Broadband v. Satcom , 418 P.3d 1055 ( 2018 )


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  •                                 IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    BROADBAND DYNAMICS, LLC, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    SATCOM MARKETING, INC., et al., Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 17-0102
    FILED 3-1-2018
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2016-003476
    The Honorable Dawn M. Bergin, Judge
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    Wilenchik & Bartness, P.C., Phoenix
    By Dennis I. Wilenchik (argued)
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Provident Law, PLLC, Scottsdale
    By Christopher J. Charles, Edwin G. Anderson
    Co-Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Berke Law Firm, PLLC, Phoenix
    By Lori V. Berke (argued), Jody C. Corbett
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
    BROADBAND v. SATCOM, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    OPINION
    Judge Paul J. McMurdie delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Jennifer B. Campbell
    joined.
    M c M U R D I E, Judge:
    ¶1            Broadband Dynamics, LLC (“Broadband”) appeals the
    superior court’s order dismissing its complaint against SatCom Marketing,
    Inc. and SatCom Marketing, LLC (“SatCom”). We reverse and remand to
    the superior court, holding that when a written contract provides for
    obligations that would give rise to both a claim for debt on an open account
    and a claim for breach of contract, the six-year statute of limitations under
    Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 12-548 applies to the claims that
    are based on damages arising from the breach of contract. Broadband’s
    breach of contract claim was based on obligations provided for in the
    written contract between the parties, which were separate from the open
    account obligations, and therefore the superior court erred by barring
    Broadband’s claim under the three-year statute of limitations under A.R.S.
    § 12-543.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 1
    ¶2            In September 2008, Broadband and SatCom entered a Service
    Agreement in which Broadband would provide SatCom with dedicated
    voice and telecommunications services. The term of the Service Agreement
    was 12 months, with an effective date of October 22, 2008. The agreement
    provided an automatic 12-month renewal that could be canceled with 90
    days’ notice prior to the anniversary date. The Service Agreement provided,
    in relevant part: (1) the parties intended to establish an open account; (2)
    Broadband would invoice monthly based on usage; and (3) SatCom would
    pay the amount due by the 21st of the following month. The Service
    Agreement also provided for liquidated damages as follows:
    1      We assume the truth of, and indulge all reasonable inferences from,
    the well-pled factual allegations. Cullen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 
    218 Ariz. 417
    , 419, ¶ 7 (2008).
    2
    BROADBAND v. SATCOM, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    Termination Charge. If Customer terminates the Agreement
    without cause, or if Broadband terminates the agreement for
    cause, Customer will pay their total dollar commitment to
    Broadband as defined as the term of this agreement or any
    months remaining in term inclusive of any renewal periods
    multiplied by the total of the revenue and usage commitments.
    Customer hereby acknowledges that any termination charges
    payable under this section are a realistic estimate of the
    damages Broadband will suffer for the termination.
    (Emphasis added). 2
    ¶3           In January 2016, Broadband sued SatCom for breach of
    contract and requested the principal sum, calculated per the Termination
    Charge, of $100,044.93 ($14,334.43 (revenue commitment) plus $85,710.50
    (usage commitment)), plus interest from April 20, 2011. SatCom moved to
    dismiss, arguing that Broadband’s claim was barred by the three-year
    limitations period governing open accounts. See A.R.S. § 12-543(2). In
    response, Broadband argued the six-year limitations period applied
    because the claim was premised on SatCom’s termination of the Service
    Agreement, not the balance due on an open account. See A.R.S.
    § 12-548(A)(1). Following supplemental briefing, the superior court agreed
    with SatCom and dismissed the complaint as time barred, concluding:
    [T]he Termination Charge is part of an open account
    agreement between the same parties and constitutes a penalty
    for failing to comply with the terms of the open account. In
    addition, the calculation of the Termination Charge is based
    upon prior usage or service. In short, the Termination Charge
    is too intertwined with the services required by the
    Agreement to treat it as a separate contract.
