State v. Covarrubias ( 2018 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
    v.
    JOSE ALBERTO COVARRUBIAS, Petitioner.
    No. 1 CA-CR 18-0344 PRPC
    FILED 8-23-2018
    Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR2016-147951-001
    The Honorable Dean M. Fink, Judge
    REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Adena J. Astrowsky
    Counsel for Respondent
    Jose Alberto Covarrubias, Douglas
    Petitioner
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge David D. Weinzweig joined.
    STATE v. COVARRUBIAS
    Decision of the Court
    M c M U R D I E, Judge:
    ¶1             Petitioner Jose Alberto Covarrubias petitions this court for
    review from the summary dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief
    of-right. We have considered the petition for review and, for the reasons
    stated, grant review but deny relief.
    ¶2             Covarrubias pled guilty to theft of means of transportation, a
    class 3 felony, with one historical prior felony conviction. He also pled
    guilty to burglary in the third degree. Under the terms of his plea
    agreement, Covarrubias and the State stipulated that the court would
    impose an aggravated term of 7.5 years. The superior court sentenced him
    to the stipulated aggravated term of 7.5 years’ imprisonment for theft of
    means of transportation and placed him on three years’ probation for
    burglary. Covarrubias filed a pro se petition for post-conviction relief
    of-right after his counsel found no colorable claims for relief. The superior
    court summarily dismissed the petition and Covarrubias now seeks review.
    We have jurisdiction pursuant to Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure
    32.9(c) and Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 13-4239(C).
    ¶3           In his petition for review, Covarrubias argues the superior
    court erred when it imposed the stipulated aggravated sentence of 7.5
    years’ imprisonment for theft of means of transportation. Covarrubias
    contends that regardless of the stipulation in the plea agreement, the
    sentencing provisions of A.R.S. § 13-703 do not provide for a sentence of 7.5
    years’ imprisonment for a class 3 felony with one historical prior felony
    conviction.
    ¶4             We deny relief because the superior court did not err.
    Covarrubias misconstrues § 13-703. A person convicted of a felony who has
    one historical prior felony conviction is a “category two repetitive
    offender.” A.R.S. § 13-703(B). A category two repetitive offender convicted
    of a class 3 felony faces a sentence that ranges from a “mitigated” term of
    3.25 years’ imprisonment to an “aggravated” term of 16.25 years, with a
    presumptive term of 6.5 years. A.R.S. § 13-703(I). The court may impose a
    sentence greater than the presumptive term if the trier of fact finds
    aggravating circumstances. A.R.S. § 13-703(D) and (F). Here, the court, as
    the trier of fact, found four aggravating circumstances. Therefore, § 13-703
    authorized the superior court to sentence Covarrubias to the stipulated
    aggravated term of 7.5 years’ imprisonment for theft of means of
    transportation as stipulated in the plea agreement.
    2
    STATE v. COVARRUBIAS
    Decision of the Court
    ¶5             Covarrubias was told at the time of the change of plea the
    sentencing parameters for his crime with a historical prior felony
    conviction. By pleading guilty, Covarrubias indicated he understood the
    sentencing consequences, including both the sentencing range and the
    stipulated sentence. The court accepted the plea and sentenced Covarrubias
    as stipulated in the plea agreement. The sentence fell within the applicable
    statutory parameters and was imposed in a lawful manner. See State v.
    Dawson, 
    164 Ariz. 278
    , 281 (1990) (“[F]ailure to impose a sentence in
    conformity with the mandatory provisions of the sentencing statute makes
    that sentence ‘illegal.’”); State v. McPherson, 
    228 Ariz. 557
    , 559, ¶ 4 (App.
    2012) (illegal sentence constitutes fundamental, prejudicial error); State v.
    Anderson, 
    181 Ariz. 18
    , 19–20 (App. 1993) (sentence illegal when imposed in
    unlawful manner by court's failure to consider material information); State
    v. House, 
    169 Ariz. 572
    , 573 (App. 1991) (sentence outside applicable range
    is illegal). Consequently, we reject the arguments raised by Covarrubias.
    ¶6             In his reply to the State’s response, Covarrubias raises other
    claims he neither raised below nor presented in his petition for review.
    These claims include: (1) that his sentences constitute cruel and unusual
    punishment, are discriminatory, arbitrary and capricious, and violate both
    equal protection and the prohibitions against double jeopardy; (2) his
    consecutive term of probation is both excessive and illegal; (3) the
    sentencing court did not consider all the appropriate mitigating
    circumstances before imposing sentence; (4) trial counsel was ineffective;
    and (5) the superior court was required to conduct an independent review
    for fundamental error. We deny relief on these issues as well because a
    petitioner may not raise issues not first presented to the superior court.
    Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(4)(B); State v. Bortz, 
    169 Ariz. 575
    , 577 (App. 1991);
    State v. Wagstaff, 
    161 Ariz. 66
    , 71 (App. 1988); State v. Ramirez, 
    126 Ariz. 464
    ,
    468 (App. 1980); see also State v. Smith, 
    184 Ariz. 456
    , 459 (1996); State v.
    Swoopes, 
    216 Ariz. 390
    , 403, ¶ 42 (App. 2007) (both holding there is no
    review for fundamental error in a post-conviction relief proceeding).
    Further, this court will not consider arguments or issues first raised in a
    reply. See State v. Watson, 
    198 Ariz. 48
    , 51, ¶ 4 (App. 2000). Finally, “an
    of-right Rule 32 petitioner is not entitled to a review of the record by the
    superior court for arguable issues as required for direct appeals under
    Anders v. California [] and State v. Leon [].” State v. Chavez, 
    243 Ariz. 313
    , 314
    ¶ 1 (App. 2017).
    3
    STATE v. COVARRUBIAS
    Decision of the Court
    ¶7   For the above reasons, we grant review and deny relief.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4