In Re Mh2014-002674 , 238 Ariz. 188 ( 2015 )


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  •                                IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    IN RE MH2014-002674
    No. 1 CA-MH 14-0073
    FILED 9-3-2015
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. MH2014-002674
    The Honorable Susan G. White, Judge Pro Tempore
    AFFIRMED
    COUNSEL
    Maricopa County Legal Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Anne Phillips
    Counsel for Appellant
    Maricopa County Attorney’s Office, Phoenix
    By Anne C. Longo, Bruce P. White
    Counsel for Appellee
    OPINION
    Judge Maurice Portley delivered the Opinion of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Patricia K. Norris and Judge Patricia A. Orozco joined.
    IN RE MH2014-002674
    Opinion of the Court
    P O R T L E Y, Judge:
    ¶1           Appellant, who is deaf, challenges the trial court’s order that
    she undergo a combination of inpatient and outpatient treatment at a
    mental health treatment facility. She argues that her statutorily defined due
    process rights were violated because the court-ordered evaluations were
    conducted through written communications despite her request for an
    American Sign Language (“ASL”) interpreter. Because a reasonable
    attempt was made to secure an ASL interpreter and Appellant effectively
    communicated with both evaluating doctors during the evaluations, we
    find no due process violation and affirm the court’s order.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2            After Appellant refused voluntary inpatient treatment to
    stabilize her condition, her psychiatrist filed a petition for court-ordered
    evaluation in August 2011 alleging that Appellant was persistently or
    acutely disabled as a result of a mental disorder. The court granted the
    petition and, based on Appellant’s request, also ordered the Court
    Interpretation and Translation Services office to provide an ASL interpreter.
    ¶3            Appellant renewed her request for an ASL interpreter the
    next day before she was interviewed by two psychiatrists, Dr. Michael
    Hughes, who was on her outpatient treatment team, and Dr. Sead
    Hadziahmetovic. The hospital social worker attempted to get an ASL
    interpreter, but one was not available during the time the doctors had to
    evaluate Appellant. As a result, each doctor interviewed Appellant by
    asking her written questions in English and getting her written responses.
    ¶4             After the evaluations were completed, Dr. Hughes filed a
    petition for court-ordered treatment (“COT”) pursuant to Arizona Revised
    Statutes (“A.R.S.”) section 36-533,1 and attached the affidavits of the
    evaluating doctors. The affidavits reflected that both doctors made
    probable diagnoses of “unspecified psychotic disorder” and
    “schizophrenia,” and both explained how Appellant was persistently or
    acutely disabled and concluded that there was no alternative to involuntary
    treatment.
    ¶5           Appellant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing the hospital
    failed to adhere to statutorily defined due process standards by not
    providing an ASL interpreter to assist her during the court-ordered
    1   We cite the current version of the statute unless otherwise noted.
    2
    IN RE MH2014-002674
    Opinion of the Court
    evaluations. She argued that because the doctors did not use an ASL
    interpreter during the interviews, the doctors’ affidavits were legally
    insufficient under A.R.S. § 36-501(12)(a)(ii). The trial court considered the
    motion during the hearing on the COT petition, where she had the benefit
    of an ASL interpreter.
    ¶6            Dr. Hughes testified that Appellant requested an ASL
    interpreter and he passed along the request to the social worker to make the
    arrangements. The social worker contacted the interpreter service
    provider, but no ASL interpreters were available. As a result, Dr. Hughes
    conducted his interview by writing out the questions he wanted Appellant
    to answer. He also testified that he was able to read Appellant’s
    handwriting, Appellant appeared to understand the written questions, and
    her answers were appropriately related to the written questions.2
    ¶7            After setting a briefing schedule on Appellant’s motion to
    dismiss, the court continued the hearing to September 12, 2014. At the
    hearing, the court denied Appellant’s motion to dismiss, finding that an
    attempt had been made to secure an ASL interpreter, but an ASL interpreter
    was not available during the time the psychiatrists had to evaluate
    Appellant; and Appellant appeared to be comfortable communicating in
    writing, especially since “she has done [so] historically and . . . there were
    little to no indications that there were communicational problems or
    impediments because she was communicating in writing in English with
    both doctors.” Then, based on all of the evidence presented, the court found
    that Appellant had a mental disorder and was persistently or acutely
    disabled and in need of psychiatric treatment, and ordered her to undergo
    combined inpatient and outpatient treatment.
    ¶8            Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal.          We have
    jurisdiction pursuant to A.R.S. §§ 36-546.01 and 12-2101(A)(10)(a).
    2  Appellant stipulated to the admissibility of Dr. Hadziahmetovic’s
    affidavit because he was unavailable to testify at the hearing. His affidavit
    similarly noted: “The patient has bilateral deafness, and the social worker
    made attempts to have a sign language interpreter come in to help perform
    this psychiatric interview; however, the interpreter was not available until
    the next day, and since this affidavit was due today by 1600 hours, I
    conducted the interview with the patient writing down the questions and
    having her respond to me in the same manner.”
