State v. Flores ( 2016 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    ABRAHAM ESTRADA FLORES, Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 15-0674
    FILED 6-9-2016
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Yuma County
    No. S1400CR201500114
    The Honorable Maria Elena Cruz, Judge
    AFFIRMED AS CORRECTED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Joseph T. Maziarz
    Counsel for Appellee
    Yuma County Public Defender’s Office, Yuma
    By Edward F. McGee
    Counsel for Appellant
    Abraham E. Flores, Buckeye
    Appellant
    STATE v. FLORES
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Patricia K. Norris delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Jon W. Thompson and Judge Maurice Portley joined.
    N O R R I S, Judge:
    ¶1             Abraham Estrada Flores timely appeals from his conviction
    and sentence for aggravated assault, a Class 3 dangerous felony. See 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13-1204
    (A)(2) (Supp. 2014). After searching the record on appeal
    and finding no arguable question of law that was not frivolous, Flores’
    counsel filed a brief in accordance with Anders v. California, 
    386 U.S. 738
    , 
    87 S. Ct. 1396
    , 
    18 L. Ed. 2d 493
     (1967), and State v. Leon, 
    104 Ariz. 297
    , 
    451 P.2d 878
     (1969), asking this court to search the record for fundamental error, and
    also raising several issues at Flores’ request. This court granted counsel’s
    motion to allow Flores to file a supplemental brief in propria persona, and he
    did so. We reject the arguments raised in Flores’ counsel’s brief and Flores’
    supplemental brief, and, after reviewing the entire record, we find no
    fundamental error. Therefore, we affirm Flores’ conviction and sentence as
    corrected.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND1
    ¶2            Victim J.C. testified that on January 30, 2015, he was working
    at an agricultural farm when he received a call to come help repair a broken
    sprinkler pipe. After receiving the call, he and two coworkers, J.C.B. and
    J.H.B., met a foreman, C.C., at the location of the broken pipe to start
    repairing it. Flores arrived shortly thereafter and began “arguing with
    [C.C.] and cursing at him,” calling him “a snitch” and other obscenities
    because C.C. had told Flores’ boss about the leaking pipe. Flores repeatedly
    challenged C.C. “to hit him,” but C.C. told Flores “he wasn’t getting paid
    to fight.” Flores eventually walked to his car, yelled several obscenities to
    the whole group, and got in his car.
    ¶3            J.C. then approached Flores “to ask [Flores] why he was
    saying that to [him]” because Flores barely knew him. According to J.C.,
    1We   view the facts in the light most favorable to sustaining
    the jury’s verdict and resolve all reasonable inferences against Flores. State
    v. Guerra, 
    161 Ariz. 289
    , 293, 
    778 P.2d 1185
    , 1189 (1989).
    2
    STATE v. FLORES
    Decision of the Court
    he “wasn’t approaching [Flores] with the intention of arguing or fighting.”
    Flores got out of his car when J.C. approached, so J.C. “turned around to
    walk away” and “started ignoring him” to avoid trouble. As he was
    walking away, C.C. yelled, “watch out.” J.C. “glanced back and [] got a
    glimpse of [Flores] coming at [him] with [a] machete,” and he got “really
    scared.” J.C. thought Flores “was going to hit [him] on the head, but”
    because he was able to duck down, Flores struck his back with the machete
    instead.
    ¶4             C.C., J.C.B., and J.H.B. testified and described the incident in
    similar terms. They also testified that when J.C. was walking away, Flores
    got out of his car and retrieved the machete from his trunk. J.C. and the
    other witnesses also testified that when J.C. approached the car, J.C. had his
    “hands on his back” and did not make any threats to Flores. J.H.B. also
    testified that at “no time at all” did Flores appear to be in fear of J.C.
    ¶5            An eight-member jury found Flores guilty of aggravated
    assault, a dangerous offense. The superior court sentenced Flores to a
    mitigated term of five years’ imprisonment with 38 days of pre-sentence
    incarceration credit.
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Supplemental Brief and Anders Brief Arguments
    ¶6            As we construe his supplemental brief and the arguments he
    asked his counsel to raise in the Anders brief, Flores first argues the facts
    supported his claim of self-defense. We reject this argument. We must not
    “take the case away from the jury” by reviewing the record for evidence
    supporting a conclusion or inference different from the resulting decision.
    Flanders v. Maricopa Cty., 
    203 Ariz. 368
    , 371, ¶ 5, 
    54 P.3d 837
    , 840 (App. 2002).
    “Courts are not free to reweigh the evidence and set aside the jury verdict
    merely because the jury could have drawn different inferences or
    conclusions or because judges feel that other results are more reasonable.”
    