    2      The test for whether a contract fixes an unenforceable penalty or
    enforceable liquidated damages is whether the payment is for a fixed
    amount or varies with the nature and extent of the breach. Dobson Bay Club
    II DD, LLC v. La Sonrisa de Siena, LLC, 
    242 Ariz. 108
    , 112–13, ¶ 21 (2017);
    Miller Cattle Co. v. Mattice, 
    38 Ariz. 180
    , 190 (1931); Pima Sav. and Loan Ass'n
    v. Rampello, 
    168 Ariz. 297
    , 300 (App. 1991). We do not resolve in this appeal
    whether the Termination Charge is an appropriate liquidated damages
    provision, or an impermissible penalty. See infra ¶ 14.
    3
    BROADBAND v. SATCOM, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    Following entry of a final judgment, see Ariz. R. Civ. P. 54(c), Broadband
    timely appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶4              We review the superior court’s dismissal of a complaint de
    novo. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 
    230 Ariz. 352
    , 355, ¶ 7 (2012). We will affirm if
    the plaintiff is not entitled to relief “under any facts susceptible of proof in
    the statement of the claim.” ELM Ret. Ctr., LP v. Callaway, 
    226 Ariz. 287
    , 289,
    ¶ 5 (App. 2010) (quoting Mohave Disposal, Inc. v. City of Kingman, 
    186 Ariz. 343
    , 346 (1996)).
    A.     Broadband’s Claims Were Not Barred by the Three-Year Statute of
    Limitations in A.R.S. § 12-543.
    ¶5             Broadband argues the superior court erred by applying the
    three-year statute of limitations to its breach of contract claim. We review
    de novo the application of a statute of limitations, Watkins v. Arpaio, 
    239 Ariz. 168
    , 170, ¶ 7 (App. 2016), considering the nature of the cause of action and
    not the form, Redhair v. Kinerk, Beal, Schmidt, Dyer & Sethi, P.C., 
    218 Ariz. 293
    , 298, ¶ 21 (App. 2008) (citing Atlee Credit Corp. v. Quetulio, 
    22 Ariz. App. 116
    , 117 (1974)). “The defense of the statute of limitations is not favored by
    the courts, and where two constructions are possible, the longer period of
    limitations is preferred.” Woodward v. Chirco Const. Co., Inc., 
    141 Ariz. 520
    ,
    524 (App. 1984), approved as supplemented, 
    141 Ariz. 514
     (1984).
    ¶6             The Service Agreement characterizes the parties’ agreement
    as “an open account.” An open account is one “where there are running or
    concurrent dealings between the parties, which are kept unclosed with the
    expectation of further transactions.” Krumtum v. Burton, 
    111 Ariz. 448
    , 450
    (1975) (quoting Connor Live Stock Co. v. Fisher, 
    32 Ariz. 80
    , 85 (1927)). A cause
    of action to recover on an open account arises from “a contract between the
    parties for work done or material furnished.” Underhill v. Smith, 
    23 Ariz. 266
    , 269 (1922). To recover on an open account, the plaintiff must meet its
    burden to prove “the correctness of the account and each item thereof.” Holt
    v. W. Farm Servs., Inc., 
    110 Ariz. 276
    , 278 (1974). The statute of limitations
    runs on an open account from the date the last item is charged. Krumtum,
    
    111 Ariz. at 451
    .
    ¶7            Broadband concedes that the Service Agreement created an
    open account between the parties, and that accordingly, the three-year
    statute of limitations bars a claim for any unpaid balance on the open
    account. However, Broadband contends the Service Agreement is also an
    enforceable contract, setting forth the duties and liabilities of the parties
    4
    BROADBAND v. SATCOM, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    apart from SatCom’s promise to make timely payments, to which the
    six-year statute of limitations in A.R.S. § 12-548(A)(1) applies. See Connor
    Live Stock Co., 
    32 Ariz. at 85
    . We agree.
    ¶8            “An express contract, which defines the duties and liabilities
    of the parties, whether it be oral or written, is not, as a rule, an open
    account.” Connor Live Stock, 
    32 Ariz. at 85
    . The Service Agreement sets forth
    other obligations that were separate and distinct from SatCom’s duty to pay
    for services provided on the open account. Cf. Flori Corp. v. Fitzgerald, 
    167 Ariz. 601
    , 602 (App. 1990) (action on a guaranty was governed by the six-
    year limitations period regardless of whether a claim on the underlying
    open-account debt was barred by the three-year statute of limitations).
