Amber S. v. Dcs, L.C. ( 2017 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    AMBER S., Appellant,
    v.
    DEPARTMENT OF CHILD SAFETY, L.C., Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-JV 17-0113
    FILED 9-14-2017
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. JD528591
    The Honorable Timothy J. Ryan, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    The Stavris Law Firm, PLLC
    By Alison Stavris
    Counsel for Appellant
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Mesa
    By Ashlee N. Hoffmann
    Counsel for Appellee Department of Child Safety
    AMBER S. v. DCS, L.C.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge James P. Beene delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Randall M. Howe and Judge Kent E. Cattani joined.
    B E E N E, Judge:
    ¶1           Amber S. (“Mother”) appeals the superior court’s order
    terminating her parental rights to her daughter. For the following reasons,
    we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2            Mother and Nicolas C. (“Father”)1 are the biological parents
    of L.C. (born in March 2015). When L.C. was less than one-week old, the
    Department of Child Safety (“DCS”) took her into temporary physical
    custody and filed a dependency petition. DCS alleged that Mother was
    unable to parent L.C. due to (1) neglect because Mother and Father were
    homeless and could not provide for L.C.’s basic needs and (2) Mother’s
    mental health because she had a serious mental-illness and was not taking
    her medication.
    ¶3           Mother denied the allegations, but submitted the issue of
    dependency to the superior court. The court found L.C. dependent and
    adopted a case plan of family reunification. DCS offered Mother the
    following services to reunify with L.C.: parent aide; case aide; supervised
    visits; psychological evaluation; transportation; and coordination with
    Mother’s mental health provider through Partners in Recovery.
    ¶4             Mother participated in services, including a psychological
    evaluation in September 2015 with Dr. Jessica Leclerc. Mother was
    diagnosed with bipolar disorder and personality disorder with borderline
    and histrionic traits. Dr. Leclerc found that if Mother “can actively engage
    in services, show a pattern of stability . . . maintain a health[y] interpersonal
    support system, she should be able to exhibit minimally adequate parenting
    skills within the foreseeable future.”
    1    The superior court also terminated Father’s parental rights in 2016;
    however, he is not a party to this appeal.
    2
    AMBER S. v. DCS, L.C.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶5            Despite Mother’s participation in services and Dr. Leclerc’s
    instructions, Mother and Father engaged in domestic violence throughout
    the dependency proceedings. In November 2015, DCS updated Mother’s
    case plan to reflect her domestic violence and co-dependency issues.
    Mother admitted that she and Father had engaged in domestic violence
    from at least 2014 — they both were arrested during one instance in 2014,
    Father had assaulted her in 2014-2015 (presumably while Mother was
    pregnant with L.C.), Father was arrested in 2015 when he hit someone else
    in an attempt to hit Mother, and Father assaulted someone in Mother’s
    apartment complex in 2016.
    ¶6            Given the domestic violence concerns, the superior court
    changed Mother’s case plan in August 2016 to severance and adoption. The
    next month, DCS filed a petition to terminate Mother’s parental rights on
    the grounds of fifteen months’ out-of-home placement under Arizona
    Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 8-533(B)(8)(c). DCS alleged that Mother
    had failed to demonstrate that she made behavioral changes necessary to
    ensure the safe return of L.C. because she was deceptive about her
    continued contact with Father and lacked an understanding of the safety
    concerns Father presented.
    ¶7            A contested termination hearing was held in February 2017.
    The superior court terminated Mother’s parental rights and found that
    severance was in L.C.’s best interests. Mother timely appealed the
    termination. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 8-235(A) and 12-
    120.21(A)(1) (2017). 2
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8            The fundamental right to parent one’s child is not absolute.
    Kent K. v. Bobby M., 
    210 Ariz. 279
    , 284, ¶ 24 (2005). The superior court may
    terminate parental rights if it finds, “by clear and convincing evidence, at
    least one of the statutory grounds set out in section 8–533,”and by a
    preponderance of the evidence that termination is in the best interests of the
    child. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    196 Ariz. 246
    , 248–49, ¶ 12 (2000).
