context, the Court
    finds that the Special Master’s ruling simply concluded that it
    was neither fair nor equitable for [Husband] to pay the
    attorneys’ fees and costs of [Wife]. The Special Master did not
    impose a “sanction” against [Husband] in the form of not
    allowing any additional offsets.
    ¶6            Husband timely appealed the final order.         We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-
    120.21(A)(1)2 and -2101(A)(1).
    ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶7             On appeal, Husband argues that the superior court abused its
    discretion by not enforcing the Rule 69 agreement and imposing a sanction
    against him as recommended by the Special Master. We view evidence in
    the light most favorable to upholding the decision, Krisko v. John Hancock
    Mut. Life Ins. Co., 
    15 Ariz. App. 304
    , 305, 
    488 P.2d 509
    , 510 (1971), and “will
    not disturb a trial court’s factual findings unless clearly erroneous,” Hrudka
    v. Hrudka, 
    186 Ariz. 84
    , 92, 
    919 P.2d 179
    , 187 (App. 1995), superseded by statute
    1 After a December 2013 hearing, $35,534.97 remained in escrow. Husband
    received credit for mortgage payments, bills, and expenses, totaling $2,526.
    The remainder, $33,008.97, was paid to Wife.
    2 Absent material revisions from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s current
    version.
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    LEDO v. LEDO
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    on other grounds as stated in Myrick v. Maloney, 
    235 Ariz. 491
    , 494, ¶ 8, 
    333 P.3d 818
    , 821 (App. 2014). “A court abuses its discretion if it commits an
    error of law in reaching a discretionary conclusion, it reaches a conclusion
    without considering the evidence, it commits some other substantial error
    of law, or ‘the record fails to provide substantial evidence to support the
    trial court’s finding.’” Flying Diamond Airpark, L.L.C. v. Meienberg, 
    215 Ariz. 44
    , 50, ¶ 27, 
    156 P.3d 1149
    , 1155 (App. 2007) (quoting Grant v. Ariz. Pub. Serv.
    Co., 
    133 Ariz. 434
    , 456, 
    652 P.2d 507
    , 529 (1982)). “Moreover, we review
    legal issues and the application of law de novo.” Walsh v. Walsh, 
    230 Ariz. 486
    , 490, ¶ 9, 
    286 P.3d 1095
    , 1099 (App. 2012).
    DISCUSSION
    I.     The Superior Court Did Not Err In Its Enforcement of the Rule 69
    Agreement.
    ¶8              Husband first argues that the superior court erred in failing
    to enforce the Rule 69 agreement and exceeded its authority in denying him
    credit for all of his documented expenses. Husband essentially argues that
    because he submitted some documentation, he complied with the Rule 69
    agreement and is automatically entitled to a reduction of his equalization
    payment. We disagree.
    ¶9              Pursuant to the Rule 69 agreement, Husband was to receive
    credit against the net proceeds received from the sale of the parties’
    California residence if he could provide evidence that the money was spent
    on the community. See supra ¶ 2. Although Husband provided the superior
    court and Special Master with voluminous records of payments on
    community expenses, the documents detail expenditures made from the
    parties’ joint checking account. Thus, as the court concluded, Husband did
    not provide evidence that he paid any of the $78,500 deposited into his
    personal savings account on community expenditures:
    [Husband] did show expenditures on community expenses.
    However, the expenditures for community expenses came
    from the parties’ joint checking account . . . . What this means
    is that [Husband] has offered voluminous support to
    document matters which are not in dispute and for which the
    Court and Mother already were giving him credit — namely,
    the community expenditures out of the parties’ joint checking
    account. What [Husband] has not done with his voluminous
    documents is demonstrate that he paid all of the $78,500 —
    monies that he deposited into his personal savings account —
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    LEDO v. LEDO
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    for community expenditures. The Special Master Report noted
    that “[Husband] did not provide the money market
    statements.”      Without such documentary evidence,
    [Husband] did not prove by even a preponderance of the
    evidence that there was a connection, or nexus, between the
    community bills he paid and the $78,500 in community funds
    that he transferred to his own savings account.
    Based on this record, the superior court did not err in agreeing with the
    Special Master’s report that Husband failed to meet his burden of proof.
    II.   The Superior Court Did Not Sanction Husband.
    ¶10        Husband next argues the superior court abused its discretion
    by imposing a $33,534 sanction against him pursuant to a purported
    recommendation by the Special Master.
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    LEDO v. LEDO
    Decision of the Court
    ¶11          As the superior court discussed, although the Special Master
    used the phrase “that is sanction enough for this matter” in his report, when
    viewed in context, it is clear that Wife’s request for sanctions was, in fact,
    denied. See supra ¶¶ 4-5.3 Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    :ama
    3 In his reply brief, Husband argues that the court erred in denying him
    $49,500 in credit for mortgage payments made between January 2011 and
    October 2013. “We will not address issues raised for the first time in a reply
    brief.” Marco C. v. Sean C., 
    218 Ariz. 216
    , 219 n.1, ¶ 8, 
    181 P.3d 1137
    , 1140
    n.1 (App. 2008). In addition, Husband suggests the superior court judge
    erred in failing to disclose his working relationship with the Special Master.
    Because Husband failed to develop this argument, we consider it
    abandoned. See ARCAP 13(a)(6) (requiring the appellant’s briefs to
    “concisely and clearly set forth . . . [a]n argument which shall contain the
    contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented, and the
    reasons therefor, with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the
    record relied on”); see also DeElena v. S. Pac. Co., 
    121 Ariz. 563
    , 572, 
    592 P.2d 759
    , 768 (1979).
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