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    IN RE MH2014-002674
    Opinion of the Court
    DISCUSSION
    ¶9              We will not disturb an order for treatment unless it is “clearly
    erroneous or unsupported by any credible evidence.” In re Mental Health
    Case No. MH 94–00592, 
    182 Ariz. 440
    , 443, 
    897 P.2d 742
    , 745 (App. 1995)
    (citing In re Coconino Cty. No. MH 1425, 
    176 Ariz. 525
    , 528, 
    862 P.2d 898
    , 901
    (App. 1993)). In reviewing the record to determine whether the order is
    supported by substantial evidence, see Pima County Mental Health Service
    Action No. MH–1140–6–93, 
    176 Ariz. 565
    , 566, 
    863 P.2d 284
    , 285 (App. 1993)
    (citing Commitment of an Alleged Mentally Disordered Person MH 91–00558,
    
    175 Ariz. 221
    , 224, 
    854 P.2d 1207
    , 1210 (App. 1993)), “[w]e view the facts in
    the light most favorable to sustaining the trial court’s judgment.” Cimarron
    Foothills Cmty. Ass’n v. Kippen, 
    206 Ariz. 455
    , 457, ¶ 2, 
    79 P.3d 1214
    , 1216
    (App. 2003) (quoting Sw. Soil Remediation, Inc. v. City of Tucson, 
    201 Ariz. 438
    , 440, ¶ 2, 
    36 P.3d 1208
    , 1210 (App. 2001)) (internal quotation marks
    omitted). We review the application and interpretation of statutes de novo.
    In re MH2011-000914, 
    229 Ariz. 312
    , 314, ¶ 7, 
    275 P.3d 611
    , 613 (App. 2012);
    see also In re MH2010-002348, 
    228 Ariz. 441
    , 444, ¶ 7, 
    268 P.3d 392
    , 395 (App.
    2011).
    ¶10           Appellant argues that her due process rights were violated
    because the hospital failed to secure an ASL interpreter to assist during her
    interviews with the evaluating psychiatrists.          Relying on A.R.S.
    § 36-501(12)(a)(ii), she contends that because she was not provided an ASL
    interpreter, the doctors’ affidavits were legally insufficient and the trial
    court’s involuntary treatment order must be vacated. We disagree.
    ¶11            Due process requires courts to adhere strictly to statutes
    pertaining to court-ordered treatment. In re MH 2007–001264, 
    218 Ariz. 538
    ,
    539, ¶ 6, 
    189 P.3d 1111
    , 1112 (App. 2008); see also A.R.S. §§ 36–501 to -550.08;
    In re Pinal Cty. Mental Health No. MH-201000029, 
    225 Ariz. 500
    , 501, ¶ 5, 
    240 P.3d 1262
    , 1263 (App. 2010) (stating that a lack of strict compliance makes
    the proceedings void).
    ¶12           The statutory framework provides that a petition for
    involuntary treatment “shall be accompanied by the affidavits of the two
    physicians who participated in the evaluation,” A.R.S. § 36-533(B), and that
    “every reasonable attempt shall be made to conduct the evaluation in any
    language preferred by the person,” A.R.S. § 36-501(12)(a)(ii). The plain
    language of the statute does not mandate that the court-ordered evaluations
    be conducted with an ASL interpreter if requested by a deaf patient. Id.
    Instead, § 36-501(12)(a)(ii) requires that “every reasonable attempt” be
    4
    IN RE MH2014-002674
    Opinion of the Court
    made to acquire an interpreter to assist the patient in order to ensure that
    the patient and doctors can communicate during the evaluations.
    ¶13            Section 36-501(12)(a)(ii) does not, however, define “every
    reasonable attempt.” As a result, we look to the ordinary meaning of the
    words. See A.R.S. § 1–213; HCZ Constr., Inc. v. First Franklin Fin. Corp., 
    199 Ariz. 361
    , 364, ¶ 10, 
    18 P.3d 155
    , 158 (App. 2001) (“Words are given their
    ordinary meaning unless the context of the statute requires otherwise.”)
    (citation omitted). “Reasonable” is defined to include “[g]overned by or in
    accordance with reason or sound thinking . . . [w]ithin the bounds of
    common sense . . . fair.” Webster’s II New College Dictionary (1995); see
    also Black’s Law Dictionary (10th ed. 2014) (defining “reasonable” as “[f]air,
    proper, or moderate under the circumstances”). And, “attempt” is defined
    as including “[t]o try to do, make, or achieve.” Webster’s II New College
    Dictionary (1995). Consequently, the determination of “every reasonable
    attempt” will be an ad hoc determination based on specific facts, as well as
    the patient’s ability to communicate with or without an interpreter in the
    patient’s preferred language.