    Id.
     As the finder of fact, the jury rejected Flores’ self-defense claim. We do
    not reweigh the evidence presented at trial to reach an opposite conclusion.
    ¶7            Flores next argues his conviction was not supported by
    sufficient evidence. Based on our review of the record, however, the State
    presented sufficient evidence supporting Flores’ conviction, see supra ¶¶ 2-
    4, and any inconsistencies or weaknesses in the evidence merely went to the
    weight of the evidence. See State v. Erivez, 
    236 Ariz. 472
    , 476, ¶ 16, 
    341 P.3d 514
    , 518 (App. 2015).
    3
    STATE v. FLORES
    Decision of the Court
    ¶8            Flores next argues three witnesses, C.C., J.C.B., and J.H.B.,
    gave perjured and biased testimony and coordinated their initial witness
    statements to police. The record does not support these arguments.
    ¶9            Flores next argues the trial was unfair and he was the victim
    of a conspiracy among the trial judge, the prosecutor, and his lawyer to see
    him convicted (“unfair trial argument”). In support of his unfair trial
    argument, he asserts his counsel never provided him paperwork
    confirming he wanted to go to trial; the prosecutor and judge repeatedly
    got his last name wrong; J.C. lied at the conditions of release hearing; the
    day after giving evidence, J.C., J.C.B., and J.H.B. celebrated with a box of
    doughnuts because J.C.B. and J.H.B. had supported J.C. with their
    testimony; the superior court required Flores to go to trial, but denied him
    the opportunity to present other witnesses; and he was the victim of racism
    because he is Mexican and does not speak English. The record does not
    support these arguments. Furthermore, a trial judge is presumed to be
    unbiased, State v. Henry, 
    189 Ariz. 542
    , 546, 
    944 P.2d 57
    , 61 (1997), and
    rebutting this presumption requires a party to prove bias or prejudice by a
    preponderance of the evidence. State v. Hurley, 
    197 Ariz. 400
    , 404-05, ¶ 24,
    
    4 P.3d 455
    , 459-60 (App. 2000). Flores has not submitted any evidence to
    rebut the presumption.
    ¶10            Flores raises several other arguments in further support of his
    unfair trial argument. First, he points out he was never offered a plea
    agreement. The State, however, is not required to offer a plea agreement.
    See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 17.4(a). Second, he asserts the superior court did not
    permit him to offer evidence that J.C. had been fired from his previous
    employment for fighting his boss. Based on our review of the record,
    however, the superior court did not abuse its discretion in excluding
    evidence that J.C. had been fired from his previous job for fighting with his
    boss. The evidence was only marginally relevant, at best, and could be
    misleading or confusing to the jury. See Ariz. R. Evid. 403. Third, he argues
    the superior court should not have limited him to presenting evidence of
    J.C.’s prior aggressive acts to only the single act Flores knew about before
    the incident in this case—J.C. fighting his prior boss. In Arizona, “a
    defendant may not introduce evidence of specific acts unknown to the
    defendant at the time of the alleged crime to show that the victim was the
    initial aggressor.” State v. Fish, 
    222 Ariz. 109
    , 121, ¶ 35, 
    213 P.3d 258
    , 270
    (App. 2009). “Accordingly, the superior court properly excluded the
    specific act evidence” unknown to Flores for the purpose of showing J.C.
    was the initial aggressor. Id.; see Ariz. R. Evid. 404(a)(2), 405.
    4
    STATE v. FLORES
    Decision of the Court
    ¶11           Flores also argues his trial counsel was ineffective. This court
    will not consider claims of ineffective assistance of counsel on direct appeal.
    State v. Spreitz, 
    202 Ariz. 1
    , 3, ¶ 9, 
    39 P.3d 525
    , 527 (2002) (ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims must be raised in Arizona Rule of Criminal
    Procedure 32 proceedings).
    ¶12           Finally, Flores argues his sentence was excessive. If a
    sentence is within the permissible statutory limits, we will not modify or
    reduce it unless it is clearly excessive. See State v. Gillies, 
    142 Ariz. 564
    , 573,
    
    691 P.2d 655
    , 664 (1984). The record does not support Flores’ contention
    that his sentence was clearly excessive. See generally State v. Vermuele, 
    226 Ariz. 399
    , 403, ¶ 15, 
    249 P.3d 1099
    , 1103 (App. 2011) (appropriate sentence
    within statutory range rests in trial court's discretion; abuse of discretion
    characterized by failure to consider factors relevant to imposing sentence).
    Flores received a mitigated sentence—the minimum sentence allowed
    under the statute. His sentence was within the prescribed statutory range
    and was imposed lawfully.
    II.    Anders Review
    ¶13          We have reviewed the entire record for reversible error and
    find none. See Leon, 
    104 Ariz. at 300
    , 
    451 P.2d at 881
    . Flores received a fair
    trial. He was represented by counsel at all stages of the proceedings and
    was present at all critical stages.
    ¶14           As discussed, the evidence presented at trial was substantial
    and supports the verdict. The jury was properly comprised of eight
    members, and the court properly instructed the jury on the elements of the
    charge, Flores’ presumption of innocence, the State’s burden of proof, and
    the necessity of a unanimous verdict. The superior court received and
    considered a presentence report, Flores was given an opportunity to speak
    at sentencing and did so, and, as discussed, his sentence was within the
    range of acceptable sentences for his offense.
    ¶15         We note, however, the judgment and sentence of
    imprisonment incorrectly states the superior court imposed a presumptive
    sentence, when in fact the court imposed a mitigated sentence. We
    therefore correct the superior court’s judgment and sentence of
    imprisonment to reflect the superior court imposed a mitigated sentence.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶16           We decline to order briefing and affirm Flores’ conviction and
    sentence as corrected.
    5
    STATE v. FLORES
    Decision of the Court
    ¶17           After the filing of this decision, defense counsel’s obligations
    pertaining to Flores’ representation in this appeal have ended. Defense
    counsel need do no more than inform Flores of the outcome of this appeal
    and his future options, unless, upon review, counsel finds an issue
    appropriate for submission to the Arizona Supreme Court by petition for
    review. State v. Shattuck, 
    140 Ariz. 582
    , 584-85, 
    684 P.2d 154
    , 156-57 (1984).
    ¶18            Flores has 30 days from the date of this decision to proceed, if
    he wishes, with an in propria persona petition for review. On the court’s own
    motion, we also grant Flores 30 days from the date of this decision to file an
    in propria persona motion for reconsideration.
    :AA
    6