    These included provisions which provided for exclusivity, a 12-month
    renewable term, monthly access charges and guaranteed minimum usage,
    and liquidated damages in the event of early termination. These terms are
    typical of a written contract and do not fall within the definition of an open
    account. See, e.g., Underhill, 23 Ariz. at 269 (defining an open account as “a
    contract between the parties for work done or material furnished”).
    ¶9             The logic behind an open account’s shorter statute of
    limitations does not support applying it to the contract claim in the instant
    case. Open accounts are held to the same statute of limitations as an oral
    debt. A.R.S. § 12-543. The shorter statute of limitations for oral debt
    “recognizes the inherent difficulties of proving an oral contract,” which are
    frustrated by “evidence that becomes less reliable through passage of time.”
    Kersten v. Cont’l Bank, 
    129 Ariz. 44
    , 47 (App. 1981). Debt evidenced by a
    written contract, however, is memorialized in writing and therefore
    afforded a longer statute of limitations. A.R.S. § 12-548(A)(1); see Kersten,
    
    129 Ariz. at 47
    . While the Service Agreement between the parties in this case
    may have characterized itself as establishing an open account, the
    agreement was memorialized in writing between two sophisticated and
    represented parties; its terms therefore did not require proof based on the
    unreliable evidence used to prove an oral agreement.
    ¶10           SatCom counters by arguing Broadband’s claim, even for the
    amount owed under the Termination Charge, is based on a contract that
    created an open account, and no Arizona authority supports a holding that
    multiple claims can be asserted by a plaintiff arising from an open account.
    While no Arizona case is directly on point, our caselaw does acknowledge
    multiple claims, including a breach of contract claim, being brought in
    addition to claims for amounts owed on an open account, when both arose
    from the same agreement. See Am. Power Prods., Inc. v. CSK Auto, Inc., 
    235 Ariz. 509
    , 511, ¶ 2 (App. 2014) (seller agreed to sell items to buyer on an
    5
    BROADBAND v. SATCOM, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    open account; seller sued buyer for breach of contract and negligent
    misrepresentation, seeking over $5 million in damages), rev’d on other
    grounds, 
    239 Ariz. 151
     (2016); Sun World Corp. v. Pennysaver, Inc., 
    130 Ariz. 585
    , 586 (App. 1981) (discussing dismissal, on other grounds, of plaintiff’s
    claims for collection “on an open account owed for certain printing
    delivered under the terms of the contract” and for damages “for the
    premature wrongful termination of the contract”); see also Wean Water, Inc.
    v. Sta-Rite Indus., Inc., 
    141 Ariz. 315
    , 316 (App. 1984) (seller sold business to
    buyer; buyer sued seller for breach of contract, misrepresentation, and
    fraud, and seller counterclaimed for breach of contract and balances due on
    a promissory note and an open account); Phoenix Newspapers, Inc. v.
    Schmuhl, 
    114 Ariz. 113
    , 115 (App. 1976) (seller sued for breach of contract
    and for payment of newspapers furnished on an open account). Our
    conclusion is further bolstered by the difference in the elements a plaintiff
    is required to prove on a claim to recover debt on an open account and a
    claim for breach of contract. Compare Holt, 
    110 Ariz. at 278
     (to recover on an
    open account, the plaintiff must meet its burden to prove “the correctness
    of the account and each item thereof”), with Graham v. Asbury, 
    112 Ariz. 184
    ,
    185 (1975) (“To bring an action for the breach of the contract, the plaintiff
    has the burden of proving the existence of the contract, its breach and the
    resulting damages.”).
    ¶11            SatCom also claims out-of-state caselaw suggests that a cause
    of action arising out of an open account is governed by the limitations
    period applicable to a suit on the open account. See Touro Infirmary v. Am.
