Newman v. Cornerstone National Insurance , 234 Ariz. 377 ( 2014 )


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  •                                  IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    KATELIN NEWMAN, Plaintiff/Appellant,
    v.
    CORNERSTONE NATIONAL INSURANCE COMPANY dba FREEDOM
    NATIONAL INSURANCE SERVICES, Defendant/Appellee.
    No. 1 CA-CV13-0082
    FILED 3-27-2014
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CV2011-099023
    The Honorable David O. Cunanan, Judge
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Warnock, MacKinlay, & Carman, PLLC, Phoenix
    By Brian R. Warnock and Krista M. Carman
    Counsel for Plaintiff/Appellant
    Elardo, Bragg, Appell & Rossi, P.C. , Phoenix
    By John A. Elardo and Amanda Nelson
    Counsel for Defendant/Appellee
    NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE
    Opinion of the Court
    OPINION
    Judge Jon W. Thompson delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Lawrence F. Winthrop and Judge Margaret H. Downie
    joined.
    T H O M P S O N, Judge:
    ¶1            This opinion addresses whether a premium price is required
    on a written offer of underinsured (UIM) motorist coverage pursuant to
    Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.) § 20-259.01(B) (Supp. 2012). 1 Plaintiff
    Katelin Newman (Newman) appeals from the trial court’s judgment in
    favor of Cornerstone National Insurance Company (Cornerstone). We
    affirm, holding no premium price is required for a written offer of UIM
    coverage to be valid.
    1   Section 20-259.01(B), regulating offers of UIM, reads in pertinent part:
    Every insurer writing automobile liability or motor vehicle
    liability policies shall also make available to the named
    insured thereunder and shall by written notice offer the
    insured and at the request of the insured shall include
    within the policy underinsured motorist coverage which
    extends to and covers all persons insured under the policy,
    in limits not less than the liability limits for bodily injury or
    death contained within the policy. The selection of limits or
    rejection of coverage by a named insured or applicant on a
    form approved by the director shall be valid for all insureds
    under the policy.
    The background and legislative history of uninsured motorist (UM) and
    underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage in Arizona can be found in
    Ballesteros v. American Standard Ins. Co. of Wisconsin, 
    226 Ariz. 345
    , 346, ¶ 8,
    
    248 P.3d 193
    , 194 (2011).
    2
    NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶2            In May 2011, Newman was seriously injured in an
    automobile accident. The policy limits of both her own insurance and the
    adverse party’s insurance were insufficient to cover the loss. Newman
    sought payment of UIM benefits from her insurer Cornerstone.
    Cornerstone rejected the UIM claim, relying on a waiver form declining
    UIM coverage Newman had signed in 2010. Newman filed suit against
    Cornerstone and sought partial summary judgment asserting
    Cornerstone’s UIM coverage “offer” was deficient under A.R.S. § 20-
    259.01(B) in that it lacked a premium price. Cornerstone filed a cross-
    motion for summary judgment on the basis that Newman had waived
    UIM benefits. The trial court, relying primarily on Garcia v. Farmers Ins.
    Co. of Arizona, found for Cornerstone and against Newman. See 
    191 Ariz. 410
    , 
    956 P.2d 537
    (App. 1998). Final judgment was entered and Newman
    timely appealed.
    ¶3              Arizona Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) allows a trial court to
    enter summary judgment when “there is no genuine dispute as to any
    material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
    law.” We review a summary judgment determination de novo, viewing
    the facts and inferences drawn from those facts in the light most favorable
    to the party against whom judgment was entered. Brookover v. Roberts
    Enters., Inc., 
    215 Ariz. 52
    , 55, ¶ 8, 
    156 P.3d 1157
    , 1160 (App. 2007). We will
    affirm summary judgment if it is correct for any reason. City of Tempe v.
    Outdoor Sys., Inc., 
    201 Ariz. 106
    , 111, ¶ 14, 
    32 P.3d 31
    , 36 (App. 2001).
    ¶4             Newman asserts that the trial court erred in entering
    summary judgment for Cornerstone.           She argues that to comply with
    A.R.S. § 20-259.01 the insurer must “make available” and “offer” UIM
    coverage, which she argues must necessarily include providing definite
    terms such as a premium quote in the blank space provided on the form
    approved by the Arizona Department of Insurance. To this end, Newman
    cites, generally, to Tallent v. National Gen. Ins. Co., 
    185 Ariz. 266
    , 
    915 P.2d 665
    (1996) and Ballesteros, 
    226 Ariz. 345
    , 
    248 P.3d 193
    , and, more
    specifically, to Melendez v. Hallmark Ins. Co., 
    232 Ariz. 327
    , 
    305 P.3d 392
    (App. 2013) (holding insurer’s UIM offer was ineffectual when it offered
    no premium price and was on a form that failed to comply with
    Department of Insurance guidelines) (depublished by order of the
    Arizona Supreme Court August 27, 2013).
    ¶5            Cornerstone, in response, asserts that no Arizona statute or
    case law requires the insurer to include the premium price in the offer. It
    further notes that while A.R.S. § 20–259.01 does not require insurers to use
    forms approved by the Department of Insurance, its use of an approved
    3
    NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE
    Opinion of the Court
    form is considered conclusive evidence it complied with the statute. See
    