    ¶14            The doctors had, by statute, “less than seventy-two hours” to
    evaluate Appellant and submit their reports after learning that the court
    had ordered her evaluation. A.R.S. § 36-530(B). And like the other
    requirements for involuntary treatment proceedings, it is one that requires
    strict compliance. See In re MH 2008-000438, 
    220 Ariz. 277
    , 279, ¶ 7, 
    205 P.3d 1124
    , 1126 (App. 2009). Here, the court heard that the doctors attempted to
    secure an ASL interpreter for Appellant before their interviews with her
    and when they learned that one was not readily available, and would not
    be in the time they had to conduct their evaluations, they communicated
    with Appellant in writing. In fact, Dr. Hadziahmetovic stated in his
    stipulated affidavit that the interpreter was not available and would not be
    by 4:00 p.m. (1600 hours), the time he had to submit his evaluation. And
    because the doctors, like Appellant’s treatment coordinator and others,
    were able to communicate with Appellant in writing, the court did not err
    by finding the doctors made a reasonable effort to secure an ASL interpreter
    and denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss.
    ¶15            Moreover, there was no evidence indicating that there was a
    more reasonable option available or that further efforts to secure an ASL
    interpreter from another source would have been successful. And although
    communicating in writing was not Appellant’s preferred method of
    communication, she does not complain about, and the record does not
    show, any communication problems or impediments during the
    evaluations.
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    IN RE MH2014-002674
    Opinion of the Court
    ¶16           Appellant also argues that the Americans with Disabilities
    Act (“ADA”) and federal case law support her argument. The ADA
    provides that “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of
    such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits
    of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to
    discrimination by any such entity.” 
    42 U.S.C. § 12132
     (1990). The regulation
    implementing the ADA states that:
    Although in some circumstances a notepad and written
    materials may be sufficient to permit effective
    communication, in other circumstances they may not be
    sufficient. For example, a qualified interpreter may be
    necessary when the information being communicated is
    complex, or is exchanged for a lengthy period of time.
    Generally, factors to be considered in determining whether an
    interpreter is required include the context in which the
    communication is taking place, the number of people
    involved, and the importance of the communication.
    28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. B § 35.160 (2011). Consequently, based on the plain
    language of the ADA and the implementing regulations, the ADA does not
    mandate that a deaf patient have an ASL interpreter for an evaluation when
    one is not available in the short time required for the evaluation and the
    patient is able to effectively communicate in writing.
    ¶17            Appellant also relies on Randolph v. Rodgers, 
    170 F.3d 850
     (8th
    Cir. 1999) and Tucker v. Tennessee, 
    539 F.3d 526
     (6th Cir. 2008) to support her
    argument. In Randolph, a deaf inmate secured a permanent injunction in
    federal district court arguing that the Missouri Department of Corrections
    had violated Missouri Statute § 476.753(1)(4) by failing to provide him with
    an ASL interpreter during disciplinary proceedings. 
    170 F.3d at 854-55
    . On
    appeal, the circuit court vacated the injunction on other grounds, and in
    doing so noted that the plain language of the Missouri statute required that
    “a designated responsible authority shall provide” a qualified interpreter at
    certain proceedings. 
    Id. at 859
     (emphasis added). Here, and unlike the
    mandatory language of the Missouri statute that the responsible authority
    “shall provide,” the Arizona statute only requires that “every reasonable
    attempt” be made to provide an interpreter. Compare A.R.S. § 36-
    501(12)(a)(ii) with Mo. Stat. § 476.753(1)(4). Consequently, Randolph does
    not inform our analysis in this appeal.
    ¶18           In Tucker, the police responded to a domestic dispute and
    after learning that the family members suffered from hearing and speech
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    IN RE MH2014-002674
    Opinion of the Court
    impediments, communicated in writing. 
    539 F.3d at 528
    . The police
    arrested a number of family members for assault, disorderly conduct and
    resisting arrest. 
    Id. at 528-29
    . The arrestees, and their deaf mother,
    subsequently sued the city and county for civil rights violations, alleging in
    part that the city’s failure to provide an interpreter when the police
    responded to the domestic disturbance call, as well as during their arrest,
    post-arrest detention, initial appeal and dispositional hearing violated the
    ADA. 
    Id. at 530
    . The federal district court granted summary judgment for
    the city and county, and the Sixth Circuit affirmed after finding there was
    no intentional discrimination and that the police officers were able to
    communicate effectively with all parties in writing. 
    Id. at 535-36
    .
    Consequently, in looking at the evidence, the court found that even if an
    ASL interpreter had been requested for certain court hearings, the
    individuals properly proceeded without one, and affirmed the summary
    judgment. 
    Id. at 540-42
    .
    ¶19            Here, like the litigants in Randolph and Tucker, Appellant
    communicated with the psychiatrists in writing after reasonable efforts to
    locate an ASL interpreter proved unsuccessful. Therefore, based on the
    record, the trial court did not err by denying Appellant’s motion to dismiss
    for violating her due process rights.
    CONCLUSION
    ¶20           For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the court’s order.
    :ama
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