Beulah Johnson v. State ( 2015 )


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  •                                       In The
    Court of Appeals
    Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont
    ____________________
    NO. 09-13-00041-CR
    ____________________
    BEULAH JOHNSON, Appellant
    V.
    THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
    __________________________________________________________________
    On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 3
    Jefferson County, Texas
    Trial Cause No. 296066
    __________________________________________________________________
    MEMORANDUM OPINION
    We withdraw our opinion of November 4, 2015, and substitute this opinion
    in its place. Beulah Johnson pleaded guilty to misdemeanor theft, and the trial
    court sentenced Johnson to 180 days in jail. Johnson appealed, contending that her
    prosecution was statutorily barred and her right to counsel was violated. Johnson v.
    State, No. 09-13-00041-CR, 
    2014 WL 1857694
    , at *1 (Tex. App.—Beaumont May
    7, 2014), vacated, Johnson v. State, No. PD-0748-14, 
    2015 WL 1954102
    , at *1
    (Tex. Crim. App. Apr. 29, 2015) (not designated for publication). This Court
    1
    overruled Johnson’s contention that her right to counsel had been violated, but
    found that Johnson’s prosecution was barred by the applicable statute of limitations
    because the information did not contain tolling language. 
    Id. Upon appeal
    by the
    State from our judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeals noted that this Court had
    issued its opinion without the benefit of Ex parte Heilman, 
    456 S.W.3d 159
    (Tex.
    Crim. App. 2015), vacated our judgment, and remanded the cause for this Court
    “to consider the effect of Heilman, if any, on [our] reasoning and analysis in this
    case.” Johnson, 
    2015 WL 1954102
    , at *1. We now undertake to do so.
    EX PARTE HEILMAN
    In Heilman, the defendant pleaded guilty to misdemeanor tampering with a
    governmental record after the applicable two-year statute of limitations had
    expired. 
    Heilman, 456 S.W.3d at 160
    . Heilman signed a written waiver that stated,
    “I hereby waive all statute of limitations[,]” [sic] and he also signed a deferred
    adjudication   order   that   stated,   “DEFENSE     WAIVES      STATUTE       [OF]
    LIMITATIONS[.]” 
    Id. at 161.
    “In return for Heilman’s plea, the State agreed not
    to pursue indictment for state-jail felony tampering with a governmental record.”
    
    Id. at 160.
    Heilman subsequently filed an application for writ of habeas corpus, in
    which he argued that his statute of limitations defense was a category-one absolute
    right. 
    Id. at 160-61.
    The habeas court granted relief, and this Court affirmed the
    2
    habeas court’s decision. 
    Id. at 161.
    The Court of Criminal Appeals held that “the
    right at issue is a category-three forfeitable right[.]” 
    Id. at 161.
    In so holding, the
    Court of Criminal Appeals noted:
    [i]t would be easy to misinterpret a statute-of-limitations defense as a
    uniquely fundamental right, given that when it is properly raised, it
    leads to only one result: dismissal. But its true nature -- a mere
    legislative “act of grace” -- is modest, especially when compared to
    weightier, constitutionally based rights that we have nonetheless
    deemed forfeitable.
    
    Id. at 166.
    APPLICATION OF HEILMAN
    An information or indictment for a Class B misdemeanor may be presented
    within two years from the date of the commission of the offense, but not afterward.
    Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 12.02(a) (West 2015). In this case, the information
    was presented on January 9, 2013, more than two years after the theft was
    committed. As we noted in our previous opinion, the record suggests that the
    original felony charge of forgery against Johnson was dismissed, followed by a
    new charge for misdemeanor theft. Johnson, 
    2014 WL 1857694
    , at *1. The plea
    admonishments signed by Johnson contain the following language: “I give up all
    rights given to me by law, whether of form, substance[,] or procedure.” In this
    case, as in Heilman, Johnson received a benefit from pleading guilty to a
    misdemeanor offense. See 
    Heilman, 456 S.W.3d at 160
    , 168. Johnson had every
    3
    right to waive her limitations defense as part of her plea agreement, and we hold
    that she did so by signing the written plea admonishments which included a waiver
    of “all rights given . . . by law, whether of form, substance[,] or procedure.” See 
    id. at 169.
    Accordingly, because Johnson waived her statute of limitations defense as
    part of her plea bargain agreement, we affirm the trial court’s judgment of
    conviction.1
    AFFIRMED.
    ________________________________
    STEVE McKEITHEN
    Chief Justice
    Submitted on July 28, 2015
    Opinion Delivered November 5, 2015
    Do Not Publish
    Before McKeithen, C.J., Kreger and Johnson, JJ.
    1
    The portion of our previous opinion which overruled Johnson’s issue
    regarding an alleged violation of her right to counsel is unaffected by either the
    Court of Criminal Appeals’s opinion or this opinion.
    4
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 09-13-00041-CR

Filed Date: 11/5/2015

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 9/28/2016