State v. Getzen ( 2019 )


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  •                      NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION.
    UNDER ARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c), THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL
    AND MAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.
    IN THE
    ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS
    DIVISION ONE
    STATE OF ARIZONA, Respondent,
    v.
    DAVID M. GETZEN, Petitioner.
    No. 1 CA-CR 19-0007 PRPC
    FILED 10-22-2019
    Petition for Review from the Superior Court in Yavapai County
    No. V1300CR201780472
    The Honorable Michael R. Bluff, Judge
    REVIEW GRANTED; RELIEF DENIED
    COUNSEL
    Yavapai County Attorney’s Office, Prescott
    By Jonathan Hale
    Counsel for Respondent
    David M. Getzen, Cottonwood
    Petitioner
    STATE v. GETZEN
    Decision of the Court
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Judge Jennifer M. Perkins delivered the decision of the Court, in which
    Presiding Judge Samuel A. Thumma and Judge Paul J. McMurdie joined.
    P E R K I N S, Judge:
    ¶1            David Michael Getzen petitions this court for review from the
    dismissal of his petition for post-conviction relief, filed pursuant to Arizona
    Rule of Criminal Procedure 32. We have considered the petition for review
    and, for the reasons stated, grant review and deny relief.
    ¶2            Getzen pleaded guilty to one count of shoplifting with two or
    more predicate convictions. The superior court sentenced him to two and
    one-half years’ imprisonment, the presumptive term to which Getzen and
    the State had stipulated in their plea agreement.
    ¶3             Getzen timely filed for post-conviction relief. Assigned
    counsel could find no colorable claims after reviewing the record and other
    pertinent materials, and interviewing Getzen and his prior attorneys.
    Getzen elected to file a pro se petition, which the superior court summarily
    dismissed, leading to Getzen’s petition for review in this court. We will not
    disturb the superior court’s denial of post-conviction relief absent an abuse
    of discretion. State v. Kolmann, 
    239 Ariz. 157
    , 160, ¶ 8 (2016).
    ¶4            Getzen contends that his plea attorney provided ineffective
    assistance by purportedly (1) coercing him to plead guilty, (2) failing to
    request a second examination of Getzen’s competency, and (3) failing to
    offer mitigating evidence or appear at his sentencing. The superior court
    did not abuse its discretion in summarily dismissing Getzen’s petition.
    ¶5             To merit an evidentiary hearing on an ineffective assistance
    of counsel claim, “a defendant must show both that counsel’s performance
    fell below objectively reasonable standards and that this deficiency
    prejudiced the defendant.” State v. Bennett, 
    213 Ariz. 562
    , 567, ¶ 21 (2006)
    (citing Strickland v. Washington, 
    466 U.S. 668
    , 687 (1984)). A defendant
    demonstrates prejudice by showing “a reasonable probability that, but for
    counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have
    been different.” Id. at 568, ¶ 25 (quoting Strickland, 
    466 U.S. at 694
    ). “There
    is a strong presumption of effective assistance.” State v. Henry, 
    176 Ariz. 569
    ,
    2
    STATE v. GETZEN
    Decision of the Court
    585 (1993). We need not address both requirements of the Strickland
    standard where the petitioner fails to satisfy one. State v. Salazar, 
    146 Ariz. 540
    , 541 (1985).
    ¶6            The superior court acted within its discretion in rejecting
    Getzen’s claim of a coerced plea. At the change of plea hearing, Getzen
    confirmed that he understood the terms of the plea agreement, that he
    understood the consequences of changing his plea, and that his plea was
    voluntary. Even though Getzen pleaded guilty to the charged offense and
    stipulated to a presumptive term, the plea was favorable to him because the
    State agreed not to allege prior felonies that would have mandated a longer
    prison term. Getzen’s generalized claim of coercion, without more, does not
    suffice to show his counsel was deficient. See State v. Donald, 
    198 Ariz. 406
    ,
    413, ¶ 17 (App. 2000) (observing that a colorable ineffective assistance claim
    requires the defendant to “present more than a conclusory assertion”).
    ¶7            Nor does Getzen substantiate his contention that defense
    counsel should have requested a second competency examination. At the
    defense’s request, the superior court ordered a mental health expert to
    examine Getzen pursuant to Rule 11. The examiner found Getzen
    competent to proceed to trial or to enter a guilty plea. Defense counsel
    accepted the examiner’s findings without challenge, and the superior court
    ruled Getzen competent. Legal authority does not require multiple Rule 11
    examinations as a matter of course, and Getzen offers no facts showing an
    additional examination was warranted. See, e.g., State v. Amaya-Ruiz, 
    166 Ariz. 152
    , 162–64 (1990).
    ¶8            Getzen also fails to show ineffective assistance with respect to
    his sentencing hearing. The superior court sentenced Getzen in conformity
    with the plea agreement, and Getzen does not explain how mitigating
    evidence or the presence of assigned counsel “would have made a
    difference,” Henry, 
    176 Ariz. at 585
    , so as to demonstrate prejudice. See State
    v. Woodall, 
    155 Ariz. 1
    , 6 (App. 1987) (rejecting defendant’s claim that
    assigned counsel would have performed differently than a “stand-in”
    public defender as “purely speculative”). The superior court gave Getzen
    an opportunity to provide mitigating evidence before imposing the
    sentence. Getzen accepted responsibility for his conduct and stated he had
    mental health issues. In addition, Getzen was not sentenced without legal
    representation because another attorney assumed the place of his assigned
    counsel.
    ¶9            Other arguments Getzen asks us to consider are not availing.
    Getzen faults the superior court for declining to rule on various motions he
    3
    STATE v. GETZEN
    Decision of the Court
    filed, and for excusing the State from responding to those motions. We
    discern no error in the court’s decisions, which it adequately explained in
    written rulings. Getzen also alludes to purported conflicts of interest and
    an alleged violation of the Uniform Commercial Code. We decline to
    address those claims, which Getzen did not properly raise before the
    superior court. See Ariz. R. Crim. P. 32.9(c)(4)(B)(ii); see also State v. Bortz,
    
    169 Ariz. 575
    , 577 (App. 1991).
    ¶10           We grant review but deny relief.
    AMY M. WOOD • Clerk of the Court
    FILED: AA
    4