Hall v. Hardy ( 2023 )


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  •                       NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    TAKIA SHENE HALL, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    RYAN WILLIAM HARDY, et al., Defendants/Appellees.
    No. 1 CA-CV 22-0468
    FILED 2-14-2023
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2021-051758
    The Honorable Sara J. Agne, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Collins & Collins, L.L.P., Phoenix
    By Joseph E. Collins
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Phoenix City Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Victoria R. Torrilhon
    Counsel for Defendants/Appellees
    HALL v. HARDY, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Maria Elena Cruz delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge James B. Morse Jr. and Judge Daniel J. Kiley joined.
    C R U Z, Judge:
    ¶1           Takia Shene Hall appeals the superior court’s dismissal of her
    personal injury claim against the City of Phoenix (“the City”).1 For the
    following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             In June 2020, Ryan William Hardy (“Hardy”), a City
    employee, drove a fire engine northbound on 26th Drive past a stationary
    United States Postal Service (“USPS”) vehicle. Hall, an on-duty USPS
    employee, was inside the USPS vehicle. As it passed the USPS vehicle, one
    of the fire engine's passenger side mirrors collided with the USPS vehicle’s
    rear driver-side mirror. Both vehicles sustained minor damage. Hall
    served the City with a notice of claim in December 2020 but did not serve
    Hardy with a notice of claim.
    ¶3            In May 2021, Hall filed a personal injury lawsuit against
    Hardy and the City alleging claims of negligence against Hardy and
    vicarious liability against the City. The City and Hardy answered and,
    among other things, raised the affirmative defense that Hall had failed to
    serve a notice of claim on Hardy as required by Arizona Revised Statutes
    (“A.R.S.”) section 12-821.01.
    ¶4           In August 2021, Hall filed an “Unopposed Motion to Amend
    Complaint.” Hall attached a proposed amended complaint to her motion,
    which added a negligent entrustment of a vehicle claim against the City.
    The proposed amended complaint named both the City and Hardy as
    defendants. The superior court granted the motion.
    1     The superior court also dismissed Hall’s claim against the City’s
    employee, Ryan William Hardy. Hall makes no argument on appeal that
    the superior court erred by dismissing Hardy. Accordingly, we do not
    address Hardy’s dismissal. See ARCAP 13(a)(7).
    2
    HALL v. HARDY, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    ¶5           The next day, Hall filed an amended complaint which
    differed from the unopposed proposed amended complaint. The amended
    complaint eliminated Hardy from the caption and added the City’s
    “agents” as defendants. The amended complaint referred to Hardy as
    “Unnamed Ryan Hardy” and “Unnamed Defendant Hardy.” Hall
    continued to seek damages “jointly and severally.” The City answered the
    amended complaint.
    ¶6            The City moved for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to
    Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure (“Rule”) 12(c) in March 2022. In its motion,
    the City argued it was entitled to judgment because (1) Hall had failed to
    serve Hardy with a notice of claim, and (2) she had failed to include her
    negligent entrustment claim in the notice of claim served on the City. Hall
    did not respond. The City moved for summary disposition pursuant to
    Rule 41(b) for failure to prosecute, including Hall’s failure to respond to the
    City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings. The superior court dismissed
    the complaint. The court noted that because Hall had not filed a response
    to the City’s motion for judgment on the pleadings the court could
    summarily grant the motion, but considered the merits of the motion to
    dismiss and entered judgment for the City because Hall had failed to
    comply fully with the notice of claim statute. The court’s order contained
    Rule 54(c) language.
    ¶7            Hall filed a motion and amended motion requesting the
    superior court to set aside its order dismissing the complaint pursuant to
    Rule 60(b)(1), asserting excusable neglect. The City responded, and the
    superior court denied Hall’s motion. The court struck the City’s filings “to
    the extent they [were] responses to the Motion for Reconsideration.” See
    Rule 7.1(e)(2). The court ruled “[t]o the extent [Hall’s] Motion for
