Clark v. Clark ( 2015 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Marriage of:
    LINDA JEAN HARNISH CLARK, Petitioner/Appellee,
    v.
    EDWARD WAYNE CLARK, Respondent/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 14-0293 FC
    FILED 5-12-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. FC2011-090967
    The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Bishop Law Office, PC, Tempe
    By William D. Bishop, Daniel P. Beeks
    Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
    Edward Wayne Clark, Mesa
    Respondent/Appellant
    CLARK v. CLARK
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Kent E. Cattani delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
    C A T T A N I, Judge:
    ¶1            Edward Wayne Clark (“Husband”) appeals from the superior
    court’s order denying his motion for relief from judgment in his divorce
    case against Linda Jean Clark (“Wife”). Husband argues that the court
    should have reallocated marital assets based on Wife’s alleged failure to
    comply with disclosure rules. For reasons that follow, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            Husband and Wife married in August, 1993; they separated
    in January, 2010. Over the course of the marriage, the parties purchased a
    marital residence and a condominium office. After separating, the parties
    discussed by email the need to refinance the mortgage on the home, a
    process that included obtaining an appraisal. After the appraisal was
    completed on October 7, 2010, Wife sent Husband a copy of the appraisal
    as an attachment to an email, which Husband subsequently acknowledged
    receiving.
    ¶3            In February 2011, Wife filed for divorce. Following a
    dissolution trial in April 2012, the parties submitted proposed findings of
    facts and conclusions of law. Wife’s submittal valued the home at
    approximately $328,000, a figure she reached through her independent
    research and an estimate posted on “Zillow.com.” Husband did not
    dispute this value.
    ¶4           In an amended decree of dissolution, the superior court
    awarded the home to Wife conditioned on her refinancing it in her name.
    The court awarded Husband the office, likewise conditioned on
    refinancing. Neither party took issue with the distribution of the home to
    Wife and the office to Husband or otherwise asserted that the distribution
    was inequitable. Following various motions and proceedings in 2013, the
    superior court entered a final order and awarded Wife her attorney’s fees.
    ¶5          In December 2013, Husband filed a motion for relief from
    judgment, asserting that he had become aware that the home had been
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    CLARK v. CLARK
    Decision of the Court
    appraised at $410,000 during the 2010 refinancing process. Wife responded
    that Husband was aware of the bank’s appraisal long before entry of the
    decree because of the parties’ email correspondence regarding the
    refinancing, including the email from Wife to Husband attaching a copy of
    the appraisal. Although Husband acknowledged receiving the email, he
    claimed that he had not opened the attachment containing the appraisal.
    ¶6           Following briefing and oral argument, the superior court
    denied the motion for relief from judgment. The court found that the
    appraisal was not obtained in the anticipation or course of litigation and in
    any event the appraisal “was physically in [both parties’] possessions.”
    ¶7          Husband timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under
    Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) § 12-2101(A)(2).1
    DICUSSION
    I.     Rule 49 Disclosure Violation.
    ¶8            Husband argues that Wife’s failure to formally disclose the
    appraisal during litigation constituted a “reason justifying relief from the
    operation of the judgment.” Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. (“ARFLP”) 85(C)(1)(f).
    We review a denial of relief under Rule 85 for an abuse of discretion. See
    Duckstein v. Wolf, 
    230 Ariz. 227
    , 231, ¶ 8, 
    282 P.3d 428
    , 432 (App. 2012). We
    similarly review a superior court’s decision regarding an alleged disclosure
    violation for an abuse of discretion. Jimenez v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 
    206 Ariz. 424
    , 426, ¶ 5, 
    79 P.3d 673
    , 675 (App. 2003).
    ¶9             Husband asserts that Wife violated Rule 49 of the Rules of
    Family Law Procedure by not formally disclosing the appraisal as part of
    the divorce proceedings. Rule 49 is based on Rule 26.1 of the Arizona Rules
    of Civil Procedure, and we thus analyze the claim as we would a claim
    under Rule 26.1. See ARFLP 1 cmt. (“Wherever the language in these rules
    is substantially the same as the language in other statewide rules, the case
    law interpreting that language will apply to these rules.”).
    ¶10             The disclosure rules are intended to avoid unfair surprise at
    trial. See Carlton v. Ernhardt, 
    138 Ariz. 353
    , 355, 
    674 P.2d 907
    , 909 (App. 1983)
    (“[T]rial by ambush is a tactic no longer countenanced in Arizona courts.”).
