State v. James , 239 Ariz. 367 ( 2016 )


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  •                                IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA,
    Appellee,
    v.
    REGGIE GABLE JAMES,
    Appellant.
    No. 1 CA-CR 15-0002
    FILED 4-21-2016
    Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County
    No. CR 2013-428962-001
    The Honorable Brian D. Kaiser, Commissioner
    VACATED IN PART AND AFFIRMED AS MODIFIED
    COUNSEL
    Arizona Attorney General’s Office, Phoenix
    By Chris DeRose
    Counsel for Appellee
    Maricopa County Public Defender’s Office, Phoenix
    By Louise Stark
    Counsel for Appellant
    STATE v. JAMES
    Opinion of the Court
    OPINION
    Judge Patricia A. Orozco delivered the opinion of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Diane M. Johnsen and Judge Kenton D. Jones joined.
    O R O Z C O, Judge:
    ¶1             Reggie Gable James appeals his convictions and resulting
    sentences for six counts of aggravated driving or actual physical control
    while under the influence of intoxicating liquor or drugs (aggravated DUI),
    all class 4 felonies. James asserts he cannot be convicted of aggravated
    driving while impaired under both Arizona Revised Statutes (A.R.S.)
    section 28-1383.A.1 (driving intoxicated while license is restricted) and
    § 28-1381.A.4 (driving intoxicated when an Ignition Interlock Device (IID)
    is required) because an order requiring an IID under § 28-1383.A.4 is a
    “restriction” on his license under § 28-1383.A.1. For the following reasons,
    we vacate the judgment in part and affirm the judgment in part, as
    modified.
    FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    ¶2           Scottsdale Police arrested James for aggravated driving under
    the influence.1 At the time of the arrest, James’s driver’s license and
    privileges had been suspended and revoked. In connection with a prior
    proceeding, the Arizona Motor Vehicle Division (MVD) had also ordered
    James to have an IID installed either before reinstatement of his license or
    the MVD receiving a copy of his conviction, whichever occurred last.
    ¶3            James was charged with six counts of aggravated DUI:
    1) aggravated DUI while the license or privilege to drive is suspended,
    cancelled, revoked, refused, or restricted; 2) aggravated DUI with a BAC of
    .08 or more while the license or privilege to drive is suspended, cancelled,
    revoked, refused, or restricted; 3) aggravated DUI while subject to an IID;
    4) aggravated DUI with a BAC of .08 or more while subject to an IID;
    5) aggravated DUI while under the influence of intoxicating liquor with
    two prior convictions within eighty-four months; and 6) aggravated DUI
    1     James’s blood test, taken after his arrest, showed his blood alcohol
    content (BAC) was .105.
    2
    STATE v. JAMES
    Opinion of the Court
    with a BAC of .08 or more with two prior convictions within eighty-four
    months.
    ¶4             James was convicted of all counts. The trial court sentenced
    James to concurrent prison sentences, the longest of which was four and a
    half years. James timely appealed and we have jurisdiction pursuant to
    Article 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution and A.R.S. §§ 12-120.21.A.1,
    13-4031 and -4033.A.1 (West 2016). 2
    DISCUSSION
    I.     Ignition Interlock Device Convictions
    ¶5            James argues Counts 1 and 2 and Counts 3 and 4 were
    multiplicitous and that “convictions for both pairs . . . violate his protection
    against double jeopardy.” We have previously held a defendant may be
    convicted of both A.R.S. § 28-1381.A.1 (impaired to the slightest degree) and
    § 28-1381.A.2 (BAC of .08 or more) without “offending the principles of
    double jeopardy.” State v. Nereim, 
    234 Ariz. 105
    , 112, ¶ 24 (App. 2014); see
    also Anderjeski v. City Court, 
    135 Ariz. 549
    , 550-51 (1983) (interpreting the
    statutory predecessor to A.R.S. § 28-1381). James, however, asserts a
    defendant may not be convicted of aggravated driving while impaired
