State v. McGhee ( 2017 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    QUINEL JAMES MCGHEE, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 16-0817
    FILED 7-27-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County
    No. S8015CR201401403
    The Honorable Lee Frank Jantzen, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Jason Lewis
    Counsel for Appellee
    Mohave County Legal Advocate, Kingman
    By Jill L. Evans
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. MCGHEE
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Margaret H. Downie delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Paul J. McMurdie and Judge Maria Elena Cruz joined.
    D O W N I E, Judge:
    ¶1          Quinel James McGhee appeals the revocation of his
    probation and resulting prison sentence. For the following reasons, we
    affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            In October 2014, McGhee was charged in Mohave County
    with one count of burglary in the second degree, a class 3 felony. In
    February 2015, he pleaded guilty to the charge and was placed on
    probation for three years.
    ¶3            On May 29, 2015, McGhee’s probation officer filed a
    revocation petition, alleging McGhee had failed to report to the probation
    department and had changed his residence without prior approval. The
    petition stated that McGhee’s whereabouts were unknown, and a bench
    warrant issued for his arrest.
    ¶4          At a June 9, 2015 arraignment, the superior court noted that
    McGhee was “in custody in another county” and continued the
    arraignment. In July 2016, the court ordered McGhee transported from
    the Department of Corrections to the Mohave County jail. McGhee
    appeared in court on August 24 and denied the allegations of the
    revocation petition. The court set a probation violation hearing for
    September 14, 2016.
    ¶5            On McGhee’s motion, the September 14 probation violation
    hearing was continued to October 11. On September 21, 2016, the State
    filed a supplemental revocation petition, alleging that McGhee had been
    found guilty of burglary in the second degree in Maricopa County on May
    25, 2016.
    ¶6            At the October 11 hearing, McGhee denied the allegations of
    the first revocation petition but admitted he had been found guilty in
    Maricopa County of burglary in the second degree for an offense
    2
    STATE v. MCGHEE
    Decision of the Court
    committed on June 4, 2015, while he was on probation.1 The superior
    court found that McGhee had violated the terms of his probation by
    committing the Maricopa County felony offense and sentenced him to a
    mitigated sentence of two years’ imprisonment, with 116 days of
    presentence incarceration credit, to run consecutive to the Maricopa
    County sentence. McGhee timely appealed. We have jurisdiction
    pursuant to Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) sections 12-120.21(A)(1),
    13-4031, and -4033(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶7            McGhee argues his due process rights were violated by
    “unjustified delay in [the] probation violation proceedings.” Whether we
    review for fundamental error, as the State suggests, or analyze whether
    the superior court abused its discretion by finding no unreasonable delay,
    as the defense urges, McGhee has not demonstrated a constitutional
    violation.
    ¶8           A probationer is entitled to due process protections,
    including a revocation hearing within a “reasonable time” to ensure that
    “information is fresh and sources are available.” State v. Adler, 
    189 Ariz. 280
    , 282 (1997). McGhee does not contend the purported delay in the
    probation revocation proceedings led to stale information or unavailable
    sources. In assessing the reasonableness of any such delay, we consider
    the “length of delay, reasons for the delay, and prejudice to the
    defendant.” State v. Flemming, 
    184 Ariz. 110
    , 115 (1995).
    ¶9            McGhee relies on Adler and Flemming, but we find both cases
    readily distinguishable. In Adler, a probation revocation petition was
    filed, but the State made no effort to pursue it, and the defendant —
    almost three years later — moved for a speedy trial or disposition in
    absentia. 
    189 Ariz. at 281
    . Even after that motion, the State did not seek to
    have the matter adjudicated. 
    Id.
     The probation revocation hearing finally
    occurred more than six years after the petition was filed. 
    Id. at 282
    . Based
    on these facts, we found both unreasonable delay and resulting prejudice.
    
    Id.
     at 283–85. Flemming also involved a probationer who made concerted
    efforts to have his revocation proceedings timely resolved, but
    1       The State did not pursue the original revocation petition, stating
    that it was proceeding only on the allegation that McGhee committed a
    felony while on probation. The court dismissed the first revocation
    petition with prejudice.
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    STATE v. MCGHEE
    Decision of the Court
    nonetheless was not brought before the court for more than 27 months
    after his revocation petition was filed. 
    184 Ariz. at 112
    .
    ¶10          Unlike Adler and Flemming, McGhee made no attempt to
    have his probation violation adjudicated sooner. Nor did he move to
    dismiss the probation revocation petition. Unlike the lengthy delays in
    those cases, the State here filed the petition within four months of
    McGhee’s Maricopa County sentencing, the underlying offense had
    occurred only the year before, and the probation violation was
    adjudicated roughly one month after the supplemental petition was filed.
    ¶11           Finally, McGhee asserts that if the probation violation had
    been resolved before his sentencing in Maricopa County, “it is likely that
    the Maricopa County judge would have ordered that the Maricopa
    County prison sentence run concurrently with the Mohave County
    sentence.” Not only is this contention speculative, but A.R.S. § 13-708(E)
    requires a trial court to impose a consecutive sentence when a defendant
    commits an offense while on felony probation.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12         For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the revocation of
    McGhee’s probation and resulting sentence.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 16-0817

Filed Date: 7/27/2017

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 7/27/2017