    But the rules are not designed to give the parties a “weapon” to use at trial
    or on appeal. See Zimmerman v. Shakman, 
    204 Ariz. 231
    , 235, ¶ 13, 
    62 P.3d 1
         Absent material revisions after the relevant date, we cite the current
    version of a statute unless otherwise indicated.
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    CLARK v. CLARK
    Decision of the Court
    976, 980 (App. 2003) (citation omitted); see also Bryan v. Riddel, 
    178 Ariz. 472
    ,
    476 n.5, 
    875 P.2d 131
    , 135 n.5 (1994) (noting that the purpose of the rules is
    to provide the parties “a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial or
    settlement-nothing more, nothing less”).
    ¶11         As relevant here, Rule 49 provides the minimum disclosure
    requirements for family law cases, including disclosure of:
    copies of all documents and all electronically stored
    information that may assist in identifying or valuing any item
    of real or personal property in which any party has or had an
    interest for the period commencing six (6) months prior to the
    filing of the petition, including any documents that the party
    may rely upon in placing a value on any item of real or
    personal property.
    ARFLP 49(E)(5).
    ¶12           Here, the appraisal at issue was arguably relevant to assist in
    valuing the home and should have been disclosed under Rule 49. But Wife
    did not rely on the appraisal, and the lack of formal disclosure did not deny
    Husband a reasonable opportunity to prepare for trial because he was
    aware of (and had access to) the appraisal by virtue of his email
    correspondence with Wife in October 2010. Thus, the lack of formal
    disclosure did not result in a “trial by ambush,” and the superior court acted
    well within its discretion by denying Husband’s request for relief based on
    the alleged Rule 49 violation.
    A.     Involvement of Wife’s counsel.
    ¶13           Husband argues that Wife’s counsel may have been aware of
    the appraisal and if so, had an obligation to disclose it. But Husband did
    not present evidence to that effect, and the superior court appropriately
    reasoned that there is “no basis to suggest [Wife’s attorney] knew anything
    about [the appraisal].” Moreover, even assuming Wife’s attorney knew
    about the appraisal, Husband has not established that he was prejudiced by
    the attorney’s alleged inaction because Husband was already aware of and
    had a copy of the appraisal prior to trial.
    B.     Bias.
    ¶14           Husband argues the trial judge’s comments regarding his
    failure to open the email attachment containing the appraisal demonstrates
    that the court was biased against him during the hearing addressing the
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    CLARK v. CLARK
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    motion for relief from judgment. However, Husband did not raise this
    issue in the superior court, so his claim is arguably waived. See State v.
    Schackart, 
    190 Ariz. 238
    , 256, 
    947 P.2d 315
    , 333 (1997) (bias claims based on
    “comments allegedly showing the [superior] court’s irritation with
    defendant, should have been raised at that time and are therefore now
    waived”).
    ¶15            Moreover, Husband has not shown any bias on the part of the
    trial judge. Judicial bias or prejudice ordinarily must “arise from an extra-
    judicial source and not from what the judge has done in his participation in
    the case.” Simon v. Maricopa Med. Ctr., 
    225 Ariz. 55
    , 63, ¶ 29, 
    234 P.3d 623
    ,
    631 (App. 2010) (quoting State v. Emanuel, 
    159 Ariz. 464
    , 469, 
    768 P.2d 196
    ,
    201 (App. 1989)). Thus, “judicial rulings alone almost never constitute a
    valid basis for a bias or partiality motion.” Liteky v. United States, 
    510 U.S. 540
    , 555 (1994); see also State v. Ellison, 
    213 Ariz. 116
    , 129, ¶ 40, 
    140 P.3d 899
    ,
    912 (2006). Here, Husband has not alleged bias arising from an extrajudicial
    source, and the judge’s comments interpreting evidence presented at trial
    do not establish bias.
    II.    Attorney’s Fees.
    ¶16           Wife requests her attorney’s fees and costs under A.R.S. § 25-
    324(A). In an exercise of our discretion, we award her reasonable attorney’s
    fees and costs upon compliance with ARCAP 21.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶17           We affirm the superior court’s denial of Husband’s motion for
    relief from judgment.
    :ama
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