    The court must consider those circumstances existing at the time of the
    termination hearing. Shella H. v. Dep’t of Child Safety, 
    239 Ariz. 47
    , 50, ¶ 12
    (App. 2016). As the trier of fact, the superior court “is in the best position
    to weigh the evidence, observe the parties, judge the credibility of
    witnesses, and resolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O.,
    2     Absent material revision after the relevant date, we cite a statute’s
    current version.
    3
    AMBER S. v. DCS, L.C.
    Decision of the Court
    
    209 Ariz. 332
    , 334, ¶ 4 (App. 2004). Thus, we review an order terminating
    parental rights for an abuse of discretion and will not reverse unless “there
    is no reasonable evidence to support” the order. Mary Lou C. v. Ariz. Dep’t
    of Econ. Sec., 
    207 Ariz. 43
    , 47, ¶ 8 (App. 2004).
    I.   Sufficient Evidence Supports Severance
    ¶9            Mother argues insufficient evidence supports the superior
    court’s order severing her parental rights because she was consistent with
    her mental health services, obtained an order of protection against Father,
    successfully completed individual counseling, appropriately interacted
    with L.C. during visits, and obtained housing.
    ¶10            To meet its burden under A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(8)(c), DCS was
    required to prove: (1) the child has been in an out-of-home placement for
    at least fifteen months; (2) DCS has “made a diligent effort to provide
    appropriate reunification services;” (3) “the parent has been unable to
    remedy the circumstances” causing the out-of-home placement; and (4)
    “there is a substantial likelihood that the parent will not be capable of
    exercising proper and effective parental care and control in the near
    future.”3
    A. Diligent Effort to Provide Appropriate Reunification Services
    ¶11         Mother argues DCS did not take the necessary steps to ensure
    she was provided with individual counseling services during a six-month
    lapse from May 2016 through November 2016.
    ¶12            DCS must provide a parent “with the time and opportunity
    to participate in programs designed to help her become an effective
    parent[.]” Maricopa Cty. Juvenile Action No. JS-501904, 
    180 Ariz. 348
    , 353
    (App. 1994). DCS must “undertake measures with a reasonable prospect of
    success,” Mary Ellen C. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ. Sec., 
    193 Ariz. 185
    , 192, ¶ 34
    (App. 1999), but it “is clearly not obligated to provide services which are
    futile,” Pima Cty. Severance Action No. S-2397, 
    161 Ariz. 574
    , 577 (App. 1989)
    (citation omitted).
    ¶13            At the termination hearing, DCS case manager Kimberly
    Tuttle testified that Mother was receiving counseling through Partners in
    Recovery, but her therapist left and was no longer providing services,
    3      Mother does not challenge the superior court’s finding that L.C. had
    been in an out-of-home placement for at least fifteen months. Thus, we do
    not address it.
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    AMBER S. v. DCS, L.C.
    Decision of the Court
    causing a gap in Mother’s therapy. Mother was receiving social security
    disability insurance (“SSI”) for mental health issues and, as such, DCS was
    not permitted to offer or refer Mother for counseling services. Further, DCS
    was required to comply with the terms of SSI by coordinating with Mother’s
    behavioral case manager at Partners in Recovery, Sarah Hilger. Tuttle
    explained that she told Mother that if Partners in Recovery was not
    providing her with therapy, Mother would have to find another
    organization through SSI.
    ¶14            Sarah Hilger confirmed Tuttle’s account of the lapse in
    Mother’s counseling. Hilger explained that Mother’s therapist left Partners
    in Recovery and that she made several referrals for replacement counseling
    services, but each “continued to come back as declined at capacity.” Then,
    it took time to find a counselor to meet Mother at her home, as Hilger
    requested, to facilitate an easier process for Mother. Mother began therapy
    again in August 2016.
    ¶15           Over nearly two years, Mother was provided with a parent
    aide, case aide, supervised visits, psychological evaluation, transportation,
    and coordination with Partners in Recovery. The lapse in her counseling
    was four months (May 2016 through August 2016). DCS made a diligent
    effort to provide Mother with appropriate reunification services. And
    given Mother’s SSI benefits and the resulting limitation placed on DCS, we
    agree with the superior court’s finding that DCS “acted reasonably in
    relying on the service providers providing care and services for Mother
    through her SSI disability status.”
