Vincent v. Shanovich ( 2018 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    In re the Marriage of:
    FRANCENE LAVERNE VINCENT, Petitioner/Appellee,
    v.
    PATRICK JUDE SHANOVICH, Respondent/Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CV 16-0431 FC
    FILED 9-25-2018
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    DR2000-095278
    The Honorable Stephen M. Hopkins, Judge
    VACATED AND REMANDED
    COUNSEL
    The Harrian Law Firm P.L.C., Glendale
    By Daniel S. Riley
    Counsel for Respondent/Appellant
    Popp Law Firm, P.L.C., Tempe
    By James S. Osborn Popp
    Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee
    VINCENT v. SHANOVICH
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision of the Court, in which Chief
    Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.
    B R O W N, Judge:
    ¶1            Patrick Shanovich appeals the superior court’s order denying
    his motion to set aside a Qualified Domestic Relations Order (“QDRO”)
    because of an alleged clerical mistake and a judgment awarding attorneys’
    fees to his former spouse Francene Vincent. For lack of appellate
    jurisdiction, we previously dismissed his appeal of the order denying his
    motion to set aside the QDRO and vacated the judgment awarding fees.
    Vincent v. Shanovich, 1 CA-CV 16-0431 FC, 
    2017 WL 1174317
    , at *1, ¶ 1 (Ariz.
    App. Mar. 30, 2017) (mem. decision). The Arizona Supreme Court granted
    Shanovich’s petition to review the appellate jurisdiction issue and held that
    an order granting or denying a motion to correct clerical mistakes, filed
    pursuant to Arizona Rule of Family Law Procedure (“Rule”) 85(A), is
    appealable under Arizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section
    12-2101(A)(2). Vincent v. Shanovich, 
    243 Ariz. 269
    , 270, ¶ 1 (2017). The
    supreme court directed us to consider the merits of the order denying his
    motion to set aside the QDRO. 
    Vincent, 243 Ariz. at 270
    , ¶ 13. For the
    following reasons, we vacate that order and remand for entry of an
    amended QDRO.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2             Vincent petitioned to dissolve her marriage to Shanovich on
    August 25, 2000, effectuating service that same day, and the parties
    divorced in 2002. The Decree awarded Vincent “a one-half (1/2) portion of
    [Shanovich]’s retirement including employer contribution and accrued
    interest as of the date of filing the Petition for Dissolution,” to be reflected
    in “a [QDRO] stating such provisions.”
    ¶3            In March 2004, Vincent moved for the entry of a stipulated
    QDRO “Re: Arizona [State] Personnel Retirement System [(“ASRS”)] and
    City of Mesa Deferred Compensation Plan.” The motion explained that the
    QDRO was intended to divide deferred compensation benefits “due in
    accordance with the terms and conditions of the Decree.” The parties do
    not dispute that the QDRO entered by the superior court in April 2004 was
    2
    VINCENT v. SHANOVICH
    Decision of the Court
    the stipulated QDRO they submitted. The QDRO stated it (1) was
    “intended to meet the requirements of an ‘Acceptable Domestic Relations
    Order’” relating to ASRS and (2) was “an integral part” of the Decree. The
    QDRO provided that Vincent was “awarded 50% of [Shanovich]’s annuity,
    payable at the time and in the manner payments are made to the member
    pursuant to the retirement benefit elected.” Unlike the Decree, however,
    the QDRO did not specify the relevant valuation date for that award.
    ¶4            Years later, when nearing retirement, Shanovich allegedly
    learned that the ASRS pension plan administrator “interpreted the [QDRO]
    as awarding [Vincent] one-half of the entire retirement benefit—including
    the portion of the benefit [Shanovich] has accrued since the parties’
    divorce.” In March 2016, Shanovich filed a motion to set aside the QDRO
    under Rule 85, alternatively asserting it contained a clerical mistake under
    Rule 85(A) (because it did not include the valuation date specified in the
    Decree) and was void. The motion attached a six-page proposed Amended
    QDRO, which included the August 25, 2000 valuation date, but also
    included several provisions that were not part of the original QDRO.
    ¶5            In response, Vincent acknowledged that the Decree awarded
    her one-half of Shanovich’s retirement assets as of the date of filing the
    petition for dissolution. She did not assert she was entitled to any more of
    Shanovich’s retirement than the Decree awarded to her, but nonetheless
    maintained that the motion failed to establish a clerical mistake. She
    explained that several months earlier, she had informed Shanovich that she
    opposed modifying the QDRO because she considered it to have been
    entered correctly, it was untimely, and “she did not want to forfeit the
    survivor and estate-payment provisions in the existing order.”
    ¶6            The superior court denied Shanovich’s motion to set aside,
    reasoning in part that the Decree and the QDRO are unambiguous and were
    never appealed. Shanovich timely appealed that order.1 We have appellate
    1      Shanovich also appealed the superior court’s judgment awarding
    $6,213.75 in attorneys’ fees and costs to Vincent. In our prior memorandum
    decision, we vacated the award of attorneys’ fees and that issue was not
    addressed by the Arizona Supreme Court. To the extent that ruling on
    attorneys’ fees is not the law of this case, see Ezell v. Quon, 
    224 Ariz. 532
    , 536,
    ¶ 14 (App. 2010), we reaffirm it. As to the superior court’s award of costs
    in the amount of $3.75, we affirm that award because Shanovich failed to
    argue such costs were not appropriately awarded to Vincent as the
    successful party under A.R.S. § 12-341. Finally, although the superior court
    3
    VINCENT v. SHANOVICH
    Decision of the Court
    jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(2). See 
    Vincent, 243 Ariz. at 272
    ,
    ¶ 12.
    DISCUSSION
    A.     Clerical Mistake
    ¶7              Shanovich argues the superior court erred in concluding the
    discrepancy between the Decree and the QDRO was not a clerical mistake.
    We review a ruling on a motion for clerical mistake under Rule 85 for an
    abuse of discretion. See Duckstein v. Wolf, 
    230 Ariz. 227
    , 231, ¶ 8 (App. 2012)
    (addressing a motion to set aside judgment pursuant to Rule 85(C)); see also
    Ariz. R. Fam. L.P. 85(A) (“Clerical mistakes . . . may be corrected by the
    court. . . .”). We review de novo the interpretation of a decree. See Cohen v.
    Frey, 
    215 Ariz. 62
    , 66, ¶ 10 (App. 2007) (citation omitted).
    ¶8               “Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders, or other parts of the
    record and errors therein arising from oversight or omission may be
    corrected by the court at any time of its own initiative or on motion of any
    party and after such notice, if any, as the court orders.” Ariz. R. Fam. L.P.
    85(A). A clerical mistake “occurs when the written judgment fails to
    accurately set forth the court’s decision[,]” while “[a] judgmental error
    occurs when the court’s decision is accurately set forth but is legally
    incorrect.” 
    Vincent, 243 Ariz. at 271
    , ¶ 8 (citing Ace Auto. Prods., Inc. v. Van
    Duyne, 
    156 Ariz. 140
    , 142–43 (App. 1987) (addressing Ariz. R. Civ. P. 60(a),
    which, at the time, was textually identical to Rule 85(A)). When considering
    an alleged clerical mistake, “the family court should examine the record to
    determine whether the judgment accurately recorded the court’s intent. If
    not, the judgment should be corrected.” 
    Id. (citation omitted).
    The
    judgment at issue “must be construed in light of the situation of the court,
    what was before it, and the accompanying circumstances. In cases of
    ambiguity or doubt[,] the meaning of the judgment must be determined by
    that which preceded it and that which it was intended to execute.” Benson
    v. State ex rel. Eyman, 
    108 Ariz. 513
    , 515 (1972) (quoting Paxton v. McDonald,
    