    Reconsideration is an attempted [Rule] 60(b)(1) Motion . . . the court finds
    no grounds here on which to base any [Rule] 60(b)(1) relief.”
    ¶8            Hall timely appealed, and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
    A.R.S. § 12-2101(A)(1).
    DISCUSSION
    ¶9            We review de novo the superior court’s dismissal of a
    complaint pursuant to Rule 12. Coleman v. City of Mesa, 
    230 Ariz. 352
    , 355,
    ¶ 7 (2012). On a motion for judgment on the pleadings, all material
    allegations of the opposing party must be taken as true, and judgment may
    only be granted if the moving party is clearly entitled to judgment. Young
    v. Bishop, 
    88 Ariz. 140
    , 143 (1960). “We review de novo a trial court’s
    3
    HALL v. HARDY, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    determination that a party’s notice of claim failed to comply with [A.R.S.]
    § 12-821.01.” Jones v. Cochise Cnty., 
    218 Ariz. 372
    , 375, ¶ 7 (App. 2008). We
    review the superior court’s decision declining to set aside a judgment under
    Rule 60(c) for an abuse of discretion. City of Phoenix v. Geyler, 
    144 Ariz. 323
    ,
    328-29 (1985).
    ¶10            As a threshold matter, the City argues Hall’s appeal “may” be
    time-barred if Hall’s amended motion requesting the superior court to set
    aside its order dismissing the complaint pursuant to Rule 60(b)(1) was a
    motion for reconsideration, as suggested by its title. See Rule 7.1(e)(3)
    (motions for reconsideration do not extend the time within which a notice
    of appeal must be filed). As noted above, Hall cited Rule 60(b)(1) as
    authority for her motion, and the superior court ruled accordingly: “[t]o the
    extent the Motion for Reconsideration is an attempted [Rule] 60(b)(1)
    motion . . . the court finds no grounds here on which to base any [Rule]
    60(b)(1) relief.” We find that Hall timely appealed because she filed a time-
    extending Rule 60 motion, regardless of its title, within fifteen days of entry
    of judgment. See ARCAP 9(e)(1)(E).
    ¶11           It is undisputed in this case that Hall served the City with a
    notice of claim but did not serve Hardy with a notice of claim.
    ¶12            Hall asserts that after she filed her amended complaint, the
    City was the only defendant remaining in the lawsuit. 2 The City argues
    Hall’s “attempt to dismiss [Hardy] from the lawsuit” was ineffective. We
    agree that the new, unsanctioned language in the amended complaint did
    not result in a voluntary dismissal of Hardy from the lawsuit. After Hardy
    answered Hall’s complaint, Hall never received leave from the court to
    dismiss Hardy or a stipulation from the parties agreeing to the dismissal.
    See Rule 15(a)(2); 41(a)(1). And the superior court did not separately
    dismiss Hardy before it dismissed the complaint in its entirety.
    ¶13           The City argues that, whether or not Hardy was still a named
    defendant, Hall’s failure to serve Hardy with a notice of claim was fatal to
    her vicarious liability claim against the City. Hall argues that she need not
    sue Hardy to prevail on a vicarious liability claim against the City.
    ¶14         We need not address whether a dismissal of an employee
    pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01 precludes a claim of vicarious liability
    2       On appeal, Hall refers to Hardy as a “non party at fault,” but she did
    not file a notice naming Hardy as a non-party at fault under Rule 26(b)(5).
    4
    HALL v. HARDY, et al.
    Decision of the Court
    against an employer. See, e.g., Banner Univ. Med. Ctr. Tucson Campus, LLC v.
    Gordon (Banner I), 
    249 Ariz. 132
     (App. 2020), vacated, Banner II, 
    252 Ariz. 264
    (2022) (noting at n.2 the Banner II Court did not “address the underlying
    merits of whether a dismissal of an employee pursuant to A.R.S. § 12-821.01
    precludes a claim of vicarious liability against an employer”). Because Hall
    failed to respond to the City’s motion to dismiss, a dispositive motion, she
    has waived on appeal her argument about the City’s vicarious liability and
    whether she was required to serve Hardy with a notice of claim for that
    claim to survive. See BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Espiau, 
    251 Ariz. 588
    , 593-94,
    ¶ 25 (App. 2021) (legal theories must be timely presented to the superior
    court so the court may address all issues on their merits, and if the argument
    is not raised below, it is waived on appeal).
    CONCLUSION
    ¶15           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CV 22-0468

Filed Date: 2/14/2023

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/14/2023