State v. Ward ( 2015 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Appellee,
    v.
    TRAVIS LEE WARD, Appellant.
    Nos. 1 CA-CR 14-0019 and 1 CA-CR14-0020 (Consolidated)
    FILED 4-2-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    Nos. CR2013-111485-001 and CR2013-001557-001 DT
    The Honorable Karen L. O’Connor, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Michael O’Toole
    Counsel for Appellee
    Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Paul J. Prato
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. WARD
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Presiding Judge Andrew W. Gould delivered the decision of the Court, in
    which Judge Maurice Portley and Judge Jon W. Thompson joined.
    G O U L D, Judge:
    ¶1           Travis Lee Ward appeals his convictions and sentences on the
    grounds the trial court erred in finding him competent to stand trial. For
    the following reasons, we affirm.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    ¶2             Ward, while under the influence of methamphetamines, stole
    an ambulance. With a police officer following him, Ward proceeded to
    strike a parked car, some lawn furniture, several fences, and multiple walls
    before finally crashing into a house. Ward was arrested and indicted for
    theft, a class two felony; theft of means of transportation, a class three
    felony; and two counts of criminal damage, class four felonies.
    ¶3           While Ward was in custody and pending trial, he assaulted
    two detention officers. As a result, a second indictment was filed against
    Ward charging him with two counts of aggravated assault, both class five
    felonies.
    ¶4            Before trial, Ward’s counsel filed a motion for a competency
    evaluation. The motion was based on Ward’s statements to counsel that he
    believed in vampires.
    ¶5             The trial court granted the motion, and, between November
    2011 and April 2012, Ward was examined by several mental health doctors.
    Ward was initially found to be incompetent, but restorable. He was placed
    in a restoration program where he was restored to competency. On October
    1, 2012, the trial court determined that Ward was competent to stand trial.
    ¶6          Following the trial court’s competency determination, Ward’s
    counsel made several oral and written requests to re-evaluate Ward’s
    competency. All of these requests were denied.
    ¶7           Ward testified at his first trial. During his testimony, Ward
    explained that his actions in stealing the ambulance were based on his belief
    2
    STATE v. WARD
    Decision of the Court
    in vampires. Ward testified that he stole the ambulance and ran it into the
    victim’s house – which he believed belonged to the queen of the vampires
    - because he had been chosen to kill the vampire “queen” and thereby lift
    the vampire “curse.”
    ¶8            The jury convicted Ward of theft, theft of means of
    transportation, and two counts of criminal damage at his first trial. At
    Ward’s second trial, which was held seven days later, Ward was convicted
    of one count of aggravated assault. Ward timely appealed both convictions.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶9              Ward contends that the trial court abused its discretion by
    denying his renewed requests for a competency examination. We review a
    trial court’s order denying a defendant’s renewed request for a competency
    examination for an abuse of discretion. State v. Lynch, 
    225 Ariz. 27
    , 33, ¶ 16
    (2010).
    ¶10            A criminal defendant has a fundamental right to be
    competent when he stands trial. Cooper v. Oklahoma, 
    517 U.S. 348
    , 354 (1996);
    Drope v. Missouri, 
    420 U.S. 162
    , 171–72 (1975). A conviction of an
    incompetent defendant violates due process. Cooper, 
    517 U.S. at 354
    ; Pate v.
    Robinson, 
    383 U.S. 375
    , 378 (1966). A defendant is incompetent to stand trial
    if, as a result of a mental illness, defect, or disability, he is unable to: (1)
    understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, or (2)
    consult with counsel and assist in his own defense. 
    Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 13
    -
    4501(2); Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1; Dusky v. U.S., 
    362 U.S. 402
    , 402 (1960); State
    v. Moody, 
    208 Ariz. 424
    , 443, ¶ 50 (2004).
    ¶11          Competency to stand trial is a legal standard, not a psychiatric
    standard. Godinez v. Moran, 
    509 U.S. 389
    , 402 (1993). As a result, the
    threshold for determining competency is a low one. The Supreme Court
    has stated:
    Requiring that a criminal defendant be competent has a
    modest aim: It seeks to ensure that he has the capacity to
    understand the proceedings and to assist counsel. While
    psychiatrists and scholars may find it useful to classify the
    various kinds and degrees of competence . . . the Due Process
    Clause does not impose these additional limitations.
    
    Id.
    3
    STATE v. WARD
    Decision of the Court
    ¶12           Courts examine a variety of factors in determining
    competency. Cf. Bishop v. Superior Court, 
    150 Ariz. 404
    , 409 (1986)
    (discussing the varied and fact intensive inquiry necessary to determine
    competency). A court may consider the testimony of experts, the opinions
    of defense counsel and its own observations of the defendant in
    determining competency. State v. Arnoldi, 
    176 Ariz. 236
    , 239 (1993),
    overruled on other grounds by State v. Jones, 
    235 Ariz. 501
     (2014). Any one
    factor may be sufficient to make a competency determination. Drope, 
    420 U.S. at
    179–80.
    ¶13           Ward concedes that he understood the nature and object of
    the proceedings against him. He argues, however, that based on his
    delusional belief in vampires, he did not have the ability to consult with his
    lawyer or assist in his defense.1
    ¶14            We note at the outset that “[t]he presence of a mental illness,
    defect or disability alone is not grounds for finding a defendant
    incompetent to stand trial.” Ariz. R. Crim. P. 11.1; Moody, 
    208 Ariz. at 444, ¶ 56
    . Thus, the fact that Ward appears to have suffered from delusions may
    show that he has a mental illness, but it does not establish he is legally
    incompetent. Indeed, numerous decisions have found that defendants
    suffering from mental illness were competent to stand trial. See State v.
    Glassel, 
    211 Ariz. 33
    , 44, ¶ 30 (2005) (holding that a defendant was
    competent to stand trial despite the fact he was suffering from a paranoid
    personality disorder causing him to believe in a vast conspiracy involving
    his counsel, the police, the court, and several high-level government
    officials); State v. Evans, 
    125 Ariz. 401
    , 403 (1980) (defendant found
    competent despite suffering from paranoid schizophrenia).
    ¶15           The record shows that Ward’s repeated requests to re-
    evaluate his competency were based on the same information the court had
    reviewed in making its initial competency determination; Ward’s belief in
    vampires. However, before a court grants a motion to re-evaluate a
    defendant’s competency, “there must be some reasonable ground to justify
    another hearing on facts not previously presented to the trial court.” State
    1       The record is not clear as to the precise nature of Ward’s mental
    illness. The trial court determined that “Defendant’s competency issues
    primarily stem from his use of methamphetamine.” Other diagnoses
    include possible schizophrenia, paranoid delusional disorder, and
    drug/amphetamine induced psychosis.
    4
    STATE v. WARD
    Decision of the Court
    v. Contreras, 
    112 Ariz. 358
    , 360–61 (1975). Accordingly, the court did not
    abuse its discretion in denying Ward’s renewed motions.
    ¶16            Additionally, the record supports the court’s determination
    that Ward was competent to stand trial. During jury selection for the
    second trial, Ward’s counsel advised the court that just days earlier, during
    the first trial, Ward was able to effectively communicate with counsel.
    Ward expressed an understanding of his case and confidence in his
    attorney. When defense counsel raised questions about Ward’s continued
    competency, the court engaged Ward in colloquies until it was satisfied that
    Ward remained competent to stand trial. Moreover, there were several
    reports, medical opinions, and statements that had been made by both
    attorneys, as well as the court’s own observations, upon which the court
    could base its finding that Ward was competent.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶17          For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
    :ama
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