    Mar. Officer, 
    34 So. 3d 878
    , 883–86 (La. Ct. App. 2010); Dean Vivian Homes,
    Inc. v. Sebera’s Plumbing & Appliances, Inc., 
    615 S.W.2d 921
    , 926 (Tex. Civ.
    App. 1981). We find these cases unpersuasive. In Touro, the claim asserted
    by the plaintiff was for the balance due on an open account, though the
    exact amount was in dispute, and there was no written agreement between
    the parties. 
    34 So. 3d at 886
    . Here, Broadband is seeking relief under the
    liquidated damages clause as part of the written Service Agreement, and
    has specifically conceded that it cannot collect any unpaid balance due on
    the open account. In Dean Vivian, the claim asserted by the plaintiff was also
    for balance due on an open account, but did include a claim for interest
    based on a written agreement. 
    615 S.W.2d at
    923–24. However, the
    application of a statute of limitations under either an open account or a
    written contract was not at issue, and therefore that case is also not
    informative.
    ¶12         Finally, we disagree with the superior court’s finding that the
    Termination Charge was “too intertwined” with the open account
    agreement to allow for a breach of contract claim. The superior court
    6
    BROADBAND v. SATCOM, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    explained that (1) the lack of a separately signed agreement, (2) the
    Termination Charge being enforced as a penalty for failing to comply with
    the terms of the agreement, and (3) the calculation of the Termination
    Charge being based on prior usage all supported a finding that Broadband’s
    claim should be barred by the three-year statute of limitations for actions
    on open accounts.
    ¶13            The factors cited by the superior court are not determinative
    of the statute of limitations issue. Instead, when determining whether a
    plaintiff’s claim should be construed as one on an open account or one
    based on a breach of a written contract, where a written agreement contains
    mixed obligations, some of which cannot be characterized as an open
    account, we look to the parties’ obligations under the agreement and
    determine whether they are seeking a remedy for an unpaid balance due
    on the open account, or for damages because of a breach of the written
    contract. As previously noted, if “two constructions are possible, the longer
    period of limitations is preferred.” Woodward, 141 Ariz. at 524. Accordingly,
    Broadband’s claim against SatCom for breach of the written Service
    Agreement should be allowed to proceed under § 12-548 because the
    obligations and remedy sought are not based on those of an open account.
    B.     The Enforceability of the Liquidated Damages Provision is Not
    Properly Raised on Appeal.
    ¶14           In the answering brief, SatCom urges us to affirm the
    judgment dismissing the case because the Termination Charge constitutes
    an unenforceable penalty. Although we may affirm if the dismissal was
    correct for any reason, see Sw. Non-Profit Hous. Corp. v. Nowak, 
    234 Ariz. 387
    ,
    391, ¶ 10 (App. 2014), we decline to consider this issue because it was not
    addressed by the superior court and the facts are not sufficiently developed
    to permit a proper legal analysis. See Mirchandani v. BMO Harris Bank, N.A.,
    
    235 Ariz. 68
    , 72, ¶ 15 (App. 2014); see also ARCAP 13(a)(7)(B) (argument on
    appeal should contain “references to the record on appeal where the
    particular issue was raised and ruled on”); cf. Watson v. Apache County, 
    218 Ariz. 512
    , 517, ¶ 23 (App. 2008) (declining to address argument that
    summary judgment was proper because claim was precluded by economic
    loss rule).
    C.     Attorney’s Fees and Costs on Appeal.
    ¶15           Both parties request their attorney’s fees on appeal pursuant
    to the Service Agreement and A.R.S. § 12-341.01. Because SatCom is not the
    successful party, we deny its request. Because Broadband is the successful
    7
    BROADBAND v. SATCOM, et al.
    Opinion of the Court
    party, we grant its request for reasonable attorney’s fees and costs upon
    compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil Appellate Procedure 21.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16          Because the obligations and remedy Broadband sought are
    not based on those of an open account, its claim against SatCom for breach
    of the written Service Agreement should be allowed to proceed under
    § 12-548. We reverse and remand to the superior court for further
    proceedings consistent with this opinion.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    8