    under both A.R.S. § 28-1383.A.1 (driving intoxicated while license is
    restricted) and § 28-1381.A.4 (driving intoxicated when an IID is required).
    The premise of his argument is that an order requiring an IID under A.R.S.
    § 28-1383.A.4 is the same as a “restriction” on his license under
    § 28-1383.A.1. He argues, therefore, that “[e]ither Counts 1 and 2, or Counts
    3 and 4 must be vacated.” Thus, the question James’s appeal presents is
    whether the convictions of Counts 1 and 3 and Counts 2 and 4, respectively,
    violated his double jeopardy rights.
    ¶6            At the time James was stopped, his license had been
    suspended and revoked. The MVD order issued in the prior proceeding
    required him to have an IID “installed on any motor vehicle that you
    operate for 12 [m]onths from the date that your driving privilege is
    reinstated or from the date we receive the report of conviction, whichever
    occurs later.” Therefore, by its own terms, the IID order had not become
    effective because his license had not yet been reinstated. Because James’s
    license had not been reinstated, there was not yet a requirement that he
    2     We cite the current version of applicable statutes when no revisions
    material to this opinion have since occurred.
    3
    STATE v. JAMES
    Opinion of the Court
    install an IID on any vehicle he operated. Consequently, while he could be
    charged with aggravated DUI for driving while his license was suspended
    and revoked pursuant to A.R.S. § 28-1383.A.1, James could not also be
    charged with, nor convicted of, a requirement that he had failed to obtain
    and operate his vehicle with an IID for a year under A.R.S. § 28-1383.A.4.
    When police arrested James in the current proceeding, his driving privilege
    had not been restored, so the IID provision was not yet in effect. We
    therefore vacate the convictions for Counts 3 and 4.
    II.    Corrected Sentencing Minute Entry
    ¶7           Both James and the State request this court amend the
    sentencing minute entry to reflect the sentence actually imposed at the
    sentencing hearing. When there is a discrepancy between the trial court’s
    oral statements at a sentencing hearing and its written minute entry, the
    oral statements control. State v. Ovante, 
    231 Ariz. 180
    , 188, ¶ 38 (2013).
    ¶8           The trial court initially sentenced James to 4.5 years’
    imprisonment for all six counts. However, during the same sentencing
    hearing, the court amended the sentence to 2.5 years’ imprisonment for
    Counts 5 and 6 because James’s prior convictions were elements of the
    crimes and could not be used to enhance the sentences beyond the
    presumptive term. Notwithstanding that James stipulated to two prior
    felony convictions during sentencing, the trial court’s December 5, 2014
    sentencing minute entry listed James as a non-repetitive offender on all
    counts.
    ¶9              The trial court issued a minute entry on January 8, 2015
    amending its December 5 minute entry to correct James’s sentences for
    Counts 5 and 6 to 2.5 years’ imprisonment. We have vacated the
    convictions for Counts 3 and 4. We further modify the December 5 minute
    entry to reflect that James is a repetitive offender as to Counts 1 and 2. See
    State v. Jonas, 
    164 Ariz. 242
    , 245 n.1 (1990); see also State v. Contreras, 
    180 Ariz. 450
    , 453 n.2 (App. 1994) (“When we are able to ascertain the trial court’s
    intention by reference to the record, remand for clarification is
    unnecessary.”).
    4
    STATE v. JAMES
    Opinion of the Court
    CONCLUSION
    ¶10          For the foregoing reasons, we vacate James’s convictions on
    Counts 3 and 4, affirm the convictions and sentences for Counts 1, 2, and 5,
    and modify the trial court’s December 5 minute entry consistent with this
    opinion.
    :ama
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1 CA-CR 15-0002

Citation Numbers: 239 Ariz. 367, 372 P.3d 311

Filed Date: 4/21/2016

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 1/12/2023