Valenzuela v. Maricopa ( 2015 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    MELINDA G. VALENZUELA, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    MARICOPA COUNTY SHERIFF, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 15-0049
    FILED 11-5-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2014-094691
    The Honorable Mark F. Aceto, Retired Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Melinda Gabriella Valenzuela, Buckeye
    Plaintiff/Appellant
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By J. Randall Jue
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Kenton D. Jones delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Peter B. Swann joined.
    VALENZUELA v. MARICOPA et al.
    Decision of the Court
    J O N E S, Judge:
    ¶1           Melinda Valenzuela appeals the trial court’s order dismissing
    the complaint and denying a request to disqualify opposing counsel. For
    the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             On September 12, 2014, Valenzuela filed a complaint against
    the Maricopa County Sheriff’s Office and several detention officers
    (collectively, MCSO) alleging a First Amendment violation of the right to
    maintain a religious diet by serving Valenzuela bologna for lunch. At that
    time, Valenzuela was subject to Administrative Order 2006-052 (the Order),
    which identified Valenzuela as a named party in at least 104 civil court cases
    filed since 2002, the majority of which were dismissed for failure to state a
    claim.1 The Order concluded Valenzuela was a “vexatious litigant” and
    prohibited the filing of any new lawsuit in Maricopa County without
    obtaining advance permission from the presiding judge.
    ¶3            MCSO moved to dismiss, asserting Valenzuela had not
    complied with the Order and was therefore barred from filing the lawsuit.
    Valenzuela did not file a response. The trial court, finding the motion to be
    meritorious and deeming the failure to respond as consent to its granting,
    entered a final order dismissing the case.
    ¶4            Four days after the dismissal, Valenzuela filed a response and
    objection to the motion to dismiss, asserting compliance with the Order.
    Valenzuela also requested the trial court disqualify MCSO’s counsel
    because Valenzuela had previously filed a sexual harassment claim against
    him. The court determined the untimely arguments had been waived and,
    on its own motion, ordered the response stricken.
    ¶5           Valenzuela timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant
    to Arizona Revised Statutes sections 12-120.21(A)(1)2 and -2101(A)(1).
    1     The order is addressed to “Quennel Devon Glover aka Enrique
    Gabrielle Mendez,” names the State asserts are prior aliases of Valenzuela.
    2     Absent material revisions from the relevant date, we cite a statute’s
    current version.
    2
    VALENZUELA v. MARICOPA et al.
    Decision of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    I.    Motion to Dismiss
    ¶6             Valenzuela first argues the trial court erred in granting
    dismissal because Valenzuela purportedly complied with the Order. We
    review de novo an order granting a motion to dismiss for failure to state a
    claim. See Vortex Corp. v. Denkewicz, 
    235 Ariz. 551
    , 556, ¶ 17 (App. 2014)
    (citing Coleman v. City of Mesa, 
    230 Ariz. 352
    , 355-56, ¶¶ 7-8 (2012)). In doing
    so, we assume the truth of the material facts asserted by the plaintiff and
    will affirm dismissal where the plaintiff is not entitled to relief under any
    facts susceptible of proof under the claims stated. Mohave Disposal, Inc. v.
    City of Kingman, 
    186 Ariz. 343
    , 346 (1996) (citing Menendez v. Paddock Pool
    Constr. Co., 
    172 Ariz. 258
    , 261 (App. 1991)).
    ¶7             Valenzuela did not allege compliance with the Order within
    the complaint. See 
    Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 356
    , ¶ 9 (“‘[C]ourts look only to the
    pleading itself’ when adjudicating a Rule 12(b)(6) motion.”) (quoting Cullen
    v. Auto-Owners Ins., 
    218 Ariz. 417
    , 419, ¶ 7 (2008)). Moreover, when
    presented with an opportunity to oppose the motion to dismiss and
    demonstrate actual compliance, Valenzuela failed to do so. See Anson v.
    Am. Motors Corp., 
    155 Ariz. 420
    , 421 (App. 1987) (noting the plaintiff carries
    the burden when a motion to dismiss establishes the claim is facially
    barred); see also Ariz. R. Civ. P. 7.1(b) (authorizing the trial court to deem a
    party’s non-response as “a consent to the denial or granting of the motion”).
    And even if the trial court had elected to consider Valenzuela’s belated
    response,3 it offered only vague assertions that “the case was sent to the
    [presiding judge] for ruling” and “plaintiff complied as required.” These
    conclusory statements do not justify Valenzuela’s failure to establish a right
    to file the lawsuit. 