    B. Unable to Remedy Circumstances Causing Out-of-Home
    Placement
    ¶16          The superior court found that Mother was unable to remedy
    the circumstances causing L.C. to be in out-of-home placement due to her
    long-standing domestic violence issue with Father. Based on this record,
    we agree.
    ¶17            Early in the dependency proceedings, Mother and Father
    were referred for parent-aide services. At the intake session in June 2015,
    Father “was asked to leave the building due to his aggressive actions and
    belittling” of Mother. Mother told her case manager that “she worries about
    [Father] being around because he has paranoia and aggression . . . he has
    had assault charges and she does not want to go back with him.” However,
    Mother returned to Father upon his release from jail, telling her case
    manager she “did not mean any of those things.” In July 2015, another
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    AMBER S. v. DCS, L.C.
    Decision of the Court
    domestic violence incident occurred between Mother and Father. And the
    next month, the parent aide expressed concerns about the “continued
    domestic violence encounters between [Mother and Father],” noting that
    Mother was very defensive of him and stated she had “no intent on not
    having a relationship with [Father] despite the domestic violence within the
    relationship.” Then in September 2015, Father was arrested for assault
    when he “hit [Mother’s] behavioral health case manager in the midst of
    trying to hit [Mother].”
    ¶18           Police reports in 2016 further substantiated the continuing
    violence and instability in Mother’s relationship with Father. In February
    2016, Mother called police claiming she and Father got into an argument
    and he kicked the wall. Apparently, Father had been staying at Mother’s
    apartment, but told police he was leaving and did not intend to return. On
    May 17, 2016, the landlord called police to Mother’s apartment complex
    because Mother and the landlord had a verbal altercation. Witnesses told
    police Mother was yelling and cursing and told the landlord “karma is a
    bitch.” Less than one week later, on May 23, 2016, police were again called
    to Mother’s apartment complex. In response to Mother’s prompting, Father
    came to her apartment carrying a crow bar and threatening bodily harm to
    people with whom Mother had arguments. Father was arrested.
    ¶19            Tuttle testified that Mother completed her parent-aide
    referral, but not successfully due to her continuing contact with Father and
    refusing to acknowledge issues of domestic violence between her and
    Father. DCS was still concerned about this at the time of the termination
    hearing. Tuttle explained that Mother had been instructed by DCS
    numerous times it was not in L.C.’s, or her own, best interests to be in
    contact with Father due to his volatile temper. In fact, at an in-person
    meeting with Tuttle and the parent aide, Mother played audio recordings
    of incidents of domestic violence where Mother begged Father not to hit
    her. Despite this abuse, Mother continued to have a relationship with him.
    Tuttle confirmed the May 23, 2016 incident where Father was arrested at
    Mother’s apartment. She stated that Mother and Father had a court hearing
    on May 24. Father did not appear at the hearing. When questioned, Mother
    told the court she did not know Father’s whereabouts and had not had
    contact with him.
    ¶20           Tuttle testified that up until the May 2016 incident, the case
    plan was family reunification because DCS felt Mother had participated in
    services and had ended her relationship with Father. But, had DCS known
    Mother was still involved with Father, it would not have requested a family
    reunification case plan. Tuttle stated that Father continuously threatened
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    AMBER S. v. DCS, L.C.
    Decision of the Court
    and harassed her and other parties involved in the dependency, including
    the CASA, and L.C.’s foster placement, and made blanket statements that
    everyone involved would be harmed because they kidnapped his child.
    Tuttle explained that despite Father’s parental rights being severed months
    ago, he was still threatening everyone involved and it would be unsafe to
    return L.C. to Mother. Tuttle admitted Mother had recently taken steps to
    conceal her residence from Father, including obtaining an order of
    protection against him. However, Mother failed to provide DCS with proof
    she served, or even attempted to serve, the protective order on Father.
    Tuttle acknowledged that Mother has limited funds, perhaps creating a
    barrier to serving the order of protection on Father. But because Father’s
    address remained the same throughout the dependency proceedings and
    was the same address listed in his criminal assault case, Mother would have
    known where to serve him.