    Ballesteros, 226 Ariz. at 350
    , ¶ 
    21, 248 P.3d at 198
    . For these reasons,
    Cornerstone asserts that the trial court correctly granted it judgment. We
    agree.
    ¶6              Statutory interpretation is a question of law that we review
    de novo. People's Choice TV Corp. v. City of Tucson, 
    202 Ariz. 401
    , 403, ¶ 7,
    
    46 P.3d 412
    , 414 (2002). Where the statutory language is clear, we hold to
    the plain meaning of its terms. Rineer v. Leonardo, 
    194 Ariz. 45
    , 46, ¶ 7, 
    977 P.2d 767
    , 768 (1999). As “[o]ur goal in interpreting statutes is to fulfill the
    intent and purpose of the legislature” we look first to the plain language
    of the statute “as the most reliable indicator of its meaning.” Garden Lakes
    Cmty. Ass'n, Inc. v. Madigan, 
    204 Ariz. 238
    , 241, ¶ 14, 
    62 P.3d 983
    , 986 (App.
    2003); New Sun Bus. Park, LLC v. Yuma Cnty., 
    221 Ariz. 43
    , 46, ¶ 12, 
    209 P.3d 179
    , 182 (App. 2009). The plain language of A.R.S. § 20-259.01 does
    not require insurers to provide a UIM premium quote as part of the offer
    of coverage to insureds. The statute merely requires insurers to “make
    available” by “written offer” UIM coverage in an amount not less than the
    liability limits for bodily injury or death. See A.R.S. § 20-259.01(B); 
    Tallent, 185 Ariz. at 266
    , 915 P.2d at 666.
    ¶7              Courts are “not at liberty to rewrite [a] statute under the
    guise of judicial interpretation.” State v. Patchin, 
    125 Ariz. 501
    , 502, 
    610 P.2d 1062
    , 1063 (App. 1980). Rather, “[t]he choice of appropriate wording
    rests with the Legislature.” City of Phoenix v. Butler, 
    110 Ariz. 160
    , 162, 
    515 P.2d 1180
    , 1182 (1973). The statute is very specific regarding what the
    offer must contain and we will not substitute our judgment by imposing
    any additional statutory requirements. See 
    Tallent, 185 Ariz. at 268
    , 915
    P.2d at 667 (“[w]e find nothing in [A.R.S. § 20–259.01] justifying the
    imposition of this additional requirement. If the legislature desires such an
    addition, it may create one.”); 
    Ballesteros, 226 Ariz. at 349
    , ¶ 
    17, 248 P.3d at 197
    (“[i]f the legislature desires to add such a requirement, it may do so . .
    . but it is not our place to rewrite the statute”).
    ¶8            Likewise, the case law cited by Newman interpreting A.R.S.
    § 20-259.01 does not require the inclusion of a premium quote to satisfy
    the “offer” requirement of the statute. Our supreme court in Tallent used
    the plain meaning of “offer”: “[t]o bring to or before; to present for
    acceptance or rejection; to hold out or proffer; to make a proposal to; to
    exhibit something that may be taken or received or not” after finding the
    word “offer” in A.R.S. § 20-259.01 to be so unambiguous that there was no
    “need to determine what the legislature intended by using that 
    term.” 185 Ariz. at 267-68
    , 915 P.2d at 666-67 (citations omitted). The supreme
    4
    NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE
    Opinion of the Court
    court held that the insurer’s written notice to the insured was a sufficient
    offer of UIM coverage despite the notice’s lack of explanation of the
    benefit because:
    The imposition of a requirement for an explanation of
    coverage is, we believe, both unwarranted by the statute and
    unwise . . . The statute requires an offer of UIM coverage-
    not a treatise on UIM coverage. National's form certainly
    seems sufficient to cause any insured or potential insured
    who has questions about the meaning of UM or UIM
    coverages to ask for an explanation.
    Id. at 
    268, 915 P.2d at 667
    .
    ¶9             The Ballesteros case similarly provides no basis for holding
    an insurer's offer must list the premium to be charged for UIM coverage.
    