    Coleman, 230 Ariz. at 356
    , ¶ 9 (noting “mere conclusory
    3      Valenzuela’s reply brief on appeal argues for the first time that the
    response should be considered filed on the day it was provided to jail
    personnel, which could be no earlier than December 4, 2015, the date it was
    signed. The motion to dismiss, however, was served November 3, 2014,
    meaning a response was due November 18, 2014, ten business days later.
    Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(a), 7.1(a). Adding five mailing days extended the deadline
    to November 23, 2014, a Sunday, meaning the last day for filing was
    Monday, November 24, 2014. See Ariz. R. Civ. P. 6(a), (e). Valenzuela did
    not purportedly transmit the response to jail personnel until December 4,
    2014, ten days past the date the response was due.
    3
    VALENZUELA v. MARICOPA et al.
    Decision of the Court
    statements are insufficient” to state a claim for relief) (citing 
    Cullen, 218 Ariz. at 419
    , ¶ 7).
    ¶8            Only on appeal does Valenzuela attempt to prove compliance
    with the Order and establish a right to file the lawsuit. Because Valenzuela
    did not present any evidence in this regard to the trial court, we will not
    consider it on appeal. See West v. Baker, 
    109 Ariz. 415
    , 418-19 (1973) (“[A]n
    appellate court is confined in the determination of a case to what is shown
    by the record only and cannot consider such extraneous matters.”). Even if
    we were to consider information outside of the record, the application
    seeking leave to file the lawsuit against MCSO, included in the appendix to
    Valenzuela’s opening brief, although dated July 17, 2014, bears no
    indication that it was filed with the court and does not include a signed
    order from the presiding judge granting the application.
    ¶9           Under these circumstances, the trial court properly dismissed
    Valenzuela’s complaint.
    II.     Disqualification of Counsel
    ¶10            Valenzuela next argues the trial court erred in denying the
    request to disqualify MCSO’s counsel. We review a ruling on a
    disqualification motion for an abuse of discretion. Burch & Cracchiolo, P.A.
    v. Myers, 
    237 Ariz. 369
    , 381, ¶ 14 (App. 2015) (citing Simms v. Rayes, 
    23 Ariz. 47
    , 49, ¶ 8 (App. 2014)). “To find an abuse of discretion, there must either
    be no evidence to support the court’s conclusion or the reasons given by the
    court must be ‘clearly untenable, [be] legally incorrect, or amount to a
    denial of justice.’” Charles I. Friedman, P.C. v. Microsoft Corp., 
    213 Ariz. 344
    ,
    350, ¶ 17 (App. 2006) (quoting State v. Chapple, 
    135 Ariz. 281
    , 297 n.18 (1983),
    and citing United Imps. & Exps., Inc. v. Superior Court, 
    134 Ariz. 43
    , 46 (1982)).
    We are further mindful that “[o]nly in extreme circumstances should a
    party to a lawsuit be allowed to interfere with the attorney-client
    relationship of his opponent,” Alexander v. Superior Court, 
    141 Ariz. 157
    , 161
    (1984), and “[t]he burden is on the party moving to disqualify opposing
    counsel to show ‘sufficient reason’ why the attorney should be
    disqualified,” Amparano v. Asarco, Inc., 
    208 Ariz. 370
    , 377, ¶ 24 (App. 2004)
    (citing 
    Alexander, 141 Ariz. at 161
    ).
    ¶11          Although the trial court did not explicitly state why it denied
    the motion, Valenzuela’s request for disqualification was made after the
    court entered the order of dismissal. Moreover, a prior personal conflict
    between a party and opposing counsel is not, alone, an “extreme
    circumstance” that may trump the opposing party’s right to counsel of his
    4
    VALENZUELA v. MARICOPA et al.
    Decision of the Court
    choice. This is particularly true here, given Valenzuela’s apparent litigious
    nature. We therefore find no abuse of discretion. See Double AA Builders,
    Ltd. v. Grand State Constr. L.L.C., 
    210 Ariz. 503
    , 506 (App. 2005) (noting that,
    where no reason is given by the trial court, we presume the decision is
    supported and will affirm “if any reasonable construction of the evidence
    justifies it”) (citing Garden Lakes Comty. Ass’n v. Madigan, 
    204 Ariz. 238
    , 240,
    ¶ 9 (App. 2003), and In re CVR 1997 Irrevocable Trust, 
    202 Ariz. 174
    , 177,
    ¶ 16 (App. 2002)).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12          The trial court’s orders dismissing the complaint and denying
    Valenzuela’s request to disqualify opposing counsel are affirmed.
    :ama
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