    ¶21           Mother admitted that she had lied to the court, DCS, and
    everyone involved when she stated at the May 24 hearing that she was not
    involved in a relationship with Father and did not know his whereabouts.
    Mother also admitted that before DCS received the May 2016 police report
    and confronted her, she was having unsupervised visits with L.C. at her
    home, but denied that Father was at her home during those visits. Mother
    said she continued her relationship with Father because she felt they could
    co-parent, that he would change. But after the May 2016 incident, Mother
    said she became afraid of Father, surrounded herself with positive people
    and her family, participated in therapy, took classes, obtained an
    apartment, and began taking care of her depression and anxiety. As such,
    Mother said she was a different person and wanted a chance to parent L.C.
    because she had worked so hard.
    ¶22           In its severance order, the superior court detailed the
    domestic violence history between Mother and Father, including Mother’s
    attendance at hearings where the court admonished Father for his
    threatening behaviors. Yet she continued to allow Father to live with her
    and lied to the court about it. The court found:
    Mother continues to lack credibility . . .
    ****
    . . . even though she claims that she had been untruthful in the
    past, but was being truthful at trial. It is more reasonable to
    believe Mother’s continued statements throughout the case,
    that she still wants to parent with [Father], and acts in a
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    AMBER S. v. DCS, L.C.
    Decision of the Court
    manner consistent with her statements that she intends to
    continue to be romantically involved with him.
    ****
    Mother’s claimed inability to serve the municipal court order
    of protection also lacks credibility, as domestic violence
    programs routinely provide waiver or deferment of costs of
    service, and Father’s residence at [xyz] street remains the
    same.
    ¶23          We conclude that the superior court did not abuse its
    discretion in finding Mother had not remedied the domestic violence
    circumstances that caused L.C. to be in out-of-home placement.
    C. Substantial Likelihood Mother Will Not be Capable of
    Exercising Proper and Effective Parental Care and Control in
    Near Future
    ¶24            Mother argues because she remedied the circumstances
    causing L.C. to be in out-of-home placement, there is a substantial
    likelihood she will be capable of exercising proper and effective care and
    control in the near future. The superior court found, however, that Mother
    was unable to rid herself of the violent and abusive relationship with
    Father. We agree. Substantial evidence in the record supports the finding
    that Mother will not capable of exercising proper and effective parental
    control in the near future.
    II.    Severance is in L.C.’s Best Interests
    ¶25           Mother argues that severance is not in L.C.’s best interests and
    the court should give her a chance to be reunified with L.C. because she has
    changed her life.
    ¶26           To prove that severance is in the child’s best interests, DCS
    must show that the child would either benefit from severance or be harmed
    by a continuation of the parental relationship. Mario G. v. Ariz. Dep’t of Econ.
    Sec., 
    227 Ariz. 282
    , 288, ¶ 26 (App. 2011). We will uphold the superior
    court’s best interests determination if a preponderance of the evidence
    supports it. Kent K., 
    210 Ariz. at 284, ¶ 22
    . It is sufficient that DCS show
    severance would free a child for adoption, and that the child would benefit
    from finding an adoptive placement. See JS-501904, 
    180 Ariz. at 352
    .
    Additionally, DCS can establish that termination is in a child’s best interests
    8
    AMBER S. v. DCS, L.C.
    Decision of the Court
    by presenting evidence showing that an existing placement is meeting the
    needs of the child. Mary Lou C., 207 Ariz. at 50, ¶ 19.
    ¶27            The superior court’s finding that severance was in L.C.’s best
    interests is supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Tuttle testified
    that for over one year L.C. has been in a foster home that is an adoptive
    placement. Tuttle said L.C.’s foster home was providing a safe and stable
    home for her and caring for all her needs. Further, Tuttle testified L.C. has
    a significant bond with her foster parents and brother. At the time of the
    termination hearing, L.C. had been in placement for nearly her entire life.
    We agree with the superior court: L.C. “should not languish in the system
    and have permanency delayed.”
    CONCLUSION
    ¶28          Because sufficient evidence supports the superior court’s
    termination of Mother’s parental rights, we affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    9