    72 Ariz. 378
    , 382 (1951)).
    ¶9            The Decree, which directs division of Shanovich’s retirement
    “as of the date of filing the Petition for Dissolution” (which also was the
    date of service), is in accord with Arizona law that only community
    property as of the time of service of a petition for dissolution is subject to
    awarded Vincent an additional $510 in attorneys’ fees, that ruling is not
    challenged on appeal.
    4
    VINCENT v. SHANOVICH
    Decision of the Court
    distribution in a decree. See A.R.S. §§ 25-211(A)(2), -213(B), -318(A).
    Additionally, other portions of the QDRO, including those addressing the
    consequences of Shanovich’s withdrawal or death, use August 25, 2000 as
    the valuation date, making clear the valuation date is tied to the amount of
    Vincent’s benefit as of the petition’s filing date. Moreover, the supreme
    court’s instruction on remand was for us to “consider whether the QDRO
    accurately reflects the family court’s intent expressed in the [Decree] to
    award Vincent a one-half portion of Shanovich’s retirement ‘as of the date
    of filing the Petition for Dissolution.’” 
    Vincent, 243 Ariz. at 272
    , ¶ 13.
    ¶10             Given this express directive, the unambiguous language of
    the Decree, and other provisions in the QDRO, the QDRO is not complete
    in that it failed to make clear that Shanovich’s retirement is to be divided as
    of the petition’s filing date. Because the QDRO does not accurately reflect
    the Decree, the QDRO contains a clerical mistake. See Ariz. R. Fam. L.P.
    85(A) (noting clerical mistakes include those “arising from oversight or
    omission”); accord 
    Vincent, 243 Ariz. at 271
    , ¶ 8 (explaining a clerical mistake
    “is inadvertent and may be a misstatement or an omission”). It was error
    not to correct that clerical mistake. We therefore vacate the order denying
    Shanovich’s motion to set aside the QDRO and remand for entry of an
    amended QDRO directing the division of Shanovich’s retirement benefits
    as of August 25, 2000.
    B.     Attorneys’ Fees On Appeal.
    ¶11           Both parties request attorneys’ fees incurred on appeal
    pursuant to Rule 31, which authorizes the sanctions against an attorney or
    party who advances a position that is not well-grounded in fact or made in
    good faith. Because neither party has shown that the other asserted such
    arguments on appeal, their requests are denied. Vincent also requests an
    award of attorneys’ fees on appeal pursuant to A.R.S. § 25-324(A). Given
    the lack of evidence regarding the financial positions of the parties, and
    because Shanovich has shown that a clerical mistake occurred, we deny
    Vincent’s request. As the successful party on appeal, Shanovich is awarded
    his costs on appeal, subject to his compliance with Arizona Rule of Civil
    Appellate Procedure 21.
    5
    VINCENT v. SHANOVICH
    Decision of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶12            The superior court’s order denying Shanovich’s motion to
    correct the clerical mistake in the QDRO is vacated. The case is remanded
    for entry of an amended QDRO that matches the Decree by directing the
    division of Shanovich’s retirement benefits as of August 25, 2000.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 16-0431-FC

Filed Date: 9/25/2018

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/25/2018