    See 226 Ariz. at 346
    –47, ¶¶ 1, 
    6, 248 P.3d at 194
    –95. In Ballesteros, the
    supreme court examined whether UM coverage offered by way of an
    English language form to a Spanish speaker constituted a valid offer to
    make such coverage available. 
    Id. The court
    concluded the notice was
    sufficiently clear that a reasonable reader would understand that coverage
    was being offered that, “if accepted, would bind the insurer to provide the
    offered coverage.” 
    Id. at 349,
    11, 248 P.3d at 196
    .
    ¶10          As noted by the trial court, this court has also examined the
    “offer” component of A.R.S. § 20-259.01. 2 In Garcia, we held that Farmers
    made a valid UIM offer where there was no premium quote and Farmers
    2  Given this result, we need not expound at length as to how contracts
    may be entered even without enumerated price terms. See, e.g., Goodman
    v. Physical Res. Eng'g, Inc., 
    229 Ariz. 25
    , 27, ¶ 7, 
    270 P.3d 852
    , 854 (App.
    2011); Banner Health v. Medical Sav. Ins. Co., 
    216 Ariz. 146
    , 
    163 P.3d 1096
    (App. 2007) (price terms were supplied by the hospitals' rates filed with
    Department of Health Services).         Premium amounts are presumably
    ascertainable by reference to the Underwriting Rules and Rate Manual
    once the coverage limits are selected. In the course of this litigation,
    Cornerstone disclosed its rate manual and the rate of UIM/UM coverage
    to Newman.
    5
    NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE
    Opinion of the Court
    had pre-selected the coverage amount for the insureds. 
    3 191 Ariz. at 412
    ,
    ¶ 
    19, 956 P.2d at 539
    . We found: “Farmers adequately offered UIM
    coverage. The election form did ‘bring before’ and ‘hold out’ to the
    Garcias that UIM coverage was available. The form referred to the
    applicable limits and indicated how the Garcias could change their policy.
    Nothing more is required under Tallent.” 
    Id. Garcia did
    not require a
    premium quote to fulfill the statutory requirements, and we similarly find
    no basis for requiring it here. Cornerstone’s offer of UIM coverage to
    Newman satisfied the requirements of A.R.S. § 20-259.01. 4
    3  That the notice did not contain a premium quote was an issue made
    clear in the dissent by Judge Fidel. See Garcia, 
    191 Ariz. 412
    , ¶ 29, 
    956 P.2d 539
    .
    4 Although we have reached the merits of the offer, we note that it is
    undisputed that Newman signed the UIM waiver form on December 16,
    2010, and that the form used by Cornerstone was approved by the
    Department of Insurance in 2007. The Ballesteros court held:
    After passage of the 1992 amendment, if an insurer provides
    and the insured signs a DOI–approved UM/UIM selection
    form, the insurer has satisfied the statutory requirement to
    “make available” and “by written notice offer” UM/UIM
    coverage. Senate Committee Minutes 9 (“[T]he insurance
    agent can use a form approved by the Director of the
    Department of Insurance to satisfy [§ 20–259.01].”); Fact
    Sheet (noting that § 20–259.01 “is satisfied if the insured
    signs a form approved by the Department of Insurance
    stating the amount of coverage 
    desired”). 226 Ariz. at 350
    , ¶ 
    21, 248 P.3d at 198
    .
    6
    NEWMAN v. CORNERSTONE
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶11           For the above stated reasons, we decline to extend the
    “offer” requirements of A.R.S. § 20-259.01 beyond the statutory language
    enacted by our legislature and beyond the bounds laid out by our case
    law. A premium quote is not a required term for a valid offer of UIM
    coverage.
    ¶12          The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
    :MJT
    7